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Abstract 
‘Fairness’ is veiled with multiple and competing interpretations. Standard Setting Organisations, 
non-governmental organisations and carbon market actors have introduced fairness notions into 
the carbon market in an attempt to charter, standardise and communicate alternative approaches 
for carbon credits produced in smallholder and rural settings in the global South. Propositions 
that carbon credits can be ‘fair’ are contentious, warranting careful analysis. Using an action-
oriented case study approach, I explore Fairtrade International’s attempts to collaboratively 
develop the Fairtrade Climate Standard and examine its relevance within carbon programmes in 
Kenya. Multi-sited ethnographic observations and interviews, in Kenya and within various 
forums for deliberating the standard, are combined with specific tools designed to open-up 
inputs and enhance reflection amongst contributors to the standard.  
A Q study reveals three empirical perspectives on fairness in carbon projects, held amongst 
stakeholders in the standard-setting process. These diverge regarding what would be fair for 
whom, and mechanisms for achieving it, and not all notions are incorporated into the standard. 
Critical analysis of the standard-setting process against the benchmark of Fairtrade 
International’s participatory governance approach illustrates process design features facilitating 
participatory collaboration and the limits to participatory governance in practice. I develop a 
heuristic to discuss how the most contentious topics were shaped by the initiators’ ambitions, 
shared and mutually incompatible interests amongst stakeholders, and dynamics of 
protectionism. Using a Theory of Change approach I unpack specific mechanisms believed to 
lead to fairer outcomes and explore associated assumptions and evidence-bases. Key Fairtrade 
concepts- ‘producers’, ‘organisations’, and transfer between external actors and Producer 
Organisations; are clouded by mixed evidence. This predicates future monitoring, evaluation 
and critical assessment of the standard once in operation. Finally I provide practical insights on 
doing collaborative action-oriented PhD research and make recommendations for researcher 
engagement in standard-setting processes and opportunities for enhancing deliberation and 
reflection.   
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Chapter 1 General Introduction 
1.1. Carbon: complex, controversial and fast evolving 
Carbon credits, which involve the measurement and transaction of emissions savings, have 
become a new commodity linking the global North and the global South via a complex array of 
technologies, institutions and discourses (Bumpus and Liverman, 2008). They are created 
within carbon projects, which involve sets of activities that supposedly result in fewer 
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere compared to a hypothetical situation without the project 
(Lohmann, 2010). Credits created within projects are sold on carbon markets. Carbon markets 
allow governments, companies and individuals to compensate their own emissions by financing 
emissions reductions in another area of the world, in both an efficient and politically attractive 
way (Boyd et al., 2011). They are a popular approach for mitigating the climate crisis 
worldwide (Lohmann, 2010) and are firmly rooted in the next decades of climate policy through 
the Paris Agreement (Marcu, 2016) as part of a portfolio of actions believed to lead to cost 
effective solutions (Bodansky et al., 2015). The carbon market has been highly volatile and has 
become increasingly fragmented and complex (Lövbrand and Stripple, 2012), which led to 
concerted efforts prior to the adoption of the Paris Agreement to foster greater linkage between 
the various schemes and regulatory bodies. These efforts were partially successful, but the new 
provisions are still highly complex and require more work to develop the architecture for a 
functioning carbon market (Marcu, 2016).  
Carbon credit infrastructure has been heralded as an opportunity for financing low carbon 
development in the global south whilst mitigating climate change. However it is criticised for 
dubious environmental effectiveness (Green, 2013) and is the subject of major discussions about 
fairness, equity and justice (Howard et al., 2015b, McDermott et al., 2013), and about 
governance, effectiveness and legitimacy of the mechanisms that carbon markets entail (Merger 
and Pistorius, 2011, Page, 2012). In particular, concerns have been raised regarding i) the 
burdens, benefits and positioning of local communities involved in international carbon projects 
(Mathur et al., 2014, Melo et al., 2014) and ii) the technical complexity of crediting 
mechanisms, which create dependency on outside expertise for audit that can shape and 
determine the character of carbon market access (Corbera and Brown, 2010, Lansing, 2013a). 
Interest in mitigation has often crowded out concerns about adaptation, but they are increasingly 
being recognised as inseparable, including within international climate policy and certification 
schemes (Willers, 2016). Scholars have laid important groundwork for understanding the trade-
offs, winners and losers, and fairness issues surrounding both, as well as how they can be 
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targeted simultaneously (Grasso, 2010, Paavola and Adger, 2006). While this thesis focuses on 
mitigation rather than adaptation, it is acknowledged that mitigation is only part of the story. 
In this complex, controversial and fast moving context, movements opposing carbon markets 
and their attempts to commodify the Earth’s carbon cycling capacity, and campaigns for a fair 
transition away from fossil fuel dependence, co-exist along technical-fix proposals for 
governments to expand carbon markets, and for regulators (such as Standard Setting 
Organisations or SSOs) to oversee better measurement and calculation and develop new 
schemes for certification and reform (Lohmann, 2010). Insufficient attention has been paid to 
the performance of these schemes, or the normative ideals they invoke (Page, 2012). As both 
the schemes and the markets they are part of are socially and politically embedded, they hold 
the potential to be socially and politically transformative. There is need to determine whether 
SSOs can trigger alternative outcomes where equity and justice can emerge (Fairhead et al., 
2012:254, Suiseeya and Caplow, 2013), or whether they are simply laying down ever more 
implausible sets of rules and procedures (Lohmann, 2010) that do little to interact with the 
global development agenda. In this thesis I respond to this need by undertaking a critical 
analysis of one particular attempt to innovate and revise a portion of the voluntary carbon 
market and introduce the normative ideal of fairness. 
1.2. Fair Carbon 
In 2011 the ethical standards body Fairtrade International (FTI) committed to address fairness 
within the climate change arena with a new fair trade commodity initially named ‘Fair Carbon 
Credits’ (Mhene, 2012). In 2012, FTI began a strategic collaboration with the Gold Standard 
Foundation (GSF), a non-profit organisation coordinating a standard to certify carbon projects 
which also contribute to sustainable development. Their partnership brought the concepts of 
Fair Trade and Carbon Trading to the same table for the first time, with a commitment to 
enhance fairness in the carbon market.  They announced plans to develop a joint certification 
scheme (Gold Standard Foundation and Fairtrade International, 2012) expected to redress rural 
communities’ unequal access to, information about, and capacity to benefit from, the carbon 
market (Howard et al., 2015b). The two organisations pooled their expertise and elicited inputs 
from multiple stakeholders familiar either with the carbon market or with Fairtrade1 to develop 
a standard eventually named the Fairtrade Climate Standard (FCS) for projects that would 
                                                     
1 I use ‘Fairtrade’ to refer to the product certification system operated by Fairtrade International,  
including all or any part of the activities of FLO ev, FLO-CERT, Fairtrade producer networks, national 
Fairtrade organisations and Fairtrade marketing organisations. I use ‘fair trade’ to refer to the broader 
movement, including activities under the umbrella of Fairtrade International and activities led by 
organisations independent of its system.  
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engage and benefit smallholders and rural communities in the production of Fairtrade Carbon 
Credits2. Both organisations would also jointly develop the components of a wider scheme 
supporting carbon project implementation and standard application, involving elements such as 
technical support, auditing, and joint marketing. The desire to codify fairness on the carbon 
market was a key motivation for the Dutch civil society organisation (CSO) ICCO to engage 
with FTI and contribute to funding the Fairtrade Climate Standard Setting Process (FCSSP). 
ICCO was already involved in carbon activities billed as ‘fair’3.  
Fairness, equity and justice are widely interpreted and lack clear definitions within carbon 
projects (Luttrell et al., 2013, McDermott et al., 2013). This opaqueness is also apparent within 
sustainability product certification, where FTI’s hegemony of power to define fairness is 
internally and externally contested, with competing actors beginning to develop their own ‘fair’ 
labels (Tallontire and Nelson, 2013, Renard and Loconto, 2013). FTI is one of many SSOs 
addressing fairness, equity and justice in commodity markets through people-centred 
approaches aimed at poverty alleviation, participation and empowerment (Melo et al., 2014, 
Phillips, 2014). However, actual impacts are shaped by the priorities driving standards and the 
multiple contexts where they are applied (McDermott, 2013, Nelson and Martin, 2015). 
Operating both ‘within and against the market’ (Brown, 1993), and deploying a technocratic 
logic of measurement, SSOs are in a place of inherent contradiction and have the potential to 
result in continued marginalisation of local communities, centralised control and reinforcing of 
dominant interests, despite efforts to avoid these outcomes (Melo et al., 2014). FTI is a 
membership-based organisation providing opportunities for its members to influence major 
decisions via a number of channels. Nevertheless, its sheer size, stakeholder diversity, political 
and historical foundations and subsequent trajectory into mainstream markets and new 
commodities render it a heterogeneous, evolving movement characterised by a number of fault 
lines and recent scissions between different cohorts who seek to represent, advocate, dilute or 
codify different notions of fairness in different ways (Bennett, 2012, Doherty et al., 2013, 
Raynolds and Greenfield, 2015, Renard and Loconto, 2013), see also chapter 5. Introduction of 
carbon credits into the Fairtrade system triggers new debates about what is fair about fair trade 
and carbon credits, both within and outside of the movement. 
                                                     
2 This was designed as an add-on label to the Gold Standard certification, for projects which meet the 
social, environmental, trade and carbon accounting criteria of both organisations. 
3 These activities included supporting the development of the Fair Climate Network and holding 100% of 
shares in the Fair Climate Fund. 
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1.2.1. Can carbon be fair?  
Carbon trading has divided NGO, academic and policy-making communities. Some 
acknowledge the key role it must play in combating climate change; others out-rightly oppose it 
(Bachram, 2004, Caney, 2010). Within academic, policy and campaigns literature, critics have 
referred to carbon trade as dumping of carbon in poor countries (Bachram, 2004, Lohmann, 
2005), while rich countries ‘continue in their unequal over-consumption’ (Bachram, 2004:16). 
The term ‘carbon colonialism’ has been coined to refer to actors in rich countries who entice 
people in poorer countries into sacrificing long-term development goals in pursuit of short-term 
capital gains associated with creating carbon credits (Bachram, 2004, Page, 2012). As a result, 
poorer countries may exhaust their cheaper mitigation options and need to engage in costlier 
strategies to meet their reduction targets should these become compulsory. Other critics argue 
that everyone should minimise their own environmental impact (Sandel, 2005), with the 
ultimate goal being to catalyse a transition away from fossil fuels (Lohmann, 2010). 
Commodification approaches to carbon (chapter 2) posit that neoliberalism and market 
environmentalism are vehicles for promoting the abstraction or extraction of things from a local 
context to be sold elsewhere, involving unequal power relations (Lovell et al., 2009). Harvey’s 
(2003) concept of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ has been reworded as ‘accumulation by 
decarbonisation’ (Bumpus and Liverman, 2008, Wang and Corson, 2015) to refer to the 
injustices of profit-making on the back of mitigation burdens placed on people in the global 
south rather than reductions in the global north. This is essentially about taking advantage of the 
commodification of carbon ‘because the creation, transfer, and sale of carbon…make money’ 
(Bumpus and Liverman, 2008 p144).  
The main argument for paying others to reduce emissions through carbon trading is that it can 
improve environmental quality (or minimise environmental harm) at least economic cost and 
with minimum worsening of existing global inequities (Page, 2012). When carbon trading was 
first introduced, developing nations were motivated by the prospect of financial and 
technological transfers from the global North to the global South (Boyd et al., 2011), which 
were intended to be channelled into low carbon development pathways. If an intervention does 
effectively reduce emissions to a safe level, it could be judged as just on one level because 
everyone is entitled, as a matter of justice, to be protected from anthropogenic climate change 
(Caney, 2010). However, arguments of efficiency and environmental effectiveness do not 
adequately address the ethical dimensions of carbon trading. It is important to assess whether 
those involved in carbon trading schemes consider the distribution of costs and burdens to be 
fair (Caney, 2010), and whether they perceive the scheme to be politically legitimate and 
procedurally just (Page, 2012).  
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It is important to illuminate the economic systems that commodities are situated within (Sayer, 
2001) and to look at carbon relationally, in terms of its historical, material and social contexts in 
order to tell what is being talked about, how it is being reduced and who stands to gain 
(Bumpus, 2011a). Although the carbon economy is a relatively new phenomenon it is also part 
of a longer history of market environmentalism (Goodman and Boyd, 2011, Boyd et al., 2011). 
Nevertheless, framing the carbon economy as an example of imperialism, colonial or neo-
colonialism or drawing parallels between them, does not necessarily aid understanding about 
what is occurring on the ground (Bridge, 2011), or what is already being, or could still be done 
to transform the system or carve out spaces for fairer practices to emerge. An overemphasis on 
uneven power relations between the global north and the global south may mask examples of 
countervailing power (Fung and Wright, 2003) or tactical and strategic use of power (Goodman 
and Herman, 2015) within particular places and spaces including in the global south. Any 
ethical appraisal of carbon trading ‘must be sensitive to the very diverse forms it can take’ 
(Caney, 2010 p198). Such an appraisal can only be done on a case-by-case basis, exploring how 
particular schemes operate, whether they are considered legitimate, which outcomes they result 
in and whether the people involved perceive them to be fair.  
Drawing on the conclusions of a number of scholars, I recognise that what is needed is a 
combined approach that can produce multi-faceted and multi-dimensional explanations of how 
the carbon economy [or aspects of it] functions and for whom, and conscious of the wider 
sociological, economic and ecological landscape it is both part of and which it needs to 
transform (Boyd et al., 2011). Power must be a part of this analysis, but with adequate attention 
to the multiple forms and spaces it can occupy. This can appropriately be done by seeking 
nuanced and place-based understandings of carbon instruments in operation within particular 
projects and carbon reductions in particular places (Corbera and Martin, 2015), together with 
analyses of the particular networks, certification schemes and value chains (Bumpus and 
Liverman, 2011, Caney, 2010) that these projects are embedded within. Research needs to 
acknowledge the complications of commodification and critically assess the moral-ethical 
underpinnings of particular practices within carbon markets (Goodman and Boyd, 2011). 
Moreover, in each of these levels of analysis, it is useful to apply an empirical justice or fairness 
lens in order to give sufficient space to understanding what the people involved in these 
projects, networks, certification schemes and value chains perceive to be fair, legitimate and just 
rather than applying a universal justice lens and predisposing the analysis to one particular 
moral reading.  
Accordingly, in this thesis I undertake an extensive appraisal of the FCSSP, its governance, the 
content of the FCS and how this interacts with different people’s perceptions of fairness and 
realities within particular carbon projects. I do this by combining two intersecting approaches: 
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the pathways approach, and an empirical analysis of fairness, described in sections 1.3 and 
1.4.1.1 respectively. Together these approaches help to illuminate the liminal space between the 
poles of the debate.   
1.3. Pathways to ‘Fair Carbon’  
The pathways approach was developed by Leach et al. (2010) to deal with complex 
sustainability challenges in a dynamic world, and stems from the need to link environmental 
sustainability with poverty reduction and social justice, and make science and technology work 
for people who are poor. Their premise is that ideas of sustainability have become co-opted into 
managerial and bureaucratic ‘solutions’. These take the form of dominant pathways which are 
universalising and generalising, and inappropriate for problems which are actually much more 
complex and political (such as climate change and carbon trading). Meanwhile, there may be 
alternative pathways, which are harder to detect as they are less powerfully articulated.  
A central component of the pathways approach is a concern with the ways in which particular 
actors and networks produce, prioritise and promote particular ‘framings’. Framing is 
understood as the different ways of understanding and representing a system, including its 
boundaries, key terms, functions and outcomes. Different people’s framing involves their own 
choices and subjective judgements and it is therefore important to consider what is included or 
left out of the system framing, and to identify which goals, definitions, values, perspectives, 
interests and experiences are prioritised (Leach et al., 2010). System framings can turn into 
narratives, involving ‘lock-in’ of a particular world view and a categorisation of what the 
problem is and who is responsible for it. When used by powerful factions, framing and 
narratives provide the traction for particular pathways and close down alternatives (Leach et al., 
2010, Nelson and Tallontire, 2014).  
Climate change and mitigation has become one of the dominant narratives and leading drivers 
of development agendas (Goodman and Boyd, 2011). Within this context, the development of 
the FCS constitutes the construction of one particular pathway. It involves framing of problems 
and solutions, bounding definitions of what is fair and universalising these in terms of a 
standard to be applied in multiple contexts. It also involves setting out a narrative or theory 
about the change process, expected to lead from interventions and outputs to outcomes and 
impacts. A pathways approach to research involves unpacking the bounding definitions (such as 
‘fair carbon’), framing devices and narratives, and also attending to governance processes, as 
these are crucial in shaping which definitions, inputs and pathways are followed and which are 
ignored (Leach et al., 2010). Following Nelson and Tallontire (2014), I also understand the 
pathways concept as a way of considering historical and future trajectories and the fluidity of 
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governance processes. Specifically, it allows this research to encapsulate the dynamic nature of 
the FCSSP and its evolution over the months that I followed it whilst situating it within the 
moving trajectories of the Fairtrade movement and the carbon economy.  
The pathways approach is normative, in that the ultimate aim is to ‘open up’ the space which 
may allow for recognition of the pathways which support the goals and ambitions of particular 
groups of poorer and marginalised people, and allow these to flourish (Leach et al., 2010). It 
aims to achieve this through the use of flexible methods applied at different scales, and 
conducive to an emphasis on diverse perspectives, enhanced learning and reflexivity.  
1.3.1. Summary of pathways components 
The following pathways components are used in this thesis. They are highlighted in the 
following sections in relation to each objective and research gap or contribution. Appendix 
Figure 1 visualises where in the thesis they are addressed.  
1. Identifying and unpacking key terms used in pathway-building  
2. Uncovering the pathway framing, and choices, assumptions, and judgements behind it  
3. Identifying the implications of different pathways for poorer and marginalised people 
4. Uncovering the actors, institutions, goals and governance processes involved in 
pathway-building 
5. Engaging in pathway building processes 
6. Enhancing reflexivity 
1.4. Thesis aim, objectives and questions 
This thesis aims to unpack fairness in standard-setting processes and carbon projects through 
action-oriented research. This is addressed through three research objectives and nine research 
questions rooted in the pathways approach. These are focussed firstly on the content of the FCS, 
secondly on the standard-setting process (the FCSSP), and thirdly on the research process itself. 
The objectives and questions are each linked to a research gap and/or methodological 
innovation that emerged from Howard et al. (2015b) and subsequent research design work.  
1.4.1. Objective 1 
To uncover the debates, perspectives and different options for achieving fairness within 
carbon projects, and explore them in relation to the FCS 
Question 1.1: How is ‘fair carbon’ understood and defined by different people involved in the 
FCSSP? (addressed in chapter 5) 
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Question 1.2: Whose definitions and understandings are incorporated into the FCS? (addressed 
in chapter 5) 
Question 1.3. Which assumptions and evidence is the Theory of Change for the FCS based on? 
(addressed in chapter 7) 
Question 1.4. What can example carbon projects tell us about possible pathways to the 
outcomes and impacts articulated in the Theory of Change as the FCS is applied? (addressed in 
chapter 7) 
1.4.1.1. Research gap 1: Empirical analysis of multiple definitions of, and 
mechanisms for achieving ‘fair carbon’ 
I use the term ‘fair carbon’ as an analytical concept to guide an exploration both of the fairness 
elements that GSF and FTI sought to bring to the carbon market, but also what other 
stakeholders understand by fairness in the context of the carbon market. ‘Fair carbon’ 
exemplifies the tension between viewpoints because for some it represents a misnomer, while 
for others, it offers a space for change (Howard et al., 2015b).  
Pathways component: identifying and unpacking key terms used in pathway building 
‘Fairness’ and ‘fair carbon’ are key terms that were frequently used during the FCSSP but had 
no clear definition when FTI and GSF began their collaboration. Fuzzy concepts like these  may 
have strong cohesive power, but this can disguise tensions between agendas of different 
stakeholders, making it challenging for those who are responsible for inscribing multiple 
interests into the technology to be developed (Allen, 2009:355). Underneath an apparent 
consensus on meanings there may be multiple conflicting definitions that cannot co-exist and 
some are likely to get pushed aside. McDermott et al. note with respect to equity (a term often 
used in place of fairness, see section 1.5.1), that ‘without a clear definition of which aspects... 
are being pursued and how, it is difficult to evaluate the impact of policies and programs..., and 
impossible to plan for it effectively’ (2013: p417). My goal was to capture plural definitions in 
situ, rather than to apply a universal or theory-driven singular definition of fairness (e.g. Rawls, 
2009) to this particular context. To achieve my goal, an empirical approach was appropriate. 
Empirical analyses of justice, equity and fairness start from actual claims and the notions used 
to support these (Sikor et al., 2014). They acknowledge that multiple and competing notions co-
exist that are experiential, context-dependent and vary according to the kinds of resources and 
responsibilities being shared (Sikor et al., 2014, McDermott et al., 2013).  
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Sikor et al. (2014) identify two overlapping lines of enquiry in empirical analyses of justice (or 
fairness). The first involves identifying dominant notions, exploring their appropriateness in 
different contexts, and analysing their operation in practice. This is important because the 
implications of using particular notions only become apparent when they are explored in 
practice in particular contexts (Sikor et al., 2014). Also, this analysis helps to reveal the 
underlying power dynamics shaping whose interests and definitions make it into the dominant 
pathway, and how different actors and networks may exercise discursive power to legitimate or 
side-line particular perspectives (Leach et al., 2010). The second involves characterising 
different stakeholders’ notions in particular contexts, examining their justifications within 
public discourse, and then identifying how different notions gain or lose ground. This helps to 
identify which notions are driven by self-interest and which ones have wider relevance (Sikor et 
al., 2014). Together these lines of enquiry enable a better understanding of the interplay 
between different notions, contexts and practice, and the tensions between multiple notions 
upheld maintained at different scales. This is important because the interactions between 
different notions used simultaneously by different people is a key dynamic shaping outcomes 
(Sikor et al., 2014). Tensions can also be a creative force for generating definitions which are 
more appropriate or better adapted to the different contexts. 
I address both lines of enquiry in this thesis. The literature review in chapter 2 pursues the first 
line of enquiry, focussing on the notions of ‘fair carbon’ initially held by FTI and GSF and 
exploring these within carbon projects documented by literature. Chapter 5 pursues the second 
line of enquiry, focussing on the perceptions of ‘fair carbon’ held by a range of FCSSP 
stakeholders and addressing questions 1.1 and 1.2. Chapter 7 combines both enquiries in 
questions 1.3 and 1.4 through its exploration of the specific standards mechanisms considered as 
quintessential for achieving fairness outcomes by actors taking part in the FCSSP. These 
mechanisms were incorporated into the FCS but their entry was a result of dynamic governance 
processes involving negotiation of interests, power dynamics, and compromise. In chapter 7 
they are explored in terms of their justifications, different stakeholders’ perceptions and their 
appropriateness in different contexts.  
1.4.1.2. Research gap 2: Standards mechanisms and actual local level 
outcomes 
The extent to which standards exclude smallholders from markets or provide them with 
opportunities to improve welfare and competitiveness is much debated and there is evidence to 
support both positions (Jaffee et al., 2011, Henson and Humphrey, 2010). Changes in standards 
provisions and development of new tools may fuel change on the ground in projects, but actual 
local outcomes are contingent on factors beyond standards themselves (Bumpus, 2011b), and 
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there is considerable room for interpretation and opportunism in the way these standards are 
implemented. Therefore, it is critical to explore not only the standards provisions or the project 
designs on paper, but also the implementation of standards and projects in practice in order to 
identify where standards mechanisms are not leading to envisaged changes, which factors shape 
actual outcomes, and how they interact with particular project designs. Several studies have 
explored the impact of Fairtrade standards (Jaffee, 2008, Nelson and Martin, 2014), as well as 
the impact of particular carbon projects on poverty reduction (e.g. Jindal et al., 2012). However, 
studies on the impact of particular carbon standards and their ability to produce changes within 
projects have been limited to desk reviews (Wood, 2011, Suiseeya and Caplow, 2013). FTI 
maps out envisaged outcomes and impacts resulting from FTI interventions within a Theory of 
Change.  
Pathways component: uncovering the pathway framing, and choices, assumptions, and 
judgements behind it 
The Theory of Change is an example of a ‘framing’- one particular way of understanding and 
representing a system, including its boundaries, functions and outcomes. Different people’s 
analyses of a system involve drawing on their own sets of assumptions, interpretations, values 
and goals (Leach et al., 2010). It is important to explore whether the assumptions in the Theory 
of Change hold up in diverse contexts and whether they match with other people’s assumptions, 
interpretations, values and goals because if not, the envisaged changes are unlikely to happen.  
Pathways component: identifying the implications of different pathways for poorer and 
marginalised people 
Given the prevalence of private standards, the structural power behind them, and the frequently 
negative social consequences they entail (Fuchs et al., 2011), exploring the implications of 
attempts to develop standards which are specifically geared towards smallholders, households 
and communities is still necessary. I find Leach et al.’s (2010) term ‘poorer and marginalised 
people’ slightly dissatisfactory because it suggests a static state that people are designated as 
belonging within. However, implied in their usage of this term is a recognition that while there 
are people who are actively trying to escape poverty and marginalisation, particular pathways 
can result in constraints to their livelihoods and freedom. In relative terms, the smallholders, 
households and communities affected by standards are more likely to be marginalised from the 
standard setting process, economically poorer and their livelihoods subject to more constraints 
than the people working for or partnering with the standard setting organisations to develop the 
standards.  
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While it will only be possible to explore the impact of the complete set of standards provisions 
and tools developed through FTI and GSF’s partnership retrospectively, initial research can 
explore this theme on a micro-scale within the context of particular projects by examining 
whether any of the individual fairness mechanisms they propose are already mirrored in existing 
projects, if and how they are working, and by seeking the opinions of project participants or 
those who involved in project implementation on the ground. This research gap is addressed 
particularly in the latter part of chapter 7 through question 1.4, where evidence from carbon 
programmes is explored alongside the FCS.  
1.4.2. Objective 2 
To describe and analyse the process of collaborative development of the FCS (addressed in 
chapter 6) 
Question 2.1 What did the FCSSP look like (in terms of forums for input, debates and 
interests)? 
Question 2.2 How did the FCS reflect stakeholder input and what shaped this? 
Question 2.3 What does this say about participatory governance in practice? 
1.4.2.1. Research gap 3: Collaborative Standard Setting in Practice 
The FTI-GSF partnership can be viewed within a broader context of sustainability governance, 
which is characterised by the emergence of market driven, voluntary standards which have 
expanded into ever new sectors (Loconto and Fouilleux, 2014, Cashore et al., 2004). 
Governance networks emerge as heterogeneous actors and institutions representing diverse 
organisational fields come together and negotiate multiple goals and interests (Bumpus et al., 
2010). This involves different actors endowed with different amounts of power (Merger and 
Pistorius, 2011) and takes place at particular scales, often to the exclusion of actors operating at 
different scales (Swyngedouw, 2000). Several analytical focal points have been underlined with 
respect to such initiatives, such as how and why they emerge (Green, 2013, Loconto and 
Fouilleux, 2014), the issues they focus on and the way that they define the boundaries of these 
issues (Loconto and Fouilleux, 2014, Bulkeley et al., 2012). A number of authors have 
underlined the need to critically assess the legitimacy of initiatives and the mechanisms they 
deploy to garner accountability (Loconto and Fouilleux, 2014, Smith and Fischlein, 2010, 
Suiseeya and Caplow, 2013, Fuchs et al., 2011). This is particularly relevant to the FTI-GSF 
partnership because of the controversy surrounding carbon trading and the sensitivity of 
combining fairness with carbon.  
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There has been a growing interest in the governance of sustainability standards, including 
Fairtrade as standards become a key feature of international trade and a tool for ensuring 
responsible business practice (Tallontire et al., 2011, Tallontire, 2007). Sustainability standards 
developed through multi-stakeholder processes tend to be regarded as more democratically 
legitimate than standards developed by single companies or industries, without the input of 
NGOs, trade unions or other organs of civil society (Fuchs et al., 2011). Nevertheless, an 
analysis of a number of private standards in terms of participation, transparency and 
accountability concluded that they all face the challenge of needing to adjust asymmetries in 
access and influence, and most accord little decision-making power to small farmers (Fuchs et 
al., 2011). FTI, initially a network of consumer labelling organisations, has been commended 
for opening out its standard-setting process to southern based producer networks (Sutton, 2013, 
Bennett, 2015).  
Pathways component: uncovering the actors, institutions, goals and governance processes in 
pathway-building 
There has been less attention on the actual process of standard setting and how core criteria are 
determined. Significant exceptions are Bacon’s (2010) historical reconstruction of the processes 
undergone in fixing coffee minimum prices, Reinecke’s (2010) ethnographic study of the 
Standard Setting Unit, and Reinecke and Ansari’s (2015) analysis of the tensions between FTI 
and FLOCERT in standard setting. This is important to look at because governance pressures 
can often push powerful institutions to overlook the goals of marginalised people or to ignore 
crucial uncertainties, leading to a closing down of approaches around those which are only 
suited to a relatively knowable and manageable world, which means that any solutions may only 
be short-lasting and easily disrupted (Leach et al., 2010). The exploration of the FCSSP comes 
at an important time when they are increasing tensions within fair trade as to the movement’s 
priorities, some of which are related to ‘politicising’ versus ‘pragmatic’ narratives (Tallontire 
and Nelson, 2013) or the target ‘beneficiary’ (small producers or workers) (Renard and 
Loconto, 2013). Any precedents set within the FCSSP could have an implication on the future 
of fair trade as a whole. This thesis contributes to filling this research gap in chapter 6 in 
particular (questions 2.1-2.3) and also to some extent in chapter 7, through question 1.3. 
1.4.3. Objective 3 
To assess the value of action-oriented research in collaborative standards-setting processes 
(addressed in chapter 8) 
Question 3.1 How can action oriented multi-sited research enhance reflection amongst 
stakeholders involved in the research, and how does it shape emergent outcomes?  
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Question 3.2 What can be learnt about conducting collaborative research on standard setting 
processes through this thesis? 
1.4.3.1. Contribution: forging methodological innovations  
The developers of the ‘pathways’ approach have made suggestions as to the types of methods 
and designs appropriate for doing pathways research on processes such as the FCSSP but 
recognise that these need to be developed, tested and adapted in diverse and dynamic settings 
and explored in terms of how they interact with governance, policy and decision-making 
processes (Stirling et al., 2007).  
Pathways components: engaging with pathway-building processes and enhancing reflexivity 
This thesis contributes methodologically to a better understanding of two particular pathways 
components in particular- ‘engaging with pathway-building processes’, and ‘enhancing 
reflexivity’- both implying different roles and tasks for researchers.  
The normative goal of the pathways approach is to encourage an ‘opening up’ towards more 
diverse narratives and pathways which may be more suited to the goals of poor and 
marginalised people. Conducting an appraisal of what might be required to reveal these entails a 
different role for researchers- one that involves crossing traditional research boundaries where 
the researcher seeks detachment from the subject of research, to one where s/he is engaged in 
the pathway-building process and proactively convenes processes of deliberation (Leach et al., 
2010). These processes need to be initiated at various levels and scales to reduce the risk of 
exclusion and disempowerment of those who are not able to take part in the ‘high-end’ 
standards development activities.  
Pathway-building must be reflexive, in order that ‘destinations, routes and directions are 
continuously reconsidered by multiple participants’ (Leach et al., 2010:37). This requires 
researchers, standard-setters and anyone else involved in the process, to be humble and reflexive 
and acknowledge how our own positions and assumptions shape our perspectives and ways we 
participate in political processes. Reflexivity is particularly important in the context of dynamic 
and complex systems, where engagement in the system can serve as a pivot for experiential 
learning and awareness about the possible implications of one choice as opposed to another 
(Leach et al., 2010). Being aware of the choice should be synergetic with taking responsibility 
for it, and this awareness opens up more possibilities for alternative actions (Schlindwein and 
Ison, 2004).  
Research which can enhance the quality of reflection about the various options currently on the 
table is much needed in order to reduce the risk of ‘fair carbon’ being co-opted as a mask for a 
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lack of real change. In order to engage with the FCS pathway-building and to enhance 
reflection, this thesis involves action-oriented case study research. A number of researchers 
have illustrated that through involvement in standards-setting processes it becomes possible to 
determine dynamics of participation, inclusion and exclusion (Bacon, 2010, Reinecke, 2010, 
Cheyns, 2011). However, this thesis is the first example of a research process that follows and 
actively engages with a complete standard-setting process led by FTI. Chapter 8 is a reflection 
on the methodological approach and how I tackled these two pathways components, addressing 
questions 3.1 and 3.2. 
1.5. Thesis frameworks and outline 
This thesis draws on a number of frameworks derived from theory, data and practice, 
respectively. The data- and practice-driven frameworks are introduced in subsequent chapters 
but the theoretically-derived framework serves as a backbone for the structure of the thesis and 
is therefore introduced here. 
1.5.1. Multi-Dimensional Fairness Framework  
The Multi-Dimensional Fairness Framework is used in this thesis as a reference point for 
identifying what does or does not form part of different stakeholders’ perceptions of fairness, 
and in understanding how the different dimensions of fairness are linked together and which 
questions frame them in a particular context. It is an adaptation of McDermott et al.’s (2013) 
Multi-Dimensional Equity Framework. The latter was developed as a tool to guide systematic 
empirical analyses of equity, enabling examination, assessment and planning of impacts on 
equity brought about by changes in the value of ecosystem services. I found it useful 
particularly because of its prior applications to certification schemes and carbon forestry 
projects (see Howard et al., 2016). I adapted the wording in the framework (see Figure 1-1 and 
Table 1-1) to reflect the language of FTI and GSF, and the input of scholars who have theorised 
on fairness, justice and equity (see Howard et al., 2016, Howard et al., 2015b).  
1.5.1.1. Choice of terms: fairness, equity and justice 
The terms fairness, equity and justice all face a similar challenge when definitions are sought 
because they are used interchangeably to refer to an overlapping set of values (Hay, 1995). The 
concept of fair trade in different languages provides a useful illustration- in Spanish it is 
comercio justo and in French, commerce équitable – both words translate as ‘fair’ but suggest 
concepts of justice and equity. In everyday language the three terms are loosely deployed 
(Levanthal, 1980) and in dictionary definitions and scholars’ deployments they are commonly 
used to define each other. For example, the Cambridge dictionary defines justice as ‘fairness in 
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the way people are dealt with’ and equity as a situation ‘in which everyone is treated fairly and 
equally’ (Cambridge University Press, 2016). Schroeder and Pisupati (2010) recognise that all 
three terms are based on the principles of fair treatment or due reward. Equity is usually 
understood by scholars as based on merit or contributions (Levanthal, 1980), and implies the 
distribution of costs and benefits (Schroeder and McDermott, 2014). McDermott et al. (2013) 
find it an appropriate concept for emphasising context. In contrast to the word ‘justice’ it is 
more comparative and concerned with relationships and relative circumstances. Justice is 
usually distinguished by philosophers in terms of justice in exchange, distributive justice, 
corrective justice and retributive justice (Schroeder and Pisupati, 2010), and implies a respect 
for human rights (Schroeder and McDermott, 2014) and some kind of moral reasoning 
(McDermott et al., 2013). Fairness has been used more broadly by scholars to refer to elements 
implied by both justice and equity (Schroeder and McDermott, 2014), or in combination with 
justice to refer to equity that takes into account both distributional fairness and procedural 
fairness (Levanthal, 1980). In some usages of the term, fairness seems to imply subjectivity- for 
example Levanthal (1980) understands procedural fairness as the individual perception of the 
rules of allocation (emphasis added), and this is likely to influence the perception of fair 
distribution, which is also likely to be based on self-interest. Ariño and Ring (2010) use the term 
‘fairness’, to refer to perceptions of fairness within organisational alliances, even though their 
theory of fairness is composed of different types of ‘justice’.  
This brief overview of the usage of terms is not designed to be comprehensive but to illustrate 
that the three concepts are socially constructed (Schroeder and McDermott, 2014) and that 
understanding who is involved in framing what is fair, just or equitable and how, is more 
important than attempting to establish universal principles to make sense of them (McDermott 
et al., 2013, Sikor et al., 2013). This is the approach laid down in empirical analyses of justice 
(Sikor et al., 2014), introduced in section 1.4.1.1. Similarly, Hay (1995 p501) understands the 
three concepts as an example of contextual-value pluralism: that ‘there may be a variety of 
principles of equity, fairness and justice held and applied independently but which are often 
brought together in a particular context’. Moreover, when people are making choices and 
judgements, there may be other competing or more important goals which are also considered 
alongside or instead of conceptions of what is fair, equitable or just (Levanthal, 1980). In this 
thesis, I use the words ‘fair’ and ‘fairness’ as empirical concepts and seek to demonstrate how 
they are understood and used differently by people rather than defining them with a universal 
definition. I have three reasons for using the word ‘fairness’ over ‘justice’ and ‘equity’. Firstly it 
is empirically meaningful and familiar (commonly used by people involved in the FCSSP). 
Secondly it offers space for exploring individual perception and subjectivity in judgement. 
Thirdly, I find it clearer to use the term fairness both to describe the overarching concept, and 
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the constituent parts it may be composed of for different people and within theories for the sake 
of consistence and clarity. 
1.5.1.2. Adaptation of the framework 
The original framework (McDermott et al., 2013) is composed of three elements (contextual, 
procedural and distributional equity) that form the core content of equity (what counts as 
equity). These are surrounded by three concentric layers of framing questions: 1) the scale and 
target of concern (who counts as a subject of equity), 2) the goals of an intervention with respect 
to equity (why equity) and 3) how decisions about each of these dimensions are taken 
(parameters of equity). Instead, I call the three core elements ‘fair access’ (replacing contextual 
equity), ‘fair procedures’ (replacing procedural equity) and ‘fair benefit-sharing’ (replacing 
distributional equity). I consider fair procedures as a pathway to fair benefit-sharing because for 
outcomes to be considered fair, stakeholders must have taken part in decision-making and their 
values considered (Suiseeya and Caplow, 2013). Fair procedures also link to fair access because 
they cover aspects of recognition, inclusion, representation, power relations and opportunities 
for participation (Mathur et al., 2014, Grasso, 2007, McDermott et al., 2013). While some 
scholars see fair access as a component of fair procedures (Mathur et al., 2014, Schlosberg, 
2004), I recognise that it interacts with both fair procedures and fair benefit-sharing and 
consider them as separate but interlinked. For the three outer layers, I have changed the framing 
questions from ‘equity’ to ‘fairness’ for the reasons given above. 
34 
 
 
 
Figure 1-1: Multi-Dimensional Fairness Framework 
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Table 1-1: Definition of fairness dimensions and their application in this thesis 
My term My definition Application in this thesis 
Fair Access 
(Howard et 
al., 2016) 
Ways people can engage with and participate in the carbon 
market via carbon projects, taking into account power, wealth 
and resource distribution differences (Sikor et al., 2013, 
McDermott et al., 2013) 
Related concepts: Contextual equity, equity of access 
(Howard et al., 2016) 
Explored in a literature review (chapter 2) 
Multiple perceptions explored empirically amongst stakeholders in the 
FCSSP (chapter 5) 
Applied to the FCS and its application in projects in chapter 7 in terms of the 
mechanisms that promote engagement and participation by project 
participants.  
Fair 
Procedures 
(Howard et 
al., 2016) 
Ways people participate in decision-making and/or project 
implementation, the rules, procedures and political processes 
structuring this, and the inclusion and negotiation between 
competing views (Suiseeya and Caplow, 2013, Brown and 
Corbera, 2003, Howard et al., 2016).  
Related concepts: Procedural equity, Equity and legitimacy 
of decision-making and institutions (Howard et al., 2016)  
Links to Fair Access: how do procedures shape access? 
Explored at the level of carbon projects in a literature review (chapter 2) 
Multiple perceptions explored empirically amongst stakeholders in the 
FCSSP (chapter 5) 
Applied to the level of fairness of parameter setting in a review of Fairtrade 
governance parameters (chapter 3) and an analysis of how they operate in 
practice (chapter 6)  
Applied to the FCS and its application in projects in chapter 7 in terms of the 
mechanisms that promote participation and engagement (overlapping with 
fair access) 
Fair Benefit-
Sharing 
(Howard et 
al., 2016) 
Ways people can benefit from project outcomes, in (non-) 
monetary and (non-) quantifiable terms. 
Related concepts: Distributional equity, Fair distribution of 
benefits and equity of outcome (Howard et al., 2016) 
Explored in a literature review (chapter 2) 
Multiple perceptions explored empirically amongst stakeholders in the 
FCSSP (chapter 5) 
Debates around how to share benefits explored in relation to fair parameter 
setting (chapter 6) 
Target of 
Fairness 
(Howard et 
al., 2016, 
Who and what counts as a target for interventions aimed at 
enhancing fairness? 
Who and what counts as a target when fairness is being 
assessed within these interventions?       
Multiple perceptions explored empirically amongst stakeholders in the 
FCSSP (chapter 5) 
Analysis of who and what is included in the scope of the FCS  and how this 
shapes fair access (chapter 6), and which rules and definitions are used to 
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McDermott 
et al., 2013) 
Links to Fair Access: any policies/ approaches being 
developed to promote access for a particular target 
population? 
define people and prescribe how they are organised (chapter 7) 
  
Goal of 
Fairness 
(Howard et 
al., 2016, 
McDermott 
et al., 2013) 
Implicit and explicit fairness goals  
Specific goals of interventions to address fairness 
 
Multiple perceptions explored empirically amongst stakeholders in the 
FCSSP (chapter 5) 
Analysis of the ambitions and interests of stakeholders engaging in the 
FCSSP, and of where FCS situates itself in relation to adaptation, mitigation 
and development goals (chapter 6) 
Exploration of the expected outcomes and impacts of the FCS and how they 
are expected to be achieved in the Theory of Change (chapter 7) 
Parameters 
of Fairness 
(Howard et 
al., 2016, 
McDermott 
et al., 2013) 
How decisions are made to set the overarching goals for 
fairness (the rules and procedures of the parameter-setting 
process) as well as specific mechanisms for achieving it (the 
content of the standard) 
Who is included or excluded in the setting of those goals and 
mechanisms. 
How parameters relate to pre-existing governance structures 
and approaches 
Link to Fair Benefit-Sharing: how do parameters for price-
setting shape possibilities for fair benefit-sharing? 
Link to Fair Procedures: how does the parameter-setting 
process relate to fair procedures expected of projects?  
Deployed in a narrow sense in chapter 5 in terms multiple perceptions about 
how parameters for trading relationships and pricing should be set (links to 
fair benefit-sharing).  
Deployed in a holistic sense in chapter 6 in terms of how the parameters for 
fairness are set within the FCS, and in chapter 3 in terms of how fair 
parameters relate to fair procedures. 
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1.5.2. Outline of remaining chapters 
Chapter 2 unpacks the concept of ‘fair carbon’, firstly by exploring theoretically what it means 
to commodify carbon, fairness and fair carbon. This is followed by an analysis of how it is 
being used by FTI and GSF and benchmarking this against the Multi-Dimensional Fairness 
Framework introduced in section 1.5.1. The chapter then presents the results of a literature 
review, based on one of my published papers (Howard et al., 2015b) that explores the 
challenges associated with enhancing fairness in carbon projects aimed at small-scale farmers 
and communities and detailing the approaches that have already been developed in standards 
and certification systems. This chapter provides the backdrop for exploring multiple 
understandings of ‘fair carbon’ in chapter 5 and multiple approaches for standardising fairness 
mechanisms in chapter 7 (both addressing objective 1).  
Chapter 3 provides an overview of the literature on the politics of standard setting and then 
gives a description of FTI’s formal governance system, necessary for contextualising the 
analysis of how the FCSSP was governed (chapter 6 and objective 2). FTI’s participatory 
governance intentions are introduced and then critically examined alongside literature on 
participatory governance and procedural fairness.  
Chapter 4 describes the research design and methods deployed. The FCSSP case is introduced, 
alongside the two example carbon programmes explored as parallel units of analysis. The data 
collection and analysis techniques for all chapters are described here, with the exception of 
chapter 5 which has its own detailed methodology section.  
Chapter 5 addresses questions 1.1 and 1.2. This chapter uses a Q study to draw out multiple 
perspectives on what fairness would mean and what fair outcomes would entail in the context of 
a Fairtrade carbon project. These are articulated by the different people involved in shaping the 
FCS. The study reveals three group perspectives (or ‘factors’) and compares them with 
perspectives incorporated into the final FCS.  
Chapter 6 addresses objective 2 and questions 2.1-2.3. It explores the governance of the FCSSP, 
identifying contentious areas (hot topics) that emerged during discussions with multiple 
stakeholders, the power, strategies and interests that shaped how decisions were made, and the 
shifting of objectives and focus of the FCS from conception to launching. Empirical data comes 
from observations and engagement with the FCSSP during a period of 15 months, and analysis 
of documents produced or commissioned by FTI throughout the FCSSP. The findings focus on 
two particular hot topics: scope, and financial benefits/ revenue sharing. While the main aim of 
this chapter is to elucidate what participatory governance as defined by FTI looks like in 
practice, the chapter also reveals key insights about standard content. 
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Chapter 7 returns to objective 1 and addresses questions 1.3-1.4. It explores standard content, 
focussing on the mechanisms within the FCS identified by FTI as crucial for achieving the 
desired outcomes and impacts. Data from this chapter comes from participant observations and 
interviews within the FCSSP but also carbon programme research in Kenya. This chapter 
explores the remaining two hot topics introduced in chapter 6: the role of project actors and how 
they are organised; and transfer of knowledge and capacities to the project stakeholders defined 
by FTI as ‘producers’. These are unravelled by looking firstly at how they relate to the Theory 
of Change developed for the FCS, and secondly how they play out in the context of two 
example carbon programmes in Kenya. This chapter unpacks the FCS Theory of Change in 
terms of the assumptions behind it, explores its hypothetical application based on existing 
programmes, and increases the pool of evidence which corroborates or contravenes it. Overall, 
this provides a basis for contextualising the FCS and identifying key areas to monitor and learn 
from as the FCS is applied, and the FCS and its Theory of Change are reviewed and revised.  
Chapter 8 addresses objective 3 and questions 3.1-3.2 and as such, is a reflection on the research 
design, collaborative research process and role of the researcher. The analysis in chapter 8 
revisits initial concerns and intentions in relation to the unfolding process, and reviews research 
inputs and interventions to support reflection in relation to emergent outcomes. The chapter 
synthesises lessons and underlines important considerations for future research collaborations. It 
also makes reference to tools and findings introduced in previous chapters and ties them 
together in preparation for the concluding chapter.  
Chapter 9 concludes by recalling the gaps that each research objective was intended to address 
and reviewing the contributions made by this thesis towards each objective. It summarises 
contributions to theory, pathways research and each of the key literature areas and then makes 
recommendations for future standard-setting processes governed by organisations intending to 
operate in a participatory collaborative manner, and recommendations for further roles to be 
provided by researchers in such processes. It concludes with recommendations for further 
research.  
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Chapter 2 Unravelling ‘fair carbon’: key challenges for standards 
developments  
2.1. Introduction to chapter two 
Chapter one introduced the ongoing debate between those who are fundamentally opposed to 
carbon markets and those who advocate them and justified the pathways approach combined 
with an empirical analysis of fairness as ways of moving on from polarised viewpoints. In this 
chapter I situate FTI and GSF’s initiative, as well as my analysis of it, within the broader 
academic landscape and summarise useful contributions and remaining gaps within existing 
literature. The primary purpose of this chapter is to operationalise the research term ‘fair 
carbon’ by exploring its symbolic significance, the governance context in which the concept is 
being introduced, the normative framing and subjective meanings attached to it, and the 
challenges implied by commitments to achieving it, by means of a literature review on 
commodification, standards and carbon projects. This provides the backdrop for exploring 
objective one of this thesis: to uncover the debates, perspectives and different options for 
achieving fairness within carbon projects, and explore them in relation to the FCS. This 
objective is addressed primarily in chapters 5 (focussing on questions 1.1 and 1.2) and 7 
(questions 1.3 and 1.4). 
The literature review on carbon projects sought to understand the practical constraints and 
structural and contextual factors associated with fair access, benefit-sharing and procedures for 
smallholders and communities, which Gold Standard (GSF) and Fairtrade International (FTI) 
may need to address if they are to fulfil their fairness commitments on the carbon market. These 
are mapped alongside their initially proposed interventions. I also highlight key lessons from 
ongoing attempts by carbon project developers and SSOs to shape benefits and procedures. 
In section 2.2 I sketch out the theoretical backdrop for my analysis of ‘fair carbon’ and then 
locate the FTI-GSF alongside parallel standard setting initiatives, and explain the triggers for 
this particular partnership in section 2.3. In section 2.44 I examine the SSOs’ own initial 
framing of fairness, which centre on questions of access, benefits and participation; and link 
these to theoretical understandings of fair access, benefits and procedures and relationships 
between them in the context of carbon markets and carbon projects based on the Multi-
Dimensional Fairness Framework introduced in chapter 1. Section 2.55 describes the 
methodology for the review, which is presented in section 2.6.  
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2.2. Constituting carbon and ‘fair carbon’ as a commodity 
Theoretical advances have been made to interpret the process of commodification of carbon, by 
which the tonne of CO2 equivalent has become the currency of the carbon market (Bumpus and 
Liverman, 2008, Bumpus, 2011a). Overall, these works have made important contributions to 
thinking about carbon credits, forging a tangible analytical component and discursive category 
out of both the intangible commodity and the invisible relationships imbued within them, and 
opening these up to critical analysis. Making sense of ‘fair carbon’ as a potential new 
commodity involves drawing on theoretical contributions to the commodification of carbon and 
the questions this poses, combined with analyses of the politics of ethical commodities.  
Commodification approaches involve looking at the geographical lives of commodities and the 
social relationships made tangible through things and are usually characterised by an attention 
to the sites and subjects of social, cultural, environmental and economic exploitation (Castree, 
2001). A key aspect of commodification is that nature is displaced and severed from sites of 
production and specificity (Bumpus, 2011a), which makes it easy to ignore the material 
implications of this process in specific places. Clarity is needed on what characterises a 
commodity in order to be able to make a normative assessment on the benefits or ills of 
commodification processes (Castree, 2004), which also needs to be a place-based assessment.  
Carbon is a slippery commodity because it is intangible (it cannot physically change hands) and 
fictitious as it essentially involves creating value based on the absence of something (the non-
production or removal of CO2 from the atmosphere) (Bumpus, 2011a). It is also a fragile 
commodity, both created and destabilised by carbon projects, market dynamics and buyers’ 
opinions (illustrated by 2011 market collapse and ongoing price fluctuation) (Bumpus and 
Liverman, 2008). These characteristics pose challenges in terms of how carbon is understood 
and talked about, measured and transacted (Goodman and Boyd, 2011), and how benefits and 
burdens are shared. Its material and biophysical properties have necessitated new governance 
practices and institutions (Boyd et al., 2011), which serve to manage the conflicts and 
contradictions inherent in the commodification of carbon (Bumpus, 2011a). The technological 
practices developed to do this are beset with problems and complications, not least because the 
science itself is contentious and is shaped by particular normative framings (Goodman and 
Boyd, 2011) (Frame, 2011).  
The process of commodification of carbon produces particular forms of socio-ecological 
relations (Boyd et al., 2011). Scholars have explored the social relationships that carbon credits 
are imbued with during production, circulation and consumption (Goodman and Boyd, 2011, 
Lovell et al., 2009, Wang and Corson, 2015), and the places and spaces where these 
relationships are played out (Lansing, 2012, Lovell and Ghaleigh, 2013). This builds on 
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scholarship on the geographical lives of Fairtrade commodities (Goodman, 2004, Guthman, 
2009, Lyon, 2006) as well as other carbon-based commodities (Bridge, 2011). Commodification 
approaches have underlined the role of framing and narratives in sustaining production and 
consumption of carbon credits and constituting connections between the two. These include 
ethical and moral grounding about what is the ‘right’, ‘good’ or ‘better’ thing to do about 
climate change and its impacts and entrench particular pathways, whilst ignoring other 
questions such as who has the marketable and moral right to pump CO2 into the atmosphere, and 
other pathways requiring larger behavioural or structural changes, or more collective or 
regulatory approaches (Goodman and Boyd, 2011). The association of normative framings and 
uncertain scientific conclusions with market-based approaches should be viewed with caution 
because of the potential to get it wrong or produce perverse incentives (Frame, 2011).  
2.2.1. Limitations to existing scholarship on carbon commodification 
Whilst the highly conceptual and discursive (as opposed to empirical) orientation of some of 
these works is useful, it still leaves a gap in terms of what may be practically be done within the 
context of carbon projects- where the carbon aspect often remains ambiguous and risks being 
misunderstood or non-transparently dealt with. Corbera and Martin (2015) point to evidence 
from projects whereby local people are handing over their property rights to carbon without 
sufficient understanding of what the carbon is or how much it is worth. An empirical analysis of 
fairness in combination with a pathways approach allows for the analytical connections to be 
made between the ways that the commodity is conceptualised and how fairness values are 
attached to it by different people involved in constituting and governing the commodity of ‘fair 
carbon’.  
Furthermore, while it is recognised that different types of carbon are more or less easy to 
measure, requiring different methods and leading to a propensity for certain types of project 
(Bumpus, 2011a) there is little acknowledgement in the literature of the implication this may 
have on social relationships. Fairtrade scholarship offers insights in terms of commodity and 
place specificity and how the Fairtrade concept plays out differently regarding different places 
and products (Phillips, 2014, McEwan et al., 2014) (see also chapter 7). Focus on the 
commodification process itself also risks underemphasising the wider aspects of carbon projects 
such as institutional and governance arrangements which do not necessarily change hands via 
the carbon credit or get projected onto it. For example Bridge (2011) describes these as ‘external 
influences’. Again, Fairtrade scholarship offers some relevant insights on how different types of 
certification intersect with and affect local spaces differently (Getz and Shreck, 2006, 
Mutersbaugh et al., 2005), and the importance of considering institutions and place in analyses 
of commodity chains (Neilson and Pritchard, 2009). Governance processes are an essential 
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component of pathways research and an empirical analysis of fairness involves looking at place-
based interpretations of fairness and implications of dominant fairness framing (see chapter 1). 
2.2.2. Constituting ‘Fair Carbon’ 
‘Fair Carbon’ is a new ethical-moral underpinning for carbon credits warranting critical 
assessment (Goodman and Boyd, 2011). Fairtrade scholarship has already raised questions 
about the politics of a movement attempting to achieve market-driven social change (Taylor, 
2005b, Fridell, 2007), where any transformation of food systems and wider political action is 
limited by the whims of a consumer market (Goodman, 2004, Lekakis, 2012). Like ‘fair 
carbon’, an ‘ethical commodity’ can arguably be considered an oxymoron (Guthman, 2002), 
though with respect to Fairtrade, this assertion has been countered by recognising that the 
movement and label has effectively situated ethics, commoditisation and livelihood struggles 
side by side (Goodman, 2004). Carbon credit retailers have already attempted to embed ‘care’ 
and ‘responsibility’ for others, the environment and the future into the narratives and pricing of 
credits (Goodman and Boyd, 2011, Lovell et al., 2009). Claims are also being made about ‘fair’ 
conduct and ‘fairly traded’ carbon credits (Howard et al., 2015b) Given the controversy that 
surrounds carbon trading outlined in chapter 1, such claims are likely to be contested in the 
absence of sufficient contextual information. GSF and FTI’s partnership can be seen as an 
attempt to mediate such claims.  
As with Fairtrade commodities, it is questionable whether market-driven strategies (in this case 
for producing and selling ‘Fair Carbon’), based on consumer politics and behavioural choice are 
‘right’ and ‘good’ enough and whether alternative pathways involving structural, collectivised 
or regulatory changes might constitute a stronger ethical-moral underpinning (Goodman and 
Boyd, 2011). 
2.2.3. Stretching and extending Fairtrade 
Application of the fair trade concept to carbon comes at a time when the meaning of fair trade is 
under question from within and outside the movement. This results from recent trajectories 
including the development of the Fair for Life label as a rival to Fairtrade (Smith, 2013); the 
breakoff of Fairtrade USA from under the umbrella of Fairtrade International (Raynolds and 
Greenfield, 2015); and the new small producer label developed by the Latin American 
producers network (Renard, 2015). Mainstreaming and the increasing participation of profit-
driven transnational corporations in Fairtrade has been held liable for the loss of the radical and 
political edge to the Fairtrade movement (Low and Davenport, 2005, Fridell, 2007) and the 
dilution of some its core principles (Doherty et al., 2013), despite the benefits that the extension 
of Fairtrade production and markets may also bring (Doherty et al., 2013, Goodman and 
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Herman, 2015). Meanwhile, there have been calls from scholars to expand or adapt Fairtrade 
certification to new areas and commodities such as wood (Klooster, 2006, Taylor, 2005a), gold 
(Hilson and Kamlongera, 2013) and commodities in conflict zones (Davenport and Low, 2015) 
where it seen as having the potential to enhance equity, fairness, promote peace and 
development, address access opportunities for smaller producers and communities, transform 
social relations and create new market niches and ties between producers and consumers. 
Nevertheless, potential challenges in implementing Fairtrade certification were noted in terms of 
the structure of the commodity chain, commodity characteristics and discrepancies between 
intended beneficiaries and producers actually capable of complying with the standard (Hilson 
and Kamlongera, 2013, Taylor, 2005a); and (with respect to gold in Sub Saharan Africa) the 
level of organisation that could be expected of producers (Hilson and Kamlongera, 2013). In 
practice, standards scoping development and improvement processes have subsequently been 
underway for both Fairtrade timber in Latin America and gold in Sub Saharan Africa4 but these 
have not been documented by scholars so it remains to be understood whether the challenges 
have been dealt with. Notably, prior to FTI’s decision to engage in the carbon market, Fairtrade 
certification of carbon credits had already been recommended as a means of (i) reframing the 
market to draw attention to the principles of dignity and common welfare and promote 
transparency and legitimacy; and (ii) organising long term collaborative interactions among 
stakeholders (Ciscell, 2010). Some of the same challenges related to the commodity chain 
structure (in terms of its complexity, fragmentation and poor consumer awareness) and 
commodity characteristics (sold in plural markets and not conducive to personalised 
consumption) recognised for Fairtrade wood (Taylor, 2005a) would nevertheless also apply to 
carbon. Ciscell (2010) does recognise some technical and financial challenges but proposes 
resolving most of them through the use of the Fairtrade premium (to cover administration costs, 
subsidise less cost-effective but more developmentally beneficial projects, and build capacity) 
and advance payments (to address lack of capital and the need for technical assistance). The 
Fairtrade premium was also flagged up as having potential to resolve some of access issues for 
small producers and communities in wood commodity chains. Without wider institutional 
support however, this alone was not expected to completely address the problem (Klooster, 
2006). 
                                                     
4 A pilot project led by FTI and the Forest Stewardship Council to develop joint certification of timber 
was implemented between 2009 and 2013 and resulted in the first jointly certified timber in 2012 initially 
marketed in Germany, see http://www.fairtrade.net/new/latest-news/single-view/article/a-world-first-
furniture-made-from-fsc-and-fairtrade-timber.html. A consultation and standard adaptation process for 
Fairtrade gold in Sub Saharan Africa was being implemented in 2014. 
44 
 
2.3. Governing by Private Rule-Setters  
Since the early 21
st
 century, a growing field of carbon standards and associated methodologies 
has emerged together with the expansion of carbon projects pioneered primarily by project 
developers, NGOs and carbon credit brokers and retailers in the global North, in new locations 
and activity sectors in the global South (Howard et al., 2015b). The FCS was designed by FTI 
and GSF for the voluntary carbon market, which during the Kyoto Protocol commitment period 
(2005-2012), operated in parallel with the compliance market developed under the framework 
of the UN-created Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). However, the Paris Agreement 
established at the UNFCCC 21
st
 Conference of Parties (COP) in December 2015 makes less of a 
distinction between voluntary and compliance markets in an effort to link and harmonise diverse 
schemes (Marcu, 2016). The FTI-GSF partnership coincided with GSF’s decision to develop 
new methodologies and standards for reducing emissions from land use and forestry5. The FTI-
GSF partnership is one of many cases of SSOs attempting to encourage, measure and 
communicate environmental and social benefits (such as Plan Vivo, Social Carbon, W+ and the 
Climate, Community and Biodiversity Standard), and combining forces to enhance the range of 
their expertise (for example dual certification offered by the Verified Carbon Standard and the 
Climate, Community and Biodiversity Standard). This attempt to meet demands of customers 
and suppliers and maintain market share is a common practice among private rule setters 
(Green, 2013).  
This thesis follows an expanding series of studies attending to the potential spaces for change 
and incremental innovations and revisions being carved out by private rule-setters and carbon 
project implementers (Green, 2013, Hale and Roger, 2014, Bulkeley et al., 2012). These works 
have contributed to an understanding of the transnational governance landscape, but this thesis 
is novel in providing a detailed empirical assessment of governance within one particular 
standards setting process. I also contribute to the Fairtrade scholarship which has documented 
the development of new labels (Smith, 2013, Renard and Laconto, 2013, Renard, 2015) and 
revisions of existing Fairtrade standards mechanisms (Bacon, 2010, Reinecke, 2010, Reinecke 
and Ansari, 2015). While most of the work on labels has been limited to discourse and content 
analysis, ethnographic work by Bacon and Reinecke has enabled a close documentation of 
governance processes and negotiations involved in making the revisions. This thesis takes the 
latter approach but with an entire standard-setting process as its focus. 
                                                     
5 This also involved entering into a partnership with the Forest Stewardship Council, also announced in 
2012. 
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Critical literature on Fairtrade and other agro-food standards has suggested that standards are 
more than just technologies for organising and regulating markets (Busch, 2000). They have 
been understood as a political field and a neoliberal governance tool (Ponte et al., 2011) aimed 
at creating uniformity through disciplining of everyday practices according to technical and 
market logics (Busch, 2000, Leach et al., 2012). Standards have been criticised as being more 
about verification and auditability than they are about resolving social and environmental 
problems (Djama et al., 2011). In the case of Fairtrade, the standards were initially more about 
facilitating development as a process, but Fairtrade International faced pressure from the auditor 
FLOCert to reconceptualise development as an auditable outcome in order to comply with ISO 
65 requirements for third party product certification (Reinecke and Ansari, 2015), as well as 
with the umbrella alliance ISEAL’s codes for member standards organisations. Carbon 
standards have a relatively recent history. Existing literature has covered comparative and 
standard-specific content reviews (Kollmuss et al., 2008, Sterk, 2009) but there is a need for 
critical research that explores what they are expected to do and what they do in practice. I 
partially address this gap particularly in chapter 7 where I explore what the FCSSP is expected 
to do and which particular mechanisms within the standard are expected to lead to specific 
outcomes, but this should be seen in the wider context of standards as a political governance 
tool.   
2.4. Standard Setters’ framing: access, benefits and participation as 
three pillars of fairness  
‘Fair Carbon’ was not clearly defined at the outset of the FCSSP. This section nevertheless 
explores FTI and GSF’s initial framing of the issue. I underline the aspects of fairness these 
organisations originally announced that they were tackling, based on the initial press release 
announcing the collaboration between FTI and GSF (Gold Standard Foundation, 2012), and 
material published on GSF’s website on the lines of partnership with FTI (Gold Standard 
Foundation, 2014). Firstly, FTI and GSF claimed their collaboration would enable access to the 
carbon market for ‘thousands more smallholders in developing countries’ (Gold Standard 
Foundation, 2012). ‘Communities’ and ‘farming communities’ were also referred to as intended 
target beneficiaries (Gold Standard Foundation, 2014). Several mechanisms were mentioned to 
address access issues: streamlined and simplified processes and reduced transaction costs (Gold 
Standard Foundation, 2012); guidelines for application of methodologies, making them easier 
and more relevant to smallholders and community projects; tools and capacity-building sessions 
for smallholders, making it easier for them to participate in carbon markets; and upfront finance 
mechanisms. Secondly, through their collaboration, GSF and FTI sought to ensure benefits to 
smallholders from the carbon market. This was framed in terms of finance for those who are 
least responsible for atmospheric greenhouse gas emissions, enabling them to both adapt to and 
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mitigate climate change in a way that is ‘fair to both people and planet’ (Gold Standard 
Foundation, 2012). One way in which GSF and FTI suggested benefits could be increased 
through a future Fairtrade label for GSF credits is through ‘defined, direct and financial benefits 
to communities’ (Gold Standard Foundation, 2014). When the objectives of the standard were 
publically announced a year later, ‘participation’ was also a major theme. Based on their initial 
research, FTI had concluded that the problem was not only smallholders’ limited access to, and 
benefits from the carbon market, but also their limited involvement or active participation, 
noting for example that where they do take part in projects, they usually do not own the carbon 
credits. In terms of changes envisaged, the spokesperson for FTI mentioned procedures such as 
Free Prior Informed Consent, and farmer organisations empowered to take control and drive 
their own projects (Gold Standard Foundation et al., 2013).  
The three pillars of access, benefits and participation underlined by FTI and GSF in public 
communications early on in the FCSSP roughly map onto the three elements that form the 
content of fairness in the Multi-Dimensional Fairness Framework. Fairness in participation is 
one element of the broader fairness concept of procedural fairness (see Figure 2-1 and Table 
1-1). For example, regarding participation, it is important to ask not only whether smallholders 
have the opportunity to participate in carbon projects, but also whether they have the capacity to 
make an informed decision, and the freedom to choose whether to participate or not.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-1: Elements of the Multi-Dimensional Fairness Framework included in FTI and 
GSF's pillars of fairness 
 
47 
 
2.5. Carbon project review methodology  
The focus of the literature review on carbon projects is largely on sub-Saharan Africa and 
organic carbon projects (carbon stored above or below ground, in trees, forests and soils) 
targeting smallholders and communities. The regional focus was chosen because of choices 
made in the research design and because the region has fewer carbon projects being 
implemented6, suggesting that the biggest constraints are present there. The sectoral focus was 
chosen for four reasons: 1) both forest and agricultural carbon projects were initially envisaged 
within the scope of the FCS; 2) their mitigation effectiveness is questionable (Newell et al., 
2013), 3) benefits to participants are less evident (Bumpus and Liverman, 2008) compared to 
energy efficiency projects, for example involving distribution of improved cook-stoves (Simon 
et al., 2012), and 4) relatively few projects have been developed7, so understanding of their 
implications is largely unknown. While many of the findings from the review apply to carbon 
projects in any sector, I have reduced the detail of the sections specific to agricultural carbon 
projects in order to remain relevant to the eventual scope of the FCS which excluded 
agricultural projects. Full details of these aspects are provided in Howard et al. (2015b).  
I identified relevant literature (project-specific case studies, multi-project reviews, general 
discussions about carbon projects in the target category, literature on specific carbon standards 
and their application) by using search engines, reference lists of key articles, and articles citing 
them (see Box 2-1 for search terms used). I prioritised peer-reviewed literature but found 
limited studies of smallholder/ community-focused organic carbon projects being implemented, 
partly because there are still few projects to date and most are at early stages of implementation 
(see Table 2-1 for details on the eleven different carbon projects detailed in the case studies I 
identified- notably all but one are forest-carbon projects, but some also include agricultural land 
management within their activities). Many project studies conducted have been commissioned 
by project developers or donors and thus constitute grey literature, which I used only for 
background information rather than evidence. However, some of the peer-reviewed literature 
used grey literature as an evidence base (especially project documentation). I compensated for 
the paucity of project-specific literature by reviewing more general discussions on the 
challenges in implementing organic carbon projects with smallholders and communities in sub-
Saharan Africa. I analysed identified literature to locate key limitations to access, benefits and 
                                                     
6 I confirmed this through an analysis conducted for FTI of all the projects listed on the registries and 
websites up to the end of October 2013 for the following standards: Verified Carbon Standard, Gold 
Standard, Carbon Fix, the Climate, Community and Biodiversity Alliance Standard, and Plan Vivo. 
Social Carbon projects were also reviewed where they were jointly certified by VCS and Social Carbon.  
7 The analysis mentioned above showed that there were significantly fewer forest and agricultural 
projects being implemented in comparison to renewable energy and energy efficiency projects. 
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procedures, on the basis of the themes underlined in Box 2-1. I also analysed the literature on 
specific carbon standards and their application using the Standards themes outlined in Box 2-1 
as a basis. I found that Plan Vivo certified projects had been most extensively documented 
whereas literature on other standards and project outcomes was limited to desk reviews (Wood, 
2011, Suiseeya and Caplow, 2013, Sterk, 2009).  
 
Box 2-1: search terms and criteria 
Details of search terms and themes used to identify and analyse literature 
Key words used for initial literature search: 
‘carbon projects’, crossed with themes such as equity; fairness; value chains; institutions; 
trade-offs; knowledge, expertise and roles for local communities; procedures; participation; 
community engagement and costs and benefits. 
 Access themes explored: 
Challenges and opportunities for implementing organic carbon projects with smallholders and 
communities in sub-Saharan Africa 
Pros, cons and risks associated with including smallholders and communities within carbon 
markets 
Types of organic carbon project designs amenable to registration 
Requirements for registering and implementing a project involving smallholders and 
communities 
Resources required for taking part in organic carbon projects 
Role of institutions in shaping access to these resources 
Benefits themes explored: 
Costs and benefits associated with the carbon project 
Monetary and non-monetary benefits and their links with participation 
How costs and benefits are distributed between project stakeholders 
Opportunities for smallholders and community members to take part in project design or 
implementation. 
Procedures themes explored: 
Mechanisms, processes and strategies for members of host communities to resist, influence, 
be informed about, take ownership over, or express discontent about projects and examples of 
how they operate in practice 
Dynamics of inclusion, exclusion, representation and participation within host communities 
Conditions required for procedural fairness and participatory parity  
Standard themes explored: 
Rules, procedures and mechanisms codified by standards  
Impact of codification on project implementation and outcomes 
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Table 2-1: Details of carbon projects identified in literature 
Type of 
literature 
No. of 
key 
articles  
Project details (and number of studies covering the project) 
Single-project 
case studies 
8 Kenya: Kenyan Agricultural Carbon Project (KACP) (soil 
carbon), VCS certified (2);  
Uganda: Trees For Global Benefits (TFGB) (community-based 
forestry), Plan Vivo certified (1) 
Mozambique: Sofala Community Carbon Project (a.k.a. 
N’hambita), (community-based forestry), Plan Vivo certified (2) 
Mali: Carbon From Communities (community-based natural 
resource management), not certified (1) 
Tanzania: Angai Villages Land Forest Reserve (REDD), no 
details of certification (1) 
Indonesia: Kalimantan Forest and Climate Partnership (REDD+ 
project) 
Multi-project 
comparative 
case studies 
7 Kenya: KACP (1) 
Mozambique: Sofala Community Carbon Project (3) 
Uganda: TFGB (2) 
Uganda: Nile Basin Reforestation Project, CDM certified (1) 
Uganda: Kikonda Forest Reserve, certified by Carbon Fix (now 
owned by Gold Standard) (protected area) (1)  
Malawi: Trees for Hope (community-based forestry), Plan Vivo 
certified (1) 
Ghana: Vision 2050 (forest plantation), considering CDM 
certification (1) 
Sierra Leone: Western Area Peninsula Forest Reserve (protected 
area), applying for VCS certification (1) 
Democratic Republic of Congo: Kamoa (environmental 
conservation), going for Plan Vivo certification (2) 
Tanzania: Angai Villages Land Forest Reserve (REDD), no 
details of certification (1) 
Tanzania: pseudonym Program Small-Grove, not certified (1) 
Desk reviews 
of organic 
carbon 
projects 
3 1 study covered 42 projects, another other covered 23 projects 
(including some overlaps) - both in Africa. A third covered 56 
projects worldwide. 
2.6. Limits to fair access, benefit-sharing and procedures  
The literature search enabled a better understanding of the principal factors limiting the ability 
of smallholders and communities in Africa to access the carbon market. Constraining factors 
shaping ability to access the land and legal resources have been documented elsewhere (Howard 
et al., 2015b). These are a crucial prerequisite for taking part in carbon projects, but possibilities 
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for addressing them fall within the remit of GSF’s requirements rather than the FCS8. I therefore 
focus in this section on access to markets, shaped by the project development and 
implementation process.   
2.6.1. Access to markets: technical complexities, uncertainties and costs 
Projects involving smallholders and communities face significant barriers to implementation 
and market access. Challenges relate to technical complexity, uncertainties and costs associated 
with project development, carbon accounting (monitoring, reporting and verification of the 
carbon sequestration or emissions reductions created by project activities) and sales of carbon 
credits. Below I explore how these limit access for smallholders and communities. 
2.6.1.1. Project development and management 
Project development requires multiple steps, starting with an initial assessment of the project 
idea, and outlining the carbon mitigation potential, social and environmental impacts and the 
financial feasibility (Leach and Scoones, 2013). This must usually be approved by the SSO 
before moving onto a more detailed Project Design Document (PDD).The PDD outlines which 
carbon accounting methodologies are appropriate. It is often a long, technically-dense 
document, has implications for the volume of emissions reductions that a project will potentially 
generate, and sets out the data requirements for verifying project implementation and actual 
emissions reductions (Leach and Scoones, 2013). It forms the backbone for validation 
(according to the rules and criteria of the chosen standard), and periodic verification after the 
project is running, but only has to be written once per project. Actors involved in multiple 
projects become adept at producing PDDs in quite a formulaic way, but sometimes PDDs are 
insufficiently sensitive to local context or adaptive to changing local conditions, needs and 
priorities (Leach and Scoones, 2013). Projects are usually managed by external (often foreign) 
project developers who have skills in identifying potential project activities, defining and 
assuring the principles of operation, and searching for buyers (Corbera and Brown, 2010), or 
who pay consultants to assist them. It would be difficult for smallholders and communities to 
manage and implement projects by themselves. They therefore rely on project developers and 
                                                     
8 Through my involvement with GSF’s standard-setting processes for Climate Smart Agriculture and 
Afforestation/ Reforestation smallholder guidelines, I used my knowledge of the existing challenges for 
smallholders, documented in the literature and testified by programme implementers I interviewed in 
Kenya, in order to lobby for changes in the requirements that would facilitate participation in carbon 
projects for people without formal land titles. Changes were effectuated in version 1.0 of the guidelines, 
published in November 2014, see http://www.goldstandard.org/sites/default/files/ar-guidelines-
smallholder-microscale.pdf, p10.  
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other actors in the carbon offset value chain, and generally have a weak positioning in relation 
to these parties (Mathur et al., 2014). 
2.6.1.2.  Carbon accounting 
Carbon accounting is characterised by considerable uncertainty and ambiguity surrounding 
hypothetical calculations about emissions trajectories with or without the project (Lohmann, 
2010), and assessments of the actual mitigation capacity of carbon projects (Jindal et al., 2012, 
Simon et al., 2012). Various techniques are deployed for estimating and quantifying actual 
emissions reductions in forest and soil carbon projects. Calculations and measurements often 
involve computer-modelling, satellite imagery and positioning systems (Corbera and Brown, 
2010) which require upfront investment and technical capacity building (Perez et al., 2007), or 
reliance on external parties. Information gained using technical methods needs to be 
contextualised and ground-truthed with field data from permanent fixed plots, tree surveys 
(Leach and Scoones, 2013), random sampling and/or self-assessments by project participants 
(Atela, 2012). Generally, the more robust and complex the methodology for carbon accounting, 
the more expensive it is to implement, with direct implications for the amount of carbon 
revenue available to those involved in generating the offset. Field techniques may involve lower 
upfront investment costs but are more labour-intensive and time-consuming. However, with less 
rigorous methodologies, projects may be required to earmark a larger proportion of the 
emissions reductions in a risk-buffer to allow for accounting inaccuracies. In the Kenyan 
Agricultural Carbon Project, 60% of the carbon credits generated were initially set aside (Atela, 
2012), leaving little to cover project implementation and incentives for participants. Certain 
types and designs of project face larger challenges in monitoring of activities and carbon 
performance.  
Projects may need to aggregate large numbers of smallholders and communities within single 
schemes in order to generate sufficient emissions reduction volumes to render a project 
financially viable (Scherr et al., 2012, Perez et al., 2007). When participants are geographically 
scattered, monitoring and verification become inherently more costly and complex (Perez et al., 
2007, Leach et al., 2012). While some authors advocate a role for communities in field data 
collection, to reduce costs and empower local people, this must be balanced against the need for 
robust accounting (Danielsen et al., 2011, Palmer Fry, 2011, Gupta et al., 2012) and the money 
available to remunerate people adequately. Some projects, such as Trees for Global Benefits in 
Uganda, rely on volunteers to undertake monitoring (Peskett et al., 2011), which may keep costs 
down, but relies on people’s willingness to work without direct remuneration. Decisions about 
which methodologies and techniques should be used to generate which kinds of data, and who 
to involve in the collection and analysis, are politically-laden (Gupta et al., 2012). They have 
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direct implications for the empowerment or disenfranchisement of local communities, as well as 
directly affecting the benefits received within the community.  
2.6.1.3.  Verification, Certification and Sales of Carbon Credits 
The structure of the carbon market necessitates rigorous auditing (verification) of a project’s 
performance and monitoring data, because the intangibility of carbon credits means it is 
possible to intentionally or unintentionally sell or account for them twice (double accounting). 
Also, both supplier and buyer have an interest in exaggerating the number of carbon credits that 
a project has produced (Kollmuss et al., 2008). For SSOs to be perceived as credible, they 
impose complex (and costly) methods for accounting both carbon and environmental and social 
benefits and granting certification. While some SSOs (e.g. Plan Vivo) reduce costs to the project 
by using their own staff to conduct desk audits of projects, SSOs that draw on CDM 
infrastructure (e.g. GSF) use CDM-accredited auditors or Designated Operating Entities. These 
auditors generally command much higher fees than the auditors from FLO-Cert (the designated 
Certification Body for Fairtrade International) or other sustainability certification schemes. 
Sales of carbon credits are usually mediated electronically, via trading platforms and databases 
(Corbera and Brown, 2010) and often involve predominantly Northern brokers, retailers and 
industrial networks. Although some buyers have shown willingness to pay more for premium 
carbon credits which involve strong storylines and/or rigorous accounting and verification 
procedures, many buyers are interested in paying as little as possible (Merger and Pistorius, 
2011) or combining a small volume of premium carbon credits with a larger volume of cheap 
carbon credits without co-benefits. Overall, carbon offset prices are extremely volatile and 
average prices may be insufficient to cover costs of production for smallholder- and 
community-focused organic carbon credits, which are comparatively more costly to generate 
than credits from cook stove projects, and less popular on the market (Swallow and Goddard, 
2013). Their sales are mainly limited to voluntary markets because of restrictions or non-
eligibility on compliance markets (Swallow and Goddard, 2013). Several organic carbon 
projects in sub-Saharan Africa have experienced difficulties or delays in making sales 
(Reynolds, 2012). In the Sofala Community Carbon project in Mozambique, it has been 
suggested that this was partly to do with the perception of the quality of the Plan Vivo 
certification (Grace et al., 2010). 
2.6.1.4. Investment costs 
It may take several years from the conception of a project to the generation and sale of its first 
carbon credits. The finance required during this period is likely to be a significant barrier for 
community or smallholder-led projects, necessitating a role for investors and donors to put 
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forward large sums of money with little guarantee of receiving returns at least in the initial years 
(Corbera and Brown, 2010). It is particularly difficult to design financially viable projects or 
source money to finance them in a context of price volatility. Many project ideas are abandoned 
during the initial feasibility assessment, because of both the lack of profitability and the 
complexity of developing them (Leach and Scoones, 2013). Pioneering organic carbon projects 
in sub-Saharan Africa such as the Sofala Community Carbon project in Mozambique and the 
Kenyan Agricultural Carbon project have been extremely costly to set up and heavily reliant on 
donor funding (Swallow and Goddard, 2013). Costs would have to be reduced if these projects 
were extended or implemented elsewhere (Jindal et al., 2012, Grace et al., 2010).  
2.6.1.5. Proposed interventions and lessons  
GSF and FTI proposed four interventions which could potentially alleviate some of the 
limitations related to access to markets. Firstly, streamlined and simplified processes would 
make it easier to tackle project development, carbon accounting and other certification 
requirements, potentially opening up these tasks to a broader range of actors. Secondly, tools 
and training to build capacity for smallholders and communities could facilitate them to take on 
particular roles within a carbon project. GSF has thus far chosen to go down the route of rigour, 
using existing CDM rules and adding further requirements. FTI standards are also becoming 
increasingly difficult for small producer organisations to apply. Simplicity and streamlining are 
greater challenges now that GSF and FTI are in partnership, as the combination of approaches 
could potentially make their certification system more complicated. If quality continues to be a 
key consideration, there will continue to be inherent trade-offs between rigour and 
simplification.  
Thirdly, GSF and FTI’s commitment to reduce transaction costs could partially resolve the issue 
of high costs in project development and generation of carbon credits. SSOs are responsible for 
setting the fees for project registration and certification and defining which actors audit projects 
against their standards and these fees absorb significant proportions of project budgets. In 
general, SSOs have been criticised for the high costs of certification that serve to exclude small 
producer organisations (Mutersbaugh, 2005). Nevertheless, projects involving smallholders and 
communities scattered over large areas may have structurally higher operational costs which 
make them less able to compete with more centralised types of project design and these are 
beyond the influence of SSOs. Fourthly, upfront financing mechanisms could alleviate another 
portion of the burden of investment costs, but outcomes depend on how these are devised and 
which conditions are placed on the finance. For example, if the upfront finance is provided by 
the buyer, they will incur greater risks, and this could fall back on those producing the carbon 
credits in terms of lower prices. This has often happened when carbon credits are sold Ex-Ante 
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(purchased before they have been delivered), but at lower prices. Also, imposing additional 
financing requirements on the buyer may discourage some potential buyers. 
Notably, GSF and FTI did not include any interventions in their initial set of propositions which 
could facilitate sales of carbon credits. In the context of a weak carbon market, a shortage of 
demand for GSF-FTI certified credits is probable. However, there is some confidence that FTI 
could play a role in transforming the market (e.g. Ciscell, 2010). In the case of coffee, FTI has 
succeeded in increasing profits and commanding a price premium (Nelson and Martin, 2014) 
although most discussions on the impact of Fairtrade certification ignore that most coffee 
producers fail to sell all their certified coffee under Fairtrade conditions because of low demand 
(Bacon et al., 2008). Fairtrade certified products have traditionally been bought by individual 
consumers, but are increasingly incorporated into public and corporate procurement strategies 
(Fisher and Corbalán, 2013). Meanwhile, the voluntary carbon market has a predominantly 
corporate consumer base (Lovell et al., 2009) but public authorities are increasingly becoming 
customers (Peters-Stanley and Gonzalez, 2014). It is difficult to predict how the market will 
evolve in coming years. 
2.6.2. Fair benefit-sharing 
Organic carbon projects involving smallholders and communities involve significant transaction 
costs which render them costly to implement. Nevertheless, carbon projects are commonly 
considered an opportunity for channelling carbon finance to those least responsible for climate 
change. Several authors have questioned the legitimacy and efficacy of project budgets 
managed by donors and investors, underlining the need to decipher how costs and revenue are 
split between the stakeholders involved, what proportion of the budget is absorbed by 
transaction costs, and how much goes to the communities responsible for carbon sequestration 
(Sharma and Suppan, 2011, Fairhead et al., 2012). In this section I explore both financial and 
non-financial benefits in terms of who benefits, how they are discussed and decided on, their 
relative importance, and the limitations to determining a ‘fair share’.  
2.6.2.1. Financial and non-financial benefits 
In organic carbon projects, there are ongoing debates about who should benefit and how benefits 
should be shared between actors. While there are rationales for making benefits available to 
those who facilitate the mitigation action at a project level (Luttrell et al., 2013), the individuals 
and groups carrying out the mitigation action will also need to receive direct and/or indirect 
financial and non-financial benefits (Stringer et al., 2012). These might include incentive 
payments, improvements to soil fertility, increased agricultural yields, employment, additional 
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income from timber or non-timber products harvested from the trees products, access to cheaper 
fuel, training or secure land tenure.  
The cost and associated risks of implementing the recommended land management practices 
often serve as a barrier to farmers, who may not have the will to implement them without 
receiving financial payments upfront (Nhantumbo and Izidine, 2009). Evidence suggests that 
financial benefits have often been insufficiently attractive, regular or disseminated enough to 
motivate or compensate participants, especially when they incur significant investment, risks 
and labour costs (Dougill et al., 2012, Swallow and Goddard, 2013). Several debates surround 
the issue of payments, such as whether or not they are a key motivation for adoption and 
sustained implementation of new land use practices associated with carbon projects (Fisher, 
2012), and how to design payments compensation or alternative approaches (Adhikari and 
Boag, 2013, Namirembe et al., 2014). Evidence from Trees for Global Benefits in Uganda 
showed that payments were the main motivation for involvement, particularly at the household 
level, although in one area, the aesthetic and existence value of trees was a bigger motivation 
(Fisher, 2012). Similarly, in the Sofala Community Carbon project in Mozambique, participants 
relied on payments which served as a safety net because planting of trees involved high 
transaction and opportunity costs and losses when they did not survive (Dougill et al., 2012). In 
both projects, payments are front-loaded, but this approach has implications for temporal 
sustainability of carbon sequestration activities, particularly after the end of the front-loaded 
payment period (Fisher, 2012). In the Mozambican project, payments temporarily ceased 
because of a rupture in the sale of credits, and participants were unwilling to act without them 
and faced disappointment as well as an income gap (Dougill et al., 2012). This also illustrates 
that participants’ perceptions of a project and its associated risks and benefits can condition 
behavioural change or adoption and the sustained implementation of new land use practices 
(Dougill et al., 2012, Tschakert, 2007).  
Carbon payments alone cannot release people from poverty, and are only intended as a way to 
smooth the transition to a more sustainable and productive set of land uses which eventually 
generate value independent of carbon payments (Jindal et al., 2012). In combination, these are 
often framed as providing multiple wins- addressing local environmental problems, offering a 
cheap pathway to climate mitigation, and providing financial benefits to farmers. In reality, 
wins may be optimistically overstated. Non-financial and non-quantifiable benefits are often 
harder to measure and attribute, which is perhaps why there is more focus in the literature on 
financial aspects. Non-financial benefits noted in the projects literature included personal 
development in the form of training, growth in women’s confidence to speak or write publically 
and in the presence of men (Bozmoski and Hultman, 2010, Grace et al., 2010) and development 
of technical and business management skills (Grace et al., 2010); environmental benefits 
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(Bozmoski and Hultman, 2010); provision of appropriate equipment and use of project vehicles 
for emergencies (Dyer et al., 2014). 
2.6.2.2. Benefit-sharing within the community 
Where benefits do reach local communities, there is evidence of unjust distributions, as carbon 
projects are unlikely to address pre-existing marginalisation (Mathur et al., 2014). In the Sofala 
Community Carbon project in Mozambique, employment was deemed one of the major 
economic benefits by those who had been hired by the project (Jindal et al., 2012), but 
employment is usually limited to a few people and may only be temporary. Actors involved in 
projects aiming to benefit smallholders and communities face a challenge in designing them in 
ways that maximise investment returns for a range of farmers without marginalising others 
(Perez et al., 2007). The role of local organisations and leaders in brokering deals or facilitating 
the distribution of benefits shapes project participants’ abilities to draw an equitable share of the 
benefits (Lipper et al., 2006, Perez et al., 2007, Dougill et al., 2012). This is especially when 
payments involve a proportion being paid into a community fund, as was the case in projects in 
Mozambique (Jindal et al., 2012), Uganda (Peskett et al., 2011) and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (Dyer et al., 2014). If community-based carbon projects are to achieve their multiple 
environmental, economic and social goals, the activities they incorporate must be backed by 
‘strong rural organisations, legitimate and representative leadership, client-driven extension, 
local capacity building, and informed and enabling policies’ (Perez et al., 2007). There is a 
knowledge gap about what levels of organisation are happening in existing projects, the role that 
organisations serve, and how they shape access to benefits. SSOs and project developers also 
need to face the challenge of how to take into account the diversity of forms of social 
organisation, institutions and practices when designing standards or projects (Leach and 
Scoones, 2013, Perez et al., 2007).  
2.6.2.3. Harmful effects and project reputation 
Some projects entail negative impacts on local communities but very few tangible benefits. 
Large-scale forestry, biodiversity corridor and bio-char projects have been criticised as routes 
for foreign direct investors to buy tracts of land cheaply from national governments for extended 
periods, and to benefit disproportionately, whilst dispossessing local communities and 
excluding them from the resources from which they earn their living (Tienhaara, 2012, Leach et 
al., 2012). In some instances, these projects have incited strong critique from affected 
communities, and from journalists and NGOs, jeopardising the project’s legitimacy and causing 
it to crumble (Reynolds, 2012). One of the projects featured in Table 2-1 was ‘wound down’ in 
2015 because of persistent difficulties (Plan Vivo, 2015) and this happened after a scathing 
report had been published (Kill, 2013). This suggests that focusing on local goals may not 
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merely be a strategy for enhancing social benefits. There are also pragmatic reasons for doing so 
since a project’s sustainability depends on its meeting of local and global expectations 
(Reynolds, 2012). 
2.6.2.4. Proposed interventions and lessons  
In the initial GSF-FTI communication, the only possible intervention relating to benefits was 
the suggestion of defined and direct financial benefits to communities. From a standards 
perspective, financial benefits may be easier to measure and track at least in the short term, 
compared to less tangible benefits, or benefits that take longer to materialise. Choosing to focus 
on community rather than individual payments has its own set of implications for fairness, and 
depends on the presence of strong local institutions which serve the interests of the smallholders 
and community members involved in projects. FTI’s historic approach of working with and 
strengthening Producer Organisations (Nelson and Pound, 2010) aligns with the need identified 
in the literature for strong organisations to back carbon projects. Evidence suggests however 
that financial payments at the household level may be important motivations for participants in 
organic carbon projects but in themselves are not enough to pull people out of poverty, 
especially in the context of weak and dynamic market prices. This suggests payments need to be 
combined with other types of benefit. Therefore, GSF and FTI are potentially raising 
expectations by underlining defined and direct financial benefits, the delivery of which is 
beyond their control.  
Meanwhile, GSF and FTI can potentially shape benefits accrued from using their label(s), in the 
form of reputation. Carbon certification has not always been successful in enhancing 
reputational benefits, especially in the face of critics’ reports of negative social and 
environmental outcomes (e.g. Kill, 2013, Lohmann, 2006). Critics have also named and shamed 
projects certified by SSOs that prioritise these attributes (e.g. Plan Vivo). Evidence of lack of 
rigour in the enforcement of carbon standards (Suiseeya and Caplow, 2013) also threatens the 
credibility of third party certified carbon credits. The GSF-FTI partnership is potentially an 
opportunity for enhancing reputational benefits since both SSOs take pride in emphasising the 
quality and attributes of their standards. FTI has succeeded in unveiling the social aspects of 
production (Nelson and Martin, 2014), although in some cases, FTI and other certification 
schemes have capitalised on and claimed credit for practices that coffee farmers have adopted 
for generations (Bacon et al., 2008). This critique is potentially applicable to GSF-FTI certified 
carbon credits. Carbon projects must involve activities which are different from ‘business as 
usual’. If they fail to prove additionality of emissions reductions, they will lose their credibility.  
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2.6.3. Fair Procedures 
Participation in carbon sequestration and trading schemes should ideally be voluntary, and 
individual resources users should have the freedom to participate in ways that allow for their 
varying resource endowments, tolerance to risk, and opportunity costs (Perez et al., 2007). In 
reality, power relations can transect the various levels of governance in a carbon project (Atela, 
2012) and provoke participation. It is important to enquire whether the local community 
members who are asked to participate in project operations are actually provided with all the 
necessary information to make an informed decision on their involvement at the outset and 
whether they have the opportunity to opt out if it is costing them more than they are gaining. 
Achieving procedural fairness is dependent on the implementation of rules and processes, the 
presence of representative and inclusive institutions, and the possibility to include, or negotiate 
between competing views. This is within a context where different stakeholders have different 
levels of knowledge, skills, power, information and languages at their disposal (Brown and 
Corbera, 2003, Grasso, 2010). Involvement of local communities in project design and 
implementation is widely expected to lead to better social and environmental outcomes and 
support the overall success of organic carbon projects (Reynolds, 2012, Suiseeya and Caplow, 
2013). However, despite efforts to include local communities, claims of injustice still persist 
(Suiseeya and Caplow, 2013). Some of the challenges of effective communication and 
engagement with local communities relate to fair access and fair benefits. Unequal access to 
information results in price uncertainty and speculation, posing challenges for communicating 
prices. Transacting credits involves larger scale uncontrollable processes and unforeseen delays 
(for example credit sales) which can erode trust even in projects with high community 
involvement. This underlines the need for community engagement to adapt to dynamic 
situations (Dyer et al., 2014).  
2.6.3.1. Community Engagement 
Table 2-2 outlines some principles of effective community engagement, based on the review of 
projects outlined in Table 2-1 and incorporating experience of practitioners and scholars who 
have studied effective community engagement in multiple settings. Each principle is illustrated 
with examples of application. Although they are ideals to aim for, some caveats and counter-
arguments are also given, in order to understand where the principle may be challenging or less 
effective to apply. Overall it is important to note that carbon projects may involve actors from 
business and NGO sectors, some of whom may have long-term histories of engagement with 
local communities while others are unfamiliar with tools and processes for facilitation and 
meaningful engagement. Those who create spaces for participation may use them to their own 
interests, co-opt them, or intentionally or unintentionally close them off to certain people 
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(Tallontire et al., 2014). If tools for engagement and participation are used instrumentally whilst 
ignoring contextual factors, they can instead serve to legitimise or exacerbate inequitable power 
dynamics and outcomes (Mahanty and McDermott, 2013), especially if the systems of decision-
making involve misrepresentation or exclusion of certain individuals or groups from the circle 
of people who count (Fraser, 2009). Even the best applications cannot address many contextual 
factors or overcome social challenges at macro (e.g. legal and political rights) and micro levels 
(e.g. entrenched poverty, highly unequal land distribution and disparities within communities) 
(Mahanty and McDermott, 2013). 
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Table 2-2: Principles of Community Engagement 
Principle Examples within reviewed projects Caveats and counter-arguments 
Recognise heterogeneity of 
community/ audience (Dyer et al., 
2014, Hillier, 1998) taking into 
account issues around how 
communities define themselves, and 
different interests and power 
relations (Mathur et al., 2014) 
Kamoa: there were lower levels of trust/ consensus in a 
‘community’ which was externally formed by combining 
two locations together to make up numbers (Dyer et al., 
2014).  
 
Inclusion of marginalised groups can be 
problematic because traditional authorities may 
resist this, but standards can be used as a lever to 
persuade local elites and officials to make 
compromises (Wood, 2011) 
 
Dedicate the time, resources and 
repetition to ensure ongoing, two-
way communication  (World 
Agroforestry Centre, 2011, Dyer et 
al., 2014), using a range of tools and 
communication outlets (World 
Agroforestry Centre, 2011). 
This is both for project developers to 
understand community institutions, 
and communities to understand 
details of financing and contract 
arrangements and understand their 
commitments (Peskett et al., 2011, 
Wood, 2011) 
Kamoa: participants reported that the initial meeting 
involved two-way communications, open and meaningful 
exchange and consensus from participants, and ongoing 
engagement was facilitated by frequent visits from project 
representatives, enabling info-exchange, support and help 
where needed (Dyer et al., 2014). 
N’hambita and TFGB: opportunities for fostering 
understanding and information exchange were limited by 
infrequent (twice-yearly) interactions with project staff and 
extension workers, who visited only to service contracts 
(Dyer et al., 2014, Fisher, 2011).  
Angai Villages: communication was hampered by irregular 
meetings and the cost of sharing information (Mustalahti et 
al., 2012) 
Projects involving little participation may gain 
little from extra consultations- and project 
developers sometimes feel that they are 
unnecessary. Nevertheless, there is evidence of 
consultations being useful for identifying negative 
impacts or ways of improving even in such cases 
(Wood, 2011)  
Facilitation and management of group dynamics is 
more important than the tools used (Chess and 
Purcell, 1999) 
Too much consultation can result in consultation 
fatigue (Mulyani and Jepson, 2015) 
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Projects need charismatic leaders and 
facilitators (Chess and Purcell, 1999, 
Dyer et al., 2014, Hillier, 1998), and 
should be based on mutual respect 
and clarity of roles and 
responsibilities (World Agroforestry 
Centre, 2011) 
N’hambita, Kamoa and the KACP project all involved 
approaching the traditional authorities first, who invited 
members of their communities to attend initial meetings 
(Atela, 2012, Dyer et al., 2014) 
 
Communication can fail if it only goes through 
authorities and representatives rather than affected 
parties (Dyer et al., 2014, World Agroforestry 
Centre, 2011) 
Seek common ownership of the 
project, goal or decisions made 
(Dyer et al., 2014, Hillier, 1998) 
In a review of 42 African carbon forestry projects, all of the 
projects initiated and implemented by communities were 
classified as successes, suggesting that local ownership may 
be a determinant of success. Meanwhile, one of the failed 
projects involved a design which was incompatible with 
local economic incentives and social norms (Reynolds, 
2012) 
Well-designed frameworks and community 
participation in management are not enough to 
ensure access to benefits. External factors (e.g. 
dependency on outside actors for resources and 
technical support) and internal factors (around 
expectations of benefit-sharing) shape their 
effectiveness (Mustalahti et al., 2012) 
Draw on people’s knowledge and 
expertise (World Agroforestry 
Centre, 2011), recognising that they 
will have different images, values, 
meanings, information and 
languages at their disposal (Hillier, 
1998)  
Kamoa: design involved joint decision-making combined 
with farmers local knowledge, giving them the sovereignty 
to choose which land and planting system to adopt (Dyer et 
al., 2014). This characterises the Plan Vivo approach. 
Avoid using patronising or insensitive examples 
and metaphors (World Agroforestry Centre, 2011) 
Principle: design and approach of 
participatory activities is important, 
Repeated small interest group meetings and intensive 
facilitation enhanced learning in Indonesian setting because 
Participatory approaches can be used 
instrumentally and may not be capable of 
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e.g. small groups, where repeated 
interaction and communication are 
facilitated, as this can enhance social 
learning (Mulyani and Jepson, 2015, 
World Agroforestry Centre, 2011) 
it enabled community members to learn and respect 
different viewpoints without intimidation and enabled shifts 
of understanding and increased trust to occur (Mulyani and 
Jepson, 2015). 
challenging existing marginalisation (Mathur et 
al., 2014) 
Principle: Free, Prior and Informed 
Consent: people need to understand 
the implications of what they are 
being proposed or asked to sign in 
carbon contracts and clarity of rules 
and terms of engagement is vital 
(Mulyani and Jepson, 2015, Mahanty 
and McDermott, 2013).  
In TFGB and N’hambita there was incomplete 
understanding of contracts and the time-scale implications 
of commitments in projects, partially due to language used 
or illiteracy of farmers (Dyer et al., 2014, Kill, 2013) 
whereas in Kamoa there was evidence of a high level of 
understanding and recollection of information given during 
initial meetings (Dyer et al., 2014). 
Clarity may be enhanced by using a local language 
but it should not be assumed that a local language 
is preferred (World Agroforestry Centre, 2011). 
There may always be a gap in knowledge and 
power between local communities and project 
proponents so communities should be given legal 
advice and support to balance external interests 
driving projects (Mulyani and Jepson, 2015, 
Peskett et al., 2011).  
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2.6.3.2. Standardised mechanisms for community engagement 
Standards have the potential to serve as instruments for regulating the fairness of procedures 
through the practices they encode (Suiseeya and Caplow, 2013). In an attempt to promote 
transparency and participation and ensure that projects do no harm, some SSOs (e.g. Gold 
Standard, CCBA, Social Carbon, Plan Vivo) mandate the involvement of community 
stakeholders (to varying degrees and with varying levels of prescriptiveness) and audit the 
documentary evidence, through mechanisms for consultation, consent and expression of 
grievances. These also serve the purposes of reducing opposition and critique as projects are 
implemented, and therefore increase the attractiveness of credits certified under their schemes 
(Wood, 2011). The GSF Local Stakeholder Consultation guidelines specify a mandatory process 
with two rounds of consultations. These should be clearly documented, and include the names 
of people who attend and participate. Project details should be presented in non-technical form, 
and include an explanation of carbon markets and the generation of finance from offsetting 
(Wood, 2011). GSF provides guidance on how to organise a Local Stakeholder Consultation, by 
providing non-technical explanations of projects, templates of invitations, suggesting ways of 
engaging people and recording their input. In contrast, the Climate, Community and 
Biodiversity Standard specifies more who should be involved, modalities of involvement and 
require a continuous stakeholder involvement throughout the project (Sterk, 2009). 
Tools such as the Local Stakeholder Consultation facilitate a more structured inclusion of social 
dimensions in a project (Bumpus, 2011b), but the actual outcomes are contingent on their 
enactment by different actors and the rigour with which the SSO checks for non-compliance and 
encourages corrective measures. Evidence from a desk-review of design documents of 56 forest 
carbon projects certified under the Climate, Community and Biodiversity Standard suggests that 
in many cases, mechanisms ‘were notably devoid of diverse measures of engagement that could 
potentially engage a more comprehensive- and possibly more representative- group of 
stakeholders’ taking part in the consultation process (Suiseeya and Caplow, 2013:973). Where 
methods for inclusion were deployed, the choice of methods and the information provided about 
them suggested a more passive role for the community. In large meetings, people may be 
hesitant to express themselves (Suiseeya and Caplow, 2013) and simply presenting technical 
information might be insufficient for communicating complex concepts related to forest carbon 
projects, and ensuring comprehension (Lewis and Sheppard, 2006). When it came to providing 
input, only 57% of projects reported any of the responses received from community members, 
and 16 projects did not gather any input from community-based stakeholders (Suiseeya and 
Caplow, 2013). There were multiple examples of design documents which were not compliant 
with aspects of the Standard but had nevertheless been validated, suggesting that the criteria 
were not being rigorously applied or audited (Suiseeya and Caplow, 2013). 
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2.6.3.3. Proposed interventions and lessons  
FTI initially proposed two ways in which they imagined addressing participation (understood as 
part of fair procedures) in carbon projects: introducing the tool of Free, Prior and Informed 
Consent (FPIC), which is already a key tool within REDD+ (Reduced Emissions from 
Deforestation and Forest Degradation) projects; and empowering farmer organisations to take 
control in carbon projects. Challenges related to the latter have already been explored in relation 
to fair access so I elaborate on FPIC before making a brief comment about this second point.  
FPIC means giving affected stakeholders the right to freely (without coercion, intimidation or 
manipulation) give or withhold consent, having been able to access appropriate and sufficient 
information to make an informed choice, prior to a course of action (Szablowski, 2010, 
Mahanty and McDermott, 2013). In theory, ‘consent’ goes beyond ‘consultation’ because it 
involves the sharing or transfer of decision-making authority to those giving or withholding 
consent, and can be used to facilitate collaborative and inclusive decision-making or to avoid 
projects (Szablowski, 2010). FPIC has been criticised for only offering the right of consent to 
people with formal land rights, although in some applications (such as FSC), the right is 
extended to the wider community (Mahanty and McDermott, 2013). GSF incorporated FPIC 
into their Land Use and Forest Framework9: it refers to the principle that a community has the 
right to give or withhold its consent to proposed projects that may affect the lands they 
customarily own, occupy or otherwise use, and therefore goes a step towards addressing the 
criticism about land rights. The Plan Vivo definition is the same but includes smallholders as 
well as communities and adds ‘once they have a full and accurate understanding of the 
implications of the project’ (Plan Vivo, 2013 p29).  
In both cases, the problem may come in defining in practice who is included as a smallholder, 
community member, land owner or occupier (customary or otherwise), and also who makes this 
decision, and on what basis, given the highly politicised challenges associated with who has the 
‘right’ level of knowledge and understanding. Project developers may not have these contextual 
understandings at the outset of a process when tools like FPIC are being applied. It is common 
for companies or project leaders to refer to points of contact such as traditional or administrative 
leaders in order to make connection with the community, but sole reliance on them is 
problematic when accountability and transparency in local systems of representation is weak as 
they can harbour and perpetuate intra-community disparities (Mahanty and McDermott, 2013). 
                                                     
9 This was influenced by their partnership with FSC, as the two organisations had done an analysis of the 
areas of overlap and gaps between their standards (Public Presentation at the 19
th
 UNFCCC Conference 
of Parties). 
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Deployments of terms like ‘consultation’ and ‘consent’ need to be critically assessed to 
understand not only what is understood and intended by them, but also how they operate in 
particular contexts, how agendas are set and participants selected (Tallontire et al., 2014). There 
is a danger that they are embraced as panaceas (Mahanty and McDermott, 2013) but in practice 
they are shaped by multiple factors. These include the project developer’s commitment to the 
process, the level of civil society engagement, cultural and institutional factors affecting 
communication and participation, knowledge gaps, power relations, inclusivity, and the 
presence of external officials, (Wood, 2011, Dyer et al., 2014, Mahanty and McDermott, 2013). 
Mandating them within the standard is therefore not enough in itself to guarantee positive 
participation of local people in practice (Suiseeya and Caplow, 2013).  
FTI’s second proposition for addressing participation- empowering farmer organisations to take 
control of projects- needs to be understood within Fairtrade’s historical approach of working 
with Producer Organisations (see chapter 6). Although there is evidence of FTI’s success in this 
field, the transferability of the approach needs to take into account the challenges of carbon 
project development and implementation mentioned in the section on Fair Access.  
2.7. Conclusion to chapter two 
Heated debates surround the concept of fairness in carbon projects but the term itself is widely 
interpreted and lacks clear definition. After a review of relevant literature on the 
commodification of carbon and ‘fair carbon’, I then took a pragmatic approach by exploring the 
pillars of access, benefits and participation that FTI and GSF proposed to include in their 
framing of fairness, and reviewing academic literature in order to unravel what lies behind these 
pillars. I assessed how they are interconnected, and which practical constraints shape fairness 
outcomes within carbon projects. The GSF-FTI partnership provides an interesting focus 
because it potentially opens up discursive and material spaces, whereby more vulnerable 
stakeholders currently excluded from, or marginal in the carbon trading system could potentially 
play a more active role and reap more benefits. My analysis offers potential guidance for those 
involved in setting the parameters of fairness in refining their definitions, as well as informing 
further academic debate on ‘fair carbon’.  
While the outcomes of efforts to enhance access and shape fairer benefits and procedures for 
smallholders and communities are highly uncertain, it is important to explore steps being taken 
towards these goals. With many actors involved, multiple interests at stake, and a competitive 
context which may push SSOs to act quickly to fill gaps in the standards market, independent 
research can help to enhance transparency within the process. This involves going beyond an 
exploration of fairness dimensions in projects and standards tools for addressing them, to 
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explore of fairness dimensions in the setting of the standards themselves. I turn to this in chapter 
3.  
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Chapter 3 Fair Procedures in Standard Setting 
3.1. Introduction to chapter 3 
This chapter provides the backdrop for understanding the empirical material introduced in 
chapter 6 and for addressing objective two of this thesis. In this chapter I extend the concept of 
Fair Procedures introduced in chapter 2, to the process of Standard Setting by FTI (Figure 3-1). 
By doing this, I make a conceptual link between Fair Procedures and Fair Parameters. After a 
brief overview of relevant literature on Standards and standard setting, I then explore the 
framework (in terms of rules, procedures and political processes) that FTI has set in place to 
govern standard-setting and partnership processes, and examine how these look alongside both 
the ideal of fair procedures and participatory governance theories. This serves as a backdrop for 
a detailed analysis in chapter 6 of the application of FTI’s governance framework in practice in 
the context of the FCSSP. 
 
Figure 3-1: Aspects of the Multi-Dimensional Fairness Framework explored in chapter 3 
The purple arrow represents the question of how the ideals of Fair Procedures relate to the pre-existing 
governance structures and approaches that are likely to shape Fairness Parameter-Setting. 
3.2. Literature review: key themes within standards governance 
Section 1.4.2.1 introduced the research gaps related to collaborative standard setting in practice. 
In this section I elaborate on each of the key themes relevant to this thesis with the support of 
existing literature. 
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3.2.1. Standards: pathways and political processes 
The burgeoning of standards in the last two and a half decades has attracted a lot of scholarship 
aimed at better understanding their emergence, evolution and continued proliferation at different 
levels (Djama et al., 2011). The majority of works have applied an institutional theory lens, 
which posits that the quest for external legitimacy is the main explanation for the existence and 
proliferation of private standard setting (Djama et al., 2011).  
By applying a pathways approach, I view standards and standard setting processes more 
critically, as an example of a managerial approach to sustainability issues resulting in 
universalising pathways that are not necessary appropriate to the problems they aim to address. 
Blowfield and Dolan (2008) protract this perspective by describing standards as techno-
rationalist solutions that are part of a drive for neoliberal normalisation. Bacon’s view on 
Fairtrade standards is that they are not a complete reflection of a neoliberal agenda, but 
Fairtrade governance is subject to ‘an array of political economic constraints, personal 
convictions, and path-dependent contingencies’ (2010 p112). A number of authors have 
explored how the organisational trajectories of standards organisations are shaped by 
cooperation and competition between participating stakeholders who seek to control the rules of 
the game and pursue their own interests (Mutersbaugh et al., 2005). It is important to 
acknowledge standards’ political backdrop not least because it has consequences on poor and 
marginalised people (Blowfield and Dolan, 2008, Leach et al., 2010). 
Attending to the political dimensions of standards requires an exploration of the internal 
processes of certification, socially embedded practices and governance tools deployed to set 
standards. Chapter 6 of this thesis is dedicated to this analysis and builds on existing works (e.g. 
Bacon, 2010, Blowfield and Dolan, 2008, Cheyns, 2011, Djama et al., 2011, Murphy and Yates, 
2011, Ponte et al., 2011, Reinecke, 2010). Between them they have looked at how governing is 
accomplished in practical and technical terms within different types of standard setting 
initiatives including those led by Fairtrade International. This has involved exploring the 
circumstances within which standards are developed; questioning the rationales, strategies and 
moral reasoning behind them; mapping the configurations of actors, interests and alliances and 
dynamics of inclusion and exclusion; examining conflict, negotiation and co-existence of 
different viewpoints; and exploring the effects of standards and the interests they serve. Despite 
a common focus across these works, scholars’ views differ on a number of aspects. Differences 
relate to some extent to the type of standards they looked at, but also the analytical lens applied.  
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3.2.2. Legitimacy, inclusiveness and power 
Standards involving inputs from a broad range of stakeholders including civil society tend to be 
regarded as more legitimate than standards developed by single companies or industries (Fuchs 
et al., 2011). Multi-stakeholder initiatives such as the Round table on Sustainable Palm Oil 
(RSPO) base their legitimacy on balanced representation and participation of ‘all categories of 
stakeholders’, and thus a wide range of interests (Cheyns, 2011). The involvement of coalitions 
of companies, trade unions, NGOs and other civil society stakeholders, is believed to reduce the 
likelihood that business will have too much influence on social and environmental issues and to 
better present workers’ and producers’ interests (Blowfield and Dolan, 2008). A significant 
defining feature of standards perceived by standard-setters is their democratic process 
orientation (Murphy and Yates, 2011), often involving extensive dialogue and consensus-based 
decision-making.  
In practice, participation is ‘inflected’ by power relations, meaning that initiatives involving 
broad participation by multiple stakeholders are potentially as exclusionary as top down 
initiatives (Blowfield and Dolan, 2008 p16). For example, Cheyns (2011) has found that the 
RSPO’s inclusive aims are compromised in practice in terms of who is considered a 
‘stakeholder’ and how participation is managed: people who engage through personal 
attachments, drawing on lived experiences or principles of justice are less able to make 
themselves heard and their interventions accorded less legitimacy than those who adopt a 
pragmatic approach. Southern stakeholders have expressed concerns that ethical trade codes are 
developed behind desks in Europe with little consultation and some critics argue that these 
reflect colonial ethnocentrism (Blowfield and Dolan, 2008).  
Standard setting is considered technical and SSOs such as FTI and Rainforest International have 
begun including both internal and external ‘experts’ on their standards committees. Murphy and 
Yates (2011) describe the members of technical standards committees rather benignly as 
epistemic communities who believe that humanity can benefit from their shared knowledge. 
Although they may represent certain interests and actors, they do not always advocate for what 
suits them. In contrast, Blowfield and Dolan (2008) detect more of a power asymmetry amongst 
the ‘communities’ who participate in devising ethical codes for horticulture. These are ‘the 
community of the supply chain’ including the poor and marginalised to which Northern 
business has a duty, and ‘the community of principals’- the CSOs and companies who are not 
commercial participants in the supply chain but they influence its governance and their 
worldviews significantly inform what constitutes virtue. This latter community is more likely to 
be recognised by Multi Stakeholder Initiatives, and ethical trade involves them exerting power 
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over the community of the supply chain through the legitimisation of certain behaviour and 
instruments (ibid).  
Standard setting committees may include people who claim to represent smallholders but may 
do so only on an ad hoc basis and without adequate accountability or legitimacy, rather than it 
being a truly representative smallholder participation (Tallontire et al., 2014, Cheyns, 2011). 
Efforts to include ‘local’ perspectives, for example within horticultural codes for African 
agriculture, are not necessarily more ethically relevant because they falsely assume that there is 
a community of beneficiaries who share a collective identity, culture and set of interests while 
ignoring the cultural embeddedness and contested nature of issues they may be consulted on 
such as gender-based discrimination and sexual harassment (Blowfield and Dolan, 2008).  
Several authors have described the management of participation within standard setting as an 
example of a managerialism: this refers to a set of knowledge and practices systematically 
aimed at increasing the efficiency of collective action (Djama et al., 2011). Arguably, the more 
managerial the approach, the less inclusive it is (Ponte et al., 2011). These same forms of 
exclusion, elitism and unequal access are likely to apply to the setting of carbon standards but 
few studies have documented this. 
3.2.3. Conflicts, tensions and governing tools 
The design, content, implementation and underlying epistemology of standards and codes are 
sites of conflict and negotiation (Blowfield and Dolan, 2008). Aside from looking at who comes 
to the bargaining table (Busch, 2000), it is important to look at how conflicts and tensions are 
dealt with, how multiple perspectives are allowed to co-exist and how conflicting viewpoints 
are transformed into cooperative attitudes (Djama et al., 2011). In an analysis of the adjustment 
of Fairtrade coffee prices in 2007-2008 from the perspective of a researcher positioned 
alongside the Latin American producer network, Bacon (2010) describes the outcomes as a 
result of a balance of power, convictions and capabilities within a contested governance system. 
Reinecke (2010) studied the same process as an intern within Fairtrade International and 
described it as a result of negotiation power drawing both on techno-scientific input from the 
Standards Unit and multi-stakeholder democracy from the Standards Committee and FTI Board.  
The fair trade movement is already marked by tensions regarding what ‘fairness’ means, who 
fair trade should target, and where should it be going (Doherty et al., 2013, Raynolds and 
Greenfield, 2015, Smith, 2013) and bringing new stakeholders into debates about Fairtrade 
carbon was likely to increase the possibility for tension and conflict in the FCSSP. Views differ 
on whether or not multi-stakeholder standard setting processes can be a site for constructively 
dealing with conflict or not. Murphy and Yates (2011) recognise that greater understanding that 
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can come from participating and that better technical solutions are frequently discovered in the 
course of debates, especially through standard setting by consensus. Focht and Lawler (2000) 
recognise that policy [or standards] processes require particular tools (such as Q) to open up 
debate and expose underlying conflicts as failing to recognise them can inhibit deliberative 
processes. In contrast, Djama et al. (2011) see consensus as a tactic for neutralising debate 
because unlike compromise, it does not result from debate or negotiation. (Rancière, 2013 p8, 
c.f. Djama et al., 2011) describes consensus as a ‘machine of power’ with the aim of imposing a 
vision, a particular presentation of facts and a direction for their interpretation. Djama et al. 
(2011) note how consensus processes are strategically commandeered in the RSPO, by 
consultants who make efforts to mobilise particular intermediaries and confine debates on 
sensitive issues to specialised committees. Cheyns (2011) describes this as a technical 
‘professional style’ of interaction without confrontation which comes down to the politically-
correct style of language used.  
The act of preventing conflict from arising in the first place has been described as ‘the most 
insidious and effective use of power’ (Lukes, 1974 p23). While some authors see consensus as a 
tool for wielding this sort of power, it is important to discern what the tool is designed to offer, 
the system it is part of, how it is enacted in practice and whether this meets the intended aims 
(Bühler, 2002). This topic is returned to in chapter 6.  
Aside from consensus and the management of tensions, a number of other tools and tactics have 
been scrutinised and labelled as technologies of managerialism, deployed to wield power and 
impose particular directionalities and outcomes in standard setting processes. These include for 
example the control of issue-exploration through tactics to open up and close down discussions 
(Cheyns, 2011, Leach et al., 2010), see also section 3.4.4; using pragmatic arguments and the 
pressure for expediency to opt for short-term, practical, implementable, economically 
acceptable or most knowable solutions (Cheyns, 2011, Djama et al., 2011, Leach et al., 2010); 
and mystifying the auditing process by limiting discussion on how criteria have been established 
(Blowfield and Dolan, 2008). 
3.2.4. Section summary 
Different views on the above themes relate to different perspectives on standards and what they 
do, as well as authors’ foci on different types of standard, ranging from standards with routes in 
social movements; to industry-dominated multi-stakeholder initiatives and business to business 
standards. While Fairtrade standards fit with the first category it is important to recognise that 
such standards are increasingly drawing on neoliberal governance tools (Djama et al., 2011). 
We can expect that FTI might hold the potential to design inclusive stakeholder processes, 
based on their participatory governance approach (see section 3.4), but this needs to be critically 
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unpacked. This section has underlined the need to look at governance processes enacted by 
particular SSOs whilst considering the wider political context within which standards are being 
deployed as techno-rational governance tools. My work builds on the authors cited in this 
section, particularly Bacon (2010) and Reinecke (2010) who have both looked at decision-
making within FTI price negotiations. They positioned themselves inside the movement in order 
to understand socially embedded governance practices and situate governance processes within 
FTI’s historical and future trajectory. My approach involves a similarly long term and 
embedded ethnographic engagement but with a broader and more comprehensive focus on an 
entire standard setting process rather than a pricing decision. I am also situated as an 
independent researcher rather than being attached to a particular sub-unit of FTI. Nevertheless it 
is important to be reflexive about the position I adopt. Leach et al. (2010) encourage 
engagement by researchers in path-building processes but some critics have questioned the 
appropriateness of intervening to make standards setting processes more democratic or to try to 
remove their structural limitations. The concern is that this can contribute to an advancement of 
the interests of already powerful actors in standard-setting, naturalise them as a form of 
governance, or disperse of local struggles (Blowfield and Dolan, 2008, Mutersbaugh, 2005). In 
chapter 8 I reflect on my positionality and its possible effects. 
In the remainder of this chapter, section 3.3 introduces FTI’s governance structure, rules and 
processes for standard-setting and explores the interface between stakeholders in the Fairtrade 
system and stakeholders involved in the FCSSP and section 3.4 discusses FTI’s participatory 
governance approach and critically explores this in relation to literature on participatory and 
collaborative governance. Section 3.5 concludes the chapter. 
3.3. FTI: a representative and inclusive institution? 
FTI is a membership organisation with an evolving governance structure. Their aims to achieve 
fairness and justice through democratic decision-making (Taylor, 2005b) are challenged by the 
number and diversity of stakeholders involved in the Fairtrade system (Sutton, 2013). The 
organisation is under substantial pressure from its consortium and onlookers to genuinely 
engage with and include not only its membership base (which includes more than 1.5 million 
producers and workers grouped within three Producer Networks (PNs) and 19 National 
Fairtrade Organisations (NFOs) involved in licensing and marketing Fairtrade products) but also 
a wider set of stakeholders such as NGOs, supporters and other CSOs in the north and south, as 
well as businesses and consumers, in its governance processes (Bacon, 2010, Sutton, 2013). 
There is evidence of significant efforts made to respond to this pressure (Bennett, 2015). A 
‘ground-breaking’ vote in 2011 instigated major changes to increase producer representation, 
according the producer networks equal voting rights in the General Assembly, the highest 
73 
 
decision-making body, and reconfiguring the Board to offer an equal number of places to 
producer representatives and market representatives (see Table 3-1). Marking these changes, 
FTI announced, ‘we’re proud of our multi-stakeholder system. We know the importance of 
being held accountable to the producers, traders, NGOs and supporters who have worked so 
hard to make Fairtrade what it is today’ (Fairtrade International, 2012 p18). However, these 
changes do not automatically render a stronger voice to all producers, particularly because of 
issues of capacity and representation (Sutton, 2013).  
3.3.1. Rules and processes 
The rules and processes for representation on the Standards Committee and decision making 
procedures are defined in the FTI Terms of Reference for the Standards Committee and the 
Standard Operating Procedure for standard setting (more details are given on decision-making 
provisions in section 6.6.2.1). However, this formal governance structure (Table 3-1 and Figure 
3-2) needs to be understood alongside the spaces created for people who are not included within 
the existing Fairtrade membership or representative structure to have an influence on standards. 
The FCSSP implied the creation of a new Fairtrade commodity involving a new set of 
stakeholders who at the time were not members of FTI and were unfamiliar with its system and 
processes, but were being relied on to fill in gaps in carbon expertise that FTI did not possess. 
This dynamic implied the need to include and negotiate between an expanded set of viewpoints 
of FTI members and non-members.  
Table 3-1: Entities within the Fairtrade System and role played in governance and 
standard-setting 
Entity Role in governance Influence on standards 
Producer Networks (PNs) 
(3): for Africa, Latin 
America and Asia 
 
Full members of FTI. 
Voting rights at Annual 
General Assembly; 4 
places on the Fairtrade 
Board   
Can submit standard request  
Invited to provide input during 
research/ drafting phase, and 
during consultation 
PNs recruit producer-facing 
members of Standards Committee 
Fairtrade Organisations:  
-19 NFOs (govern use of 
Fairtrade mark and promote 
Fairtrade) 
-6 Fairtrade Marketing 
Organisations (promote 
Fairtrade)  
Only NFOs are full 
members (voting rights at 
Annual General Assembly 
and 4 places on the 
Fairtrade Board) 
Can submit standard request  
Invited to provide input during 
research/ drafting phase, and 
during consultation 
Can postulate as members of the 
Standards Committee, recruited 
by FTI. 
General Assembly (50% 
producer representatives; 
50% NFO representatives) 
Meets once per year to 
approve accounts, decide 
on membership issues and 
ratify Board members. 
No role in standards development 
FTI Board Supreme decision-making Advises on strategies/ objectives 
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 body for FTI for standards development; 
Decides on the Standard 
Committee’s responsibilities and 
membership and delegates 
decision-making authority to them 
FTI Leadership team and 
staff  
 
Leadership team manages 
day-to-day operations and 
strategic direction 
The Standards Unit, led by 
Director of Standards and Pricing 
is responsible for developing and 
revising Fairtrade standards, 
research and coordination work. 
FTI Standards Committee No role in governance Meets 4-6 times per year, takes 
major decisions about standards, 
delegating minor decisions to the 
Standards Unit. Responsible for 
resolving contentious issues; 
balancing stakeholder comments; 
clarifying terms and conditions; 
reviewing effectiveness and 
practicalities. 
FLOCERT (independent 
certification body of the 
Fairtrade system) 
Part of the Fairtrade 
system but not members 
of FTI (and no role in its 
governance) 
Responsible for developing  
compliance criteria for standards, 
and auditing compliance  
Source: compiled by author from www.fairtrade.net  
 
Figure 3-2: FTI formal bodies involved in standard-setting and interactions between them, 
compiled by author from www.fairtrade.net 
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3.4. Participatory Governance 
Beyond the formal governance structures, FTI’s Partnership Strategy 2011-2015 lays out 
intentions to include not only member organisations but ‘everyone with a stake in a 
development process’, following an approach they call ‘participatory governance’. This is 
described as an inclusive approach, based on equality, which is critical in maximising the 
development potential of Fairtrade and in enabling partnerships to reach their potential 
(Fairtrade International, 2009).  
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Table 3-2 has been developed on the basis of the intentions laid out in FTI’s Partnership 
Strategy for 2011-2015 (Fairtrade International, 2009). While the original document does not 
describe the approach in terms of intentions and underlying aims, this structure helps to draw 
out what exactly FTI are hoping to achieve, making it easier to assess. Note that this strategy is 
intended to set out the ways that FTI works with their longer term formal institutional partners, 
(see for example Fairtrade International, 2011a). However, in this thesis I extend it to an 
assessment of how they work with ‘everyone with a stake in a development process’ including 
the stakeholders they partner with on a more informal basis during standard setting processes. 
Although this may push the bar higher than FTI originally intended, the intention is to use the 
high bar to identify opportunities for improvement and extension in the implementation of the 
strategy. 
Table 3-2: Analytical interpretation of FTI’s participatory governance approach 
FTI’s Participatory Governance Approach 
Intention A: Avoiding power 
imbalances in relationships 
A.1. Engaging with partners on an equal footing 
with shared resources and ambitions to find 
solutions to the most pressing development 
challenges 
Intention B: Enabling everyone with a 
stake to contribute to design and 
outcome 
B.1. Enabling diverse stakeholders to participate 
and interact 
B.2.Enabling diverse stakeholders to share in 
decision-making activities where practical 
Underlying governance aim To draw on alternatives to top-down development 
models 
On the surface, FTI’s participatory approach seems to fit with the ideal form of fair procedures  
described in the environmental justice literature: ‘participatory parity’ is when parties are 
recognised and affirmative efforts are made to ensure their inclusion and representation and 
redress imbalances, including removing institutional obstacles that prevent participation as peers 
(Fraser, 2009, Hillier, 1998). However, as an ideal form, it is hard to achieve in practice. Below 
I explore the possible limits to FTI’s governance intentions. 
3.4.1. Intention 1: Avoiding power imbalances in relationships 
This intention is ambitious even if it is only applied to FTI’s formal institutional partners. Power 
and resource imbalances between stakeholders are common problems in collaborative 
governance, and if stakeholders do not all have the same capacities, organisation, status or 
resources to participate on an equal footing, stronger actors can manipulate the governance 
process while certain interests and parties are subordinated (Ansell and Gash, 2008, Fung and 
Wright, 2003). Formal institutions involving participatory collaboration often involve 
significant asymmetries in prior organisation, knowledge, level of interest and capabilities 
(Fung and Wright, 2003). There is a risk that participation in governance is in practice no more 
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than an interest group approach where groups and individuals lobby a system to shape it to their 
own self-interests (Cornwall and Gaventa, 2000). Competitive interest group bargaining is at the 
root of many policy failures (Fischer, 2003a). Fung and Wright (2003 p261) classify such 
bargaining as ‘adversarial decision-making’ and contrast it with collaborative decision-making 
‘where the central effort is to solve problems rather than to win victories, to discover the 
broadest commonality of interests rather than to mobilise maximum support for given interests’. 
Adversarialism emphasises differences rather than commonalities between groups and has the 
potential to generate excess conflict, and therefore may be unhelpful when working towards 
either intention in Fairtrade’s Participatory Governance approach. Nevertheless, the tendency 
for co-optation of standards and adversarial decision-making by powerful players in the private 
sector is evidenced by a number of scholars (Busch, 2011, Cheyns, 2011, Tallontire et al., 2014) 
and power relations should always be tended to when exploring governance processes 
(Flyvbjerg, 2001).  
While at the level of formal institutional partners, FTI can strive to ensure that resources and 
ambitions are shared and that engagement is on an equal footing, when this intention is applied 
to ‘everyone with a stake’ it may be more appropriate to start by recognising that power 
imbalances are very likely, and that positive strategies of empowerment and representation of 
weaker or disadvantaged stakeholders are required. This is the approach laid down in the ISEAL 
Code of Good Practice for Standard Setting (ISEAL Alliance, 2014b) through the principle of 
accessibility, which requires SSOs to ensure that appropriate opportunities to participate in the 
Standard Setting Process are provided for stakeholders, including those who are disadvantaged. 
Similarly, environmental justice literature notes that in the absence of participatory parity, 
expectable and/or unavoidable exclusions need to be recognised rather than concealed (Hillier, 
1998), and the exclusion of certain visions of the environment, certain individuals and groups 
and certain kinds of values should be interrogated (Martinez-Alier, 2014, Mathur et al., 2014) .   
3.4.2. Intention 2: Enabling everyone with a stake to contribute to design 
and outcome 
Procedural injustice occurs either when the decision-rules deny the full participation of those 
who have been included, or when the boundaries used to define ‘who counts’ deny the inclusion 
of certain people (Fraser, 2009). The second intention needs to be understood in the context of 
who is defined as counting as a stakeholder, and who is allowed to fully participate according to 
which rules. In the Partnership Strategy (Fairtrade International, 2009), ‘everyone with a stake’ 
includes producers, consumers, businesses, funders and technical service providers. The ISEAL 
Code indicates that key stakeholders can include both directly affected stakeholders such as 
‘enterprises being assessed for compliance against the standard, community and indigenous 
78 
 
groups affected by application of the standard, and environmental organisations who have an 
interest in areas affected by the implementation of the standard’ and also indirectly affected 
stakeholders who have an interest in the application of the standard (ISEAL Alliance, 2014b 
p12-14). The ISEAL Code recommends a mapping process for stakeholder identification, and 
this is included in FTI’s Standard Operating Procedure. However, as a membership organisation 
FTI is also committed to providing particular opportunities for participation, representation and 
formal decision-making to members over and above non-members. Of the stakeholders listed 
above, only licensed producers, some businesses (licensed as traders) and NFOs (who may also 
provide funding or technical services) are actually members (see Table 3-1). While other diverse 
stakeholders may be given space to participate, interact and to contribute to design and outcome, 
if they are not members they are not included in formal decision-making processes. The ISEAL 
Code of Good Practice takes this potential tension into account within its clauses on Decision-
Making, through the guidance that ‘limiting decision-making to members does not preclude the 
standard-setting organisation from meeting other requirements for balanced, multi-stakeholder 
participation in decision-making’ (ISEAL Alliance, 2014b p14). It is important to ensure that 
commitments to include a broader range of stakeholders including non-members is not done 
instrumentally or superficially, with no real commitment to take non-members’ inputs on board. 
However it is also important to track whether existing governance arrangements resulting from 
long fought battles, are allowed to flourish when non-member stakeholders are allowed a hand 
in design, decision making and delivery of outcomes.  
In parallel, another potential tension exists between the assumed need for expert or technical 
knowledge which is common within standard-setting processes (see e.g. Tallontire et al., 2014) 
and mandated within the ISEAL Code of Good Practice (ISEAL Alliance, 2014b), and the 
intention to include everyone with a stake (including stakeholders who do not yet have a high 
degree of technical knowledge). Literature on participatory governance provides evidence of the 
value of broadening of participation beyond FTI’s formal partners to include civilians, including 
‘non-experts’ in the search for solutions to pressing development problems. ‘Including the 
public’ has become an expected component of ‘good practice’ in many arenas across the world, 
enhancing the diversity of voices and opportunities for citizen engagement and deliberation 
(Cornwall, 2004). Non-expert input can contribute to the legitimisation of the standard or policy 
development and implementation process (increasing acceptance of, or trust in the decisions 
made), its role in enhancing learning, articulation of broader demands, and help to build and 
preserve present and future decision-making capacities (Fischer, 2003a, Cornwall and Gaventa, 
2000). Non-experts in particular can contribute to problem characterisation by highlighting 
aspects of the problem requiring analysis, raising questions that have been overlooked, and 
providing knowledge and experience of specific conditions that need to be understood in order 
for assumptions to be more realistic (Fischer, 2003a). However, it is inherently complex to 
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integrate different types of knowledge and any attempts to do so need to take in account (i) that 
this must be supported by mechanisms to support mutual learning and deliberation, and (ii) that 
perspectives might change during a process as people take on board new information (Raymond 
et al., 2010). Overall, popular participation in governance processes has been heralded as a 
potential means for improving effectiveness of projects and alignment of participants’ goals 
(Leach et al., 2010), although practical implementation is challenged in particular by barriers to 
participation and power relations. Too much focus on technical aspects can mean that the 
examination of social, ethical and political values is pushed off the agenda (Fischer, 2003a) and 
it may be those whose daily lives are affected by the standard or policy rather than those who 
are providing a professional contribution, who are best placed to raise these questions (see e.g. 
Cheyns, 2011). Participation may be in various ways, and in various ‘spaces’, e.g. closed or 
provided, ‘invited’, claimed, created or ‘raided’ spaces (Cornwall and Coelho, 2007), each of 
which may be bounded but permeable and navigable by different people at different times 
(Gaventa, 2004). Attending to the spaces sheds light on the people given entry but also those 
who are temporarily or permanently excluded from spaces for participation (Tallontire et al., 
2014, Nelson et al., 2014).  
These considerations are particularly relevant within this process because of the implications of 
a new Fairtrade commodity mentioned above. Research and reflection can be used to look at 
why some suggestions and interpretations are taken forward and used as the basis for decision-
making while others are not, and this involves exploring counter-politics, operating outside 
those arenas (Leach et al., 2010). To understand how this dynamic operated in practice in the 
context of the FCSSP, including which stakeholders (members and non-members) actually 
contributed to design, decisions and delivery of outcomes, both formal and informal decision-
making processes need to be examined.  
3.4.3. Underlying governance aim: alternatives to top-down development 
models 
Fung and Wright (2003) note that top down governance solutions may lack relevant information 
and local knowledge and involve long feedback loops, because those making the decisions are 
far from those who must live under them. Also they tend to generate fixed rules that are not 
suited to contexts of high local diversity, volatility and scientific uncertainty. In principle, 
participatory governance offers a counter governance mode to top down governance, by 
involving substantive direct involvement of actors from the bottom tiers of an organisational 
structure rather than imposing decisions from the top down. However, if those who participate 
are primarily experts and elites, then this is still a form of top-down governance subject to the 
same limitations as non-participatory governance, such as distance from those who are affected 
80 
 
by the policy or standard in their daily lives. Fung and Wright (2003) distinguish between four 
varieties of governance structures and processes, using the dimensions of top-down versus 
participatory, and adversarial versus collaborative (see Table 3-3).  
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Character of decision-making process 
1: Top down  
Adversarial 
2: Top down Collaborative 
3: Participatory 
Adversarial 
4: Participatory Collaborative 
Co-optation and participatory 
window dressing 
Robust, democracy-enhancing 
forms of collaboration 
Table 3-3: Varieties of Governance Structures and Processes, based on Fung and Wright 
(2003) 
Participatory Governance as defined by FTI, should sit in quadrant 4 of the matrix. However, 
Fung and Wright (2003) posit that within this quadrant there are different possible outcomes- (i) 
those that take the form of co-optation and participatory window-dressing, and (ii) robust, 
democracy-enhancing forms of collaboration. Empowered Participatory Governance is an 
example of a governance design which can achieve the 4b-types of outcomes. It is characterised 
by decentralised decision-making, centralised coordination and includes mechanisms to 
counteract power imbalances and facilitate representation of the weak and less organised actors 
(Fung and Wright, 2003). Its three principles are practical orientation, bottom-up participation, 
and deliberative solution generation. Within this design, equality does not have to be absolute 
but it must be sufficient for the purposes of deliberation. They note that Empowered 
Participatory Governance in practice is hindered by the use of power relations to manipulate 
decisions but this can be counteracted if there is significant countervailing power (a form of 
power that develops to reduce, or even neutralises the power advantages of ordinarily powerful 
actors). It is therefore the degree of countervailing power that can shape outcomes of co-
optation versus robust collaboration within Participatory Collaborative governance modes. 
Empowered Participatory Governance has generally been applied to settings involving state and 
non-state actors but Doherty et al (2013) have assessed Fairtrade governance against the 
benchmark of Empowered Participatory Governance. They have identified examples of 
countervailing power within the Latin American Producer Network, exemplified by their 
creation of a new label (Símbolo de Pequeños Productores) and their choice to exclude Hired 
Labour set-ups from their regional network. Doherty et al (2013) recognise that their analysis of 
countervailing power within FTI is limited, and recommend further exploration.  
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Participatory Deliberation is another governance form situated in quadrant 4b of the matrix, 
which involves bringing diverse actors and perspectives together into forums for debate, 
dialogue and negotiation (Leach et al., 2010). Its goals are to create a setting for social learning 
about existing interests, problems, possibilities and responsibilities, to build legitimacy around 
new interests, and in the process, influence ‘the political pathways along which power and 
interest travel’ (Fischer, 2003a p205). The emphasis is on the sense-making of complex policy 
problems (Leach et al., 2010), and this is often a timely process with no guarantee of consensus. 
However, over time, it can be more effective in helping to define and sustain chosen actions and 
can counter tendencies towards adversarialism (Fischer, 2003a). Facilitation of a participatory 
deliberation process involves creating the conditions that support people to pose questions, 
decide on important issues and make basic connections themselves (Fischer, 2003b). It may still 
imply that proposal generation and decision-making is done by the people with the official 
mandate, and that they come with their own values and specific ideas about what should be 
done. Nevertheless, by seeking input from and stimulating discussion amongst a wider set of 
people, they receive guidance about direction and a set of alternative visions about what is 
desirable and possible. This provokes them to re-examine the premises and values at the root of 
the decisions they make (Fischer, 2003a). 
3.4.4. Opening Up and Closing Down in policy appraisal 
Genuinely deliberative policy-making and consensus-based decision making, requires active 
attempts to open up the policy-making process to include a variety of inputs, as well as 
decisions to exclude some options and come to a decision on a particular way forward. 
Subjecting policy to appraisal (whereby a system is analysed in order to generate substantive 
understandings, social learning and decipher cultural meanings, see Smith and Stirling (2007)) 
involves both opening up and closing down processes.  
Opening up involves posing alternative questions, looking at neglected issues, marginal 
perspectives and ignored uncertainties, triangulating contending knowledges, examining 
different options and highlighting new possibilities (Smith and Stirling, 2007). Closing down is 
about ‘defining the right questions, finding the priority issues, identifying the salient 
knowledges, recruiting the appropriate protagonists, adopting the most effective methods, 
highlighting the most likely outcomes and so determining the “best” options’ (Stirling, 2005 
p221-222). This contrasts with premature closure which can occur before a proper examination 
of the options and the assumptions behind them has taken place, and may come about if 
powerful interests stand behind a particular option and push it to a decision-point. 
Decision-making comes with an inherent tension, in that understanding may always be 
insufficient but approaches must be fixed in order ‘to do something here and now and perhaps 
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make a difference’ (Rip, 2006 p92). Smith and Stirling note that ‘whether consensual, 
majoritarian, elitist, or to meet sectional interests, pragmatic “decisions” must be made’ (Smith 
and Stirling, 2007 p369) which sometimes results in sub-optimal ‘satisficing’ strategies with the 
aim of producing acceptable outcomes. This happens in almost all governance settings but the 
key is to have regular self-critical reassessment to see if satisficing strategies are delivering the 
desired outcomes according to different people’s perspectives (Smith and Stirling, 2007). 
3.5. Conclusion to chapter three 
This chapter described standard setting as an example of pathway-building and then situated 
research on standards governance processes within the broader literature. It then described FTI’s 
own governance structure and approach and examined this through the lens of procedural 
fairness according to insight from literature on environmental justice and participatory 
governance. FTI is a multi-stakeholder organisation that has made efforts to include its broad 
membership base in top level governance. On paper, the organisation’s participatory governance 
approach aligns closely with ideals of fair procedures and participatory parity. In practice, it 
may be better to recognise firstly that power imbalances are likely to exist and need to be 
factored into process design, and secondly to recognise the inherent tensions linked to the aim 
of enabling diverse stakeholders to interact and participate in design and decision-making. 
Alternative governance forms must be congruent with the issue and context, or problem space 
(Voss et al., 2006 p435). In this case, it could be expected that a mix of governance structures, 
processes and mechanisms might be required. This is because there is both a need to engender 
mutual learning and bridging between member and non-member stakeholders (who have 
different pieces of knowledge and experience to contribute); and a need to respect FTI’s formal 
decision-making processes (which emphasises consensus). Governance structures and processes 
also need to be dynamic as issues move through the different stages deliberation and consensus-
based decision making. This might begin with mechanisms that open up the issue to further 
exploration, and move into mechanisms that are more conducive to reaching closure on an issue 
when decisions ultimately need to be made. In chapter 6 of this thesis, I undertake an issue-
based exploration of the various governance forms that came to the fore in practice, and assess 
the extent to which they were alternatives to top-down governance. This is preceded by a 
description of the overall research design and methodology (chapter 4) and an empirical 
assessment of perspectives on fairness held by stakeholders in the FCSSP in chapter 5. 
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Chapter 4 Research Design and Methodology 
4.1. Introduction to chapter four 
This thesis used a case study approach to conduct action-oriented research within the case of the 
Fairtrade Climate Standard Setting Process (FCSSP) managed by FTI in partnership with GSF. 
These approaches are conducive for exploring complex processes, which need to be understood 
in their real-life context (Nowotny et al., 2005). Case study research enables the researcher to 
maintain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of contemporary phenomenon, situated 
within their real life contexts, and is especially appropriate when the boundaries between the 
phenomenon and the context are entangled (Yin, 2013). Action-oriented research is also 
context-bound, and takes on real life and often complex problems (Greenwood and Levin, 1998, 
Bolwig et al., 2008). It recognises the inextricable link between research and action, or between 
research processes, outcomes, and the application of results to problem solving. Access to real 
time data on the early stages of organisational alliance formation (and in this case, on the early 
stages of a standard which was the principal product arising from the partnership between FTI 
and GSF) can be hard to come by for a number of reasons. Firstly, the alliance process may be 
happening secretly and is hidden to the researcher; secondly, it may move too fast for the 
researcher to gain access; thirdly, once the researcher’s interest in the alliance is known, 
lawyers, partners and others may be ambivalent about an outsider’s involvement; and fourthly 
the organisations may be concerned about research ‘advertising’ a non-successful outcome 
should their partnership result in this (Ariño and Ring, 2010). In my case, I met and surmounted 
the third and fourth barriers. Meanwhile, serendipity, timeliness and support from a number of 
key people during the research partnership negotiation phase helped me to bypass the first two 
potential barriers. Trust, determination and conviction from myself, my supervisors and the 
research partners made this process challenging rather than ‘hard’, but the real time data 
accessed is nonetheless a rare and valuable find. 
I used the methods of participant observation, interviews, Q method, document analysis, 
participatory policy analysis, supported reflection and documentary evidence of impact. This 
was a novel mix of methods aimed not only at addressing the research questions but also at 
achieving the two pathways components 5 and 6 introduced in sections 1.3.1 and 1.4.3.1: 
engaging in pathway-building processes and enhancing reflection. While some methods were 
selected as the case study was being negotiated, others were added during the course of the 
research process. Flexibility of methods is a characteristic of action oriented research (see 
section 4.4.1) and indicative of my close engagement with the pathway-building process and 
hence the need to find ways of aligning my own unfolding research process with that of the 
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FCSSP. This positionality accorded me opportunities to be inventive, creating novel ways of 
enhancing reflection during moments when I discerned that it was most needed. The sections 
below set out the research design, data collection, analysis, and quality control procedures, and 
then outline important reflections on the role of the researcher, ethical issues and 
methodological challenges. 
The approach I adopted is rooted in an ‘organistic-oriented’ action research process in which 
inquiry into the assumptions and ways of thinking and acting of the participants rather than 
problem-solving is central10 (Coghlan, 2003). My purpose was to contribute to the ongoing 
FCSSP, support reflection and learning and reflect on the role of research in live standard-
setting processes rather than engage in joint problem-solving alongside the Research Partner 
Organisations (RPOs) about how to produce an optimal standard. I had an understanding of the 
‘problem’ and the ‘solution’ as framed by the RPOs but I did not know whether the same 
‘problem’, or ‘solution’ would be articulated by the smallholders who were the intended target 
of the solution (I had not been able to consult them). Also I was agnostic as to whether or not it 
really would address the problems that it was expected to so I wanted to reserve the right to be 
critical of the process if necessary. Therefore I chose to intervene by asking questions; exploring 
values and assumptions; ‘opening up’ the inputs by shedding light on any alternative pathways 
before one particular approach to fairness became codified in the FCS; examining the extent of 
participation within the FCSSP (particularly in terms of whether and how the contributions of 
smallholders and rural communities were being taken into account); and supporting reflection 
on the FCSSP amongst those leading it. The extent to which I was able to facilitate reflection 
was limited by the time constraints and degree of willingness of the RPOs.  
I intended my research would be useful and meaningful to the RPOs. Although we did not 
commit at the outset to a relationship of co-researchers (this would have required more time 
commitment on their part and more intense communication between us), I gave them 
opportunities to provide inputs on my proposed research questions11, and we proposed activities 
I could take part in whilst contributing inputs to the FCSSP. My purpose was challenged during 
an early discussion where one of the coordinators asked whether I aimed to criticise the FCS, or 
to contribute to it. In several discussions, they stated that providing critique at the end of the 
                                                     
10 This contrasts with a ‘mechanistic-oriented’ process where the researcher collectively defines the 
change required and works towards it with the other people involved. 
11 Although action research should really involve joint question development, in this case I approached 
them with a rough idea of questions and formulated them as the partnership grew more likely. On the 
whole they were happy with the questions though GSF made a proposition to add an enquiry about how a 
future standard would be better as a result of their collaboration. I chose not to frame the question in this 
way as it involved an assumption that the standard would necessarily be better. 
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FCSSP when it was too late to change anything, would not be useful to them. This shaped my 
design to incorporate multiple research inputs throughout the FCSSP as well as conducting a 
longitudinal process analysis. In hindsight I recognise that maintaining a constructively critical 
stance was a useful accompaniment as both RPOs underwent transformative learning journeys 
during the FCSSP. My contributions at different stages may have provided some fuel for 
undertaking these journeys or making sense of them in hindsight (see chapter 8). 
4.1.1. Approach to knowledge  
My research approach fits most closely to a critical action research paradigm, whereby 
participants and researchers are both subjects in the dialectical task of unveiling reality, 
critically analysing it, and recreating that knowledge (Freire, 1970). It is based on the action-
oriented principle that understanding cannot be achieved independent of context, time and place 
(Small and Uttal, 2005). Co-learning is considered a primary aspect of the process, and 
researchers openly acknowledge their bias, making no attempts to be objective (Greenwood and 
Levin, 1998, O’brien, 2001). This involves both subjectivism and inter-subjectivism as forms of 
meaning-making and knowledge generation. Subjectivism, which is more common, posits that 
reality is a projection of the human imagination, and the subject is a reflective individual or 
actor. Knowing and meaning-making is based on individual experience and consciousness and 
can be explored using methods that inquire into people’s interpretations and perceptions. As a 
researcher, I could step back from a situation or dialogue I participated in, and draw on my 
subjectivity to interpret and make sense of it, define patterns and construct metaphors. 
Nevertheless, as embodied, relational and reflexively-embedded humans, we are also inter-
subjective. Action-oriented research involves acknowledging, valuing but also critically 
assessing inter-subjectivity in the research process, where meaning-making and knowledge 
generation arises through interactions between people in moments of space and time. As a 
researcher and participant in the FCSSP, I was often embedded in, or a witness to such 
interactions, and actively drew on them during open-ended interview dialogues and participant 
observation in meetings.  
4.1.2. Research strategy  
Action-oriented research creates theory grounded in action, whereby problem diagnoses are 
shaped by theory, and theory influences possible grounds for action based on the problem 
diagnoses (Susman and Evered, 1978). This thesis is based on abductive reasoning, which 
acknowledges that observing and thinking is theoretically shaped, but also that what we observe 
exceeds our ways of understanding (Locke, 2011). I carried theory and constructs with me into 
my field research, and they influenced the development of my research tools, data collection and 
analysis but they did not limit me from picking up on people’s own theories even if they did not 
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fit within the frame of the theories I had come with. This was particularly the case in my use of 
McDermott et al’s (2013) Equity Framework (see Q study, chapter 5), and my reading of 
theories on participatory governance before analysing the data on governance in chapter 6.  I 
also drew on the ‘local’ theories developed by Fairtrade International on participatory 
governance from their organisational perspective, and the Theory of Change mapped out in the 
FCS, using them as principle benchmarks for analyses in chapters 6 and 7.  
4.2. Case study design and selection criteria 
This methodology is based on an ‘extended case’ design (Mitchell, 2006) which involved 
dealing with a sequence of events, where the same actors were involved in a series of situations 
and the links between different events were traced over time, through multi-sited ethnography 
(Marcus, 1995). The case selection strategy was information-oriented rather than random, 
selected for maximum utility on the basis of expectations about information content (Flyvbjerg, 
2006). The justifications were formulated after entering into discussions with the RPOs, once I 
knew what might be possible. The FCSSP matched four of Yin’s five rationales for opting for 
single case designs (Yin, 2013).  
1) It was expected to be a ‘critical case’, of strategic importance in relation to the general 
problem- such cases are identified and explored by looking for most or least likely examples 
and exposing them to tests of falsification (Flyvbjerg, 2006). I expected that the FTI-GSF 
partnership would equip them and their wider consortium with multiple combined tools and 
ideas for addressing the problem of smallholder access and benefits within the carbon 
market, and I expected FTI to be exemplary at stakeholder inclusion in standard-setting 
processes, but both expectations warranted critical unpacking.  
2) It was unusual (the FTI-GSF partnership itself, with both RPOs venturing into sectors that 
were novel for them; and the joint development of a standard incorporating fairness criteria 
were precedents). 
3) It was revelatory (I was the first researcher to ever track an entire FTI Standard Setting 
Process, and following the FCSSP in real time would enable me to reveal new phenomena);  
4) It was longitudinal (following it over an elongated time period).  
The main criticism of a single case study design is that the nature of the case can shift 
substantially, making the original research questions no longer relevant (Yin, 2013). Action-
oriented research counters this critique by incorporating flexibility and reactivity into the 
design, including potentially making changes to the methodology in response to the unfolding 
process (Small, 1995). The choice not to explore a second case was carefully considered, and 
had involved initial screening of possible parallel cases.   
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4.2.1. Parallel units of analysis 
In addition to the research within the FCSSP, I also conducted research in parallel units of 
analysis in two example carbon programmes in Kenya (see Figure 4-1). This enabled me to 
explore the perspectives of a wider range of stakeholders on potential pathways to fair carbon 
and address question 1.4 (‘What can example carbon projects tell us about possible pathways to 
the outcomes and impacts articulated in the Theory of Change as the FCS is applied?’). This is 
especially significant  as the perspectives of those expected to implement standards on the 
ground are often missed out of more technical standards discussions (Tallontire et al., 2014). It 
also enabled me to analyse how some of the FCS mechanisms related to particular contextual 
realities. I had originally planned to explore these aspects within FTI and GSF’s selected pilot 
projects but the piloting phase was delayed beyond the timeframe of my data collection period.  
Figure 4-1: FCSSP case design showing relationships between the example carbon 
programmes and the FCSSP  
 
Note that I actively shaped the interactions between the programmes and the FCSSP by (i) 
instigating FTI to invite the personnel from the first programme to a stakeholder workshop, (ii) 
holding a workshop with the personnel from this project to provide feedback on the FCS during 
the consultation phase; and (iii) choosing the second programme because it was initially 
expected to pilot the FCS.  
4.2.2. Independent carbon programme research  
Data were collected during four months of field research in Kenya in January-February and 
May-August 2014. Kenya was chosen as a study site for multiple reasons:  
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1) My previous fieldwork experience was in Africa and my supervisors all had fieldwork 
experience and networks in East Africa. 
2) Staff from FTI and GSF expected that the FCS would be piloted in Kenya because the 
presence of Fairtrade Africa (the African Fairtrade Producers Network) would facilitate 
learning and support during the pilots.  
3) Kenya had the highest incidence of carbon projects and programmes within Africa at the 
time.  
4) My participation in a stakeholder workshop in February 2014 in Nairobi organised by FTI 
as part of the FCSSP was useful for building relationships with Kenyan stakeholders.  
4.2.2.1. Selection of carbon programmes 
The first programme was TIST-Kenya (The International Small group and Tree planting 
programme), primarily in operation around Mount Kenya and spreading to other areas in Kenya. 
The second was the Kenyan Domestic Biogas Programme (KENDBIP) present in most regions 
of Kenya. Both are linked to parallel initiatives elsewhere in Africa and Asia. 
TIST-Kenya is an on-farm reforestation programme brought to Kenya in 2005 by Clean Air 
Action Corporation (CAAC), a US company specialised in designing and analysing emissions 
reductions strategies. With support from US charity Institute for Environmental Innovation 
(I4EI), the programme implements sustainable development, biodiversity, health and fuel-
efficient stove training and activities to further benefit the TIST member farmers. TIST-Kenya 
received financial support from USAID and is now the largest of the four country programmes, 
expanding to include over 59,000 member farmers, who planted more than 6,000,000 trees on 
14,000 hectares of land during the first ten years of operation (2005-2015). The Kenyan 
Domestic Biogas Programme (KENDBIP) is part of the African Biogas Partnership Programme 
funded by the Dutch government and implemented by two CSOs headquartered in the 
Netherlands. In the first phase (2009-2013), the programme was focussed on biogas sector 
development, and involved activities such as partnership building, training of biogas 
entrepreneurs, lobbying for biogas sector policies and norms, and promoting biogas amongst 
farmers. Digester subsidies were given and more than 11,000 were installed. The second phase, 
(2014-2017), was expected to involve continued sector development but with a view to phasing 
out the support of the CSOs, and promotion of biogas without subsidies. Carbon finance was 
envisaged as a means to financially sustain the sector.  
The following criteria were used to make the selection, which was again information-oriented 
rather than random in order to maximise information from only two units of analysis:  
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Interest in the FCS: in the interests of designing the carbon programme research to be mutually 
useful (for my research, the RPOs and the programme implementers and participants), it was 
important that there was some interest from within the programmes to influence the FCS and/or 
eventually apply it. By May 2014 when I made the final selection, staff from both programmes 
had taken part in at least one of the stakeholder meetings or workshops organised by FTI and 
provided input while the standard was being drafted, and at the time were considering its 
potential applicability for their programmes in the future. KENDBIP was later selected as an 
FCS pilot project but subsequently pulled out. 
Coverage of a spectrum of mitigation measures: bearing in mind the four sectors originally 
proposed within the scope of the FCS, I wanted to test my hypothesis that different types of 
carbon resource would have different implications for smallholder participation and benefits. 
Cook stove projects were already highly represented within the FCSSP and perspectives of 
project proponents often seemed at odds with those of land use projects. I therefore chose 
programmes which combined elements of land use and energy and between them covered all 
four sectors (Figure 4-2). I considered projects certified by any carbon standards within the 
selection, as GSF had only just begun certifying land use and forest projects at that point. 
Potential to generate insight on projects/ programmes at different stages of development: given 
the time for projects to move through to issuance of credits, and the vast number of projects that 
spend years stuck in pre-registration phases (see e.g. Shames et al., 2010), I chose TIST-Kenya 
because of their ten year history which had included becoming the world’s first programme to 
obtain dual certification from the Verified Carbon Standard and the Climate, Community and 
Biodiversity Standard (see details in chapter 7). TIST-Kenya’s success made it an ‘unusual’ or 
‘extreme’ example (Flyvbjerg, 2006). The programme had generated more carbon credits 
compared to similar forest carbon projects in the East Africa region (Deshmukh et al., 2014) and 
received an award from Environmental Finance for the best offset project in 2014. In 
comparison to most of the carbon projects and programmes represented by people taking part in 
the FCSSP, the programme had already witnessed some of the outcomes underscored within the 
FCS. This implied that if the FCS requirements were too ambitious for TIST-Kenya, then it 
would be difficult to expect them in other projects.  
The potential lessons to learn from TIST-Kenya became a justification for my later choice to 
prioritise focus on TIST-Kenya over KENDBIP. The programme managers were still working 
towards compliance with the Gold Standard despite running biogas activities since 2009. Steps 
had been taken in mid-2014 to register the biogas activities overseen by KENDBIP within a 
Programme of Activity (a term for a coordinated series of carbon mitigation measures) managed 
by a carbon actor in Europe but the carbon components were still being formulated when data 
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Figure 4-2 Coverage of mitigation measures between the two example programmes 
was collected. Nevertheless, the programme illustrates the challenges and uncertainties that 
often characterise the initial phases of a carbon programme. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2.3. Bounding the case  
4.2.3.1. Temporal boundaries  
According to the projected timeframe, my fieldwork period was expected to cover the 
development of the FCS, its testing in a pilot project, and possibly its release. However, delays 
were envisaged and the content of my data was dependent on what would happen within the 
snapshot of time that I was able to witness (plus what I could gather about the historical 
processes prior to my engagement with the FCSSP). Eventually, the fieldwork period extended 
from September 2013 to November 2014. This coincided with phases 2 and 3 of the FCSSP and 
ended with an FTI meeting where the FCS was approved, thus marking the beginning of phase 4 
of the FCSSP (see Appendix 1). I continued following the process remotely for another 12 
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months, by accessing documents and occasional email correspondence with FTI. The longer 
fieldwork period in Kenya (May-August 2014) was while FTI and GSF were preparing and 
conducting their public consultations, which meant (i) that I was only absent from one FCSSP 
event held in Europe during this period (and followed it via published minutes); and that (ii) I 
was able to channel inputs from Kenyan stakeholders for both consultations whilst there. 
4.2.3.2. Spatial boundaries 
I attended in person or online events held related to the FCSSP held in Germany, the U.K. and 
Kenya. Other events in Latin America and Asia were excluded from my scope because of my 
regional focus on Africa. Three CSO meetings held in Belgium, France and Germany; and the 
FCS launch event held at the UNFCCC 21
st
 Conference of Parties in Paris were beyond my 
scope to attend because I had been unable to forecast them in my fieldwork budget. I bounded 
the two Kenyan carbon programmes by focussing on a geographical area of Kenya where they 
both had activities so that I could look at them both within the same time period.  
4.3. Stakeholder identification and selection strategies 
The work to develop the FCS was managed by a Project Team composed of FTI staff from 
Standards and Pricing Units, Strategy and Policy, and also FLO-cert staff. GSF staff were 
considered by FTI as project participants but not part of the project team. The FCSSP 
incorporated a wide net of stakeholders from FTI and GSF’s combined networks as well as 
some people involved in carbon projects not yet certified by GSF but interested in the FCS (see 
Figure 4-3 for a visual mapping, and chapter 6 for more details). I came into contact with the 
majority of these stakeholders during my research. When doing so, I sought their permission to 
conduct participant observation and potentially interview them. The 26 participants of the Q 
study also came from this combined network of stakeholders. The Kenyan carbon programme 
research was conducted with two programmes not yet certified by GSF or FTI, but whose staff 
and contractors were included as stakeholders in the FCSSP through being invited to participate 
in meetings and workshops. Figure 4-4 maps stakeholders participating in the research and 
forums where research was conducted. 
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Figure 4-3: Stakeholders in the FCSSP
  
9
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Figure 4-4: Pools of stakeholders and events/ forums where research was conducted
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4.4. Overview of data collection and analysis techniques  
4.4.1. Data collection 
Triangulation through multiple methods and sources of evidence allows stronger substantiation 
in case study research (Yin, 2013). This may involve introducing methods during the course of 
the study (Eisenhardt, 1989) or in the case of action oriented research designing new tools or 
playing different roles at different points. This is because of the novelty of research problems, 
the need for practical utility, and the desire to capture multiple perspectives (Small, 1995). I 
established the majority of my data collection techniques before collecting data, but introduced 
Q method part way through and developed several novel tools for reflection and sharing 
findings (objective 3, questions 3.1 and 3.2, see chapter 8). Sources of data in this thesis were 
both primary (collected and documented by the researcher) and secondary (collected and 
documented by someone else)12. I drew on four different sampling strategies, which were 
purposeful sampling, where the researcher selects respondents, sites and events likely to be 
information-rich; opportunistic, where the researcher makes selections on the basis of available 
and willing participants or fortuitously occurring events; snowball sampling, where key 
informants are invited to suggest other people or sites that could generate useful information; 
and simple stratified sampling, where the researcher identifies key sub populations and ensures 
that they are included in the sample (Bernard, 2006). In the following sections I give an 
overview of data collection, sampling, recording, collation and initial analysis techniques, which 
are linked to the research questions in Figure 4-5 and Table 4-1. I then provide more detail on 
each collection technique and overarching approaches to analysis in sections 4.4.3, 4.4.4 and 
4.4.5.  
I collected documents and used them in different ways based on confidentiality restrictions. 
Within the main FCSSP case documents included all those generated during my 15 month 
period of close involvement and in the preceding phase prior to my involvement that had been 
shared with me, and documents put into the public domain in the final approval stage after I 
stepped back. I used them to inform my observations, prepare feedback documents, collect 
statements for the Q study and in holistic data analysis. With the carbon programmes, I 
collected and used secondary documents concerning TIST-Kenya, but not KENDBIP (because 
it was in an earlier stage limiting document availability). These were read during the data 
                                                     
12 This binary categorisation mostly works but there are some examples of data which are jointly created, 
such as email correspondence between the researcher and collaborators, or minutes from a call generated 
by another party which I then added to, which for simplicity, I categorise as primary. 
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collection period and used to identify gaps in my understanding and further questions to ask. 
They were stored in a database alongside primary documents and re-read when writing up the 
case description and any relevant information was included as a means of triangulating primary 
evidence sources. Secondary documents were categorised as ‘confidential/ sensitive’ 
(categorised by the Project Team as such, and shared with me in order to get my feedback or to 
give me a background understanding); ‘limited sharing’ (shared with participants of the specific 
event within the FCSSP; or in the case of TIST, with registered members) or ‘public’ (freely 
available online, or shared at events where there were no restrictions on participation).  
  
9
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Figure 4-5: Objectives, questions and methods
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Table 4-1: Data collection, analysis and application 
Period of data 
collection 
Case/ unit Data tools Period of 
data analysis 
Approach and outputs Use of data 
Sep 2013-
Mar 2014 
FCSSP Participant observation,  
interviews and document 
analysis 
Oct, Nov and 
Dec 2013 
Incremental coding in Atlas.ti Feedback reports for FTI 
Preparation of House Exercise 
FCSSP April 2014 Coding in Atlas.ti for ‘fairness’ Compilation of Q concourse 
May-Aug 
2014 
FCSSP Q method (Q sorts and 
interviews) 
Sep-Oct 
2014 
Factor analysis using PQ Method Chapter 5 (Q1.1 and 1.2) 
Q method (interviews only) April 2015 Coding in Atlas.ti for contentious issues 
(pricing/payments, producers and 
organisations, roles of project actors) 
Chapters 6 (Q2.1) and 7 (Q1.3)  
Jan-Feb and 
May-Aug 
2014 
 
TIST-
Kenya 
Participant observation, 
interviews  
June 2014 Synthesis of data collected; benchmarking 
against the FCS draft  
Preparation of participatory 
policy analysis workshop 
TIST-
Kenya and 
KENDBIP 
Participant observation, 
interviews (both programmes) 
and document analysis and 
participatory policy analysis 
workshop (TIST-Kenya only) 
Jan-Mar 
2015 
Compilation of case study database; 
development of case descriptions in 
Microsoft Word, Excel and Powerpoint 
Chapter 7 (Q1.4) 
TIST-
Kenya and 
KENDBIP 
Apr 2015 Systematic coding in Atlas.ti, for contentious 
issues and mechanisms linked to the FCS and 
their application 
Chapter 7 (Q1.3, 1.4) 
Sep 2013-Oct 
2015 
FCSSP Participant observation, 
interviews, document analysis 
Jun-Nov 
2015 
Manual holistic analysis of FCSSP case study 
database 
Chapter 6 (Q2.1-2.3) and 7 
(Q1.3) 
Mar 2013-
Apr 2016 
FCSSP Participant observation, 
interviews, correspondence, 
workshops, findings sharing 
sessions, questionnaire 
July 2015 
and Mar-Apr 
2016 
Manual holistic analysis of collaboration 
with RPOs 
Chapter 8 (Q3.1 and 3.2) 
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Participant observation and interviews were the principal techniques for collecting data 
longitudinally throughout the FCSSP to address questions 1.3, 2.1-2.3, 3.1, 3.2, and during the 
four month field research period in Kenya (question 1.4). With the former, close involvement 
and association was intended to generate data by watching and listening to what people say and 
do whilst personally experiencing the same situation as them (Burgess, 2002). I mainly took the 
role of participant-as-observer, in which the researcher participates as well as observes, by 
developing relationships with people within natural settings and situations, whilst making it 
known that research is the overriding interest (Brewer, 2000). Interviewing served to triangulate 
or elaborate on material from participant observations and collect individual opinions outside of 
meeting or workshop settings. Interviewing in case studies often involves pursuing a consistent 
line of enquiry but fluidly generating questions in a conversational format (Rubin and Rubin, 
2011). Such interviews are reciprocal because both parties engage in a dialogue which is about 
mutual discovery (Neuman, 1991 p367, c.f. Bailey, 1996). I applied this approach to both semi-
structured and unstructured interviews, which were either ‘formal’ (planned conversations) or 
‘informal’ (spontaneously arising conversations) (designation derived from Schut, 2012).  
In contrast, the interviews I conducted using Q method to address question 1.1, followed the 
structure of the statements that were ordered randomly and I deliberately declined when asked 
to give my own opinion. The Q study took place over the FCSSP consultation period, and in 
contrast to FTI’s quite structured consultation tool, my 26 Q interviews served to open up a 
space where people could discuss and reflect on the FCSSP and raise concerns that are 
sometimes held back in a meeting situation, and to unpack the different understandings that key 
actors in the FCSSP had about the emerging FCS criteria. I devised, organised and facilitated 
two interactive workshops, firstly with the staff in the FTI Standards Unit (the House 
Exercise), and secondly with a focus group of TIST-Kenya contractors (a participatory policy 
analysis workshop). Both served to critically reflect on the draft FCS and the mechanisms it 
included, and provided data for addressing questions 3.1-3.2, and 1.4 respectively. Finally I 
collected documentary evidence of impact to gather perspectives from RPO staff involved in 
the collaboration to gather their inputs on the usefulness of my research inputs and drew on this 
in addressing questions 3.1 and 3.2.  
The multiplicity of methods in this thesis is novel and rich in terms of the multiple datasets 
generated; the tools for reflection developed; and its application within research on standards for 
the carbon market and research on fair trade. It drew on precedents such as Neilson and 
Pritchard’s (2009) study of value chain struggles in Indian tea plantations and Cheyn’s (2011) 
work with the Round table on Sustainable Palm Oil. Both studies used a three pronged 
methodology including analysis of written material; participation in conferences, meetings and 
events; and interviews (including informal conversations) and both studies were conducted over 
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several years (4 and 6 years respectively). Neilson and Pritchard describe the difficult ethical 
and practical choices involved in this level of engagement and the need to align oneself with 
particular gatekeepers which undoubtedly shapes the research orientation. Cheyn’s position was 
comparatively more detached from the process than mine, and accordingly she faced more 
barriers to participation but also enjoyed more freedom to tell the story she wanted to tell. I 
discussed and reflected on my methodology and chosen positionality with a number of 
researchers engaged in standard setting processes including Emmanuelle Cheyns, Alison 
Loconto and Valerie Nelson, as well as with my supervisors. Other precedents for my approach 
are the 10 years of participatory action research with the Latin American Fairtrade Producers’ 
Network and particular producer groups in the region completed by Bacon (2010) and 
ethnographic observations from within the Standards Unit at Fairtrade International (Reinecke, 
2010, Reinecke and Ansari, 2015). My engagement was shorter than Bacon’s and more 
extensive than Reinecke’s, but like them, I was able to situate the events I observed within the 
evolving movement and relate them to ongoing fair trade debates. By positioning myself both at 
the level of Fairtrade International and at the level of production and project activities in Kenya 
I was able to achieve a multi-level analysis and compare perspectives held by people situated in 
different places. The choice to add Q methodology to the mix of methods was influenced by my 
attendance at a summer school hosted by Melissa Leach and her colleagues at the STEPS centre 
at Sussex University. They encouraged researchers using the pathways approach to go further in 
crafting methodologies capable of opening up policy-making and other decision-making 
processes to critical reflection and Q methodology was just one of the methods they suggested.  
4.4.2. Data analysis 
Case studies often involve overlapping data collection and analysis phases, allowing for more 
flexible data collection (Eisenhardt, 1989). The ‘discovery’ approach associated with field 
research methods (Locke, 2011) requires an analytical approach to data collection as the 
researcher picks up on themes as they emerge in the field and explores them further. Field notes 
should include analytic ideas and inferences (Bailey, 1996). In my research the RPOs’ request 
for punctual feedback in the form of written documents was an additional reason for combining 
collection and analysis or returning to reanalyse data for different purposes. Table 4-1 and 
Appendix 1 indicate the different data collection and analysis phases that occurred throughout 
the research. With material collected during the FCSSP, I conducted incremental analyses on 
subsections of the dataset as they were gathered (mainly in order to provide punctual feedback 
to FTI) and then conducted a holistic analysis after the material had all been collected. At this 
point, documents were collated chronologically in a case study database and later used to 
provide evidence for chapters 6, 7 and 8. A case study database is a formal assembly of 
evidence which a) helps to increase familiarity with the case, b) facilitates ‘playing’ with the 
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data and the search for emergent patterns across the different evidence sources, c) serves as a 
basis for comparing evidence with theoretical propositions; and d) serves as a source to return to 
when the thesis is complete and therefore enhances reliability (Yin, 2013). With the Q study 
data, it was analysed on two occasions- firstly to derive the Q factors (chapter 5), and then later 
to provide more material for chapters 6 and 7. TIST-Kenya data was used to undertake a 
preliminary analysis in preparation for the participatory policy analysis workshop, and then 
again alongside KENDBIP data once the datasets were complete. They were compiled 
chronologically in carbon programme databases and subjected to coding with Atlas.ti and 
manual analysis, providing material for chapter 8. Appendix 2 details the complete list of 
documents collected and how they were used. Overall, the data analysis approach involved 
iterations between Noticing interesting things in the data, Collecting similar or linked pieces 
within the data (and giving them a higher order code), and Thinking about the data13 (Friese, 
2012). I applied this approach both within Atlas.ti software and manually when reading the hard 
copies of the datasets holistically (using the hard copies ordered chronologically in the case 
study database), see Table 4-2. The manual strategy enabled me to more easily cope with the 
size of the dataset and see the underlying threads and big picture.  
Table 4-2: Examples of how the NCT approach was applied to analyses 
 
                                                     
13 Note that the NCT approach does not prescribe what kind of coding to use- codes can be based on a 
combination of topics, emotions, values etc., and ideas for codes can derive from theory, research 
questions, literature, interview guidelines or the data itself. 
NCT Data in Atlas.ti Manual holistic analysis 
Noticing Labelling ‘quotations’ (extracts 
of interesting text) with initial 
codes 
Reading through the dataset and 
highlighting and noting themes and aspects 
of interest, resulting in a short list of key 
points per document 
Collecting Collecting similar things within 
the data and giving them a higher 
order code, or renaming and 
combining codes 
Collecting themes and codes on cardboard. 
Producing tables, lists and graphics by 
hand or in Excel, Word or Powerpoint. 
Thinking Creating outputs generated by 
requesting all the quotations 
within one or more code 
categories 
Making connections between themes and 
codes, or between data and theory. 
Devising an analytical framework. 
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4.4.3. Detailed description of primary data collection methods: FCSSP 
4.4.3.1. Participant observation: 
Throughout the FCSSP, the principal sampling strategy for participant observation was 
opportunistic- I took part in every event fitting within my spatial and temporal boundaries, but 
they had also been purposefully pre-selected as likely to be information-rich when I first 
established the fieldwork budget.  
I took the role of participant-as-observer and communicated my research (in introduction 
rounds, coffee breaks, by sharing a concept note, see Appendix 6, or in more formal 
presentations) in each of the FCSSP stakeholder events I participated in, except at the FTI 
Standards Committee meetings. Here, an advance introduction to the committee was made on 
my behalf in the form of a formal request for me as researcher to attend the sections of the 
meetings where the FCS was being discussed, with the right to observe but not speak. I do not 
know how my research was introduced or whether all the members knew why I was there, but 
my presence was noted in the minutes. My role was therefore more like observer-as-participant 
(Brewer, 2000) as encounters with most of the meeting participants were brief and I was obliged 
to leave immediately after the discussion on the FCS (there were other items on the agenda that 
were not in my remit). As researcher, I took on particular roles within the events, partly by 
choice and partly as requested. I spoke rarely (usually only in go-rounds, or if my opinion was 
asked, or occasionally if I felt an important consideration was being neglected), in order to 
prioritise data recording. When requested to by FTI, I occasionally facilitated group discussions 
or gave summaries of them.  
I recorded verbatim transcripts and wrote field notes. This consisted of mental or jotted notes at 
the time, and fuller notes written in the evenings. Mental and jotted notes included aspects such 
as notable dynamics in the room, syntheses of interesting conversations had or heard in the 
corridors and apparent relationships between stakeholders. In fuller notes I often wrote down 
my personal feelings and reflected on my role. For a full list of aspects I observed, see 
Appendix 3.  
4.4.3.2. Interviews 
Most of the interviews undertaken during, before or after FCSSP events were informal (see 
Appendix 3).  Often they were a few minutes’ length, occurring in breaks between sections of 
the meeting, but a few were prolonged (an hour or more), during journeys. I also undertook 
formal interviews lasting 30-90 minutes with members of the Project Team, where we 
scheduled to meet physically or on Skype to talk about the FCSSP or my PhD process; and with 
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three carbon market actors involved in the Group of Experts14. Interviewees were purposefully 
selected because of their pivotal roles in the process, gatekeeper positions, or because they had 
expressed interesting opinions I wanted to explore further. With physical interviews I usually 
took notes or sometimes drew graphics to ensure that the interviewee and I had a shared 
understanding. I typed them immediately afterwards and shared with the interviewee to check 
for accuracy. Some clarifications were made regarding minor details and any confidential 
aspects were signalled. With Skype interviews I was usually able to type verbatim. 
Interviews with the Project Team were used at the time to inform my understanding of the 
unfolding FCSSP and cross-check my explanatory theories about what was happening and why. 
They were stored chronologically in the FCSSP case study database alongside email 
correspondence. They were reviewed holistically and used to reflect on the collaboration prior 
to a call with FTI in July 2015 and in the analysis for chapter 8. Interviews with carbon market 
actors were loaded into Atlas.ti. and used for the Q study (chapter 5).  
4.4.3.3. The ‘House Exercise’ 
The idea for the first workshop (called the ‘House Exercise’, see details in chapter 7- the House 
and surroundings was a metaphorical device) arose as I was writing a mid-term cumulative 
feedback report on the FCSSP in December 2013, and finding it difficult to a) conceptualise 
how each of the various component and contingent parts of the FCS scheme would fit together 
and b) make sense of which of the various options on the table had already been chosen or 
discarded and why. I devised an interactive exercise to collaboratively reflect on these aspects, 
eventually held in May 2014. Workshop participants were recruited by a Project Team member 
and were all involved in working on the FCS and related scheme. The workshop lasted three 
hours and was recorded and subsequently transcribed, and results shared with participants in the 
form of the transcript, photographs and a spreadsheet summarising the outcomes. Data from the 
‘House Exercise’ was not used in this thesis but the process of developing and delivering the 
activity is discussed in chapter 8. 
4.4.3.4. Documentary evidence of impact 
I elaborated a brief set of online questions on www.surveymonkey.com as a way of collecting 
feedback from GSF and FTI staff on the value of my research inputs. I had planned to use a 
dialogue but the allotted time for the feedback sessions was insufficient. Instead, I was 
                                                     
14 Although I undertook more interviews, I did not end up using them so have not described them here. I 
discounted them from my dataset because I did not get permission from the interviewee to use them, or 
because they ended up being about topics that were less relevant to the focus of my research.  
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recommended by a member of the Project Team to use a questionnaire as a tool not requiring 
coordination between the people from whom I was requesting feedback, and to elicit quick 
responses whenever it was convenient for people to fill it in. The design (Appendix 5) included 
ranking of the usefulness of each research input provided, and a space for comments to 
elaborate or explain. The link was sent to the four staff at FTI and one staff member at GSF who 
had taken part in the findings-sharing sessions. As the comment-giving was optional, few were 
provided. Only three responses came back despite prompts. Time spent filling it in varied from 
5 to 15 minutes. I also filled it in myself, both as a means of testing it, and because I wanted to 
compare my viewpoints (on which inputs had been useful for me) with those of the RPOs. 
Rankings and comments were analysed by hand, given the small number of responses. I 
complemented this data with anecdotal evidence on the value of particular inputs provided at the 
time and used it to reflect on the collaboration in chapter 8. 
4.4.3.5. Q study 
Details on Q methodology are provided in chapter 5 as these are best read as an introduction to 
the Q results. I made the decision to undertake a Q study part way through the implementation 
of my research design in late February 2013. Q is a methodology used to empirically analyse 
subjectivity in an open, yet structured and statistically interpretable form (Curry et al., 2013, 
Setiawan and Cuppen, 2013). Although Q study preparation is often time-consuming (Webler et 
al., 2009), the understanding and contacts gained during the participant observation in the 6 
months prior formed a basis. Also I already possessed a large body of primary and secondary 
data sources for compiling the Q concourse. Some of these sources were confidential, but using 
them to select statements was an appropriate way of extracting ideas whilst respecting 
confidentiality. Similarly, while I had detailed transcripts of what participants had said during 
meetings, I recognised that these did not always accurately portray exactly what people thought, 
and viewpoints were evolving throughout the FCSSP. Results were reflected back to FTI and 
study participants in a clear and synthesised form, serving as a punctual input to the FCSSP15 
(see Appendix 1). Q interviews were analysed according to the steps outlined in chapter 5 but in 
addition, Q interview transcripts were coded in Atlas.ti for contentious issues (pricing and 
payments, producers and producer organisations, roles of project actors- these became hot topics 
2, 3 and 4 in chapters 6 and 7) and outputs were used to create matrices in Microsoft Powerpoint 
or included as quotations in these chapters.  
                                                     
15 Although I recognise that the findings were shared later than they could have been because I waited 
several weeks to receive validation from one person before sharing the results with all participants. 
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4.4.4. Detailed description of primary data collection methods: Carbon 
programmes 
4.4.4.1. Participant observation 
TIST-Kenya’s structure and functioning were conducive to participating in a diverse set of 
meetings, seminars and audits held in different geographical and ecological zones and grouping 
members at different scales (ranging from small groups in one locality, to representatives of the 
whole movement). I used three sampling strategies to compose my programme of which events 
to take part in.  
Sampling 
strategy 
Application 
Simple 
stratified 
Ensuring participation in events happening in three different project areas 
around Mount Kenya with different biophysical, cultural and economic 
characteristics and different programme histories and funding sources.  
Opportunistic Coinciding the start of my fieldwork period with a TIST celebratory event, 
two-day training course, and management meeting: these enabled a wide-
lens introduction to the programme and contact with lots of TIST members. 
Through these events I received five invitations from people to attend their 
local TIST meetings and took up four. 
Purposeful Selecting meetings to attend that represented the full range of TIST 
activities (e.g. audits, payments to groups, training sessions, group savings 
schemes and meetings without a scheduled activity) happening at different 
levels of aggregation. 
With KENDBIP there were no organised events to observe but I noted observations when 
conducting interviews and biogas visits. However, when farmers spontaneously gathered during 
one of my household visits, I used the opportunity to note interactions between them and I 
effectively became a participant in an ad hoc biogas plant demonstration.  
I also conducted participant observation within both carbon programmes during transect walks- 
‘walks through an area, with key informants, observing and asking for explanations of 
everything[…]’ (Bernard, 2006 p352). These were during one farm audit with TIST-Kenya and 
during visits to ten biogas plants with KENDBIP, enabling me to understand better farming 
practices, and how participation in the programme fitted with other livelihood activities. In all 
cases I was accompanied by the farmer and by programme field staff. 
I adopted the role of participant-as-observer because I was interested in gaining a rich 
understanding of the programmes and their functioning in a relatively short period of time. 
Within TIST-Kenya and KENDBIP, the programme managers and some contractors or field 
staff were aware of my research and aims and had received either the concept note or a detailed 
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explanation from me. With other TIST members and also with participants of KENDBIP I met, 
I presented myself as a student researcher seeking to understand how the programme worked.  
Data and reflections from participant observations within the carbon programmes were noted in 
field note books or occasionally typed, and frequently re-read during the carbon programme 
research period. Hand-drawn diagrams and sketches and ‘to-do’ lists were produced as I 
discovered themes, linkages and things to explore further. I also took photographs during 
observations of meetings and biogas visits and stored these electronically. 
4.4.4.2. Interviews 
Within the TIST-Kenya programme research, most of my interviews were informal, involving 
opportunistic sampling and occurring before or after events as we travelled together, or in 
spontaneous moments during events when I had opportunities to talk to English-speaking TIST 
members (individuals and groups). I also held formal interviews (usually lasting 30-60 minutes) 
with purposefully selected informants- mainly with one key informant but also occasionally 
with other TIST contractors. Interviews ranged from unstructured ‘grand tour’ (Bailey, 1996) 
sets of questions (such as ‘what is this?’, ‘why does this happen?’ etc.); to semi-structured 
eliciting of in-depth personal testimonies about individual TIST members’ involvement in the 
programme; and semi-structured interviews to discuss topics and themes that had arisen in 
participant observation and field notes, or interview data that I wanted to corroborate or expand.  
I held two informal interviews with the KENDBIP programme funder during FCSSP events. On 
both occasions, I made mental notes, asked for permission to use the information as data, then 
wrote them up and checked them back with the interviewee. In Kenya I followed a trail of 
interviewees from the top of the programme down to the biogas users, using a snowball 
sampling strategy. This facilitated access as the recommendations often came with introductions 
between me and the next person. All interviewees were semi-structured and formal but some of 
them were scheduled by key informants who served as gatekeepers. I jotted notes down at the 
time and wrote full notes the same evening. Programme managers were able to check their 
interview transcripts through email exchanges but this was not possible with farmers and 
entrepreneurs who I did not see again. Appendix 4 provides details on participant observation 
and interviews in Kenya.  
4.4.4.3. Participatory Policy Analysis workshop 
The workshop with TIST-Kenya during the FCS consultation in June 2014 constituted 
participatory policy analysis (Fischer, 2003a). The aim was to translate between the logic and 
language of the FCS consultation draft, and the lived experiences of six purposefully selected 
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TIST members who had been involved in the programme for several years as leadership council 
members, auditors or manager. I invited people who had some awareness of the FCSSP and 
based on recommendations from a key informant who was more aware of people’s schedules, 
willingness to participate and ability to contribute. I facilitated the 6 hour workshop, recorded it 
and transcribed the recording afterwards. More details are provided in chapter 8. The transcript, 
summary of feedback, and the comments within the FCS consultation document were shared 
with participants and added to the case study database.  
4.4.5. Details on data analysis approaches 
A variety of approaches were used to analyse data at different levels, depending on the data 
type, the purpose, and the point at which the analysis was taking place. The section below 
describes the approaches applied for chapters 5-7. The specific approach for chapter 5, 
questions 1.1-1.2 is detailed in chapter 5 itself. 
Results for chapter 5, addressing questions 2.1-2.3 were derived from a manual holistic 
analysis of the entire FCSSP case study database and Q transcripts coded in Atlas.ti, based on 
the following approaches: 
4.4.5.1. Timeline analysis (Yin, 2013):  
The ability to trace changes over time is a major strength in case studies including the FCSSP. I 
used my case study database to reconstruct the FCSSP along a timeline, identify critical events, 
debates and decisions and track them through the FCSSP and to pattern-match the actual 
process alongside FTI’s Standard Operating Procedure for Standard Setting (see Figure 6-2). To 
validate my analysis, I shared findings with FTI in March 2016 and they completed gaps.  
4.4.5.2. Explanation building (Yin, 2013): 
Building on the first approach, I then began a process of explanation building in order to 
postulate what had led to certain outcomes within the FCSSP, and what meant that alternative 
outcomes or pathways were not pursued. These explanations were developed for the four ‘hot 
topics’ in the target framework introduced in chapter 6 (Figure 6-1). My explanations were 
based on a combination of theory (on participatory governance, see chapter 3), data and my 
personal experiences of the process and background understanding of FTI. In order to 
strengthen my explanations, I tested for some of Yin’s ‘real world’ rivals (see Yin, 2013 p141), 
first in my own analyses, and then when presenting findings to FTI. In particular, I invited FTI 
to look for ‘direct’, ‘commingled’ and ‘super’ rival explanations (meaning respectively that the 
outcome can be explained by factors other than those I was proposing; that it was other factors 
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as well as those I was proposing that led to a certain outcome; or that a force larger than the 
factors I was proposing).  
Results for chapter 7, addressing questions 1.3 and 1.4 were derived from Atlas.ti coding of 
data from Q interviews transcripts and Kenyan carbon programme data, combined with a 
holistic analysis of the FCSSP and carbon programme case descriptions, based on the following 
approaches:  
4.4.5.3. Pattern matching (De Vaus and de Vaus, 2001) 
Pattern matching involved looking for where mechanisms and requirements within the FCS 
matched or mismatched the example carbon programmes. By the time I conducted the carbon 
programme research, a rough FCS draft was available, identifying key mechanisms as important 
for achieving fairness in carbon projects. I had taken these as a basis for collecting data within 
the carbon programmes, seeking examples which demonstrated, nullified or suggested 
alternative mechanisms to the ones in the FCS. I validated and deepened this analysis during the 
Participatory Policy Analysis Workshop with TIST-Kenya. This workshop involved combining 
both timeline analysis and explanation-building. One of the key outputs was a participatory 
construction of a historical timeline of the evolving TIST-Kenya programme compared to the 
requirements for different project actors within the FCS and their evolution over time. By 
comparing the TIST-Kenya programme with the requirements and intentions of the FCS, I 
sought to test FTI’s assumptions about which activities and mechanisms might lead to which 
outcomes, and whether any plausible alternative theories could be espoused. The KENDBIP 
data collection and analysis followed on sequentially from the TIST-Kenya programme 
research, as an opportunity to explore what evidence KENDBIP could provide that was not 
evident within TIST-Kenya. Once I had collected a series of aspects that did or did not fit with 
the FCS in the context of KENDBIP and/or TIST-Kenya, I then moved to an analysis of the 
FCS based on logic models. 
4.4.5.4. Logic models (Yin, 2013)  
Logic models involve unpacking assumptions, evidence and attending to contextual conditions 
and can come at individual, organisational or programme-levels. I used FTI’s logic model for 
the FCS, known as a Theory of Change as a basis to undertake an analysis of its underlying 
assumptions and sketch out one particular impact pathway (making the links between particular 
aspects of Fairtrade interventions, and how they appear to be linked to outputs, outcomes and 
impacts in the Theory of Change). I then triangulated between multiple sources to assess the 
available evidence and identify the weak links in the Theory of Change. More details are given 
in chapter 7.  
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Results for chapter 8, addressing questions 3.1 and 3.2 were derived from a manual holistic 
analysis of the interactions (emails, meetings and interviews) with the RPOs, reflective field 
notes and research inputs contributed throughout the FCSSP combined with an analysis of the 
evolving drafts of the FCS, based on a reflexive analysis. 
4.4.5.5. Reflexive analysis of researcher’s role (Schut, 2012) 
In addressing question 3.1, I undertook a reflexive analysis of my role in the FCSSP and the 
possible influence of the various inputs I provided. This involved (i) reviewing the inputs and 
highlighting the main points; (ii) analysing the correspondence between myself and the project 
team and anything that had been said in documentary evidence about the value of the input; and 
(iii) viewing these alongside the timeline and critical events analysis. Rather than seeking to 
build a complete explanation (i.e. that my overall contribution, or this particular input led to this 
outcome), I sought to develop tentative theories for the possible influence I had on the process, 
recognising the presence of commingled and super rivals (see chapter 8). I analysed material for 
question 3.2 by (i) reviewing the correspondence between myself and the project team or 
between myself and my supervisors about the collaborative architecture and reflecting on its 
merits; (ii) reconstructing a timeline of the roles that the RPOs and I had played and concerns 
and conundrums that had been expressed at different points and reflecting on whether they had 
manifested or been resolved; (iii) reviewing calls and interviews where the collaboration had 
been reflected on; and (iv) reviewing material produced by FTI (in particular the Monitoring, 
Evaluation and Learning (MEL) Unit who usually coordinate research) about their relationship 
with researchers and ongoing researcher-policy development work. My analysis was done 
partially in preparation for a reflection call in July 2015 initiated by the MEL Unit and reviewed 
at the end of the collaboration. 
4.5. Quality control  
Empirical research is commonly assessed in terms of four quality tests: construct validity, 
internal validity, external validity and reliability (Yin, 2013). The third test, also referred to as 
generalisability or transferability, is thought to be particularly challenging for single-case study 
research because there is no possibility for searching emergent themes through cross-case 
analysis (Donmoyer, 2000). Yin (2013) recommends a number of strategies for passing the 
quality tests, while action research offers some strategies of its own. These strategies are 
presented in Table 4-3, alongside evidence of quality of this thesis.  
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Table 4-3: Quality tests, test questions, pass strategies and evidence of quality. 
Quality 
Test 
Test questions for action-
oriented case study research 
Action research and case study 
strategies 
Evidence of quality of this thesis 
Construct 
validity 
Do recorded changes 
genuinely reflect critical 
events or are they only based 
on the investigator’s 
impressions? 
Use multiple sources of evidence, 
establish chains of evidence and ask 
participants to review empirical data 
(Yin, 2013). 
 
Seek critical feedback from peers, 
supervisors and critical friends 
(McNiff and Whitehead, 2011). 
Project Team appreciated constructs I devised such as ‘the house exercise’ 
(chapter 4 and 8); the target diagram and concept of ‘rug tugging’ (chapter 
6). 
 
 
Confidentiality requirements limited discussion of raw data and initial 
analyses with peers, but critique was provided by fellow academics during 
research group presentations, conferences and in peer reviewed papers. 
Internal 
validity 
Are inferences and 
connections between 
theories, frameworks and the 
real-life situation valid and 
recognisable to participants 
of the research? 
 
Did the research and arising 
actions contribute usefully to 
the policy-making process?  
Seek validation from the people 
involved in the research (Greenwood 
and Levin, 1998). 
 
 
 
 
Reflect on the impact of the research 
with the people involved 
(Greenwood and Levin, 1998).  
 Early feedback reports to FTI provided opportunities to check 
inferences.  
 Two academic papers combining theories, frameworks, empirical 
evidence and literature were reviewed and validated by FTI and GSF. 
 Q study participants reviewed the findings of the Q study.   
 TIST-Kenya members validated my inferences about the fit between 
their programme and the FCS. 
 
See chapter 8 for a discussion of the contribution of this research to 
reflection and FCSSP outcomes. 
External 
validity 
Do the study’s findings 
resonate with those who 
were not involved in the 
Link the case to hypotheses and 
theoretical concepts (Yin, 2013). 
 
Findings of each empirical chapter shared and validated by FTI including 
by those who were not involved in the research.  
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research? 
 
Are they transferable beyond 
the study itself?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Examine meanings for transferability 
to another situation through a 
conscious and collaborative 
reflection on the similarities and 
differences in context/history in both 
contexts (Greenwood and Levin, 
1998). 
 
 Findings are contextualised within the historical and political context 
of FTI but parallels are drawn between carbon credits and other 
commodities: FTI staff also recognised that some findings also 
applied to other standard-setting processes (chapter 8).  
 Some recommendations recognised by GSF as relevant to their own 
organisational processes (RRf.5)  
 The Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning unit within FTI and other 
researchers who have worked with FTI recognised the value of this 
thesis as a lesson for future collaborations. 
Reliability If another researcher 
conducted the same case 
study, would s/he arrive at 
the same findings and 
conclusions?  
Document procedures using 
protocols and develop a case study 
database (Yin, 2013). 
This test can only be hypothetical as no researcher will ever have the 
opportunity to do a real time action-oriented case study on this process. 
Nevertheless, the evidence, protocols, analytic strategies and other 
processes devised to conduct this research are stored in hard and soft 
copies and the important information is included in the appendices of this 
thesis. 
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4.6. Ethical and legal issues and methodological challenges 
Engaging in real-life processes necessarily requires consideration of complex ethical issues, 
which were described in my application for ethical review). Action-oriented research involves a 
strong ethical commitment to participants who have as much right to benefit from the research 
process, including its findings, as the researcher (Small, 1995). Although the ethical review 
process safeguards against mistreatment of participants, much research with human participants 
does not benefit them. Also, provision of information to RPOs should be timely in both its 
manner and style. The challenge of designing and conducting mutually beneficial research and 
presenting it to the RPOs is discussed in chapter 8.  
Procedures simultaneously needed to meet the RPOs’ demands regarding treatment of 
confidential or sensitive information, and my need for freedom to be critical and make 
independent judgements and this required a sensitive balancing act. The need for some form of 
written agreement between the RPOs and the researcher was evident from the outset but initial 
drafts proposed by either RPO were unworkable as they were designed for interns or 
consultants. The eventual agreement signed in September 2013 between GSF, FTI and the 
University of Leeds took 6 months to develop and involved thirteen people’s contributions.  
A number of methodological challenges were encountered in my research. This section 
describes how they were dealt with and recognises both the strengths and weaknesses in the 
research design as a result. Chapter 8 covers some more specific aspects which helped or 
hindered the collaborative process at different points. 
4.6.1. Timing/ sequencing of FCSSP alongside parallel units of analysis and 
PhD process 
The unpredictability of the timing of FCSSP events made it difficult to plan research with the 
parallel units of analysis much in advance or to prolong the period of research with them. The 
first trip to Kenya was organised within three weeks and I had been unable to meet the staff 
from the second programme until the second trip, meaning that research tools were developed 
during the limited Kenyan fieldwork period. This related to the choice made to prioritise FCSSP 
events in order to get as complete a picture as possible. The problem of getting the ‘whole 
picture’ is not unique to this type of multi-sited ethnography but the method presents part of the 
solution because presence in multiple sites allows the researcher to gather multiple perspectives 
and take on multiple identities (Freidberg, 2001)- for example, using the fieldwork period with 
TIST-Kenya to generate useful feedback for the FCS consultation.  
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The limited timeframe for collecting data meant I had to step back from the FCSSP before it 
reached completion. The data collection period ended fortuitously with the approval of the FCS. 
However, in the months that followed, several important changes took place as the FCS went 
through a cycle of further revision and re-approval based on comments from FTI internal 
stakeholders. When I met with FTI in March 2016, staff expressed disappointment that I had not 
followed the process closely in this final phase but briefed me on changes so I could 
acknowledge them.  
My ability to attend events in person was also limited by what I thought would take place when 
writing my fieldwork funding application in spring 2013. There were some important events 
which were critical to the FCSSP but had not been foreseen in the planning phases of my PhD 
or occurred after my fieldwork budget had temporally expired. Despite appeals to the funders, I 
was not permitted to access the remaining funds I had saved, which was disappointing.   
4.6.2. Challenges related to data collection techniques 
a) Participant observation 
While the role of participant-as-observer has the advantage of providing greater opportunity to 
gain access to meanings assigned to what is said (Schatzman and Strauss, 1973), associated 
weaknesses are that participation may require too much attention relative to observation or that 
the researcher may need to assume positions or advocacy roles (Brewer, 2000). Regarding the 
attention needed to participate, I needed to choose between focussing on observing verbal and 
non-verbal behaviours during the FCSSP events, and generating complete transcripts of 
verbatim. Opting for the latter was a practical, strategic and ethical decision- it proved too 
difficult to systematically record observations at the same time as collecting verbatim during the 
meeting. Using audio-recording devices was not an option as I had been requested by FTI and 
GSF not to approach the meeting attenders in advance to ask them for permission to record. It 
was also most time-efficient to generate transcripts this way. These proved valuable to me as 
components of my dataset, but also for FTI16 (see chapter 8). 
Regarding the assuming of positions, I initially avoided giving my opinion given my relative 
lack of understanding of the topic area and my feedback to FTI came in the form of synthesising 
other stakeholders’ perspectives, reminding them of different options proposed etc. However, as 
my understanding of the TIST-Kenya programme grew and I recognised the value of their 
learning for FTI, I deliberately supported them to make their voices heard. I did this by 
                                                     
16 After the first meeting, I had been requested to share my meeting notes with FTI and was apologetic 
that they were 18 pages long! To my surprise, they told me that this level of detail was extremely useful.  
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encouraging FTI to invite them to participate in a workshop; supporting them to deliver 
feedback during the FCS consultation; facilitating a visit by FTI to TIST-Kenya; and speaking 
up for TIST-Kenya during a workshop that an invited TIST representative had been unable to 
attend.  
During KENDBIP research I encountered an ethical dilemma as I became aware that I had been 
framing the programme as a carbon project while the programme staff had not communicated 
with biogas users that their digesters were going to be generating carbon credits. There was a 
growing dissatisfaction about this from some farmers who already had prior but somewhat 
misconceived ideas about the carbon market. I chose to respond to biogas users’ ad hoc requests 
for more information about the carbon market, but did not reveal what I knew about the 
programme managers’ intentions for the carbon credits, and then fed back this situation in the 
form of a recommendation for more transparency between the programme and biogas users. On 
this occasion, as well as another when I tried to explain to Fairtrade tea farmers about the FCS 
and how it related to tea and carbon credits, I think I created more confusion.  
Marcus (1995 p113) gives advice regarding this dilemma:  
‘in conducting multi-sited research, one finds oneself with all sorts of cross-cutting 
and contradictory personal commitments. These conflicts are resolved, perhaps 
ambivalently [and, I add sometimes quite clumsily], not by refuge in being a 
detached anthropological scholar, but in being a sort of ethnographer-activist, 
renegotiating identities in different sites as one learns more about a slice of the 
world system’. 
I posit that these occasions are to be seen as human experiences and learning opportunities 
rather than weaknesses of the research design. 
b) Interviews 
With my TIST-Kenya research I relied heavily on one key informant, with whom I developed a 
friendship. She lived locally to where I was based, was enthusiastic to collaborate, enjoyed our 
discussions, and was a pioneer of the programme. I was hesitant about asking more time of 
other TIST contractors because I had been cautioned by U.S.-based programme founder that 
they were very busy. Key informants are often pivotal in the success of a case study but 
researchers are cautioned against over-dependence on one key informant (Bailey, 1996). I dealt 
with this by shadowing other TIST contractors during their work, and by corroborating what I 
had learnt in discussions with the principal key informant during the Participatory Policy 
Appraisal Workshop.  
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4.6.3. Cultural bias and language 
My identity as a white female offered both opportunities for access which were mutually 
beneficial as well as creating expectations beyond my control. With one key informant, we 
regularly ‘played the white card’. We used my presence to jointly visit civil servants and 
institutional partners so that she could discuss important topics with them or get policy updates 
and I could interview them17. Introducing herself as mentor for my PhD about TIST-Kenya 
helped her increase her status and credibility amongst these people (mostly men). Unfortunately 
her strengths of character and work were not inherently recognised without an association with 
whiteness, but I was nevertheless happy to stand behind her and nod.  
On another occasion, my (white) presence in a farmer’s compound accompanied by a 
KENDBIP staff member attracted about 20 local farmers who turned up to see what was going 
on, interpreting our visit to the farmer’s newly installed biogas plant as the official opening 
ceremony. The occasion turned into a demonstration of the plant and an explanation of the 
programme to those present and I was told that afterwards those who had not been there would 
be frustrated to learn that they had missed a key event.  
My inability to speak Kiswahili well enough or any of the more common local languages in the 
areas I visited limited opportunities to communicate with TIST members and narrowed my 
interviews to English-speakers or those that could translate for a group. This weakness relates to 
limited time with the carbon programmes but I experienced an abundance of willing translators. 
4.6.4. Reflections on researcher role and positionality 
In action-oriented research on policy-making processes, researcher roles are dynamically 
configured, changing as policy-processes unfold and it is important to be aware and reflect on 
this  (Schut, 2012). My role shifted throughout the process in response to increasing contextual 
understanding, familiarity with the collaborators, and opportunities to contribute in different 
ways during the process. Predominantly, my positionality in relation to the FCSSP was one of a 
‘friendly outsider’18 (Greenwood and Levin, 1998). While the external perspective is important 
for opening up internal processes for change, the friend is necessary for reflecting back to the 
participants. Greenwood and Levin (1998) recognise the following contributions that the 
                                                     
17 I did not end up using this data. 
18 I variously used the phrase ‘critical friend’ and ‘friendly outsider’ to describe myself during the 
process. For simplicity, I use the latter term in this chapter because in Greenwood and Levin’s definition, 
it includes providing encouragement such as helpful information and moral support as well as giving 
constructive critique and speaking the locally unspeakable - therefore, the right to be critical is embedded 
in the term. 
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friendly outsider can make: (i) providing constructive criticism (in terms of direct feedback and 
written reflections, pointing to comparable cases, bringing in examples from outside where 
similar problems, opportunities and processes have occurred); (ii) opening up lines of discussion 
(pointing out opportunities for flexibility and opportunities for change, alongside 
encouragement in the form of moral support and helpful information); (iii) making visible the 
forms of tacit knowledge that people are using and helping them to explore the resources that 
they have at their disposal; and (iv) speaking the locally unspeakable (by giving honest 
feedback, exploring tacit agreements which might actually be blocking a process).  
I occupied a particular position as an outsider who was invited into the FCSSP to observe and 
make sense of the internal workings, in exchange for constructive feedback and critical analysis. 
Acting from here was important for enhancing process transparency, and because this was a 
critical case study offering lessons for science, standard-setting and practice. Nevertheless I 
needed to remain conscious of my role and positionality as I iterated between different levels of 
the process (from field to office, and from participant observer to external critic) and make these 
subtleties explicit to the various stakeholders I engaged with. Meanwhile, during my time with 
TIST-Kenya I shifted roles and became more of an on-the-ground correspondent and advocate, 
aiming to make their experiences, lessons and best practices known.  
One of the critiques of participant observation is that it is impossible to genuinely experience 
the same as the other participants in the instance you are observing. In the role of participant-as-
observer I received the same information as other participants in advance of workshops, sat at 
the table with other meeting participants, joined particular sub-group discussions, remained with 
the participants during breaks, and sometimes (when invited by FTI) stayed in the same 
accommodation and shared meals. This meant that some of my own experiences (such as 
noticing that I was becoming more familiar and confident as I returned to follow up meetings, 
forming friendly relationships with people) could have been experienced by other participants. 
At most meetings I was one of the youngest and one of fewer females, and knew less about 
carbon than most of the Group of Experts but came with some of my own experiences of project 
development and business in Africa. On the other hand, by participating in a wider range and 
larger number of workshops as part of the FCSSP than all other invited participants and 
regularly talking to the staff managing it, I experienced a heightened familiarity, gained a 
broader overview, and had privileged access to information (the non-sensitive aspects of which I 
sometimes shared when asked by other participants). Despite efforts to clarify, I was sometimes 
misconceived as coming from within FTI or working for them. 
In Kenya, my participation in the meetings, trainings and workshops involved travelling by the 
same means as other programme level staff, sitting with people, hearing everything said to the 
meeting participants (or if it was in Kiswahili or a local dialect, hearing a synthesised translation 
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whispered to me by an English-speaker who I would sit next to), and sometimes being invited to 
stand up and say something19. I experienced such things as the hunger of sitting at a 6 hour 
meeting with no snacks, the anticipation of payments arriving via the mobile payment system 
and the honour of receiving kujengana (personal appraisal, see chapter 7). Nevertheless, many 
things were not possible to experience as a true participant of TIST because of my very different 
life experiences and income level.   
Throughout my research, I sought to develop rapport with the various collaborators in the 
research and this was a two way thing- as a researcher, one is sometimes accorded trust and 
respect relatively easily, but it was important to be worthy of this through my actions, 
transparency of my intentions, and willingness to look critically at myself with the same 
scrutiny that I applied to the FCSSP. I reflect in more detail on my positionality in chapter 8.   
4.7. Conclusion to chapter four 
This chapter has described the research design, selection of cases, strategies for sampling and 
bounding the case, and specific tools for data collection and analysis for the multiple methods 
deployed in this thesis. With the exception of Q method, which is detailed in chapter 5, all other 
methods used in this thesis have been detailed in this chapter rather than in the results chapters 
as a strategy to avoid repetition (because they were used to address multiple questions and 
generate results presented in multiple chapters). The chapter has also outlined the main ethical, 
legal and methodological considerations associated with the design. Some of these are returned 
to in chapter 8, which involves a more detailed reflection on the research design.  
 
 
                                                     
19 On several occasions, I was requested to explain what carbon credits were, and how they linked to tree 
planting activities and payments. Having witnessed an explanation given by seminar leaders to TIST 
members, I tried to align my explanation. Such incidents served as an indication of particular TIST 
members’ understanding of carbon credits but also gave me an opportunity to influence it.   
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Chapter 5 Which ‘fairness’, for whom and why? An empirical 
analysis of plural notions of fairness applied to Fairtrade carbon 
projects, using Q methodology20 
5.1. Introduction to chapter five 
This is the first empirical chapter of this thesis, and contributes towards addressing objective 1, 
to uncover the debates, perspectives and different options for achieving fairness within carbon 
projects and explore them in relation to the FCS by answering questions 1.1 and 1.2. Most of 
the chapter is dedicated to question 1.1., namely how is ‘fair carbon’ understood and 
articulated by the various stakeholders involved in developing the Fairtrade Climate Standard 
as well as those who may be affected by it? This concept was initially used by FTI and GSF (see 
chapter 2) to refer to what they were seeking to achieve through the Fairtrade Climate Standard, 
i.e. fair carbon credits. During subsequent discussions with stakeholders taking part in the 
FCSSP, ‘fair’, ‘fairness’ and ‘fair carbon’ were frequently alluded to but not accorded space for 
an explicit discussion about what they actually meant to different actors, including FTI and 
GSF. Through my engagement with the FCSSP and my efforts to enhance reflexivity (pathways 
components 5 and 6, see section 1.3.1), I decided to open up a space for these discussions by 
means of a Q study. I conducted this between May and September 2014, during the consultation 
and revision phase of the FCSSP. The project team welcomed this contribution because they 
recognised that the Q study would enable people to go on a reflective journey whereas the 
consultation led by FTI was aimed at seeking answers to relatively closed questions (CoordC.2, 
April 2014, see Appendix 2). I operationalised the terms in the form of the research question 
posed to Q participants: ‘what should ‘fairness’ mean in the context of a Fairtrade carbon 
project?’. At the end of this chapter I address question 1.2., namely whose perspectives on ‘fair 
carbon’ are incorporated into the Fairtrade Climate Standard.  
                                                     
20 This chapter was developed from the following published papers: HOWARD, R. J., TALLONTIRE, A. 
M., STRINGER, L. C. & MARCHANT, R. A. 2016. Which “fairness”, for whom, and why? An 
empirical analysis of plural notions of fairness in Fairtrade Carbon Projects, using Q methodology. 
Environmental Science & Policy, 56, 100-109. and HOWARD, R., TALLONTIRE, A., STRINGER, L. 
& MARCHANT, R. 2015a. Which “fairness”, for whom, and why? Broadening inputs for a standard 
designed to certify “fairtrade carbon credits”. Sustainability Research Institute Working Papers [Online]. I 
conceived, executed and led the study and conducted all the analysis and interpretation of the results. I 
also led the writing and collated inputs for the discussion and general comments from the supervisory 
team. 
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The chapter draws on the first pathways component (identifying and unpacking key terms used 
in pathway-building) that was introduced in sections 1.3.1 and 1.4.1.1. It also pursues the 
second line of enquiry characteristic of empirical analyses of fairness introduced in section 
1.4.1.1 (Sikor et al., 2014), to characterise different stakeholders’ notions in particular contexts, 
examine their justifications in public discourse, and identify how different notions gain or lose 
ground. It does this through an exploration of notions upheld by stakeholders in the deliberative 
contexts of the FCSSP and an assessment of which ones eventually make it into the FCS and 
why. Section 5.2 situates this chapter’s enquiry within the landscape of debates on Fairtrade, 
carbon and what fairness means, based on a brief overview of literature. Section 5.3 describes 
the methodological approach and specific steps in detail. They are included here rather than in 
Chapter 4 because an understanding of these is a prerequisite for making sense of the results of 
the Q study (section 5.4) and analyses that follow in sections 5.5 and 5.6. These discussion 
sections link the results (the three Q factors) both to debates regarding Fairtrade and carbon, and 
to the published FCS. The chapter concludes with a summary of the Q study’s findings and a 
reflection on the method and scope for further research. Chapter 9 revisits these latter two 
points. 
5.2. Space for debates on fairness within Fairtrade and carbon 
markets? 
This chapter responds to calls to unpack the normative ideals, in particular of fairness evoked by 
SSOs in the carbon market (Page, 2012) and used differently by different actors in depoliticised, 
technocratic, standardised and instrumental ways which threaten the achievement of fairer 
outcomes (Melo et al., 2014, McDermott et al., 2012). This builds on discussions in chapters 1 
and 2 of the inherent tensions in the term ‘fair carbon’. Without clear definitions, normative 
ideals and concepts are open to co-option or dilution by powerful actors (Leach et al., 2010). 
Attempts by SSOs to set ‘rules’ or standards on what constitutes ‘fairness’ necessarily involve 
legitimising some definitions over others and ‘closing down’ debates concerning its boundaries 
(Renard, 2005, Renard and Loconto, 2013). Standard setting processes and the tools and 
strategies used to govern them may deliberately involve avoidance of debate on visions, values 
and definitions (Djama et al., 2011, Cheyns, 2011). This may be attributed to the need for 
expediency (acting quickly to achieve desired ends), but the legitimacy of processes requires a 
consideration of what is the ‘fair’ or ‘just’ thing to do (Cheyns, 2011).  As standards for fairness 
are set, it is important to critically assess what is understood by fairness in order to establish 
which types of fairness outcomes the standards are designed to achieve, for whom, how and 
why, and to enable the future evaluation of these outcomes (McDermott et al., 2013).  
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This is particularly important in the context of an initiative co-led by FTI. The fair trade 
movement’s inherent tensions and current trends and pathways have thrown into question the 
meaning of fairness (Lyon, 2006, Smith, 2013). Philosophical explorations of this issue 
(Griffiths, 2012, Suranovic, 2015) have not managed to bring this debate into the heart of the 
movement where people act (with more or less power, legitimacy, capacity or authority) to 
shape the definitions and add direction and momentum to particular pathways. Facilitating this 
discussion amongst such actors therefore contributes empirically towards an understanding of 
the movement’s current state and also impacts on the future of fair trade (Renard and Loconto, 
2013). Questions raised about the meaning of fairness in fair trade relate to four major issue 
areas dividing both participants of the movement and its supporters. Each of these resonates 
with similar fairness concerns in the carbon market indicated in chapter 2 and Howard et al. 
(2015b). These are outlined briefly in Table 5-1 
Table 5-1: Fairness concerns in the carbon market and links to fair trade debates 
Issue Fairness concerns in the carbon market  Summary of relevant debates in fair 
trade 
1 Is it fair to place mitigation burdens on 
people less responsible for climate 
change? What is the role and 
responsibility of people who are more 
responsible for climate change? (Wang 
and Corson, 2015, Lovell et al., 2009, 
Goodman and Boyd, 2011) 
Who should fair trade target as 
producers and consumers and what 
should be expected of them? (Keahey, 
2015, Raynolds and Greenfield, 2015, 
Renard and Laconto, 2013, Tallontire, 
2015)  
2 Who should be benefitting from 
‘decarbonisation’? Is it a problem that 
smallholders and communities receive 
only marginal shares of the benefits? 
(Corbera and Martin, 2015, Wang and 
Corson, 2015) 
Which kinds of benefits are accessible 
to whom in different contexts?  (Getz 
and Shreck, 2006, Nelson and Martin, 
2012, Tallontire et al., 2012) 
3 Projects frequently result in a marginal 
positioning for smallholders and 
communities (Mathur et al., 2014, Leach 
and Scoones, 2013) 
Which kinds of relationships and 
divisions of tasks should prevail 
between different actors in the chain? 
(Blowfield and Dolan, 2010, Raynolds 
and Greenfield, 2015, Taylor, 2005b) 
4 Marketization and technocratisation 
approaches of standards result in 
exclusivity of expertise and inherent 
trade-offs (Corbera and Brown, 2010, 
Tensions between the movement-driven 
origins of fair trade and current 
applications in multiple types of 
industries, commodities and supply 
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Gupta et al., 2012, Lansing, 2013b, Melo 
et al., 2014) 
chains. (Doherty et al., 2013, Smith, 
2013, Raynolds and Greenfield, 2015, 
Renard and Laconto, 2013) 
 
5.3. Methodology 
I used Q methodology (‘Q’) to empirically analyse how the term ‘fairness’ was differently 
understood and deployed by people contributing to the development of the Fairtrade Climate 
Standard (FCS). Q is classified as both quantitative, because of the use of factor analysis as a 
calculation method, and qualitative, because discourse analysis or a descriptive approach is 
adopted for interpreting the Q results (Setiawan and Cuppen, 2013). It enables analysis of 
subjectivity in an open, yet structured and statistically interpretable form (Curry et al., 2013, 
Setiawan and Cuppen, 2013) and can be used to identify a range of voices, accounts and 
understandings (Barry and Proops, 1999). It ‘opens up’ inputs and reflexivity in policy-making 
processes (Leach et al., 2010, Ockwell, 2008), facilitating dialogue (Focht and Lawler, 2000) 
and enhancing policy implementation processes (Barry and Proops, 1999). My focus was on 
competing notions and discourses around fairness which shaped the FCS while it was under 
development.  
I used the questions from the Multi-Dimensional Fairness Framework (see section 1.5.1 and 
Figure 5-1) to categorise and analyse these notions during statement selection and interpretation 
of results. In this chapter I refer to the framework’s content, goals and target of fairness, and 
how the parameters of fairness, deploying the latter dimension in a narrower sense in my 
selection of statements and analysis of results, looking only at how parameters for trading 
relationships and pricing are set.  
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Figure 5-1: Multi-Dimensional Fairness Framework: dimensions explored in ch 5 
The Q study followed six methodological steps. 
5.3.1. Collation of the ‘Fair Carbon’ concourse 
A Q concourse is a body of literature which aims to represent the full range of ideas and 
opinions on the issue under study. This concourse, defined as opinion on what ‘fairness’ would 
mean in the (hypothetical21) context of a Fairtrade Carbon Credit (FCC) project, was collated 
from materials collected or accessed during observations of the standards development process 
between September 2013 and March 2014 (see Appendix 2 for sources used in the concourse). 
It included secondary documents; transcripts of events observed; and transcripts or notes from 
interviews (n=7) with individuals involved in carbon projects or carbon certification, based in 
East Africa, the U.S., Asia and Europe. Interview themes included gender in carbon projects, 
roles and responsibilities, challenges related to production, certification and sales of carbon 
credits, expectations of the standard, philosophy and moral positioning.  
                                                     
21 The FCS was still under development and no projects had yet been certified. 
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5.3.2. Refinement of concourse into a ‘Q set’ 
Concourse materials were analysed inductively using Atlas.ti software. 119 coded22 extracts 
were derived and used to generate an initial set of 58 statements, which were edited down to 40 
statements expected to trigger both positive and negative reactions (following Webler et al., 
2009). The process of editing statements involved creating hybrid statements (from several 
sentences uttered by the same author); splitting up multiple propositions into separate 
statements; making statements less ambiguous by removing words (such as ‘probably’); 
depersonalising statements to prevent feelings of exclusion or alienation; and rewording in order 
to transform rhetorical questions into statements. Finally, some statements were deliberately 
opposed to say the exact opposite from what the original author had intended with the purpose 
of attempting to achieve a balance of statements likely to trigger positive and negative reactions. 
This is because the Q sort is structured around a zero point (assumed to be a point of zero 
salience or no opinion). The ‘agree’ and ‘disagree’ points extend out either side of the zero 
point. In a forced normal distribution with a perfect balance of ‘agree’ and ‘disagree’ 
statements, this zero point is in the centre of the grid. Without knowing the perspectives of the 
participants, it is impossible to predict which statements will be categorised as ‘agree’, 
‘disagree’ and ‘neutral’ and therefore where the zero point will appear for each sort, but by 
attempting to compose a balance of statements (a roughly equal number which could be 
expected to trigger positive and negative reactions), this zero point is more likely to appear in 
the middle (see Webler et al, 2009). 
I conducted a pilot Q-sort with one person who was working for a carbon project advisory 
company but had conducted preliminary research for the Fairtrade Climate Standard and taken 
part in multiple stakeholder meetings. Using this feedback, I adjusted the set. Adjustment 
included rewording ambiguous, general or loaded statements, returning to the concourse and re-
coding it for ‘parameters of fairness’ (the outer layer in the equity framework) and selecting 
statements referring specifically to pricing mechanisms. The final set contained 40 statements. I 
ensured the theoretical breadth by cross-checking the statements against six thematic categories, 
based on the Multi-Dimensional Fairness Framework, selecting at least five from each category, 
although some covered more than one category (Table 5-2 and  
Table 5-3). Following Lansing (2013a), I chose not to make these categories explicit to 
participants because I did not want to confine their reactions.  
                                                     
22 Five codes were theoretically inspired by the Multi-Dimensional Fairness Framework (fair access, fair 
benefit-sharing, fair procedures, the target of fairness and the goal of fairness), and three were developed 
inductively (generic fairness, issues of ownership of the credits and trade-offs involved in delivering 
fairness). 
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Table 5-2: Fit between statements and thematic categories 
Thematic category Number of 
associated 
statements 
Statements used to build factor interpretations 
Parameters of 
fairness 
13 Statements about pricing and margins, and to 
what extent Fairtrade should prescribe 
parameters of fairness within a standard. 
Goal of fairness 8 Combined: Statements about where credits 
should be produced and sold, by which kinds 
of people and structures; and statements about 
the overall goal of projects. 
Target of fairness 11 
Fair Procedures 13 Combined: Statements about ownership of 
credits, involvement in project design and 
implementation, and participation in financial 
and management decisions. 
Fair Access  6 
Fair Benefit-
sharing 
16 Statements about distribution of benefits, 
responsibilities and skills. 
 
5.3.3. Purposive selection of participants 
Q studies select participants based on a diversity of perspectives (Setiawan and Cuppen, 2013) 
rather than representativeness or quantity (Eden et al., 2005). In this case, most participants 
were purposively selected based on their views expressed during interventions in meetings, 
workshops and informal discussions as part of the Fairtrade Climate Standard Setting Process 
(FCSSP)23. Two additional participants from the fair trade system were encouraged to 
participate by their colleagues. Of 36 invited, 26 participated (Table 5-4): 23 had been involved 
in at least one stakeholder meeting connected to the standard development; the remainder had 
received information about the process via colleagues who had been involved. I ensured 
participants had experience of Fairtrade (nine were licensees, certifiers, or staff at FTI or any of 
its member organisations) and/ or experience of Gold Standard or carbon projects certified by 
other standards bodies (17 were involved in promoting, financing and/ or implementing 
projects, or developing new Gold Standard Foundation standards). Seven had practical 
experience of carbon projects involving Fairtrade producers and fitted in both categories.  
                                                     
23 Overall, this process involved several meetings and workshops led by FTI with stakeholders from fair 
trade producer organisations; fair trade marketing organisations; and NGOs, businesses and consultants 
involved in carbon project financing, development, implementation or retailing of credits, see chapter 5. 
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5.3.4. Q-sorts and accompanying interviews 
During May-September 2014, 26 Q interviews were conducted: 20 were face-to-face, using 
printed cards and a distribution grid, and six were via Skype, using Q-sort software application 
Flash Q (Hackert and Braehler, 2007). Participants were encouraged to think out loud during 
their first reading and sorting of statements into ‘agree, disagree and neutral’. This rich 
interview data helped me understand how the statement was being interpreted and why, and 
highlighted statements or words that were ambiguous for some people24. Next, participants 
ranked the statements, positioning them on a 9-columned forced normal distribution grid, 
indicating a spectrum ranging from most disagree to most agree (Figure 5-2), helping to reveal 
participants’ preferences (Brown et al., 2014, Webler et al., 2009). Participants were then asked 
open-ended questions about their positioning logic, helping me view each Q-sort from their 
perspective.  
  
                                                     
24 Different participants of the Q study were endowed with different ‘pieces’ of expertise on the discourse 
area but no one was an expert in everything. This meant that some people struggled to understand some of 
the statements because of the use of concepts that were unfamiliar to them, and some concepts were 
automatically interpreted in different ways on the basis of participants’ prior associations with them in 
their differing professions.  
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Figure 5-2: The Q-sort grid.  
I distinguished columns using letters, but the equivalent numerals used in the Q data analysis software 
package (and used later in the presentation of the results) are given in brackets.  
Most disagree                                                                                            Most agree 
 
Z   (-
4) 
Y (-3) X (-2) W (-1) N (0) D 
(+1) 
C (+2) B (+3) A 
(+4) 
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
          
5.3.5. Correlation and factor analysis of Q-sorts 
Q-Analysis identifies similar sorting patterns in the Q-sorts, meaning that participants share 
some distinct commonalities in their perceptions. Analysis of the 26 Q-sorts used PQ method 
software, version 2.35 (Schmolck, 2002). A 26 x 26 correlation matrix of the Q-sorts was 
produced and subjected to factor extraction using Principal Components Analysis (PCA) and 
Varimax rotation. PCA considers the specificity of individual sorts as well as the commonality 
between sorts (Webler et al., 2009)25. Rotation is applied to ensure each factor offers ‘the best 
possible, or most meaningful vantage point from which to view the subject matter’ (Watts and 
Stenner, 2012:142). Following Cairns et al, (2014), my aim was to find a factor solution which 
maximised the variance explained and number of loaders (participants significantly correlated 
with just one factor), while minimising the number of confounders (people loading significantly 
on more than one factor) and non-loaders (participants loading on no factor). I applied the 
                                                     
25 Views differ within the Q community as to whether PCA or Centroid is most appropriate for factor 
extraction, but in our case we tried them both and eventually opted for PCA because several of the 
Centroid solutions contained empty factors with no significant loaders.   
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principle that each factor should contain at least two sorts loading significantly on that factor 
alone (Watts and Stenner, 2012). I compared a number of outputs before selecting a three-factor 
solution. Together, the three factors explained 46% of the study variance. Anything above 35% 
is ordinarily considered a sound solution in factor analysis (Kline, 1994). 22 participants’ Q-
sorts loaded significantly on one of these factors, with three confounders and one non-loader. 
Weighted averages of the significant single loaders’ sort patterns from each factor were used to 
create three ‘factor arrays’ or idealised Q-sort patterns, following the same format as the 
original distribution grid ( 
Table 5-3). 
5.3.6. Qualitative results interpretation and development of ‘Fair Carbon’ 
narratives 
I wanted to understand the factors from the perspectives of the participants and create narratives 
which resonated with at least the highest loaders in each factor. Factor interpretation followed 
Watts and Stenner’s (2012) guidelines, which involves drafting crib sheets of statements and 
checking back over demographic and post-interview data to formulate hypotheses. I used the 
rich by-statement interview data to compare the views of each significant loader in the factor 
and summarise shared views. My interpretative narratives paid particular attention to the 
interview data concerning the statements on the crib sheet. I chose not to draw on statements 
which had been understood quite differently by the various people in the factor, and invited the 
highest loaders to read over them and comment. To make explicit the links between the content 
of the narratives and the original themes, I organised them according to the headings in the 
Multi-Dimensional Fairness Framework. When categorising the statements, many spanned 
multiple categories, so I chose to combine the headings of ‘goals’ with ‘target’; and ‘access’ 
with ‘procedures’ in order to avoid repetition. 
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5.4. Results 
5.4.1. Factor 1 (F1): ‘Producer First’ - Participation and Price-Floors 
F1 explains 17% of the study variance and has eight significant loaders; five working within the 
Fairtrade system; three involved in project development with experience of working with fair 
trade producers in carbon projects. 
Goals and Target of fairness: Production of Fairtrade Carbon Credits (FCCs) should be in 
‘organised communities of disadvantaged people in the south’ (statement 2, ranked +3). 
Production should not be limited to pre-existing organisations (30, -4), but well-functioning co-
operatives should be targeted (14, +2). Large structures where individual members are ‘not 
realistically engaged’ and manufacturing companies that do not engage with organised 
communities should not be targeted (13, +2; 38, -3) and credits should not be produced in the 
industrialised north (4, -4). Buyers of FCCs must also commit to reducing their emissions (32, -
3) as it would be unfair to ask poor people to reduce their emissions if high emitters are not 
committing to do the same (36, +1).  
Access and procedures: participation in an organisation and active involvement in a carbon 
project are essential fairness components. This does not mean that community-based or farmer 
organisations should manage everything from the carbon project development process (21, -2) 
to the sale of credits (25, -1). However, participating individuals and households must be able to 
input into decision-making and management (40, +4) and financial discussions (10, +3). Credits 
must transfer hands in order to be transacted, but the first owners should be the participating 
individuals and households in a project (11, +2) and the signing of an agreement with an 
aggregator is insufficient for the fair transfer of the credits away from those generating the 
emissions savings (15, -3).  
Benefit-sharing: Focus should be on the organisation carrying out the project, who must receive 
a fair price. The rest of the supply chain is not a target of fairness (hence 19 and 20, both 0). 
Choices made about budgeting and revenue do not need to be judged through a ‘fairness’ lens 
(see statements 9, 16, 22 and 23 all in zero)- these should be left to the discretion project 
participants. Nevertheless, intervening to ensure payments are reaching women may be 
appropriate in some project contexts (39, +1). 
Parameters of fairness: Minimum prices are important in setting parameters for fairer trade (27, 
+4), rather than prices being driven by market forces (28, +1). This does not mean being 
oblivious to market prices, but setting a floor price which would guarantee projects a carbon 
credit price that covers production costs and ensuring that there is willingness to pay.  
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Table 5-3: Statements making up the Q set  
Table includes idealised sort patterns for factors F1, F2 and F3 that emerged from the analysis. Sort 
patterns represent scores that an individual loading 100% on the factor would have assigned to each 
statement, where -4 is ‘most disagree’ 
∆ denotes statements used to build the factor interpretations.  
c
 denotes consensus statements (which did not distinguish between any pair of factors), non-significant at 
P<0.01. These were not used to build the factor interpretations unless they were also the highest or lowest 
scored statements.  
T G Pa A B Pr denotes coding for statements according our adapted version of McDermott et al’s (2013) 
equity framework, whereby T = target; G = goal; Pa = parameters; A = fair access; B = fair benefit-
sharing and Pr = fair procedures.  
 
 Statements in the Q set used to explore participants’ views on 
the question What would ‘fairness’ mean in the context of a 
Fairtrade carbon project? 
Idealised sort 
patterns 
  F1 F2 F3 
1c FCCs should only pay people for any emissions reductions 
resulting from the project G 
-1 -1 0 
2 FCCs should aim to shift more of the benefits of carbon trade 
to organised communities of disadvantaged people in the 
south G 
 3∆ -1∆ 1 
3 FCCs should be a mechanism for paying communities in 
developing countries for the fact that their carbon footprints 
are lower than the ones they are entitled to G 
-1 -1 3∆ 
4 The Fairtrade Climate Standard should include within its 
scope the regions that are heavy contributors of greenhouse 
gas emissions T 
-4∆ 2∆ -1 
5c In an FCC supply chain, intermediaries are acceptable as long 
as fair distribution of the benefits from sales is ensured  B 
2 3∆ 2 
6 Buyers of FCCs should pay a price which takes into account 
the cost of the damage to the atmosphere caused by excess 
carbon emissions P 
-2 0 -2 
7 The Fairtrade Climate Standard should reward projects that 
start from scratch with a group of people and enable them to 
 build an organisation Pr 
-1 3∆ -1 
8 Manufacturing companies implementing carbon projects must 
provide opportunities for users to shape product design and 
use of profits Pr   
-1 -1 0 
9 Fairness should mean that a certain amount of the financial 
revenues are going into a carbon project for reinvestment, 
infrastructure, capacity-building etc B 
0∆ 1 1 
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10 Individuals and households involved in an FCC project should 
have an opportunity to take part in discussions about its 
budget, funding source and revenue distribution Pr/ A 
3∆ 1∆ 0∆ 
11 Fairness should mean that the local households accepting an 
intervention are the initial owners of the FCCs Pr 
2∆ 2 -1 
12c Fairness should mean that a project does not import 
cookstoves, as this means exporting jobs to China and 
America B 
-2 -2 -4∆ 
13 Carbon projects implemented by manufacturing companies 
that do not engage with organised communities should not be 
eligible for Fairtrade certification T/ Pr 
2∆ -4∆ -1 
14 Fairtrade Carbon should provide the opportunity for well-
functioning co-operatives to benefit from more economic 
resources Pr/ T 
2∆ 2∆ 1 
15 It is fair for ownership of carbon credits to be transferred away 
from those who are generating the emissions savings as long 
as they are aware of what they are signing in an agreement Pr 
-3∆ 0 4∆ 
16 Fairtrade certification should be able to ensure that benefits 
from taking part in a project are reaching particular members 
of a household A 
0∆ -2∆ 1 
17 The Fairtrade Climate standard should only support smaller 
types of projects T 
-2 -3∆ -2 
18 For a fair supply chain, we need to regulate what everyone in 
the supply chain is getting P/ B  
-2 -1 -3∆ 
19 Fair revenue distribution along the carbon value chain should 
be governed by an ‘open book policy’ (where costs and 
margins are transparent) P/ B 
0∆ 4∆ -1 
20 A fair business model in a carbon project will have to cater for 
a reasonable compensation of all parties involved B 
0∆ 4∆ 3∆ 
21 People generating FCCs should not need to take on the carbon 
project development process Pr/ B 
-2∆ -2∆ 2∆ 
22c Fairness in land-based projects is about securing a certain 
proportion of the carbon revenue as direct payments for 
farmers  B 
0∆ -1 1∆ 
23 It would be fair to use part of the carbon revenue in land based 
projects to pay for technical assistance to farmers B 
0∆ 1 1 
24c Organisations must be able to make the steps and follow the 
procedures required to develop and implement an FCC project 
by themselves Pr/ B 
0 0 -1 
25 Trade of carbon credits can only be fair if communities have 
the chance to  sell their credits by themselves Pr/ B/ A 
-1∆ -3∆ -2 
26c Along with emissions reductions, development should be a 
primary target of an FCC project G 
3 3 4∆ 
27 Having Fairtrade minimum prices for carbon credits is 
fundamental for making trade fair P 
4∆ 1∆ -2∆ 
28 Prices of FCCs should not be driven by market forces P 1∆ -3∆ -2∆ 
29 You should be able to start receiving money for an FCC 
project delivering development, even before you have 
2 -2 2 
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delivered the carbon G/ B 
30c The Fairtrade Climate Standard should only be applicable for 
projects implemented by pre-existing organisations Pr/ T 
-4∆ -4∆ -3 
31c Fairness' should be assessed by looking at what the carbon 
revenue has achieved  T/ G 
1 0 0 
32 FCCs should be sold to anyone, not just those who commit to 
reducing their emissions T 
-3∆ 2∆ 0 
33 Fairtrade carbon development should enable a strong bond 
between carbon credits suppliers and sellers T/ G 
1 2∆ 0 
34 A fair outcome would be that the money generated through a 
carbon project was having a direct impact on the long term 
income situation of a farmer or household  B/ G 
0 0 3∆ 
35 If social impacts are monitored and distribution of economic 
and social benefits is balanced, it is acceptable for an FCC 
project to rely on private companies T/ B 
1 1 3∆ 
36 We cannot talk about fairness if we are asking poor people to 
reduce their emissions when high emitters have not made 
commitments to do the same T 
1∆ 1∆ -4∆ 
37 Fairness in appliance-based projects is about access to the 
technology and maintenance B/ A 
-1 0 2∆ 
38 Projects carried out by large structures involving large 
numbers of beneficiaries should be eligible for Fairtrade 
certification even if individual members are not realistically 
engaged T/ Pr 
-3∆ 0 0 
39 Fairness should mean that in certain types of  FCC projects, 
the carbon payments are made to women A/ B 
1∆ -2∆ 2∆ 
40 Individuals and  households participating in an FCC project 
 must be able to input into decision-making and management 
Pr / A 
4∆ 0∆ 0∆ 
 
5.4.2. Factor 2 (F2): Functional Value Chain, Maximum Impact for People 
and Planet.   
F2 explains 15% of the study variance and has nine significant loaders; eight involved in 
African carbon projects, as implementers, advisors or project partners; and two working with 
fair trade producers.  
Goals and Target: Anyone willing to produce carbon credits should be allowed to, including 
those in heavily-emitting regions (4, +2). Entities should not be excluded on the basis of how 
organised they are at the outset (30, -4), their size (17, -3) or whether they engage with 
organised communities or not (13, -4). Projects which enable new organisations to emerge 
should be rewarded (7, +3), through encouragement and support. Well-functioning co-
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operatives should be targeted (14, +2), but so should non-organised groups as organisation may 
not be relevant or realistic. Although FCCs should aim to shift more of the benefits of carbon 
trade to disadvantaged people in the South, the initiative should not only target organised 
communities, and neither should it limit scope to the South (2, -1). It is unfair to ask poor people 
to reduce emissions if high emitters are not doing the same (36, +1) but requiring customers to 
reduce their emissions is unhelpful (32, +2) because it narrows demand and reduces 
opportunities for those who are willing to carry out mitigation activities which can benefit 
communities, households, and more broadly the environment.  
Benefit-sharing: the most important element of fairness in FCC projects is financial governance 
and distribution within the value chain. Transparency of costs and margins is essential (19, +4) 
and can facilitate trust between parties, encourage efficiency and prevent one party from making 
windfalls. All parties can ensure that everyone is reasonably compensated (20, +4). Micro-level 
decisions about how the carbon revenue is paid and what it is used for, e.g. whether it is paid to 
women or men (39, -2), and whether it reaches particular members of the household (16, -2), are 
not important components of fairness.   
Access and procedures: communities involved in carbon projects do not have to sell credits by 
themselves (25, -3) as this is impractical and inefficient. Intermediaries have a role to play as 
long as they do not take an unfair proportion of the sales revenues, (5, +3), hence the people 
generating the carbon credits must be involved in the project development process (21, -2) so 
they can accept and appropriate it, and determine whether they are getting a fair deal. ‘Taking 
on’ the project development process should still allow for essential technical support, especially 
in a project’s earlier phases. Some loaders suggested the onus is on FTI to make project 
procedures simple to facilitate people in taking on at least part of the project development 
process. Providing opportunities for individuals and households involved in a project to 
participate in management decisions and finance discussions will not be relevant (40, 0 and 10, 
+1) if they lack the capacity or willingness.  
Parameters: Fairtrade minimum prices (a floor price) may have a role to play in fairer trade (27, 
+1) but market forces will naturally drive prices (28, -3) through supply, demand and 
negotiation between parties. A strong bond between credit suppliers and sellers is important (33, 
+2) but as one person noted, this should be a strong collaboration enabling benefit-sharing, 
rather than a binding chain.  
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Table 5-4: Participants and degree of correlation with each factor (F1, F2 and F3). 
 Based F1 F2 F3 
Participants loading significantly on F1 
Staff of FTI Europe 0.743* 0.193 -0.293 
Staff of FTI Europe 0.797* -0.029 0.012 
Carbon project financer and seller of credits Europe 0.532* -0.001 0.027 
Staff of fair trade marketing organisation Europe 0.618* 0.103 0.013 
Carbon project advisor Europe 0.548* 0.282 0.250 
Staff of fair trade marketing organisation Europe 0.643* -0.031 0.163 
Staff of fair trade marketing organisation Europe 0.493* -0.084 0.389 
Carbon project technician/ advisor Europe 0.595* 0.126 0.131 
Participants loading significantly on F2 
Carbon project implementing partner Africa 0.027 0.660* 0.326 
Fair trade licensee and carbon project 
implementer 
Africa -0.142 0.789* 0.064 
Carbon project implementing partner Africa -0.115 0.562* 0.253 
Carbon project advisor Africa 0.219 0.519* -0.034 
Staff of fair trade producer network Africa 0.103 0.599* 0.081 
Carbon project implementer Africa 0.258 0.648* -0.263 
Carbon project implementer Africa 0.050 0.608* 0.265 
Carbon project developer and advisor Europe 0.371 0.514* 0.060 
Carbon project implementer Africa 0.267 0.427* 0.256 
Participants loading significantly on F3  
Staff of research organisation Africa -0.064 0.179 0.645* 
Low-carbon technology promoter  U.S. 0.045 0.289 0.668* 
Carbon project owner U.S. 0.019 0.116 0.491* 
Carbon project advisor and implementer Africa 0.090 -0.032 0.725* 
Staff of certification body  Europe 0.363 0.108 0.577* 
Confounders (loading significantly on more than one factor) 
Staff of FTI Europe 0.583* 0.187 0.465* 
Carbon project technician/ advisor Europe -0.129 0.508* 0.472* 
Staff of standards organisation Europe 0.442* 0.004 0.644* 
Non-loaders (loading significantly on none of the factors) 
Carbon project advisor and implementer Africa 0.365 0.332 -0.031 
* = significant sorts (±0.41 at the p<0.01 level). 
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5.4.3. Factor 3 (F3): Market Efficiency, Minimum Interference, More for 
the Project  
F3 explains 14% of the study variance and has five significant loaders from a mixture of 
professional backgrounds and locations. 
Goals and Target: Development must be a primary target of FCC projects, alongside emissions 
reductions (26, +4). They should not be a mechanism for paying communities for having low 
carbon footprints (3, -3) and insisting that poor people should only reduce their emissions if 
high emitters have made commitments to reduce theirs (36, -4) would deny them benefits of the 
carbon market (such as accessing low carbon technology, and channelling finance from 
developed countries to developing countries).  
Benefit-sharing: fairness might be achieved by enabling access to low carbon technology and 
ensuring its maintenance (37, +1), provided this comes with an appropriate design, and training 
provision in usage. Technology should be sourced with users’ interests and quality in mind: 
banning imported stoves is unhelpful and irrelevant (12, -4), as jobs are created in both stove 
production and distribution. Fairness in delivering benefits might mean making carbon 
payments specifically to women (39, +1), where payments are appropriate, and where women 
are doing the mitigation. Nevertheless, this is a project design issue, and should not be regulated 
by a Fairtrade standard. In land-based projects, direct payments to farmers for the costs they 
incur might be desirable (22, +1) but the money generated through a carbon project should 
directly impact the long term income of participating farmers or households (34, +3).  
In an FCC value chain, each actor plays a distinct role. It is acceptable (and perhaps preferable) 
for private companies to be involved in projects and any criteria used to judge them (35, +3) 
should also be applied to NGOs and non-profits. Performance, not status is important. Every 
party should be reasonably compensated for what they deliver (20, +3), as per any functional 
business model. As one person loading on this factor emphasised, ‘we are talking about a 
market mechanism and if you can’t generate fair revenue for everybody in that process, you 
don’t have a functional mechanism, or you’re talking about development aid’. It is difficult to 
evaluate what is ‘reasonable’ or which costs and margins are acceptable, even within the chain, 
but this should not be regulated by any third party (18, -3).  
Access and procedures: people generating carbon credits should understand what they are 
involved in, but do not need to take on the carbon project development process (21, +2). This 
requires a specific skill-set and is best left to those who can do it most efficiently. Offering 
opportunities for individuals and households involved in projects to input into financial and 
management decisions (e.g. through consultations), is welcomed though not relevant (10 & 40, 
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0) if they lack the capacity or willingness to meaningfully participate. As credits must be 
transacted, ownership must be transferred away from the people generating the emissions saving 
to the end buyer, but agreements between parties must be clearly understood (15, +4). 
Parameters: Market forces will undoubtedly drive prices (28, -2) and the application of 
minimum prices is not necessarily going to make trade fair (27, -2). As some suggested, perhaps 
other tools are more practical and would not risk pricing the credits out of the market.   
5.5. Application of the findings for reflexive policy appraisal 
Q studies allow for questioning of the clarity and consensus of concept definitions used in 
academic, public, expert or lay contexts, particularly where no consensus definition can be 
achieved (Watts and Stenner, 2012). Exploring both ‘expert’ and ‘lay’ opinions in policy-
making processes (e.g. Doody et al., 2009) is important for democratising policy deliberation 
(Fischer, 2003a). Q was useful for bringing to attention the terms within the concourse which 
were ‘fuzzy’ for some people because of lack of experience or familiarity or particular 
associations based on the field they were in, or because the words themselves were inadequately 
defined for a common understanding to emerge. This pointed to the need to develop clearer 
definitions within the FCS itself, which also became apparent within the FCS consultation 
process happening in parallel.  
The synthesis of pluralistic viewpoints resulting from Q studies serve as useful inputs for 
policy-making processes, potentially enabling ‘better problem identification and definition; 
estimation and specification of policy options’ (Steelman and Maguire, 1999:386), reflexive 
appraisal of policy-making processes (Ockwell, 2008) and enhancement of policy 
implementation processes (Barry and Proops, 1999). Reflexivity in policy appraisal provides 
space to consider the plurality of opinions, exposing the underlying values, interests and 
subjective assumptions to critical reflection (Ockwell, 2008). During the development of the 
FCS, plural opinions were heard through the highly consultative process that new Fairtrade 
standards undergo (see Fairtrade International, 2011b), although hearing them does not 
necessarily mean that they would be taken into account. This Q study served as a novel 
opportunity to enhance reflexivity (welcomed by participants and staff responsible for the 
standard development) by facilitating a more systematic and in-depth reflection on the values, 
interests and assumptions underpinning their plural opinions, including the interrelationships 
between different dimensions of fairness and different ways of achieving it (particularly through 
instructions to think out loud, and the sorting process itself).  
Input for the FCS was principally from a group of carbon market actors who were initially 
unfamiliar with the Fairtrade system, its history, principal tools and approaches, and from 
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Fairtrade staff and licensees lacking practical experience of the carbon market. It could be 
expected therefore that these departing differences in knowledge and experiences might produce 
a diverse and potentially irreconcilable set of inputs. Meanwhile, the Project Team were tasked 
with evaluating these inputs and discriminating between them and drafting a standard to be 
voted on and approved by the Fairtrade Standards Committee. My study’s contribution was to 
provide a synthesis of different viewpoints so that participants of the Q study could gain a better 
understanding of perspectives held by other stakeholders in the FCSSP, and so that the Project 
Team writing the FCS would be more aware of which ones they were choosing to include or 
exclude. I did this by sharing a synthesis report of findings with all study participants and 
holding a webinar with FTI and GSF, both in May 2015. Publication of the study results in 
papers in June and December 2015 also enhanced the transparency of the standard-setting 
process itself by highlighting the array of opinions provided as inputs so that those who were 
not involved in the process could assess if and how these were used. After the FCS was 
published in October 2015, I used the factors as a benchmark for assessing which aspects 
present within any of them had been incorporated into the FCS and where alternative 
approaches had been adopted. This is summarised in the boxes following each of the sub-
sections below, and serves as a key indicator of how notions gain or lose ground in public 
discourse and offers an important extension of this empirical line of enquiry (Sikor et al., 2014). 
When sharing the results of the benchmarking with FTI in March 2016, I also included a list of 
elements of fairness that participants of the Q study had identified as missing from the Q 
concourse (extracted from the accompanying interviews) and an assessment of which if any had 
been included in the published FCS.  
5.6. Discussion of findings 
This section discusses points of difference and convergence between factors, linking them to the 
dimensions of the adapted multi-dimensional framework, and to wider debates, evidence and 
lessons learned within fair trade and the carbon market. I also highlight some differences 
between existing fair trade commodity chains and the way things work in carbon projects, 
implying that some aspects of the Fairtrade approach may be under pressure to change as FTI 
moves into carbon. At the end of each section the results of the benchmarking assessment are 
displayed, indicating which perspectives were eventually incorporated into the FCS.  
5.6.1. The goals and target of fairness 
All factors agree that development and emissions reductions should both be primary goals of an 
FCC project, but differences emerge when exploring what is understood by ‘development’ and 
where priorities are placed. For F2 and F3, the goal is to maximise emissions reductions and 
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carbon credit sales whilst having a positive development impact. For F2 this is achieved by 
removing limitations to the production and marketing of credits in order to maximise the 
environmental impact. F3 envisages development at the level of the households and individuals 
participating in the project, through increased access to clean and usable technology, or positive 
impacts on household income. F1 prioritises development in the global south, achieved 
principally through participation in the project as organisational members: organisations being 
the target of support and benefits.  
Differences between the factors relate to disagreements regarding issue 1 in Table 5-1. 
Disagreements on the target of fairness are clearest between F1 and F2 regarding the necessity 
of being organised, inclusion of projects in the north, and criteria for customers buying credits. 
Similar debates are articulated within fair trade, most visibly in the recent departure of Fair 
Trade USA from the FTI system. F2 fits more with Fair Trade USA’s strategy of growing the 
market for fair trade products so that more producers will benefit (involving certifying farmers 
who are not democratically organised, plantations in sectors which FTI limits to small 
producers, and Northern producers). This has been widely condemned by FTI and other 
members of the movement because of the emphasis on market goals over movement principles 
(Raynolds and Greenfield, 2015).  
Disagreements about the relevance of organisation between F1 and F2 loaders are a reminder 
that firmly rooted assumptions about ‘organisation’ need to be reality-tested by attending to the 
specificities of carbon credits (how they are produced and by whom) compared to existing fair 
trade commodities. Producer organisations form the roots of the fair trade movement, beginning 
with coffee co-operatives in Mexico (Smith and VanderHoff Boersma, 2013) and these roots 
continue to shape organisational preferences 30 years on. Producer organisations feature 
strongly in FTI’s Theory of Change (Fairtrade International, 2013), which articulates how fair 
trade interventions result in impacts. However, scholars have underlined the need to attend to 
the geographical and cultural specificity of different commodities and modes of organisation 
(Nelson and Martin, 2015, McEwan et al., 2014). For example, African countries such as 
Ghana, Tanzania and Kenya had very different histories of co-operative formation compared to 
Latin America, leaving a legacy of very large co-operatives and co-operative unions initiated by 
colonial governments, many of which are struggling or facing particular challenges (Tallontire, 
2015).  
Disagreements about where carbon credits should be produced reflect ethical debates about neo-
colonialism in carbon and fair trade arenas. Carbon debates are polarised by those who see 
carbon trading as northern customers dumping responsibility on the global south, and those who 
see it as an opportunity for people in the south to benefit from climate finance (Howard et al., 
2015b). Perspectives taken in this debate also relate to one’s particular normative framing of the 
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problem and assessment of strategies and solutions developed in the face of it. For example, 
based on a political ecology reading of a cook stove project in Western Kenya as an example of 
‘accumulation by decarbonisation’, Wang and Corson (2015) conclude that carbon reduction 
commitments should be made in the global north rather than the global south. By applying a 
justice lens, Corbera and Martin (2015) recognise that some projects have enabled the provision 
of assistance to farmers, though they acknowledge that the market does seem to be designed to 
benefit the polluters more than the victims of pollution in the global south (Corbera and Martin, 
2015). Obliging customers to reduce their own emissions before buying credits (F1) is a strategy 
to respond to this critique despite concerns that this could limit market size (F2). Fair trade’s 
emphasis on cash crops produced in the global south for northern markets proliferates colonial 
commodity circuits and the colonial injustices that created the injustices underlying world trade 
despite efforts to transform production relations (Raynolds and Greenfield, 2015, Jaffee, 2014). 
In parallel with carbon trading, the Fairtrade movement brings together participants from the 
global north and south with disproportionate levels of economic power and such disparities 
were evident within the governance structures of Fairtrade International (Jaffee, 2014), at least 
before the governance reforms in 2011 (see chapter 3). The polarisation of producers and 
consumers is gradually changing with the development of fair trade markets in Africa (Keahey, 
2015) and Latin America (Renard and Loconto, 2013), but there are concerns that the increasing 
participation of transnational corporations as both producers and retailers continues to 
proliferate unequal relationships to the market (Jaffee, 2014).  
5.6.1.1. One year on: goals and target of fairness in the published FCS 
Table 5-5 indicates that the goal in the FCS is a combination of aspects from all three factors, 
while the target for projects and customers resonates with F1. The FCS approach to producer 
organisations fits most closely with F2, although the assumption in the FCS is that organisation 
building is always necessary. This creates a new precedent in the approach to Producer 
Organisations under FTI standards, and is discussed further in chapter 7. 
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Table 5-5: Goals and target of fairness in the FCS  
N.B. Light blue boxes indicate where perspective is reflected in the FCS 
Theme F1 F2 F3 Approach in 
FCS 
Goal 
(impact) 
Maximise 
participation 
(via the PO) 
Maximise 
emissions 
reductions and 
opportunities to 
mitigate 
Maximise 
access to 
appropriate tech 
& maintenance; 
enable 
livelihood 
improvements 
Encourage 
participation;  
Promote 
mitigation, 
adaptation 
and 
livelihood 
improvements 
in projects in 
the global 
south; 
Promote 
emissions 
reductions in 
the north 
Target: 
projects 
Limit to 
global south 
Global north and 
south 
No consensual 
views 
Projects only 
in Fairtrade 
producer 
regions 
Target: 
customers 
Buyers 
should 
commit to 
reducing 
their 
emissions 
Don’t limit number of buyers and 
size of market by requiring 
emissions reductions  
End buyers of 
larger 
amounts of 
carbon credits 
commit to 
reducing their 
emissions 
Target: 
producer 
organisation 
Target 
organised 
communities, 
especially 
coops 
Work with coops 
and non-
organised groups 
No consensual 
views 
Projects can 
be led by a 
Project 
Facilitator 
(PF) who can 
start with less 
or more 
organised 
groups and 
support them 
to build up 
into Producer 
Organisations 
Exclude 
large 
structures 
that don’t 
engage 
people 
Support 
organisation-
building only 
where relevant 
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(POs) 
5.6.2. The content of fairness 
Fair benefit-sharing 
This theme links to issue 2 in Table 5-1. The three factors diverge on where to measure fair 
benefit-sharing (at the household level (F3); within the organisation producing the credits (F1); 
and across the commodity chain (F2 and F3)). F1 echoes the  fair trade approach which is 
relatively prescriptive on fair benefit-sharing but limits the scope to producer co-operatives and 
worker associations (Fairtrade International, 2013, McDermott, 2013). Fair trade impact studies 
normally assess household level changes too, but lack of attention in F1 to individual 
households may be because FCCs cannot be expected to generate the same level of direct 
household income as other fair trade commodities, as the carbon revenue is often absorbed 
further along the chain (Howard et al., 2015b). Despite their bearing on available income, all 
factors agreed that intermediaries can be involved in an FCC commodity chain. However, while 
F1 advocates limiting them, F2 and F3 embrace them and advocate reasonable compensation. 
F1 maps onto the fair trade approach, which in the coffee sector has been focused on enabling 
primary producers to engage in ‘direct’ trade with shorter trading chains while F2 and F3 fit 
more with other sustainability standards such as by the Forest Stewardship Council which often 
include many intermediaries (Taylor, 2005b). Even so, the expectation raised by the Fairtrade 
label that producers are enabled to trade on their own terms needs to be explored in specific 
contexts because there is evidence that this is not always the case (Getz and Shreck, 2006). The 
role of intermediaries has been legitimated within Fairtrade standards, in the Contract 
Production standard developed by Fairtrade International for particular geographical areas and 
products, and in the Independent Smallholder standard developed by Fair Trade USA although 
there is not yet enough evidence of the intermediary playing the intended role. Within carbon 
projects, Boyd (2009) suggests that NGOs can sometimes serve as intermediary institutions, 
bridging the disconnect between the values and rhetoric of local resource users, and the global 
institutions that set the rules, however, evidence on how this would occur in practice is again 
lacking (Lansing, 2013a).  
Fair Access and Procedures  
This theme links to issue 3 in Table 5-1. All factors agreed that carbon project participants 
should be involved in design and implementation but recognised that households, farmers or 
community members may initially lack specific capacity or skills to engage effectively. 
However, while F1 aims to build capacities, F2 and F3 see limited capacity as reasons for 
continued involvement of additional parties. F2 recognises the need to shift power by enhancing 
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project participants’ negotiation capacities, whereas F3 does not advocate for changes in 
capabilities or power. Notably, the extent to which the shift in capabilities and power is possible 
depends greatly on context as well as motivations of actors involved. The risk with fair trade is 
that approaches focusing on political empowerment only empower those producers that already 
have more resources. Equally, without political empowerment, once dependencies become 
institutionalised, there may be few opportunities to develop socially and institutionally, and to 
challenge the trading terms and positioning in the value chain (Tallontire and Nelson, 2013). 
One interviewee whose sort was categorised in factor 2, elaborated on this point at the end of 
his Q interview. For him, the real ‘key to fairness’ was information, and capacity to not only 
follow, but if possible drive the process. He explained that the lack of information, coupled with 
the complexity and uncertainty of the carbon market removed any ability to negotiate and made 
people and organisations dependent on being led, in his words, ‘like sheep to a slaughterhouse’. 
He elaborated  
That’s why participation, critical analysis is very difficult, because you can only do 
that when you know the two sides of the coin. Otherwise you cannot know that the 
other side is dark. 
To address this issue, he argued that information was needed at all levels- from the farmer, to 
whoever is leading a group of farmers, to the intermediary. From his position as a national level 
manager of the project he acknowledged that they had a slightly better position than farmers 
(who lacked information from their cooperative leadership about what was going on), but still 
had no idea of the rationale for key decisions in the project such as which Project Developer to 
work with and why the verifier was coming from X country. This point suggests that there may 
be another element of fairness that is not fully captured in the dimensions of access and 
procedures. I return to this point in section 7.8.3.  
Rationales for participation varied between the factors, from philosophical (F1) to pragmatic or 
even instrumental (F3), and from being a means to eventually take on more tasks (F1) or a tool 
for enhancing negotiation (F2), to a means of strengthening participants’ commitment to 
emissions reductions (F3). These differences resonate with Melo et al.’s (2014) finding that 
different carbon projects certified by the Climate, Community and Biodiversity Standard 
deployed participation in different ways. While participation is commonly emphasised in 
standards and project design documents and is required for projects to achieve both mitigation 
and community benefits, interpretations are wide-ranging, and without clear definitions and 
prescriptions, the notion risks being used instrumentally (Melo et al., 2014). Also with respect 
to carbon projects based on Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD), 
McDermott et al (2012) note that safeguards (including participation) intended to enhance 
equity are deployed in distinct ways by different actors with different interests. Nevertheless, 
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Lansing’s (2013a) observation, that project designs are necessarily highly technical, require 
standardised procedures and often exclude different perspectives, thus making collaborative 
project design and implementation difficult, corroborates the comment of the interviewee in 
factor 2.  
5.6.2.1. One year on: the content of fairness in the published FCS 
Table 5-6 shows that the approach in the FCS for project management is a mix of F1 and F3: the 
role of a new actor in carbon projects called the Project Facilitator enables projects to be 
managed without the Producer Organisation needing to take full responsibility, but Producer 
Organisations should nevertheless take on tasks. The FCS does not explicitly claim to make 
things simpler for producers (F2) but this was one of the aims throughout. The polarised 
opinions on participation between F1 and F2/F3 are resolved in the FCS by splitting up 
decisions and financial responsibility regarding the project (primarily managed by the Project 
Facilitator at least initially), and the premium and adaptation plan. The only aspect from the 
factors explicitly carried into the FCS regarding benefit sharing is that of transparency. By 
paying the FMP to the Project Facilitator, there is no guarantee that the Producer Organisation 
will receive a fair price, but the contractual agreement is supposed to lay down how much each 
party is being compensated, and this would be auditable. The real test is how much projects can 
sell their credits for (as the FMP is only an absolute minimum) and whether the FMP will cover 
all of the various project costs (see 6.6.2.4). 
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Table 5-6: Content of fairness in the FCS 
Theme F1 F2 F3 Approach in 
FCS 
Access and 
procedures: 
Management 
 
Producers do not 
have to do 
everything 
themselves 
Simplify the 
process so 
producers can do 
more 
Leave 
technical 
aspects to 
those who can 
do it most 
efficiently 
PF can 
manage but 
must 
eventually 
recruit a 
manager from 
PO to take on 
some 
management 
tasks;  
PO must 
eventually be 
involved in 
monitoring. 
Access and 
procedures: 
Participation 
Producer 
participation in 
decision-making re 
project budget and 
management is key 
Producers need to be informed but 
might not have capacity/ 
willingness to take part in decisions 
Producers 
participate in 
decision-
making and 
budget re 
premium and 
adaptation 
plan; PF 
informs PO 
about 
management/ 
budget  
Benefit-
sharing 
(other trade 
aspects)  
PO should receive a 
fair price 
Everyone in the 
chain should be 
reasonably 
compensated 
Everyone in the 
chain should be 
reasonably 
compensated 
Any services 
provided 
deducted from 
FMP; 
remainder 
transferred to 
PO; Premium 
paid to PO 
Transparency of 
costs/ margins is 
key 
Contractual 
agreement 
requires cost/ 
margin 
transparency 
between PF 
and PO. 
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5.6.3. The parameters of fairness 
Although this theme is limited to a discussion of minimum price, it links up to wider debates 
around issue 4 in Table 5-1. Different reactions to some form of Fairtrade Minimum Price 
(FMP) point to different understandings of what this mechanism might look like and what it 
could achieve when applied to carbon. Some positive reactions (F1) were based on experience 
of the benefits it brings when applied to agricultural commodities, and awareness of the 
complexity and rigour used to work out prices. Other ambivalent or negative reactions (F2 and 
F3) came from people who had limited experience of FMPs or who were aware of the 
difficulties in challenging market forces or finding buyers willing to pay higher prices, 
following their experiences of carbon price slump in recent years. One said she was not in 
favour of FMPs was because she was not from fair trade, where she perceived that FMPs are ‘in 
their DNA’. However, some participants from within fair trade were also unsure how the tool 
would work when applied to carbon. The FMP sets Fairtrade standards apart from other 
sustainability standards and attempt to modify conventional trading relations (Taylor, 2005b). 
However, this is harder to achieve in capital intensive, organisationally complex networks 
(Raynolds and Greenfield, 2015) and depends on actors in the supply chain and other contextual 
aspects inherent to the commodity and the industry (Nelson and Martin, 2015). Furthermore, 
corporate pressure can dilute key fair trade principles including FMPs (Doherty et al., 2013). 
Carbon projects are capital intensive and organisationally complex, often necessitating roles for 
expensive ‘expert’ input to fulfil their technocratic requirements (Gupta et al., 2012, Melo et al., 
2014). They therefore constitute a specific context for applying FMPs, and it is not obvious who 
would receive them. People in F3 emphasised that payments to individuals are not always 
appropriate, especially when attached to the use of an energy-saving appliance such as a cook-
stove or solar light, and are better translated into subsidies or services. In this case, an FMP 
would go to the entity implementing the project and as yet, these entities are primarily NGOs 
and foreign or national businesses. For F1, these actors are not the ‘target’ of fairness. Certain 
types of carbon projects such as afforestation/ reforestation often involve complex financial 
flows where investors commit to forwarding payments to project participants several years 
ahead of the carbon credits being fungible (e.g. Fisher, 2012, Jindal et al., 2012). This requires 
agreements and risk management mechanisms specific to each project. While there may be valid 
reasons for not applying FMPs to carbon credits, this would be very controversial within the fair 
trade movement and would set a precedent potentially shaping its whole trajectory. The 
backdrop of low carbon market prices suggests the need for tools to ensure that carbon projects 
can cover costs and hedge risks, but willingness to pay higher prices would also be necessary. 
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5.6.3.1. One year on: price-setting parameters in the published FCS 
Table 5-7 shows that the typical Fairtrade pricing parameter of the FMP was included in the 
FCS, but paying it to the Project Facilitator rather than the Producer Organisation is a precedent 
within Fairtrade. At face value, this can be seen as a compromise that reflects the disagreement 
between F1, and F2/F3. I explore the dynamics behind this decision in more detail in chapter 6.  
Table 5-7: Price-setting parameters in the FCS 
Theme F1 F2 F3 Approach in 
FCS 
FMP FMPs are essential Not sure about FMPs- they will not 
necessarily make trade fair 
PF receives 
FMP 
 
Overall, the assessment shows that more of the aspects from F1 are visible within the FCS. 
Notably, most people loading on F1 come from within the fair trade system or are familiar with 
it, and the discussion above pinpointed a number of areas where the factor perspective resonates 
with key principles of fair trade (encoded for example in the Fairtrade Theory of Change, see 
Fairtrade International, 2013). Nevertheless, some participants from within Fairtrade loaded 
more significantly on other factors, reflecting internal debates within the fair trade movement.  
 
5.7. Conclusion to chapter five 
Definitions of fairness and how to achieve it are multiple and contested not only in the context 
of carbon markets but also within the fair trade movement. This chapter has contributed to what 
Schlosberg calls a ‘plural yet unified theory and practice of justice’ (2004:517), making sense of 
empirical notions of fairness by using a conceptual framework and linking findings to ongoing 
debates within the theory and practice of fair trade and fairness in carbon projects. One element 
perhaps not adequately captured by the framework came out of a post-sort interview where the 
interviewee emphasised that fairness was about information and sharing of rationales for 
decisions. This relates to Fair Access and Fair Procedures but suggests a dynamic and relational 
element where people actively choose how to treat each other and how much information to 
divulge. This point is explored again in chapters 7 and 9. 
The chapter has also advanced the body of empirical knowledge on multiple notions of fairness 
in the context of environmental governance, by exposing the views which have contributed to 
the development of the FCS. Three distinct ‘factors’ (or perspectives) were identified, and 
discussed in relation to the Multi-Dimensional Fairness Framework. The first factor prioritises 
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development delivered through organisations, participation in decision-making and use of 
minimum prices to adjust trade imbalances. The second factor conceptualises a non-exclusive 
approach maximising generation and sales of FCCs, involving a commodity chain where 
everyone performs their optimum function with financial transparency and information-sharing 
to facilitate negotiations. The third factor involves minimising intervention, allowing carbon 
commodity chains and project set-ups to function efficiently, and make their own adjustments to 
enhance benefits access and quality received by beneficiaries. The three factors reflect debates 
within carbon and fair trade spheres about who should be playing which roles, who should be 
accessing which benefits, and how people should be supported to interact on an uneven playing 
field. Crucially, I have shown that there was no clear consensus between participants’ notions, 
and that the published FCS eventually incorporated some aspects from each of the factors and 
some new aspects which bridged some of the differences between factors. However, it cannot be 
assumed to represent the views of all who took part in shaping it. Chapter 6 details the dynamics 
that shaped which viewpoints were represented in the FCS and how contested viewpoints were 
resolved. 
Further research is needed to explore viewpoints amongst stakeholders who did not take part in 
the Q study but whose views could be equally influential on the legitimacy, success or failure of 
the eventual standard. These include representatives of civil society organisations and NGOs 
who took strong ethical positions on the carbon market (but were only consulted after the Q 
study had taken place), existing Fairtrade market actors, and member organisations of FTI who 
chose not to provide input for the FCS or who could not participate in the Q study (especially 
Latin American stakeholders who would have required Spanish translation). 
It is important to be aware of the views and assumptions behind the experts and/or lobbyists 
who influence policy and standards, and social scientists have a role to play in analysing policy-
change in a way that fosters stakeholder engagement, learning and feedback loops (Visseren-
Hamakers et al., 2012), this research being an example of that. This study served to open up 
discussion and provide clarity on some of the key issues in carbon and Fairtrade debates. FTI’s 
efforts to develop the FCS with the support of external stakeholders illustrates that some of the 
pre-existing internal contestations within the fair trade movement have been mirrored in 
disagreements between people both from within and outside the movement concerning the new 
fair trade commodity of carbon credits. This suggests both that the development of the FCS was 
an opportune moment for taking these debates seriously, and also that the choices made are 
likely to shape the future of Fairtrade (Renard and Loconto, 2013), either by creating precedents 
or by furthering the status quo.  
While this study was appropriate for mapping viewpoints on fairness at one particular point in 
time and feeding them succinctly into the FCSSP, it was unable to capture the dynamism of 
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viewpoints (which are shaped by interactions with other stakeholders, critical reflection and 
ongoing experiences). The thinking-out-loud provided some insight into individuals’ 
deliberative processes, but several participants pointed out they might do the sort differently 
next time. This weakness can be addressed by doing a Q study both before and after a 
deliberative process (see Schlosberg et al., 2016)26 or by using Q as one of a series of methods 
for exploring a policy problem (Curry et al., 2013). In this thesis, it has been complemented by 
observational methods, collation of secondary sources and longitudinal analysis which were 
more appropriate for exploring evolving viewpoints. In chapter 9 I recommend some potential 
extensions of the methodological approach and results within the context of Fairtrade standard-
setting.   
To close this chapter I echo McDermott et al.’s (2013) assertion that unless sufficient attention 
is given to the process of defining fairness (the final layer of the framework), the concept may 
remain a reflection of prevailing discourses and power relations and standards and projects will 
therefore be limited in their scope to transform unfair situations and impact the beneficiaries 
who should have most to gain from them. In chapter 6 I undertake a deeper analysis of the 
process of defining the fairness mechanisms within the FCS.   
  
                                                     
26 I did my own Q-sort of the study statements in September 2014 and again in April 2016 and 
experienced some radical changes in what I agreed or disagreed with and how I ranked them. 
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Chapter 6 A participatory governance analysis of the FCSSP 
6.1. Introduction to chapter six 
Between December 2012, when the partnership between FTI and GSF was publically 
announced at UNFCCC COP 18 in Doha, and December 2015 when the FCS was launched at 
UNFCCC COP 21 in Paris, a complex, iterative and negotiated process unfolded, involving 
inputs from multiple stakeholders in closed, invited and public spaces in Europe, Asia, Africa 
and Latin America. FTI and GSF had boundaries to protect, positions to maintain and a wider 
consortium of members, partners, licensees and supporters to satisfy. Many of the stakeholders 
involved in the FCSSP shared interests which on the surface were similar, but in combination 
often proved incompatible. They possessed differential influence and stood to gain differently 
from what would become inscribed in the FCS. Faced with this situation, the outcome could 
involve compromise, co-optation, or consensual solutions. The final FCS was an emblem of 
collaborative standard-setting, but had departed substantially from its original billing.  
Building on the literature review in chapter 3 and empirical evidence in chapter 5, this chapter 
addresses objective 2 of this thesis, to describe and analyse the process of collaborative 
development of the FCS. It is based on pathways component 4: uncovering the actors, 
institutions, goals and governance processes in pathway-building (section 1.3.1 and 1.4.2.1). 
The following three questions are addressed:  
2.1 What did the FCSSP look like (in terms of forums for input, debates and interests)?  
2.2 How did the FCS reflect stakeholder input and what shaped this?  
2.3 What does this say about participatory governance in practice? 
The critical appraisal of the FCSSP and outcomes in this chapter contributes to FTI’s 
governance practices by supporting staff to reflect on the work they coordinated and making it 
visible to the FTI system as a whole. It contributes empirically to an understanding of the 
strengths and limitations of a participatory governance framework in practice and possible roles 
for researchers in supporting reflection, assumption-testing and legitimacy-building within 
similarly complex multi-stakeholder processes. Transparent documentation of the FCSSP can 
also facilitate consumers and civil society organisations in making their own assessments of the 
validity of future carbon credits certified under the FCS.  
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6.1.1. Fairtrade Participatory Governance  
‘it is not just what we achieve… [but] how we achieve [it that] matters…top-down 
development models fit neither with what we aim to achieve nor with how we plan 
to achieve it’ (Fairtrade International, 2009 Partnership Strategy 2011-2015, p3, 
p5). 
FTI has committed to a participatory approach to governance as an alternative to a top-down 
model. This means an inclusive approach which brings together everyone with a stake in a 
development process, allowing them to interact, contribute to design and outcome, and where 
practical, share in decision-making activities. While FTI’s intent fits closely to the ideals of 
procedural fairness, in practice the approach is likely to be inflected by power relations and 
pressures for expediency and may involve strategic deployment of tools for participation (see 
details in chapter 3). This chapter offers a critical analysis of participatory governance in action 
by looking at what was achieved by FTI and partners through the FCSSP, and how the FCS 
pathway was shaped by different interests. 
6.2. Methodological approach  
The previous chapter took a snapshot approach, portraying three particular shared viewpoints or 
factors that were subscribed to by some of the participating stakeholders at a particular point in 
the FCSSP (during phase 3). In contrast, this chapter takes a longitudinal approach drawing on 
primary and secondary data collected across the four phases of the FCSSP. These were 1) 
Request/ Planning; 2) Research/ Drafting; 3) Consultation/ Revision; and 4) Approval. This 
chapter mainly draws on primary data collected during 15 months of participant observation and 
closer engagement during phases 2-4 of the FCSSP (September 2013-November 2014), but 
access to secondary data produced during phase 1, and accounts from the Project Team about 
progress prior to, and after my involvement, has provided a backdrop for contextualising and 
making sense of the whole FCSSP. By maximising my attendance at the events organised with 
the FCSSP, my role as researcher was to support the Project Team to pick up and connect the 
different pieces of the puzzle, to underline contrary opinions and evidence, to open up questions 
to debate, and to lay bare (primarily in hindsight) the different common and opposing interests 
at stake and underlying conflicts in an overall effort to enhance transparency and reflection. 
Appendix 2 lists all the data sources drawn on to complete the analysis, some of which are 
referred to with document codes in this chapter. The analytical process was described in section 
4.4.5. Overall, the longitudinal approach enabled me to understand when and how different 
stakeholder groups were given opportunities to contribute (as well as how their inputs were 
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used), analyse prolonged decision-making processes, and track modifications in FCS content 
during the four phases.    
6.3. Analytical framework and chapter structure 
The analysis in this chapter is structured around two intersecting components which together, 
shaped the FCSSP and FCS content. The first is FTI’s participatory governance framework, 
(introduced in chapter three and presented again in Table 6-1), used here as a benchmark for 
assessing the FCSSP in relation to FTI’s governance commitments. The second is a framework 
developed inductively from data collected during the FCSSP (Figure 6-1) that pinpoints 
dynamics within particular participative forums and frames them in the context of the evolving 
FCSSP. Both components need to be understood within the context of FTI’s organisational 
structure and the wider standard-setting network within which FTI operates in partnership with 
GSF and as a member of ISEAL Alliance.  
Table 6-1: Analytical interpretation of Fairtrade International’s Participatory 
Governance Approach 
Fairtrade International’s Participatory Governance Approach 
Intention A: Avoiding power 
imbalances in relationships 
A.1 Engaging with partners on an equal footing 
with shared resources and ambitions to find 
solutions to the most pressing development 
challenges 
Intention B: Enabling everyone with a 
stake to contribute to design and 
outcome 
B.1 Enabling diverse stakeholders to participate and 
interact 
B.2 Enabling diverse stakeholders to share in 
decision-making activities where practical 
Underlying governance aim To draw on alternatives to top-down development 
models 
The results section begins with an analysis of the ambitions and shared interests of the 
stakeholders involved in the FCSSP (the two outer layers of Figure 6-1) as a means of critically 
examining the extent to which intention A.1 was possible (i.e. whether partners had shared 
resource/ interests and ambitions). It then proceeds to a stepwise description of the FCSSP, 
laying out the broad phases punctuating the process and the forums created by the Project Team 
for stakeholders to be involved in the process at different points, allowing exploration of 
intention B and B.1, (in which ways the FCSSP enabled diverse stakeholders to participate, 
interact and contribute to design and outcome).  
This is followed by an analysis of two particular topics identified as contentious and of major 
influence during the FCSSP (the ‘hot topics’ indicated in the central quadrant of the target 
framework, see Figure 6-1). Each one sheds more light on governance dynamics, particularly 
intentions A, A.1 and B.2.  
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Hot Topic 1: Standard Scope, relates to the scope (in FTI’s language) of the FCS and the 
projects and beneficiaries included within it. The FCS underwent a marked shift in scope and 
this illustrates the degrees of influence that particular stakeholders in fact had on the process of 
defining the standard and project scope. This serves as an opportunity to further explore 
intentions A and A.1- i.e. were relationships devoid of power imbalances? Were partners really 
able to engage on an equal footing? Did they share resources and ambitions? And were they 
seeking to find solutions to the same development challenges?  
Hot Topic 2: Financial Mechanisms, concerns the Fairtrade Minimum Price and 
Fairtrade Premium- the principal mechanisms designed to ensure fairness in financial benefit-
sharing. It is used in this chapter to explore decision-making activities and to unpack intention 
B.2, especially the caveat ‘where practical’. This example provides lessons of use in the design 
and facilitation of drawn out deliberation and decision-making processes involving inputs from 
lots of different stakeholders at different points. Research questions 2.1 and 2.2 are addressed 
throughout these sections.  
These insights are then combined in a discussion section which comments on the dynamics at 
play during the FCSSP and identifies the presence of a Protective Culture (the red layer in 
Figure 6-1). This is used to critically assess FTI’s underlying governance aim and to address 
question 2.3. Table 6-2 summarises these links.  
Table 6-2: Links between research questions, chapter sections and frameworks 
Research questions Chapter section and 
content 
Aspect of the 
participatory 
governance approach 
explored  
Layer of the target 
framework   
2.1 What did the 
FCSSP look like (in 
terms of forums for 
input, debates and 
interests)?  
Section 6.4: 
description and 
analysis of ambitions 
and shared interests. 
 
Section 6.5: 
description of the 
FCSSP including 
broad phases and 
participative forums 
created. 
Intention A.1. 
 
 
 
Intention B.1 
Ambitions and 
Shared Interests 
2.2 How did the FCS 
reflect stakeholder 
input and what 
shaped this?  
Sections 6.6 and 6.7: 
Analysis of Hot 
Topics 1 and 2 and 
how they were 
addressed in the 
FCSSP 
Intention A 
Intention B.2 
Hot Topic 1 
Hot Topic 2  
(Hot Topics 3 and 4 
are discussed in 
chapter 7). 
 
2.3 What does this Section 6.7: Underlying Entire framework, 
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say about 
participatory 
governance in 
practice? 
Discussion: 
Alternatives to top-
down governance? 
governance aim especially the 
Protectionist Culture 
153 
 
Figure 6-1 Target framework: Interests and debates in the FCSSP 
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6.4. Results part 1: ambitions and interests  
This first results section explores the green and blue layers of the target framework (Figure 6-1), 
describing the ambitions set by those who initiated the FCSSP and interests of those taking part.  
6.4.1. Ambitions that the initiators sought to achieve through the FCSSP 
6.4.1.1. Expanding expertise and networks 
Feasibility studies conducted by external parties and internally by FTI staff in 2011 and 2012/3 
had suggested that FTI lacked the capacity and prior knowledge to develop the standards 
infrastructure for Fairtrade Carbon Credits alone. The FTI-GSF partnership was timely because 
while FTI was rooted in agriculture and expanding into carbon credits, GSF was expanding into 
agriculture and experienced in certifying carbon projects in the energy sector. FTI and GSF 
hoped to provide each other with mutual support and to benefit from each other’s knowledge, 
networks, access to potential suppliers and markets, thus increasing the pool of stakeholders to 
engage in the processes of standard development, piloting, roll-out and market uptake. Mutual 
recognition of interdependence is one factor identified as important in shaping successful 
collaborative governance (Ansell and Gash, 2008).  
6.4.1.2. Putting forth alternative pathways 
The Project Assignment developed for the FCS stated that ‘through Fairtrade Carbon Credits, 
Fairtrade has the opportunity to contribute to the fairness of the carbon market by bringing its 
approach and experience of years of positive impact on producers in the developing world’. 
This had been solicited by the principal funder of the FCSSP who had already been involved in 
carbon activities billed as ‘fair’ but wanted to validate their own claims to fairness by 
incorporating them within a Fairtrade standard (T.GE.09.13, p3 and Int1, p10). Alternatives 
encountered resistance, particularly from GSF staff, supporters and stakeholders involved in 
GSF projects (with arguments along the lines of ‘it is not done that way, it won’t work’). 
Meanwhile, there were also occasions during the FCSSP when the pathways proposed were 
alternatives to the Fairtrade approach because of the specificity of carbon credits compared to 
other Fairtrade commodities. Such attempts were often met with resistance by members of FTI 
who advocated for consistency.   
6.4.1.3. Accomplishing the project mission 
FTI and GSF set a number of joint targets and timeframes, contingent on both parties’ 
contributions. Delays to the process were an anticipated part of the multi-stakeholder 
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collaborative process but staff at FTI in particular often voiced a sense of urgency. This was 
triggered by a duty to respond to Fairtrade producers’ struggles in the face of climate change, 
but also by a desire to use the momentum that was gathering. Accomplishing the project 
mission required commitment both to the process and the FTI-GSF collaboration itself. 
Obtaining such commitment is often a critical factor in the success of collaborative governance 
initiatives (Ansell and Gash, 2008). There were signs from both FTI and GSF partners and 
supporters that the collaboration between them was welcomed, but this ultimate commitment to 
the process was not shared by all stakeholders. Some may have been motivated to participate in 
the process to ensure their perspective was not neglected, and were still in a position to decide 
whether or not to apply the standard depending on its eventual content (CoordC.11.13).  
6.4.1.4. Ensuring a credible standard 
As multi-stakeholder organisations, FTI and GSF are strengthened, legitimated and held to 
account by their wider consortium of partners and supporters. FTI’s membership in the ISEAL 
Alliance and commitment to the ISEAL Credibility Principles (ISEAL Alliance, 2014b) 
provides a further level of accountability. FTI’s standard setting procedures are designed to be 
aligned with the ISEAL codes of good practice, and although compliance is not audited, 
upholding the organisational commitment was visible within the work of the Project Team.   
6.4.2. Interests shared (at face value) by stakeholders involved in the FCSSP 
Chapter 2 introduced the problem that FTI and GSF were trying to achieve through their 
collaboration. This was summarised in terms of enabling access to the carbon market (both in 
terms of access to knowhow needed for carrying out a project, and access to marketing 
channels) and facilitating benefits available from carbon finance. Although at face value these 
interests were shared by all stakeholders, when explored, there were underlying differences in 
opinion. 
The initial target group for the FCS was smallholders and (farming) communities and FTI and 
GSF had announced plans to enable their access to carbon credit knowhow by simplifying 
tools and requirements and providing capacity-building. Simplification was an interest shared 
by stakeholders in all forums:  
‘The feedback from every stakeholder is that we need to make this simple and low-
cost, and if we don’t, we won’t be achieving our goals’ (Project Team to workshop 
participants, T.GE.09.14, p8) 
However, during the FCSSP it became clear that there would be a role for intermediaries 
(eventually named ‘Project Facilitators’ within the FCS) in facilitating access to knowhow for 
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the target group, either by managing projects on their behalf, or by contributing to their 
capacity-building. The degree of involvement by Project Facilitators remained a source of 
disagreement through much of the FCSSP (see chapter 7).  
Access to market was critical for the success of the initiative but the market remained nebulous 
during most of the discussions. Stakeholders in the FCSSP sought reassurance of market 
capacity and were keen to were keen for FTI to conduct and share the results of their market 
research (T.GE.03.14a, p3 and T.PFS.B.d, p20) with retailers and customers (who had not 
present during FCSSP discussions):  
‘Do you think this can be achievable and a success? Why should I register my 
project? What is the guarantee that I’ll get the FMP and sale of my credits?’ 
(Question posed to the Project Team by a project implementer, T.PFS.B.d, p22). 
While market access was desired by all stakeholders, there were again disagreements about how 
this should be mediated, i.e. which roles for Fairtrade and for facilitators, brokers and traders.  
Regarding benefits, chapter 5 identified a disagreement as to whether the benefits of 
participating in carbon trade should be enhanced for everyone involved in the supply chain, or 
whether the attention should only be focussed on those producing the emissions reductions. 
Discussions with stakeholders during the FCSSP highlighted differences in opinion about 
whether financial benefits should be accessed by individual producers and Producer 
Organisations, mediated by Project Facilitators or channelled into projects.  
In summary, taken at face value, the interests in the green belt of Figure 6-1 appealed to 
everyone involved in the FCS-setting process but there were disagreements about who should be 
accessing and benefitting from the carbon market and how. These can be synthesised in terms of 
whether the people generating the emissions reductions (the producers and Producer 
Organisations) should be carrying out the projects with little or no involvement of external 
parties or facilitators (gaining the knowhow and accessing the market directly), or whether there 
should be a major and permanent role for external parties in the mediation of access to 
knowhow, markets and benefits. Different interpretations demonstrate the importance of context 
and positionality as a basis for assessing what is possible and desirable. These themes are 
discussed again in chapter 7. 
6.4.3. Section summary 
The above sections have discussed the outer two layers of the target framework, identifying the 
ambitions primarily held by the initiators of the FCSSP, as well as the apparently shared 
interests common to all stakeholders taking part. With the former, stakeholders who joined FTI 
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and GSF in their efforts did not have the same investment and commitment to the process as the 
initiators- their interest was more in shaping the content of the standard to make it appropriate 
and applicable to the contexts they worked in. These ambitions remained implicit but not were 
deliberately concealed from participants. They are all quite functional and fit with the view that 
standards organisations use networks and multi-stakeholder processes to legitimate their role in 
market regulation (see section 3.2.2). This relies on a presumption that standards are neutral and 
universal, that their authority is natural, and that their ethical values have resonance for 
beneficiaries, meanwhile leaving their moral reasoning unquestioned (Blowfield and Dolan, 
2008). This was perhaps one reason for not being more explicit about their ambitions. 
Meanwhile, the shared interests were at face value, common to all stakeholders, but actually 
concealed a range of values and opinions about how to achieve them. Flagging up the way that 
conflicting ideas are able to co-exist within standard setting processes attends to a research gap 
noted by Djama et al. (2011). Some scholars have emphasised the way that standard setting 
processes can avoid exploration of underlying issues as a depoliticisation tactic to avoid tension 
(Cheyns, 2011, Djama et al., 2011). In contrast, the FCSSP did not involve concealing these 
underlying conflictual opinions. I have presented them in this section as both shared and 
conflictual in order to show how they were able to co-exist but within the FCSSP, the 
conflictual aspects were often more apparent (as emphasised in hot topics 2, 3 and 4). Djama et 
al. (2011) note that it is also important to explore how conflicting ideas are transformed into 
cooperative attitudes. I do this in Results part 3 of this chapter with respect to conflicting ideas 
on benefits, and in chapter 7 regarding conflicting ideas on access.  
6.5. Results part 2: description of the FCSSP 
Chapter 3 (section 3.2.2) underscored the way that participation can be strategically managed 
within standard setting processes and does not necessarily lead to inclusive outcomes. This has 
effects on opportunities for deliberation and consensus, and may be closely linked to the way 
that conflicts and tensions are approached (section 3.2.3). This section describes the FCSSP in 
terms of stakeholders and participation, addressing question 2.1. Attention is on the forums 
provided and stakeholders who participated; the phases of the FCSSP and key process points 
(pivotal moments within the process); and the stakeholders who did not take part.  
6.5.1. Stakeholders and Forums for Participation 
Aside from partnership discussions held bilaterally with GSF, the Project Team gathered inputs 
from eight different forums for participation, involving members of FTI (producer 
organisations, National Fairtrade Organisations, producer networks, staff at FTI), FLO-cert, and 
then businesses, NGOs, advocacy organisations, consultants, researchers and other standards 
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organisations (see Table 6-3). These forums had the broad purpose of engaging other people in 
developing the concept of Fairtrade Carbon Credits, seeking their input on standard and scheme 
content, and encouraging them to take ownership and be involved in implementation. They 
therefore supported ambitions 1 and 4. Stakeholder engagement efforts were conditioned by 
FTI’s Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for Standard Setting (which indicates the points in 
the process where different stakeholders are invited to provide input or influence decisions); by 
the participatory governance approach (see intentions B, B.1. and B.2 in Table 6-1); and by 
commitment to ISEAL’s Credibility Principles.  
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Table 6-3: Forums for Participation in the FCSSP 
 Forum 
number 
and name 
Description 
In
te
rn
al
 
g
ro
u
p
s 
an
d
 
co
m
m
it
te
es
 
1. The 
Working 
Group  
Led by Project Team; voluntary participation of people from 
National Fairtrade Organisations, Producer Networks and 
FLOCERT interested in playing an active role in the standard and 
holding the Project Team to account. 
2. The 
Standards 
Committee  
Permanent governance feature of FTI- provides input and takes 
major decisions about standards, including endorsing for 
consultation and final approval (see chapter 3)  
M
ee
ti
n
g
s/
 w
o
rk
sh
o
p
s 
w
it
h
 i
n
v
it
ed
 s
ta
k
eh
o
ld
er
s 
3. The 
Group of 
Experts  
Members identified (via recommendations from GSF, or because 
they had expressed interest) during phase 1 or as the Project Team 
came into contact with them, and invited to be involved on a 
voluntary basis. Composed of mostly European carbon 
organisations (project developers, consultants and carbon credit 
retailers): described by the Project Team as having a social 
perspective, interested in a social carbon scheme. Expected to be 
the front runners of the FCS (T.PFS.B.b, p2 and T.SC.59, p1).  
4. 
Producer/ 
Field staff 
workshops 
Designed by the Project Team to assemble a balance of carbon 
organisations (NGOs/ businesses involved in implementing carbon 
projects) and Fairtrade Producer Organisations (specifically 
targeting those involved or interested in carbon projects. Described 
by the Project Team as ‘people on the ground who know the 
realities’ (T.GE.09.13a, p2). The Bonn workshop was specifically 
for those identified by the Project Team as 'more knowledgeable, 
vocal and interested in the scheme' (T.GE.09.14, p4).  
5. CSO 
workshops 
Organised in an attempt by the Project Team to expand the input 
provided during the consultation period and to take on board 
participants' critiques so they would be less likely to criticise after 
the launching of the standard/ scheme 
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6. Internal 
feasibility 
consulta-
tions 
Consultations held during the Internal Feasibility Study led by the 
Project Team, to seek input from stakeholders within the Fairtrade 
system. Used as evidence of the receptiveness towards the concept 
of Fairtrade Carbon Credits, alongside the consultations which had 
previously conducted for the External Feasibility Study (led by a 
National Fairtrade Organisation and an NGO).  
7. FCS 
public 
consulta-
tions 
Consultations held in compliance with ISEAL guidelines and 
Fairtrade SOP for developing standards. The 1st consultation was 
on the first public draft; the second was on the revised draft and 
methodology for pricing and premiums 
8. Events 
at 
UNFCCC 
COPs 
Events co-hosted by the Project Team with GSF and other partners 
at annual COPs as opportunities to present work in progress and 
seek feedback  
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6.5.2. Phases and Process Points  
This section compares the actual FCSSP with the process laid down in the FTI Standard 
Operating Procedure (SOP). The SOP maps out a flowchart involving nine steps (Fairtrade 
International, 2016) and various feedback loops. In practice, the FCS was developed in four 
broad phases (incorporating all nine steps and iterations between them). These are presented in 
Table 6-4, and in Figure 6-2 where the FCSSP is displayed alongside the SOP and my 
engagement with the FCSSP has been annotated. An A3 version of Figure 6-2 is also included 
in the inside back cover of this thesis.  
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Table 6-4: Phases of the FCS-setting process including dates and key milestones (colours 
demarcate the four phases) 
Date Milestone 
Feb 2011 External feasibility study for ‘Fairtrade certified carbon credits’ 
delivered to FTI by Max Havelaar Netherlands and Dutch CSO. 
Dec 2011 FTI announces commitments to address fairness within the climate 
change arena through two components- ‘fair carbon credits’ and ‘fair 
adaptation’, during side event at COP 17, Durban co-hosted by FTI and 
the Dutch CSO. Attended by public and private sector actors and NGOs, 
several of whom express an interest in partnering with Fairtrade. 
Mar 2012 Working Group formed at FTI to develop Fairtrade Carbon Credits and 
Fair Adaptation. 
Sep 2012 Info provided by SU to the Standards Committee, demonstrating 
alignment of Fair Carbon Credits and Fair Adaptation  with FTI’s 
Climate Change Strategy 
Nov 2012 Memorandum signed between GSF and FTI and partnership publically 
announced at COP 18, Doha 
Dutch CSO commits to funding the development of Fair Carbon Credits (later called 
the Fairtrade Climate Standard) 
Jan  2013 Standards Unit make Fair Carbon Credits a strategic priority for 2013 
Jan 2013 Internal Feasibility Study for Fair Carbon Credits completed by the 
Standards Unit and Strategy & Policy Unit. This includes Feasibility 
Consultations (forum 6) 
Mar 2013 Update to Standards Committee on Fair Carbon Credits 
Apr 2013 Plans for Fairtrade Carbon Credits shared with Working Group 
Internal Feasibility Study for Fair Adaptation near completion but 
project is put on hold until funding/ technical partners are found.  
Jun 2013 Consultants complete commissioned research on Fairtrade Carbon 
Credits, involving assessments of FTI’s contribution to the carbon 
market, and synergies between FTI and GSF 
Sep 2013 Development of Cornerstones (overview of key sections of standard, 
intent, provisional requirements, and rationale, produced by a consultant 
for FTI 
Sep-Nov 
2013 
Feedback on Cornerstones from Group of Experts, Working Group and 
public attending side and parallel events at COP 19 
Nov 2013 FTI and GSF co-host events at COP 19 (also with the Forest Stewardship 
Council) to update the public on their collaboration and introduce the 
Cornerstones 
Nov 
2013- Feb 
2014 
Project Team develop an evolving preliminary draft of the FCS, 
incorporating input as it is received. 
Versions of preliminary draft shared with forums 1-4. Input provided 
during meetings/ workshops and in some written comments sent 
afterwards.  
Dec 2013 Final version of Project Assignment for the FCS completed and 
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displayed on FTI’s website. 
Jan 2014 FTI and GSF complete harmonisation research which identifies the 
overlaps and discrepancies between the two organisations’ requirements 
Feb-Mar 
2014 
Project Team develop the 1
st
 consultation draft of the FCS 
Mar 2014 1
st
 consultation draft shared with forums 2 and 3. Input provided during 
meetings and in some written comments sent afterwards. 
Mar 2014 1
st
 consultation draft presented to Standards Committee (forum 1) and 
receive their endorsement of the standard for consultation.  
Jun 2014 Project Team update forum 1 on progress 
Jun-Jul 
2014 
1
st
 consultation period (30 days plus a week extension) 
Aug-Sep 
2014 
Project Team develop the 2
nd
 consultation draft of the FCS 
Aug-Oct 
2014 
Project Team share 1
st
 or 2
nd
 consultation drafts with forum 5 during four 
separate meetings and with forum 3 during a final Group of Experts’ 
meeting. Input received during the meetings and in written comments 
sent by some people afterwards. 
Sep 2014 Project Team update forum 1 on progress. 
Sep-Oct 
2014 
2
nd
 consultation period (30 days) 
Oct-Nov 
2014 
Project Team develop the draft of the FCS which is to be presented to 
forum 2 for approval 
Nov 2014 FCS is approved by forum 2 with a request to the Project Team to make 
minor amendments. 
Dec 2014 FTI and GSF update public on progress during side events at COP 20  
Nov 
2014- Sep 
2015 
Amendments and editing of final draft of FCS 
Jan 2015 
onwards 
Selected projects pilot the FCS and learning and feedback are 
incorporated into the standard.  
Mar 2015 Project Team update forum 2 on progress and decisions on prices and 
premiums are taken  
Jun 2015 Project Team provide further updates on forum 2 on progress.  
Oct 2015 Final FCS is published on FTI’s website 
Dec 2015 FTI and GSF co-host side and parallel events at COP 21 to update the 
public on progress and officially launch the FCS. 
 
 
  
Key to colour-phases 
Phase 1: Request/ 
Planning 
Phase 2: Research/ 
Drafting 
Phase 3: 
Consultation/ 
Revision 
Phase 4: Approval 
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Figure 6-2: Steps of the FCSSP compared to the FTI SOP   
  
 
6.5.2.1. Commentary on phases and process points 
Presenting the process alongside the steps laid down in the Standard Unit’s SOP serves to 
illustrate the messiness of such a process in practice. The following key points can be drawn out 
from Figure 6-2. 
6.5.2.1.1 Inclusion of stakeholders 
FTI made significant efforts to include Fairtrade formal governance and other Fairtrade bodies 
as well as a broader set of stakeholders during each of the steps of the process. The density of 
stars in the research and consultation phases in particular demonstrate the investment in time 
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and money to engage a wide range of stakeholders during these key phases when stakeholder 
involvement is mandated by the SOP. The regional Producer/ Field staff workshops were 
brought forward with the financial support of a CSO in the Group of Experts because Fairtrade 
producer networks had requested to be involved early on in the process- as a Project Team 
member pointed out ‘if this is a standard made for them, they should be shaping it rather than us 
deciding this in the north’ (T.WG.4, p6).  
6.5.2.1.2 Managing tensions between the need for technical input and a 
broad-based governance structure 
In their efforts to ensure relevance of the FCS, the Project Team were faced with a tension. 
They needed to include members of the FTI system in the FCSSP from an early stage and 
accord decision-making powers on the FCS to the FTI Standards Committee (most of whom 
had no background in carbon projects). Meanwhile, they were reliant on stakeholders external to 
the FTI system for specific technical input on carbon projects (also expected to become 
frontrunners in implementing the FCS). This tension was managed by allowing the FCS to be 
shaped more by the recommendations of the carbon experts during phases 2 and 3, consulting 
Fairtrade producers involved in carbon projects during the Producer/ Field staff workshops, 
seeking comments from Fairtrade marketing organisations and CSO supporters during the 
consultation period and then submitting the FCS to a ‘Fairtrade check’ in the final approval 
phase, when producer networks gave more input. The FTI Standards Committee was consulted 
regularly in an attempt to receive their ongoing validation. 
6.5.2.1.3 Separate forums, bridging disjunctures 
FTI’s intention is that diverse stakeholders can interact with each other but in practice, forums 
often grouped together those stakeholders that were similar (e.g. carbon project developers, or 
CSOs). In more mixed forums (e.g. the Producer/ Field staff workshops), stakeholders often 
divided into subgroups with similar types of stakeholders. This design contrasts with multi-
stakeholder initiatives, which are designed to facilitate representation and participation of ‘all 
categories of stakeholders’ but in practice have been criticised for limited inclusiveness, and 
unequal power relations stemming from unequal resources and competences (Cheyns, 2011).  
FTI’s design enabled people with different levels of understanding and competencies to 
participate, enhancing feelings of ease, and created spaces for people to draw on commonalities 
they might not have been able to vocalise in larger or more diverse forums (see for example the 
discussions described in section 6.6.1.2.3). It also imbued the Project Team with the power-
laden and challenging role of compiling and discriminating between divergent guidance, and 
deciding ways forward. In an attempt to remain legitimate and accountable, the Project Team 
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bridged forums, informing each about the major outcomes from others, and sometimes 
acknowledging inconsistencies in advice. At times, they also used their power to selectively 
draw on particular inputs, giving a false impression of consensual guidance. This happened in 
particular during the Standards Committee meeting for approval, when they were under most 
pressure to ensure that the FCS was passed (see section 6.6.2). 
Several stakeholders in the FCSSP built bridges and alliances between forums and between 
Fairtrade and carbon ‘worlds’ by participating in multiple forums and drawing on multiple 
identities and experiences, or informally, during journeys together or coffee breaks. Motivations 
behind such actions were both collaborative, and interest-driven.  
6.5.2.1.4 Iterations and feedback loops 
The process was highly iterative. It moved through the four phases in a fairly linear way, and 
the FCS evolved from a set of ‘cornerstones’, to a document with gaps and inconsistencies, to a 
full document. However, the influence and inputs from different stakeholders at particular 
points in the process created additional feedback loops where the Project Team were called to 
revisit decisions and rework concepts before moving forward. Section 6.6.1 illustrates this 
dynamic regarding the decisions around agriculture and adaptation, which happened in the final 
phase of the FCSSP, when the majority of stakeholders consulted during phases 2 and 3 were no 
longer in the loop.  
6.5.2.1.5 Time frame and delays 
The SOP does not specify a time frame for standard-setting, perhaps in acknowledgement that 
each process differs according to various factors including product materiality, stakeholders 
involved, and novelty of the standard. In practice, the FCSSP took four years, from the seeding 
of the idea at UNFCCC COP 17 to the official launch during UNFCCC COP 21. This was two 
years longer than the Project Team had initially expected, although they had foreseen delays due 
to the nature of a collaboration between two organisations with multi-stakeholder governance 
structures. During this period, the climate governance context evolved, but process delays were 
driven more by organisational and inter-organisational dynamics, learning journeys that 
stakeholders and organisations embarked on and unforeseen feedback loops. 
6.5.3. Missing stakeholders 
While Table 6-3 and Figure 6-2 indicate that the range of stakeholders invited to participate in 
the FCSSP at various points was substantial, there were some people with a stake who were 
missing. Retailers were not invited to participate in any of the stakeholder events, meaning that 
expected sales of Fairtrade Carbon Credits remained uncertain. This was because the Project 
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1. ‘The lady using the cook stove is the producer’ [said despite recognising 
that the ladies in this project did not identify themselves as such] (T.PFS.B.b p6) 
2. ‘My experience in stove projects is that the women don’t want to get more 
involved. There is no need to waste time at meetings, the groups will end up 
fighting amongst themselves. So as a facilitator I have to keep things together. 
Women are organised for the first year or so, but once they have the benefits of 
a subsidised stove, they don’t want to be involved anymore. Once they have the 
training and the product, they already have the benefits’ (T.PFS.B.b p9) 
3. ‘What more do you want her to do, apart from using the cookstove? She 
won’t do the monitoring, she can’t’ (T.PFS.B.b p9) 
 
 
4. ‘99% of people in a cookstove project don’t know what carbon is’ (T.PFS.B.b p7) 
 
 
 
 
Box 6-1 Examples of claims made by project developers and managers about people 
involved in cook stove projects (the ‘producers’) 
Team were concerned that their presence would counter the ‘nice cosy atmosphere’ that they 
were trying to create within the Group of Experts (CoordC, 10.13). Selected retailers’ opinions 
were eventually explored during the market research conducted by FTI in phase 3.  
The voices of carbon project participants were generally channelled by project implementers 
who claimed to represent them. Several claims were made, especially about female participants 
concerning their identities, capacities and willingness to be involved (see Box 6-1). Had more 
producers, especially females taken part in the FCSSP, more diverse opinions on requirements 
for Producer Organisations (detailed in chapter 7) might have been gathered. An FTI staff 
member shared with me her surprise that when visiting an FCS pilot project in East Africa she 
had met a group of women very enthusiastic about the prospect of greater levels of organisation 
through being involved in Fairtrade, in contrast to the Project Developer’s views on the 
organisational requirements being unwieldy for producers.  
  
 
6.5.4. Section summary 
This section has explored how participation was managed during the FCSSP through a 
description of the participation spaces provided and a temporal analysis of when in the FCSSP 
they were offered. Mapping the process alongside the FTI Standard Operating Procedure serves 
to indicate the influence of existing governance structures and rules and procedures on decisions 
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made about participation, but also the power and responsibility of the Project Team in managing 
the participation and bridging between stakeholders. Illustrations of where the FCSSP differed 
from the Standard Operating Procedure show the messiness of standard setting in practice and 
the need to balance both expediency and legitimacy (Cheyns, 2011). They also point out the 
efforts of the Project Team to go beyond the minimum level of participation set by procedures 
and to accept iterations and slower progress instead of expediency at times, in order to 
maximise the inputs gathered and ensure buy-in from as many stakeholders as possible. This is 
recognised by standard setters as a route towards greater effectiveness (Murphy and Yates, 
2011). Nevertheless, more participation is not necessarily better or fairer. Bühler (2002) argues 
that participation tools have real material implications, and when they lead to decisions that do 
not genuinely represent the concerns of those consulted or result in unrealistic propositions, this 
implies a lack of respect of one’s own dignity and that of the other. Genuine participation 
involving the respect of dignity requires commitment and responsibility from all parties to 
ensure that any outcomes reached are real and effective. While the efforts to include a wide 
range of stakeholders during phases 2 and 3 are remarkable, the exclusion of anyone but the 
Standards Committee in the key decisions in phase 4 are also remarkable. This suggests the 
need for a more detailed exploration of (i) when important and contentious decisions were 
made, (ii) whether they represented stakeholders’ concerns; and (iii) whether they point towards 
real and effective outcomes. I do this in section 6.6. 
6.6. Results part 3: opening up and closure of ‘hot topics’ 
This section explores hot topics 1 and 2 indicated in the yellow circle in Figure 6-1 as a means 
of illustrating how conflicting ideas were dealt with in the FCSSP. This contributes towards 
addressing question 2.2 of this thesis, namely: how did the FCS reflect stakeholder input and 
what shaped this?  
  
6.6.1. Hot Topic 1: Standard Scope: Which projects and beneficiaries are 
included? 
In this section, I explore the evolution of the goal and target of the FCS summarised in terms of 
hot topic 1. In particular, I draw attention to two aspects which changed substantially between 
the first attempts to set objectives in September 2012, and the publishing of the FCS in October 
2015 because they serve as useful illustrations of the unequal footing and influence of different 
stakeholders in the process, the differences in resources and ambitions, and how these aspects 
intersected with the structural context of the carbon market, and the temporal constraints of a 
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partnership between two organisations who were both seeking to develop new standards 
infrastructure simultaneously.  
The first aspect to note is the disappearance of agricultural projects from the FCS scope, despite 
FTI’s self-identification as an organisation focussed on agriculture and despite the rationale for 
the collaboration between FTI and GSF being about enhancing access to the carbon market to 
smallholders and rural communities through agricultural projects. The second aspect is the 
shifting place of ‘adaptation’ amongst the drivers, strategic rationale, objectives and intended 
outcomes of the FCS. Both aspects were explored using timeline analysis and explanation 
building (see chapter 4). In order to contextualise the topic and make key links between 
adaptation and agriculture, changes in target beneficiaries were also included in the analysis. 
Section 6.6.1.1 indicates when these changes happened, and is followed by an account of why, 
who stood to lose or gain, and what this means for FTI’s first participatory governance intention 
to avoid power imbalances and engage with partners on an equal footing (Table 6-1).  
6.6.1.1. Commentary: shifting scope, target and aims 
During phase 1, agricultural projects were firmly within the scope. Fairtrade Carbon Credits 
were framed as opportunities to reward agricultural practices, including efforts already made to 
adapt and implement sustainable agricultural practices. As plans developed, adaptation 
remained acknowledged as a necessary initiative to be developed in parallel, or a possible 
consequence of Fairtrade carbon projects, but the emphasis was on mitigation. Beneficiaries 
included community-based organisations, and Fairtrade certified Small Producer Organisations 
and the workers of Fairtrade certified Hired Labour set-ups (including plantations and factories). 
In phase 2 and phase 3, agricultural projects were still within the scope but there was a gradual 
acknowledgement that GSF methodologies and example projects were not available yet. 
Workers from Hired Labour set-ups were excluded as beneficiaries in all versions of the FCS, 
which focused in on ‘small-scale producers’. However, the question of expanding the scope to 
include them was raised during discussions with stakeholders in forums 2, 4 and 5, and during 
the 1
st
 consultation (forum 7). Adaptation activities were introduced into the environmental 
section of the draft FCS during phase 2, first as optional (but encouraged), then as mandatory. In 
phase 3, adaptation requirements were expanded. In phase 4, agricultural projects were removed 
from the scope and workers from Hired Labour set-ups remained excluded. Adaptation 
requirements meanwhile were further developed for the published FCS, resulting in mandatory 
spending of the premium on adaptation measures but with two caveats- i) once the project 
generates income, and ii) unless there are other activities which respond to greater needs of the 
Producer Organisation and communities. Nevertheless, published FCS’ stated aims include 
generating climate finance opportunities to fund both mitigation and adaptation activities.  
169 
 
6.6.1.2. Understanding the changes in terms of stakeholders’ 
disproportionate resources, ambitions, power and interests 
In this section, the interests and influential powers of stakeholders who spoke out most strongly 
in favour or against the requirements around agriculture and adaptation are outlined. 
6.6.1.2.1 The lobby against inclusion of agriculture 
One of the CSOs involved in the FCSSP was concerned that including agricultural projects and 
workers from Hired Labour set-ups in the FCS scope might lead to land grabbing by large agro-
industrial companies, potentially resulting in landlessness and food insecurity for surrounding 
populations. This view is supported by critical literature on carbon projects. In the context of 
Sub-Saharan Africa, projects have been criticised for enabling foreign direct investors to buy 
tracts of land cheaply from national governments for extended periods and to benefit 
disproportionately, whilst dispossessing local communities (Lohmann, 2006, Tienhaara, 2012, 
Takacs, 2009, Leach et al., 2012, Fairhead et al., 2012). This occurs most often in the context of 
monoculture tree plantations, which may also lead to destructive environmental effects27. 
Women are recognised as being particularly vulnerable because they often lack formal land 
titles and men are usually the ones associated with cash crops28 (Reddy, 2011). As an 
organisation with a close relationship to FTI, the CSO drew on multiple channels to advocate 
against their inclusion, including via a member of the Standards Committee who was also in the 
Working Group. Although other members of the Standards Committee had proposed that Hired 
Labour set-ups could be allowed to implement agricultural projects if the FCS incorporated 
safeguards to prevent negative impacts, the issue had remained unresolved within the meeting29. 
At the time, it was not assumed that the same risks would be present when agricultural projects 
were implemented by farmer organisations and community groups. During the CSO meetings in 
phase 3, some NGOs had also raised concerns about agricultural projects, especially soil carbon 
projects, linking them to potential land grabbing and accounting difficulties, and risks of food 
insecurity ‘if smallholders are turned into carbon sinks’ (p17, transcript, UK CSO meeting). 
They had also expressed concerns about forestry projects. The Project Team had been aware of 
                                                     
27 For example eucalyptus plantations are notorious for drying out the soil. 
28 Despite its intangibility, carbon can be seen as a cash crop because it is being ‘produced’ for sale on 
the global carbon market. 
29 This disagreement is also a reflection of ongoing disagreements within the Fairtrade system regarding 
the inclusion of Hired Labour set-ups as target beneficiaries. The Latin American Producer Network 
excludes plantations from their regional Producer Network and had advised against including Hired 
Labour within the scope of the FCS during bilateral discussions with the Project Team. The Asian and 
African Producer Networks include Hired Labour set-ups within their regional networks. The Asian 
Producer Network had advocated including Hired Labour set-ups in the FCS scope.  
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such critique which reflects the anti-soil carbon viewpoints put forward by several CSOs such 
as Action Aid, the Durban Group for Climate Justice, Econexus and the International Federation 
of Organic Agriculture Movements, as they already asked me to produce a document reviewing 
critiques of the carbon market during phase 2 of the FCSSP (Howard, 2013).  
6.6.1.2.2 Those with concerns about adaptation vs mitigation 
At the CSO-UK workshop, the Project Team emphasised the adaptation components of the FCS 
and specifically asked for feedback on how to finance adaptation through carbon projects 
(T.CSO.08.14, p17). The Project Team proposed using the Premium money for this but the 
CSOs’ views were mixed- some welcomed the idea, others doubted there would enough money 
remaining for adaptation, and preferred that the Producer Organisations would receive financial 
benefits without earmarking them for adaptation. At other CSO workshops, more critical views 
were expressed about the FCS’ mitigation goal, drawing on climate justice arguments that it 
should not be an obligation in the global south, and that the focus should be adaptation. These 
critiques triggered the Project Team to develop stronger requirements on adaptation and to 
change the original name ‘Fairtrade Carbon Credits Standard’ to the Fairtrade Climate Standard. 
6.6.1.2.3 Those in favour of inclusion of agriculture and adaptation 
Firm support for agricultural projects was expressed during the Producer/ Field staff workshop 
in Bonn. A subgroup had formed to discuss the proposed FMP methodology and was composed 
entirely of Fairtrade Producer Organisations involved in carbon projects. In particular, two 
organisations spoke up against the over-representation of energy projects and questioned why 
there was no proposed FMP for agriculture, and a third joined them in providing a counter lobby 
in favour of agricultural projects. Box 6-2 presents quotations from each of the three 
organisations’ representatives. 
During another subgroup discussion with many of the same people, a Project Team member had 
asked for ideas on adaptation activities that could be made mandatory in the FCS in order to 
respond to the CSOs’ concerns, namely that they ‘were very critical on mitigation… and how 
[it] shouldn’t really be an obligation for the global south’, and that they ‘want to see something 
more, like adaptation measures that you can measure the impact of’ (T.PFS.B.c, p1). Not 
surprisingly, as everyone in the subgroup represented a Fairtrade Producer Organisation, their 
propositions had all been agriculture-specific, many of them types of organic agricultural 
practices that they were already implementing. Group members supported the various tools that 
the Project Team were proposing in the standard- including the adaptation plan, and using part 
of the carbon revenue for adaptation. 
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6.6.1.3. Power, Strategy and Countervailing Power? 
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The potential implications of relationship damage (by not taking the concerns of the CSOs into 
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account) were significant. The CSOs could damage FTI’s reputation as they entered into a new 
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and contentious market by publically criticising Fairtrade’s intervention. Furthermore, some of 
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these CSOs had been long term supporters of the fair trade movement. These dynamics are 
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explored in section 6.7. While the Fairtrade Producer Organisations did not possess the same 
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power as the CSOs, they made attempts to hold FTI accountable by making reference to 
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Fairtrade values and attempting to speak on behalf of Fairtrade producers (see Box 6-2), 
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differentiating them from other actors who potentially stand to gain from the FCS. Their views 
were included in a transcription of the group discussion shared with the Project Team, but they 
held less weight compared to the relationships maintained with the CSOs.   
Making reference to Fairtrade values and terminologies 
Organisation 5g ‘Fairtrade should really give importance to these land based aspects [meaning 
forestry and agriculture], energy is secondary’. (T.PFS.B.d, p11) 
Organisation 5f ‘That’s very true. That’s why I’m particular about agriculture, and hearing in 
good faith that you didn’t get any scores [i.e. figures on costs for agricultural projects]. But 
that means agriculture was left out and that shows the concern. That means that people in the 
core values of Fairtrade are left out. And now giving investors in energy more clamour in this 
carbon credit market’ (T.PFS.B.d, p11) 
5g ‘it’s very demotivating to see no price for CSA, and it fails within the Fairtrade goals’ 
(T.PFS.B.d, p11) 
5g ‘the biggest non-compliance is that it’s not there’ (T.PFS.B.d, p12) 
Speaking on behalf of Fairtrade producers  
Organisation 5g: ‘And here [with agricultural projects] we are talking about the livelihood and 
existence of millions of people, compared to the other types of project’ (T.PFS.B.d, p11) 
Organisation 5f: ‘And I appreciate what manufactures will do, but they are just assembling 
cook stoves. Whereas with a farmer, look at the time and commitment, and ecosystem value 
going with it. When we go to this scheme, people will find it easy to drop an agriculture 
project in favour of an energy project because the latter may be less bothersome or costly.’ 
(T.PFS.B.d, p11) 
While several members of the group were advocating for agricultural projects to be included 
in the scope using the minimum price calculated for forestry as a basis, one organisation 
expressed concerns with blurring the boundaries between agriculture and forestry.  
Organisation 5a: ‘I think we have to have things clear. My organisation produces coffee, so 
we’re talking about agricultural projects, not about forestry projects, because forests create 
shade, and this affects our production. Also another factor is the surface area- we don’t have 
enough areas to grow coffee, so let’s put things together but not mix them up’ (T.PFS.B.d, 
p12) 
 
Box 6-2: Examples of communicative strategies deployed by Fairtrade Producer 
Organisation representatives to advocate for the inclusion of agriculture within the scope 
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6.6.1.3.1 The ‘clamour’ from energy investors 
The ‘clamour’ from energy investors mentioned in the first quotation from organisation 5f in 
Box 6-2 was a subjective interpretation of a genuine case of energy project interests 
outnumbering forestry and in particular, agricultural project interests, that had been apparent at 
all the multi-stakeholder meetings apart from the Producer/ Field staff workshop in El Salvador. 
Table 6-5 expresses these figures.  
Table 6-5: Scope interests of stakeholders taking part in multi-stakeholder forums  
 
Developed on the basis of project type that their organisations are primarily involved in. Figures take 
into account organisations implementing carbon projects and Fairtrade certified Producer Organisations 
involved in carbon projects.  
Forum Group 
of 
Experts 
Producer/ 
Field 
staff 
workshop 
El 
Salvador 
Producer/ 
Field staff 
workshop 
Nairobi 
Producer/ 
Field 
staff 
workshop 
Colombo 
Producer/ 
Field 
staff 
workshop 
Bonn 
Primary project type      
Renewable energy and 
energy efficiency 
14 1 10 4 8 
Forestry/ agroforestry and 
conservation 
3 3 2 0 3 
Mixed forestry and 
agriculture 
1 0 1 0 0 
Agriculture  1 1 0 0 2 
Various project types 1 1 1  1 
Unknown    6  
6.6.1.4. Reaching closure: winners and losers 
The proposal to remove agriculture from the project scope was developed by the Project Team 
after the 2
nd
 public consultation and taken to the Standards Committee for a decision. It was 
framed as follows: 
‘the scope needs to be more specific…stakeholders have asked Fairtrade to take a 
measured approach. Meanwhile many potential buyers don’t indicate a preference 
for any particular type of credit’ (T.SC.63, p5). 
The ‘stakeholders’ who had asked Fairtrade to take a measured approach were the CSOs. The 
market was also given as a justification (on the basis of a market study conducted by FTI in 
2014), but there was no mention of the Fairtrade Producer Organisations who lobbied for the 
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inclusion of agriculture. The Project Team’s proposal was approved after a short discussion, in 
which both Standards Committee members and the Project Team implicitly acknowledged the 
inconsistency of this narrowing of scope given FTI’s membership and basis in agriculture. The 
Project Team explained it in terms of the timelines of GSF’s own standard development work: 
‘We want to go with credible methodologies already there. The agriculture standard [is not 
ready] and there are not [projects out there yet]. We would come back to you to decide on 
inclusion of agriculture. I also want to go into agriculture. 98% of our producers are doing 
agriculture and they should have that link but for now the basis is not there’ (T.SC.63, p5). 
Delaying inclusion of agricultural projects within the scope until there are available 
methodologies and example projects was a cautious approach, and delays to unfolding processes 
managed separately and jointly by both organisations were to be expected when so many stages 
and stakeholders are involved. If agricultural projects were still the projects of most interest to 
Fairtrade’s producer membership, FTI could have chosen to delay the FCS until the 
methodologies for agriculture were ready, but this would have risked losing the momentum and 
interest behind a standard for energy and forestry projects. In hindsight, FTI and GSF both 
recognise that there are still significant barriers to including agriculture within the scope of the 
FCS and that it will be necessary to revisit the issues before any decisions are made about it.  
6.6.1.5. How thin is the line between adaptation and mitigation? Working 
within the constraints of the carbon market  
It was acknowledged by the Project Team and by GSF on several occasions when the 
adaptation-mitigation discussion came up, that the two are often integrated. The Project Team 
noted that ‘the line is often drawn between adaptation and mitigation but we think the line is 
very thin’ (T.CSO.08.14, p3). GSF had noted that the best projects combine both. This may be 
the case with projects incorporating carbon-saving sustainable agricultural practices, but as 
these were eventually not included within the FCS project scope, the line was not so thin. 
Instead, adaptation became an additional goal that Producer Organisations should achieve with 
project revenue, and agricultural producers need to find non-agricultural mitigation activities to 
implement in order to produce carbon credits which will hopefully generate revenue to be 
channelled back into adaptation. Carbon market mechanics also increase the line width because 
of the concept of additionality, which involves generating credits from, and channelling finance 
into activities that would not otherwise have happened if the finance had not been provided. The 
early intention was that Fairtrade Carbon Credits would reward farmers for the efforts they have 
already made to adapt to climate change and implement sustainable agriculture practices 
(M.SC.52). However, it was noted by the Project Team and members of the Standards 
Committee on several occasions that sustainable agricultural practices (such as composting, 
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mulching and intercropping) which could otherwise be considered under methodologies for 
carbon sequestration through agriculture, are already written into FTI’s environmental 
requirements.  
Smallholders who comply with these and perhaps additionally the more stringent environmental 
requirements of other standards (such as Rainforest Alliance or organic certification schemes), 
will have already have undertaken many of the actions that could otherwise have been included 
in carbon projects, meaning that they are not eligible for financing through carbon credit 
mechanisms. As their awareness of the carbon market grew, and disparate viewpoints were 
expressed by stakeholders, the Project Team were faced with a difficult task of ensuring that the 
published FCS was congruent with the original claims made about it, as well as finding ways to 
incorporate the goals for adaptation set out in the parallel adaptation initiative which never got 
off the ground. In hindsight, an alternative approach not constrained by carbon market 
mechanics, might have been more appropriate for generating revenue for adaptation, and might 
have allowed for the recognition of efforts already made by agricultural producers. Meanwhile, 
over the two and a half years that GSF had been working on their agricultural standard, they 
were beginning to come to similar conclusions (personal communication with GSF staff 
member).  
6.6.1.6. Summary of the section 
This section has explored how a collaboration between FTI and GSF originally framed around 
smallholder agriculture eventually came to exclude agriculture from its scope, and discussed the 
attempt to incorporate adaptation elements into a standard based around mitigation. The 
treatment of this topic has been used to illustrate power imbalances within the FCSSP, divergent 
interests, and different capacities and tactics deployed to influence the process. The attempt by 
producers (Box 6-2) to resist the exclusion of agriculture was an example of countervailing 
power (Fung and Wright, 2003) that was limited in influence because it did not generate 
solutions and because the stakeholders expressing alternative viewpoints had multiple channels 
by which to influence the decision. Because the disparate viewpoints on agriculture and 
adaptation were generally expressed by proponents attending separate forums or bilaterally with 
FTI, stakeholders missed an opportunity for participatory solution generation characteristic of 
empowered participatory governance (Fung and Wright, 2003) or participatory deliberation 
where diverse participants come together to deliberate or debate (Leach et al., 2010). 
Nevertheless, the Project Team who formulated the decisions on agriculture and adaptation 
were aware of the diverse viewpoints and found themselves re-examining the premises and 
values at the root of their decisions (RRf.4). This is recognised by Fischer (2003a) as an 
outcome of participatory deliberation.  
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In this instance, the power and influence of the CSOs in the shaping of the scope of the FCS 
supports Blowfield and Dolan’s (2008) argument that the ‘community of principals’ (in this 
case the CSOs) are more likely to be recognised in standard setting processes than the 
‘community of the supply chain’, despite the justice imperative of representing the latter. When 
I shared the findings of this chapter with the project team, they expressed their dilemmas 
regarding project scope and the difficulty of taking on board the producers’ comments. They 
recognised that this was not simply a matter of prioritising the CSOs’ views. Although they did 
have considerable influence, the main barrier to taking on board producers’ requests for 
agriculture in the FCS scope were structural, in relation to the way the carbon market works 
(RRf.4, Appendix 2). This constraint, which had not been foreseen at the beginning of the 
process, points to the difficulties of dealing with uncertainty when constructing pathways and 
demonstrates a preference for implementable and most-knowable solutions (Leach et al., 2010).  
The unresolved issues around agriculture and adaptation remain a pressing development 
challenge and point to the gaps between decisions; stakeholders’ concerns; and real and 
effective outcomes within the FCSSP. Addressing these issues in a way that brings together 
people with shared resources and ambitions on an equal footing, draws on the inputs of 
everyone with a stake, and accords them opportunity to shape design, decisions and outcome; 
will require an alternative governance form but also a specific process design. I return to this in 
chapter 9.  
6.6.2. Hot Topic 2: Mechanisms for financial-benefit sharing 
In this section I analyse the deliberation and decision-making processes that the Fairtrade 
Minimum Price (FMP) and Fairtrade Premium (Premium) passed through before becoming 
embedded in the trade section of the FCS, as two of a series of mechanisms intended to ensure 
fair financial benefit-sharing within certified projects. Whilst their presence in the published 
FCS is unsurprising given their centrality in the Fairtrade approach (see for example Fairtrade 
International, 2011c where they are listed alongside the Fairtrade Principles, Standards and 
Products as defining features of Fairtrade), a retrospective unpacking of the deliberative journey 
reveals that their inclusion was not always taken for granted, and decisions with respect to their 
requirements were not always consensual. Also, the FMP is applied one level away from the 
Producer Organisation compared to other Fairtrade products (between the Trader and the Project 
Facilitator, rather than between the Trader and the Producer Organisation). This example 
illustrates how the consensus process and the arrival at closure on a contested topic is shaped by 
the interplay between Fairtrade’s formal governance structure, ISEAL’s clauses on decision 
making (ISEAL Alliance, 2014b), and FTI’s participatory governance intentions, in particular 
intention B, ‘enabling everyone with a stake to contribute to design and outcome’ and B2, 
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‘enabling diverse stakeholders to share in decision-making activities where practical (Table 
6-1).  
6.6.2.1. Decision making provisions 
FTI’s formal governance structure shapes decision-making channels and opportunities to 
participate in the organisation and in standard setting (see chapter 3). The Standards Committee 
is mandated to decide on standards, and is composed of producer- and market-facing 
representatives of the Fairtrade system, as well as independent experts if required. The 
Standards Committee’s Terms of Reference (FP.1) state that for reasons of pragmatism and 
efficiency, strategic decision making may be passed upwards to the FTI Board (the top level 
governance body), and minor decisions can delegated  to the Director of Standards and Pricing. 
ISEAL’s clauses on decision-making (ISEAL Alliance, 2014b) include openness to 
participation of all stakeholders including those directly affected by the standard and 
representativeness of decision-making bodies. The code acknowledges that even if decision-
making is limited to members, this should not preclude balanced multi-stakeholder participation 
in decision-making, and if decisions for particular standards need to be made by Technical or 
Stakeholder Committees, top level governance bodies can still be involved in decisions on the 
quality of the standard-setting process. Consensus should be strived for in decision-making but 
predefined alternative mechanisms can be drawn on if consensus cannot be reached. These 
bases are important for understanding the broader context in which the participatory governance 
intention stated above, is framed. The where practical caveat allows for challenges that might 
be encountered in practice.  
6.6.2.2. Deliberative and Decision Disjuncture in practice 
During the FCSSP, the Standards Committee was accorded its due role in providing advice and 
making decisions on nine different occasions (Figure 6-2) but most of the members were devoid 
of the opportunity to take part in other forums and learn from these. As one item on the agenda, 
and one potential product among many Fairtrade products, the FCS only had one definite 
advocate sitting on the Standards Committee (who was also a Working Group member), while 
the other members struggled at times to understand the concept including its potential and 
limitations. The Project Team attempted to build an understanding amongst Standards 
Committee members over the times they met, and held an additional webinar for members that 
had recently joined, prior to the Standards Committee meeting where approval was being sought 
(in November 2014). However, the gap between the formal consensus-based decision making 
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processes within the Standards Committee, and the parallel deliberative processes within other 
forums30 resulted in some disjuncture in the deliberation and decision-making process regarding 
the FMP and Premium. Timeline analysis was used to map the evolution in claims made about 
financial benefit-sharing and proposals and support for or against the FMP and Premium. Figure 
6-3 portrays the decision points and compares the actual process with a typical consensus-based 
decision-making process (see Box 6-3). The diamond figure is based on a heuristic popular 
amongst groups using consensus for conceptualising and guiding themselves through a 
decision-making process, which is generally characterised by five phases or ‘zones’. Although it 
is usually applied to a decision-making process held within a specific meeting, it also applies to 
protracted decision-making processes such as decisions on particular topics contained within the 
FCSSP.  
The commentary below highlights some of the moments when consensus was compromised, 
negotiated or superficial, and two particular interventions intended to open up the topic to 
further deliberation and countervail premature closure (see chapter 3) are detailed, one which I 
led, and another led by a Standards Committee member.  
During Phase 1 of the FCSSP (points 1-3 and 9 on Figure 6-3) when initial propositions for the 
FCS were  articulated, claims were made about how Fairtrade Carbon Credits would result in 
economic benefits for producers, communities and organisations, including describing them as 
‘direct’ and ‘cash’. How this would happen was not thoroughly explored, though in one study, 
the Premium was recommended but the FMP was not. 
During Phase 2 (points 4-8 and 10), research and stakeholder meetings generated an array of 
opinions and recommendations on the FMP and Premium. The Premium was questioned in 
discussions and discussion documents, and even removed from one version of the FCS (8). 
Discussions about the FMP generated lots of concerns, but its place in the FCS was not 
explicitly questioned. On one occasion (10), both the Project Team and a Group of Expert 
member portrayed consensual support for the FMP in the absence of a systematic check of 
people’s opinions, effectively crowding out opportunities for divergence from the deliberation 
process. Meanwhile I had heard several people express strong doubts about the FMP outside 
this meeting.  Moreover, the Q study (point Q on Figure 6-3) conducted during the consultation 
                                                     
30 Note that although these forums were designed for gathering inputs rather than making decisions, the 
Project Team used language at times that suggested shared decision making or joint proposal generation. 
(e.g. T.GE.09.13, or T.PFS.B.c and T.PFS.B.d).  
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period explored participants’ views on mechanisms for financial benefit-sharing, including the 
FMP and revealed a spectrum of opinions, from those who strongly agreed on the importance of 
the FMP to those who strongly disagreed or advocated alternative mechanisms.    
During Phase 3 of the FCSSP (11-16), work to develop the details of the FMP and Premium 
was conducted by the Pricing Unit, and versions of the FCS were presented to diverse 
stakeholders for comments, and revised. The FMP and Premium were firmly embedded in both 
consultation versions of the FCS (11 and 15). Firm support for both mechanisms voiced at a 
Standards Committee meeting (13) dissuaded the Pricing Unit from questioning whether or not 
they were actually appropriate within the context of the FCS, despite doubts raised amongst 
some members of the Project Team. 
Meanwhile the forums where FMP and Premium were deliberated produced a variety of 
proposals on how they should be structured within the FCS and often discussants were unable to 
reach consensus. 
During Phase 4 of the FCS-setting process (17-19), when the FCS was finalised, deliberation 
and decision-making were limited to the Project Team and Standards Committee. Although the 
latter unanimously approved the FCS the first time it was presented to them for approval (17), 
the discussions around the FMP and Premium were highly contested, and consensus was 
reached partially as a result of strategic handling of the situation by the Standards Unit, and on 
condition that the Standards Committee members’ persistent concerns would be addressed. The 
FMP values were approved at the following meeting (18) but no details are available on how 
this decision-making process played out. The Standards Unit was mandated to do final edits and 
the topic reached closure in the form of the published FCS (19). 
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Table 6-6: Decision points where FMP and premium were deliberated  
Decision point  
1 Sep 2012, Standards Committee meeting   
2 Nov 2012, COP 18  
3 Jan 2013, Internal Feasibility Study 
4 Sep 2013, Cornerstones document 
5 Sep 2013, Group of Experts meeting 
 
 
6 Nov 2013, COP 19 
 7 Nov 2013, Working Group meeting 
8 Nov 2013, Preliminary drafts  
9 Dec 2013, Final Project Assignment  
10 Mar 2014, Further iteration of preliminary draft  
11 Jun 2014, 1
st
 consultation draft 
 12 Aug 2014, CSO London 
13 Sep 2014, Standards Committee meeting  
14 Sep 2014, Group of Experts meeting  
15 Oct 2014, 2
nd
 consultation document  
 
 
 
16 Oct 2014, Producer/ Field staff workshop, Bonn  
17 Nov 2014, Standards Committee meeting 
18 Mar 2015, Standards Committee meeting 
19 October 2015 Standard release documents 
 
N.B. colours relate to phases of the FCSSP in Figure 6-2 
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Figure 6-3 Deliberative and decision-making diamond: the actual consensus decision process 
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(based on Kaner, 2014, Seeds for Change, 2013) 
Initial proposals 
In the first zone, the issue to be addressed is put forward and opinions are expressed. If 
there are some viewpoints or concerns expressed about initial propositions, it is necessary 
to open up discussion and enter the divergent zone.   
Divergent zone 
In this zone, further information is gathered and opinions are explored. People may be 
nervous, curious, and playful but it is important that efforts are made to support them to 
feel comfortable expressing points of view even if they are divergent. 
Groan zone  
Once the team has expressed all points of view, often conflicts come forward due to not 
understanding each other's perspectives. This zone may feel uncomfortable and stressful 
and consensus may appear difficult to achieve. However, the efforts to understand each 
other’s perspectives that should be made during this stage are a necessary step for 
engaging in shared problem-solving, paving the way into the convergent zone. 
Convergent zone 
Now that everyone has a shared framework of understanding, discussions go smoother. 
Proposals generated are more likely to receive the support of the group, but should be 
checked to make sure they cover everyone's interests. 
Closure zone  
Finally, a decision has to be made. It has to be clear to everyone what the decision 
embodies and how it is supported by all.  
Box 6-3 phases in a typical consensus decision-making process 
6.6.2.3. Interventions to countervail premature closure  
Research Intervention: mapping diverse perspectives through a Q study with stakeholders 
involved in the FCSSP  
The Q study I conducted during the consultation period was a deliberate intervention to enhance 
reflexivity amongst stakeholders taking part in the FCSSP (see chapters 5 and 8) and create 
space for a thorough exploration of divergent viewpoints that were assumed to be in consensus 
(see decision point 10 in Figure 6-3). When the results of the study were discussed with the 
Project Team, they were surprised that participants loading on factors 2 and 3 were not 
convinced by the FMP but ascribed this to a lack of understanding of the FMP and how it 
worked by participants external to the Fairtrade system. However, factor 2 also included some 
Fairtrade-internal participants who saw the potential for alternatives to the FMP. The study also 
uncovered a key difference in opinion about where the focus for fair benefit-sharing should be, 
varying from the household, to the organisation grouping the individuals who produced the 
emissions reductions, to across the entire commodity chain. Further divergence in opinions on 
the topic of making payments to individual producers (those producing the emissions 
reductions) arose during the interviews accompanying the sorting activity. These are 
summarised in Figure 6-4. 
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Figure 6-4: Paraphrased opinions on payments to producers expressed during Q interviews 
Given in reaction to statements about financial benefit-sharing. Bracketed numbers represent the number of people who expressed an equivalent opinion 
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The Project Team addressed the lack of understanding about the FMP by dedicating substantial 
workshop time during the Group of Experts and Producer/ Field staff meetings in September 
and October 2014 to explain and get feedback on the methodology used to develop the FMPs 
for Fairtrade Carbon Credits. Discussions at these points still revealed a wide array of opinions 
even after people had understood more about how the FMP would work. However, when the 
Project Team came to the Standards Committee to request FCS approval, the impression they 
gave was of general support from the stakeholders consulted, on the pricing methodology and 
proposed values (see commentary on phase 3 in Figure 6-3). Opinions on the FCS had been 
mixed at the previous Standards Committee meeting and the Project Team had doubted whether 
the FCS would be approved at the first attempt. The requirements around the FMP and Premium 
were the most contentious31, and both Standards Committee members and Standards Unit 
members present at the meeting drew on strategies respectively to slow down and to manoeuvre 
into a closure (i.e. approval) of the requirements. Table 6-7 documents efforts led by one 
particular Standards Committee member to resist premature closure, which are presented in 
relation to the strategies deployed by the Standards Unit and Chair to enhance likelihood of 
reaching closure. 
Table 6-7: Resistance to closure at the meeting for approval of the FCS (November 2014) 
Type of 
strategy  
Strategies deployed to facilitate 
closure 
Strategies deployed mainly by Standards 
Committee member 1 (SCM1) to resist 
closure 
Dealing with 
insufficient 
information/ 
understanding 
Standards Unit hold an 
additional webinar for newer 
Standards Committee members 
prior to the meeting for approval 
SCM1 acknowledges the gap in 
understanding and the discomfort this 
creates- ‘I’m uncomfortable… It’s taken us 
as committee members quite a while to 
follow’ (T.SC.63, p6) 
Strategic 
agenda setting 
and critical 
deconstruction 
of the agenda 
The Standards Unit choose to 
leave the more contentious 
points about the Fairtrade 
Carbon Credits pricing 
methodology until after the 
majority of the FCS has been 
approved, when people are also 
more tired. 
SCM1 cross-references previous sub-
points on the agenda and acknowledges 
their links to the discussion at hand, 
threatening the validity of previous 
decisions. 
When a vote is proposed, SCM1 says ‘I’m 
uncomfortable to take part. It’s a pity that 
we’ve approved the standard before 
discussing this’ (T.SC.63, p8) 
Use of figures The Standards Unit present the 
price calculations figures very 
small- few people in the room 
are able to read them. They 
SCM1 uses the figures presented to 
calculate what this means for individual 
producers and Producer Organisations, 
doing this on a flipchart and asking for 
                                                     
31 This was because of SC members’ expectations about what they would generate for producers and 
Producer Organisations, rather than because they didn’t agree with them 
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admit they are not confident on 
the figures because of 
insufficient information but they 
are confident on the 
methodology because they have 
‘asked the experts’ (T.SC.63, 
p8).  
The Chair and Standards Unit 
try to steer the Standards 
Committee away from going 
into details 
contributions from the room. 
Other members bring in concrete 
examples. When the calculations are 
complete, SCM1 says ‘I want to check I’ve 
understood it right…’ and raises the 
question ‘are we comfortable with that?’ 
(T.SC.63, p8). SCM1 is evidently not 
happy, and expresses this later. 
Claiming 
representation 
The Standards Unit present the 
views of particular forums as 
unanimously in support of the 
proposals, whilst ignoring the 
nuances or divergence in 
opinions within these forums 
(e.g. ‘everybody more or less 
agreed…’, ‘the consultation’ or 
‘the Group of Experts’ told us 
that…) 
When the viewpoint of SCM1 is thrown 
into question, this member claims that the 
PNs share it 
[on the topic of revenue sharing]  
SCM1: ‘we can’t make it aspirational 
because it won’t happen. This is one of the 
ways to make more revenue come to 
individuals’ 
SC member 2: ‘are we all sharing your 
point of view?’ 
SCM1: ‘The PNs share my view definitely’ 
[not disputed by the PNs, even though one 
has just expressed a counter-opinion] 
SC member 3: ‘I do too’…(T.SC.63, p10) 
Dealing with 
incompleteness 
The Standards Unit reframe the 
decision which is put to the 
Standards Committee in terms of 
the Standards Committee 
deciding to give confidence to 
the Standards Unit to continue 
working on the values and 
suggest that there may be new 
requirements developed by the 
next Standards Committee 
meeting.  
Standards Committee members hold off 
the vote to raise more concerns, and agree 
only when the Standards Unit has taken 
these concerns on board. Consensus is on 
condition that concerns will be addressed 
by the next meeting. 
Throughout the discussion at the Standards Committee meeting, the main concern expressed by 
Standards Committee member 1 and shared by several other members, was that the pricing 
methodology, proposed FMP and premium values and proposed level at which to set the FMP, 
would not allow for sufficient financial benefits for individual producers or adequate 
transparency on the sharing of financial benefits between the Project Facilitator and the 
Producer Organisation and its members. They argue this both for land-based projects, where 
producers encounter opportunity costs which should be compensated, but also in energy 
efficiency projects. The issue is portrayed by Standards Committee member 1 as follows: 
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‘the investor has put in money, so when money comes in, it’s to his pocket. When 
money rolls in [from the premium], it’s for the community, even though individuals 
have put money in…’ (T.SC.63, p8) 
‘we’ve assumed an investor comes in with good intentions, and the community 
should be happy because they’re going to use less wood. I don’t agree with that 
and that is central to this standard. At the heart of Fairtrade, individual members 
benefit- in conventional Fairtrade. Here we are saying the community benefits. 
Who will measure the [impact on the] individual [in the] standard?’ (T.SC.63, p9) 
 
Figure 6-4 shows that the view that individual producers should benefit directly is not common 
to all stakeholders- several participants of the Q study strongly disagreed with this idea on a 
number of grounds, particularly in the context of energy-efficiency projects. However, this point 
of view does resonate with the original claims made about what Fairtrade Carbon Credits would 
achieve, made in phase 1 of the FCSSP, where expectations of direct cash benefits to producers 
were raised. Notably, claims in the published FCS are less explicit. The safety net function of 
the FMP is provided for projects rather than producers, the finance generated by the premium is 
earmarked for adaptation, and the share of the FMP paid to the Producer Organisation is 
contingent on each project set-up and the degree to which the Producer Organisation takes on 
project management tasks. This does not necessarily mean that the FCS is unlikely to achieve 
positive results, but like the analysis of adaptation and agriculture, it does provide an illustration 
of how the negotiation and learning process through which all those involved in the FCS-setting 
process passed, resulted in a standard promising to deliver something quite different from the 
original expectations.  
6.6.2.4. Reaching closure: have all concerns been taken into account? 
According to the practitioners’ advice detailed in Box 6-3, closure in a decision-making process 
should come once proposals have been checked to ensure all stakeholders’ concerns have been 
taken into account, and when everyone involved in the process is in support of the decision. In 
the FCSSP, the Project Team heard all the concerns expressed by stakeholders, but were also 
driven by the desired result to accomplish the project mission (i.e. get the FCS approved and 
ready for stakeholders to implement). Furthermore, the disjuncture between a) deliberation and 
guidance provision within the various stakeholder forums; and b) decision-making within the 
Standards Committee (which happened primarily in phase 4 once the Project Team had ceased 
to organise stakeholder forums for participation), means that the checking of decisions against 
the various concerns cannot be done by anyone but the Project Team, except in hindsight. This 
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research process therefore serves to enhance the accountability of the Project Team by tracking 
concerns raised throughout the FCSSP and assessing whether and how they have been taken 
into account. I provided a detailed analysis of concerns and efforts to address them, and shared 
this with FTI. Overall, the process of opening up the topic of financial-benefit sharing to 
exploration of diverse opinions and further research helped to enhance learning and mutual 
understanding for the diverse stakeholders involved, and as the issue moved towards closure, 
concerns were more about how the FMP and Premium mechanisms would operate rather than 
whether or not they should be in the standard. However, some remaining concerns can only be 
assessed once projects begin applying the FCS. Below is a list of questions relevant for FTI to 
ask when monitoring and evaluating the impact of the standard. These are non-exhaustive as 
more questions will arise as the FCS is rolled out. These questions were shared with the Project 
Team and they agreed that they were all relevant and crucial to monitor and would be addressed 
within monitoring work.  
 Are the three FMPs adequate for capturing the diversity of project types and 
organisational set-ups applying the standard, without excluding or creating comparative 
disadvantages for those projects which fit with the FCS’ purpose but are more 
expensive to implement? 
 Does a pricing system which is structured in the same way regardless of project type, 
cater for the differences in organisational set-ups, embedded project benefits and 
motivations for action?   
 Are buyers willing to pay the FMP and is it clear when the FMP applies as opposed to 
the reference market price? Are volumes of sales substantial enough to have a 
noticeable impact on the revenues of Producer Organisations? And is it actually 
possible to ascertain the amount of revenue flow back to Producer Organisations from 
Project Facilitators?  
 Do the amounts of Fairtrade Premium and share of the FMP received by Producer 
Organisations and producers adequately compensate for the costs they have incurred, 
without creating false incentives for action? Do these amounts and shares meet with 
producers’ and Producer Organisations’ expectations and/or the claims made in 
communication material about the FCS?  
 Do the projects being implemented involve working with Producer Organisations that 
are sufficiently organised to decide on the spending of the Premium, and are there 
effectively opportunities being created for them to take on more of the project 
management tasks and earn an increasing share of the FMP?  
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6.6.2.5. Section summary 
This section analysed deliberation and decision-making about hot topic 2 (financial benefit-
sharing through the mechanisms of FMP and premium). It serves as an illustration of how a 
consensus-based decision making process operated in practice and points to the challenges in 
applying FTI’s participatory governance intention of enabling everyone with a stake to take part 
in decision-making activities. In particular it points to the deliberative and decision disjuncture 
created because formal decision making taking place within the Standards Committee meetings 
was relatively isolated from the deliberative forums happening in parallel, which were more 
conducive to learning. Although the Project Team acted as intermediaries between these forums 
and made substantial efforts towards transparency about outcomes from different forums, they 
could not be impartial because they were also influenced by the required outcome of 
accomplishing the project mission (getting the FCS approved and ready for implementation), 
the frames set by ISEAL and the FTI SOP, as well as by their own ideals and opinions32. This 
disjuncture, characterised by unequal access to information and differential powers to decide, 
contributed to a consensus process which was manoeuvred towards premature closure on 
various occasions and subsequently slowed down through research- and stakeholder-led 
interventions aimed at re-opening discussions. Nevertheless, the example also illustrates the 
agency of participants in the process including myself as researcher and facilitator of the Q 
study. Bühler (2002) recognises that the potential for manipulation, domination and 
undemocratic outcomes is present in most experiences of participation and it is an issue for 
participants themselves to consider how they can resist this. When I discussed with the Project 
Team the attempt by members of the Standards Committee to do this, they acknowledged the 
pressures and shortcomings that had led them to push the decision (see section 8.2.2).  The end 
result was compromised in terms of its ability to adequately address all concerns (as indicated 
by the sharp descent out of the groan zone into closure in Figure 6-3) both because of remaining 
uncertainties, and because of the tensions inherent in standard-setting in participatory, 
collaborative and multi-stakeholder processes. In this case there is a need for a) technical inputs 
provided by stakeholders who are not full members of the existing system; b) representative 
decision-making rooted in the organisation’s members; c) consistency with other standards 
(those of FTI, and GSF); d) buy-in from future implementers of the FCS and market actors 
(understood broadly in terms of buyers, promoters and influencers of civil society). These 
tensions are discussed in the following section. 
                                                     
32 There has not been scope within this thesis to elaborate on the Project Team members’ ideals and 
personal opinions, but as staff of a mission-driven organisation, they regularly expressed their own 
relationships to Fairtrade principles, and their own desires and quandaries about their relevance within the 
FCS.  
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6.7. Discussion: Alternatives to top-down governance?  
Chapter 3 introduced FTI’s underlying participatory governance aim, to strive for alternatives to 
top-down governance and discussed two potential alternatives resulting in robust deliberative 
forms of participatory collaboration. In this final section of the chapter I assess the degree to 
which this was achieved with the FCSSP through a discussion of the different instances of 
governance counterforces evident within the FCSSP. This involves drawing on the concepts of 
countervailing power and efforts to resist premature closure, introduced in chapter 3, and 
introducing my own concept of ‘rug-tugging’. This is a form of adversarialism, which in the 
context of the FCSSP, arose as a result of interests outlined in Figure 6-1 in the ‘protectionist 
culture belt.  
Rug-tugging is an adversarial process whereby multiple parties, motivated by a culture of 
protectionism, act within their own camps and attempt to pull the rug in their direction to ensure 
they will fit on it or that it will satisfy the needs of the actors they represent, rather than acting 
towards shared interests or desired results. The ‘rug’ is a metaphor for the requirements and 
mechanisms within the FCS. Rug-tugging was motivated by a desire to maintain position, 
manage relationships and safeguard reputation, and to fit existing practices and protect the roles 
of existing actors within projects and supply chains. How does it operate? Imagine a rug. This 
rug is a bit too small to comfortably fit everybody who wants to sit on it… 
Over to the left of the rug are people who shape, represent and promote Fairtrade. They are 
standing up for the consistency of Fairtrade standards; of what they consider to be key Fairtrade 
mechanisms- the Fairtrade Minimum Price, Premium, Producers and Producer Organisations; 
and for how Fairtrade is communicated on the market. Some have been involved in Fairtrade for 
years, and many have witnessed changes within Fairtrade which could be considered as a 
dilution of its original core values, triggered in response to pressures to sell more Fairtrade 
products, and incorporate a wider range of organisational set-ups and commodity supply chains. 
Some have been convinced of the need for a standard for Fairtrade Carbon Credits and a 
partnership with GSF since these ideas were first proposed. Others have hesitated before 
endorsing this direction and harbour some persistent doubts- both their own, and those of the 
wider network of Fairtrade producers, traders, retailers, customers, supporters and funders they 
interact with. Without the prior knowledge and experience of the carbon market, this is a move 
requiring blind faith- in the success of the partnership, in the genuineness and good intentions of 
those who come forward to help shape the FCS, and in the possibility of creating something 
relevant, novel, applicable, and useful. Even the most faithful can doubt sometimes.  
Opposite them, to the right of the rug, are people involved in the making and governing of GSF 
and its standards- they are staff, founding partners, and advisory panel members. They have 
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witnessed, or actively taken part in forging GSF’s new pathway into land use projects. Until 
2013, all the focus had been on certifying carbon credits from energy projects, deemed by the 
much of the NGO community including their own supporters, to be a safer option for 
guaranteeing genuine emissions reductions and sustainable development. These are the 
foundations on which GSF was built, with the aim of offering an alternative to the failures of 
the faltering and much criticised Clean Development Mechanism. As an organisation that 
identifies itself to the public in terms of core values of quality, and trust, it is important to forge 
this pathway carefully. Whilst the partnership with FTI was welcomed by many of GSF’s NGO 
supporters, there is a risk that GSF certification will now be seen as unfair when it is not 
combined with Fairtrade certification and this must be avoided at all costs. The NGO supporters 
play an important role in GSF’s legitimacy and accountability. 
Representatives of both organisations recognise their organisations’ acquired expertise and areas 
of strength, as well as areas of weakness. The partnership begins with the idea of incorporating 
Fairtrade principles into GSF certification and evolves to support the creation of a Fairtrade 
Standard, applicable to projects also certified by GSF. Nevertheless, the division of labour is not 
clear-cut- both sides would like to influence the aspects that the other side was initially 
responsible for in order to produce something workable that harmonises with their 
organisations’ positions and existing standards. Both organisations are also dependent on funds 
provided by organisations who are involved in the process- these funds are crucial for financing 
standards development activities such as the stakeholder engagement activities and trialling of 
the standard tools, which are considered as a way to enhance the legitimacy and effectiveness of 
the process and final outcome. The organisations who have committed funding have their own 
expectations about process and outcome, as they would like to apply the standards of which 
they are financing the development.  
At times, both sides dig their heels, in an effort to maintain their position on the market, and in 
their areas of standards expertise, manage their relationships with their wider consortium of 
partners, licensees and supporters, and safeguard their own reputations on the market and 
within civil society. Whilst they may be aware of the possibility to maintain both organisations’ 
positions, jointly manage their relationships and safeguard their collective reputations, in 
moments of defensiveness and self-preservation, the rug gets tugged in both directions.  
On the other two sides of the rug are those who are implementing standards - on one side are 
people implementing Fairtrade standards within their own producer organisations or within a 
Fairtrade supply chain they are involved in. On the other side are people involved in carbon 
projects, as developers, field staff, consultants, promoters, or traders of credits. Regardless of 
the role they play within the supply chain of their particular products or projects, they are 
concerned about protecting their own roles, and also those of the other actors that help to 
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sustain their supply chains. The two sides have functioned in isolation until recently, but some 
people are beginning to gain experiences of the other side, as Fairtrade producers involved in 
carbon projects, as carbon project representatives working with Fairtrade producers, or as 
consultants working with Fairtrade producers on carbon projects. They look to standards as a 
tool for recognising their practices, providing them with a benchmark and helping them to 
communicate to the market. They have experienced the efforts and rigour required to comply 
with standards, the aspects of standards which have proved useful, and the aspects which 
continue to be a burden. Most would share the view that simpler standards are preferable33, but 
each has a different definition of ‘simple’- what is easy to apply for one project or product 
supply chain is difficult for another and vice versa. Regarding questions of auditing, on one side 
someone is saying: 
‘The last thing we want to do is to give the people we work with a whole bucket of 
extra requirements they’re not used to. We’ve invested a lot in training people 
about the requirements of carbon projects… the easier it is to snuggle the 
Fairtrade sticker into that, the better’ (T.PFS.B.d, p1) 
This is mirrored on the other side by a Fairtrade Producer Organisational representative who 
advocates for the auditing requirements to be consistent with current practices for Small 
Producer Organisations, rather than adding a new set auditing requirement. Whilst they may all 
share the view that the ideal standard would fit their own existing practices, their practices are 
different and it will be impossible for the standard to fit each project and product supply chain’s 
existing practices. Hence, in the moments of defensiveness, when it seems like the FCS is going 
to be too complicated, inappropriate and ill-fitting to the practices of one’s own project or 
supply chain, or when there is a fear of threat to one’s own role or those of other people relied 
on to get the product to market, the rug is tugged in both directions. 
These are the forces which prevailed on different occasions during the FCSSP. They were not 
omnipresent, but often came to the fore during discussions of hot topics or triggered certain 
decisions, as this chapter has illustrated and Table 6-8 summarises. These forces can be 
understood in combination as a protectionist culture. Although there are mutual interests in 
maintaining positions, fitting existing practices and so on, the coming together of different 
actors and organisations representing diverse positions and practices means that these common 
interests become mutually incompatible. The protectionist culture as a form of defensiveness 
imposes a restriction to creativity and consensus in option generation. This dynamic has been 
                                                     
33 Although there is one person in the room who whispered that complex standards are easier to hide 
behind.   
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noted by other scholars. As Cornwall identifies: ‘issues of power and difference may not only 
undermine the very possibility of equitable, consensual decision-making, they may also restrict 
the possibility of ‘thinking outside the box’, reinforcing hegemonic perspectives and status-quo 
reinforcing solutions’ (2002 p5). Fung and Wright (2003) also note that in such forms of 
adversarialism, the emphasis of differences rather than commonalities potentially generates 
excess conflict, the presence of which reduces process legitimacy and creativity of governance. 
Collective action faces barriers, and powerful interests dominate over or capture the less 
powerful. 
Nevertheless, the protectionist culture is not only a barrier to innovation or consensual 
solutions- there are times when it serves, both to maintain the standards bar against genuine 
pressures to lower it (see Riisgaard et al., 2009 for a discussion of raising and lowering the 
standards bar), and to ensure the relevance of standards in the context where they are applied. 
Both these outcomes are supported by ISEAL’s Code of Good Practice, and are in the interests 
of those who set and those who implement standards. Discerning between the different 
motivations and intentions behind protectionist culture is difficult to do accurately by an 
external observer- it is best done by self-reflexively examining one’s own thoughts, feelings and 
speech and actions, or with the help of a process facilitator who supports stakeholders to 
recognise their commonalities and the tensions inherent in them, and guide them discursively 
towards finding consensual approaches which allow win-win outcomes. This discussion is 
returned to in chapter 8. 
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Table 6-8 Summary of governance forms evident within the FCSSP 
G
o
v
er
n
an
ce
 s
tr
u
ct
u
re
 
Character of decision-making process 
1: Top down  
Adversarial 
 
e.g. Negotiation 
between GSF 
and FTI about 
owns the 
Standard 
2: Top down Collaborative 
 
e.g. Major final-phase changes in the scope of the FCS which 
were only subjected to review by the Standards Committee, not 
by the wider body of stakeholders 
 
e.g. Prioritising the input of those considered as experts, based in 
Europe, or of CSOs, over the input of producers and field staff 
based in the project and or production areas 
3: Participatory 
Adversarial 
 
e.g. Instances of 
rug-tugging 
between diverse 
stakeholders 
during 
workshops and 
meetings when 
protectionist 
cultures came to 
the fore 
 
4: Participatory Collaborative 
Co-optation 
and 
participatory 
window 
dressing 
 
e.g. Instances 
when the 
Project Team 
represented 
selective 
evidence to the 
Standards 
Committee  
 
 
Robust, democracy-enhancing forms of 
collaboration  
 
Empowered participatory 
governance with 
countervailing power 
 
e.g. Instances when 
Standards Committee 
members subjected the 
Project Team to critical 
questioning and slowed 
down decisions in order 
to understand their 
implications (e.g. 
November 2014) 
 
e.g. Instances during the 
Producer-Fieldstaff Bonn 
workshop when smaller 
subgroup of Fairtrade 
producers formed and 
spoke up against the 
exclusion of agricultural 
projects (although their 
attempt was unsuccessful) 
Participatory 
Deliberation 
 
e.g. 
Instances 
throughout 
the process 
where space 
was given to 
exploration 
of issues 
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6.8. Conclusion to chapter six 
 ‘Fair, effective and sustainable deliberation and participation in institutions 
depend… not just on the details of their design but also on background contexts, 
and in particular on the constellation of social forces that manoeuvre in and 
around [these] institutions’ (Fung and Wright, 2003 p259) 
This chapter has provided a critical assessment of FTI’s approach to participatory governance in 
practice. This was based on an analysis of how their aim and intentions shaped the design of the 
participatory governance process, and how the intentions, aims and design interacted with the 
wider context, and the array of social forces. The wider context included FTI’s SOP and 
governance structure, their commitments to ISEAL’s codes and principles and their partnership 
with GSF. Social forces included ambitions, protectionist culture, shared but sometimes 
mutually incompatible interests, strategies for empowerment and resistance to premature closure 
of decision-making processes. Power relations have been considered throughout, based on the 
understanding that they are inevitable and must be named before strategies to work with them 
can be identified.  
It was noted in chapter 3 that the governance form must be appropriate to the issue and context. 
The issue was conducive to bringing together a wide range of stakeholders, from multiple 
levels. However, the context also required FTI to respect its existing governance structure, 
which accords decision-making authority to a Standards Committee that only represents 
members. This issue and context is well suited to participatory deliberation, but the sense of 
urgency emphasised by the Project Team throughout and the limited time and resources 
available for facilitating participatory deliberation, created a pressure to try to move things 
forward even if they were not ideal. This meant that there was not always enough time or 
opportunity to reach consensual recommendations and also that even if/when they were reached 
in one forum, they were often disjointed from the different sets of recommendations arising 
from other forums.  
Various types of disjuncture were evident within the FCSSP- between deliberation and 
decision-making; between the outcomes and recommendations of different forums and sub-
groups within them; and between the values and experiences of people coming from two 
different standard-setting organisations, and two different fields of practice (Fairtrade 
commodity production and carbon credit generation). On the whole, the Project Team were 
tasked with attempting to bridge these types of disjuncture, as the only parties to be present in 
all the forums. They made considerable efforts in accomplishing this stressful, challenging and 
power-imbued task. They were held to account by the Working Group and the Standards 
Committee who they regularly met with, and made efforts to the enhance transparency of their 
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work amongst the other stakeholders taking part in the FCSSP during process and content 
updates at each stakeholder forum and occasionally by email. They were aided by those 
stakeholders who attended several forums, or participants who made particular efforts to 
connect with and learn from those who had different experiences. Seeing each other on multiple 
occasions, and staying and socialising together helped this. Sometimes in their busyness, and 
under pressure to move things forward, get the FCS approved and accomplish their mission, the 
Project Team failed to connect pieces of the puzzle, heed contrary opinions or evidence, or 
portray them to their audiences. My role as researcher contributed by pointing out where 
opinions, evidence or puzzle pieces had been forgotten and supporting the Project Team to 
reintegrate them.  
Findings suggest that the governance approach was neither entirely ‘top down’ nor ‘bottom up’, 
but instead oscillated between instances of robust and democratic participatory collaboration 
governance and more adversarial dynamics of ‘rug-tugging’ during moments when the 
protectionist interests came to the fore, and premature closure. Rug tugging involves using 
strategy and/or position to keep the discussion topic or standard clause within the bounds that 
suit organisational-interest. Premature closure involves using strategy and/or position to coerce 
discussants or the issue itself into a point of closure involving agreement and/or decision, before 
all the information has been gathered, understood, or before participants are ready to agree. 
However, I also identified signs of countervailing power and efforts to resist premature closure. 
These are important preconditions for a more developed form of participatory governance called 
Empowered Participatory Governance to come about (see chapter 3).    
The pressure for expediency may come at the expense of legitimacy in multi-stakeholder 
processes (Cheyns, 2011). In this case, there was not always space provided to debate legitimate 
and fundamental questions such as what is fair, to search for common understandings of the 
problem or to self-reflexively explore the interests at stake. Not exploring certain topics or 
exposing underlying interests may have been a strategy to eliminate tension or because there 
might not have been a clear and consensual answer (Cheyns, 2011), but participatory 
deliberation and policy dialogue both point to the value of deliberation even if consensus cannot 
be reached. This chapter has illustrated both the opportunities and short comings of consensus 
processes when used within standard setting processes, supporting the view that consensus and 
other tools for participation must be understood within context and are neither automatically 
‘good’ nor ‘bad’ (Bühler, 2002). It is important to acknowledge the consequences of decisions 
on participatory tools and processes and to assess whether they correspond with the aims and 
intentions for using them (ibid) as I have done in this chapter and through my work to enhance 
reflection amongst the Project Team (chapter 8).  
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While it was mentioned in chapter 3 that excess conflict can be a barrier to legitimacy and 
creativity in governance, not recognising inherent conflicts can also be a barrier to productive 
deliberation (Focht and Lawler, 2000). By pinpointing where goals of parties were mutually 
incompatible, I have identified examples of what Deutsch (1973) calls ‘true conflict’. In 
hindsight, this helps to make sense of why adversarial dynamics of protectionism prevailed in 
certain discussions and crowded out creative option generation and opportunities to learn from 
each other.  
Overall, this chapter is to be read as an illustration of how challenging it is to undertake / engage 
in participatory governance in practice, to applaud the efforts made and recognise the instances 
when robust, democracy-enhancing forms of collaboration were achieved, and to lay the 
groundwork for identifying areas of improvement and opportunities for enhancing participatory 
collaborative outcomes when this governance form is intended. In chapter 8 I discuss the value 
of my efforts to support reflection on the governance process and outcomes, but also the limits 
in terms of timing and targeted audience. I develop recommendations for enhancing 
participatory collaborative outcomes in chapters 8 and 9. 
6.8.1. Summary of key messages and contributions 
 This chapter has provided a nuanced and empirically grounded understanding of 
standard setting processes as embedded in a political and economic context but 
governed and shaped actively by the people who take part in them. This has gone 
beyond rather generalised political economic conceptions of standards as neoliberal 
governance forms, to look at the structural and contextual specificities of this particular 
process and the socially embedded nature of governance practices and tools.  
 This has enabled a reality-testing of FTI’s participatory governance approach. In 
particular, it has generated a more dynamic view of governance forms and their 
appropriateness at different points in a process, and a more multi-faceted portrayal of 
power and attempts at countervailing power (and structural carbon market constraints 
that limited one particular attempt). This helps to move beyond the perception implicit 
in the FTI approach that power imbalances can be avoided. I have also pointed to the 
tensions associated with combining inputs from ‘expert’ non-members of the Fairtrade 
system, licensees from the previously separate Fairtrade and carbon systems, and people 
who could be associated with a ‘community of principals’ (Blowfield and Dolan, 2008). 
In exploring whether all stakeholders were able to contribute to design and outcome, I 
have explored who had a voice, who had a vote, and whose views were represented in 
the final FCS. Opportunities and capacities to contribute were not equal, but it is also 
important to ask whether each contributing individual was considered as equal by the 
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Project Team. Findings suggest that this is not the case, but this needs further 
exploration. 
 Evidence from this particular process has contributed in particular to a better 
understanding of conflict and tension, a theme introduced in chapter 3. In contrast to 
authors who posit that standard setting processes neutralise conflict, and also authors 
who speak only positively of the potential of deliberation to enable learning and mutual 
understanding, I found that the FCSSP was a negotiated and contested process, 
characterised by hot debate but also unacknowledged conflicts. Contributing to 
knowledge gaps outlined by Djama et al (2011), I have shown how conflicting ideas co-
existed by demonstrating the adversarial process of rug-tugging where interests were 
shared but mutually incompatible in practice; and by illustrating where interests were 
shared on the surface but subject to underlying differences of opinion when 
operationalised. Both findings point to the potential of using conflict resolution tools to 
facilitate people’s discovery of both differences and commonalities. Allowing ourselves 
and others their opinions and confronting differences through debate is an important 
part of participation with justice and dignity (Bühler, 2002), while too much focus on 
differences over commonalities can be unhelpful (Fung and Wright, 2003). I have also 
shown how conflictual views were not always transformed into cooperative attitudes, 
illustrated most clearly by the difference of opinion on agriculture and adaptation. This 
does not necessarily violate procedure, as consensus does not require that everybody 
agrees, but it does require that all concerns are taken into account. I return to the 
questions of whether or not this is ‘fair’ in chapter 9. 
 My engagement with the FCSSP has enabled a depth of empirical evidence, a grounded 
and contextualised understanding and offered opportunities to flag up less democratic or 
inclusive governance practices and intervene directly. Recognising that it is essential to 
take responsibility for one’s actions and their consequences, I argue that this level of 
engagement has been a virtue rather than a danger particularly because of the way it 
contributes towards a more reflective standard setting process. This is discussed in 
chapter 8. 
 Exploring the establishment of auditing criteria for the FCS was beyond the scope of 
this research. This is an important remaining knowledge gap particularly, as standards’ 
‘“teeth” and hence their ultimate authority lie in [the] auditing process’ (Blowfield and 
Dolan, 2008 p12). The auditing criteria for the FCS were developed without stakeholder 
input and for this reason, deserve even more scrutiny. 
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Chapter 7 An exploration of evidence, assumptions and logic 
underpinning the FCS using the Theory of Change approach 
7.1. Introduction to chapter seven 
 ‘The nature of Fairtrade strategies and activities evolve over time in line with 
experiences and a changing environment. However, the fundamental vision, 
purpose and principles of Fairtrade remain constant, as does the basic approach’ 
(Fairtrade International, 2013: Theory of Change p3). 
Building on the previous two empirical chapters, this chapter returns to objective 1, addressing 
two further questions. These are (1.3) Which assumptions and evidence is the Theory of Change 
for the Fairtrade Climate Standard based on? and (1.4) What can example carbon programmes 
tell us about possible pathways to the outcomes and impacts articulated in the Theory of 
Change as the Fairtrade Climate Standard is applied? Addressing these questions involves 
drawing on pathways components 2 and 3 (see sections 1.3.1 and 1.4.1.2). The Theory of 
Change is a concrete illustration of the way the FCS and its change process is being framed 
(component 2). Identification of the implications on poorer and marginalised people 
(component 3) is limited to my analysis of two example carbon projects. 
The overarching aim in this chapter is to explore the applicability of core Fairtrade tenets as 
they are transferred from agricultural commodity contexts, to the novel area of Fairtrade Carbon 
Credits. Section 2.2.3 outlined the ways that the fair trade concept is already being extended and 
stretched (through mainstreaming, non-FTI fair trade labels and application to new 
commodities) and the challenges and opportunities this creates. This chapter contributes to this 
knowledge area with respect to carbon, paying attention to its materiality and the implications 
this has on knowledge, roles and relationships (building on literature from section 2.2). It also 
introduces a place-based understanding of carbon and carbon certification rooted in projects in 
Kenya. This builds on contributions by Blowfield and Dolan (2010) and Getz and Shreck 
(2006), that have critically explored the gaps between the ethical intentions and expectations 
raised by labels and certification, and the experiences of intended beneficiaries. 
Section 1.4.1.1 introduced the empirical analysis approach to exploring fairness in this thesis, 
and this chapter is constructed using both lines of enquiry. While chapter 5 looked at multiple 
notions of what fairness would mean in the context of Fairtrade carbon projects, this chapter 
explores multiple notions of the change process that Fairtrade carbon projects are expected to 
encapsulate. I identify which ones dominate within the FCS and how perspectives differed on 
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them during its construction, and test their operationalisation and appropriateness in different 
contexts. This helps to illuminate tensions at different scales, the interplay between notions, 
context and practice and the effect on outcomes (Sikor et al., 2014).  
FTI’s approach to fairness in trade has been set out in its Theory of Change (Fairtrade 
International 2013). This was adapted34 and incorporated into the FCS, following requests in the 
first FCS consultation in 2014. The Theory of Change is a methodology used extensively in 
designing and evaluating projects or interventions. Having a Theory of Change is recommended 
by the ISEAL Alliance in its Impact Assessment Guidelines (ISEAL Alliance, 2014a) because it 
helps in postulating how an intervention can lead to which kinds of change, for whom, and 
involving which actors. Evaluation approaches that focus on profit and yields struggle to make 
such attribution linkages between interventions and ultimate impact (Ton et al., 2014). While 
Theories of Change cannot produce improvements by themselves, they do provide opportunities 
to visualise and render transparent the assumptions, objectives and mechanisms within 
standards (Nelson and Martin, 2011).  
The innovative aspects within the FCS and the commodity specificity of carbon credits mean 
that possible impact pathways of Fairtrade interventions might be quite different in the context 
of the FCS compared to other Fairtrade commodities. Critical reflection should be a part of the 
process of developing a Theory of Change but this opportunity was largely missed by FTI 
during the FCSSP because it was not discussed with stakeholders apart from asking for 
comments during the 2
nd
 FCS consultation. In this chapter I bridge this reflection gap by 
critically assessing the FCS Theory of Change and unpicking the logic, evidence and 
assumptions behind it. This is useful for identifying key areas to monitor and learn from as the 
FCS and its Theory of Change is applied, reviewed and revised, and therefore contributes 
towards enhancing its robustness. Specifically, I tease out one particular impact pathway within 
the FCS Theory of Change that relies heavily on the roles that project actors take up and the 
ways they organise (Hot Topic 3), and the process of transferring knowledge and capacities 
(Hot Topic 4), both introduced in Figure 6-1. Given the contentiousness of these topics, it is 
reasonable to assume that formulations in the projects and programmes that implement the FCS 
may diverge considerably. I use evidence drawn from primary data from two carbon 
programmes in Kenya, data from participant observation and Q interviews during the FCSSP, 
and literature on producer organisations and carbon projects to critically assess this impact 
pathway, examine to what extent it holds up in particular contexts and expand knowledge of the 
                                                     
34 This involved minor modifications to take into account the different language of carbon credits and 
specific roles within the FCS. 
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range of options that could potentially be relevant for FTI to encompass in the FCS 
requirements when they are revised. 
This chapter continues with a brief overview of the Theory of Change approach followed by an 
analysis of the FCS Theory of Change including identification of seven underlying assumptions. 
The chapter then unpacks the first three assumptions and examines the various sources of 
evidence supporting or corroborating them (from the FCSSP and research with the two carbon 
programmes). These assumptions and evidence are used to shed light on Hot Topic 3, Project 
Actors and Roles. The concepts of Producer, Producer Organisation and Project Facilitator are 
each dealt with separately. The second half of the chapter explores the remaining four 
assumptions alongside (i) the mechanisms detailed in the FCS for achieving and measuring 
hand over from the Project Facilitator to the Producer Organisation; and (ii) evidence from 
TIST-Kenya. This discussion provides more understanding of Hot Topic 4, Transfer of 
Knowledge and Capacities.  
7.2. Construction and critical assessment of Theories of Change 
7.2.1. Evidence and assumptions in Theories of Change 
Theories of Change must be substantiated by evidence and include a variety of perspectives 
(ISEAL Alliance, 2014a). In discussions convened to articulate them, it is important to allow 
space for critical thinking, and to triangulate understanding with reference to different people’s 
contextual knowledge, other analytical perspectives, realistic timeframes and trajectories of 
change given the context, learning, and evidence from multiple sources (Vogel, 2012). The role 
of evidence is ‘to check and challenge assumptions, broaden the range of strategic options 
potentially relevant to the context, and strengthen the quality of hypotheses to provide a 
confident basis for action’ (Vogel, 2012 p33), but the mix of evidence bases may not align, and 
the influence of each is often difficult to discern (Mason and Barnes, 2007). The construction of 
a Theory of Change is an active, intentional and sometimes politically-charged process shaped 
by different biases depending on who produces them and the resources they draw on in the 
construction process (Mason and Barnes, 2007, Connell and Kubisch, 1998). The Project Team 
was exposed to a range of perspectives during the FCSSP but given that the FCS was a new 
initiative involving a non-tangible commodity produced in a wide variety of set-ups, the best 
available evidence came either from existing Fairtrade product supply chains not easily 
comparable with carbon credits, or from the carbon stakeholders’ experiences and assumptions 
about what would work. There were few existing examples of the types of project FTI wanted to 
certify and the projects to pilot the FCS were only selected in the final phase of the FCSSP.  
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It is crucial to make different assumptions explicit when developing a standard or an 
intervention as these are often at the root of debates about strategic choices and decisions and 
can create tensions and power struggles (Eyben et al., 2008). Assumptions about the Fairtrade 
approach (including what it involves, and how it should be incorporated into the FCS) also 
played a key role in shaping the FCS and its Theory of Change. The key elements applied to the 
FCS were the Fairtrade Minimum Price and Premiums; and concept of Producers, Producer 
Organisations and additional actors. Whilst there was substantial pressure to include them, these 
are contested within the Fairtrade movement (see chapter 5).  
7.2.2. Learning opportunities in Theory of Change work 
Despite pressures to produce a Theory of Change at the beginning of a programme, what is 
intended to happen cannot be fully predicted because of the non-linear nature of programme 
developments, context of application and range of possible outcomes interventions (Mason and 
Barnes, 2007). The Theory of Change approach can be considered as a learning tool for 
reflecting on what an intervention aims to achieve, to explore the evidence for this, and to 
incrementally develop and adapt more robust Theory of Changes and Standards (Nelson and 
Martin, 2011). FTI welcomes research that contributes to their Theories of Change (Fairtrade 
International, 2015a, Fairtrade International: MEL Unit, 2015) and the Theory of Change 
approach is well suited to understanding complex interventions, led by organisations such as 
FTI who are not directly responsible for carrying out the change-inducing actions but are 
experienced and open to learning (James, 2011).  
7.3. Methodological approach: a meta-analysis of the Theory of 
Change-construction process 
7.3.1. Application of the Theory of Change approach to the FCSSP 
Appendix 2 lists data sources used in this chapter and section 4.4.5.4 provides an overview of 
the analytical approach, which was based on logic models. The development of the FCS and its 
Theory of Change involved drawing on three principal elements: people’s mental models, 
experienced based knowledge and project based examples. My methodological tools of 
observation, document analysis and interviews within the FCSSP and carbon programmes 
served as a secondary layer of triangulation between these three elements, resulting in increased 
opportunities for reflection and learning and additional sources of evidence. Overall this enabled 
critical assessment of the context for FTI’s intervention, what change was envisaged and why, 
who it would involve, how it would happen, within which timeframe and which evidence there 
is to support or contradict these assumptions.  
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Specifically, holistic analysis of the FCSSP enabled me to observe the elements going into the 
FCS alongside the Theory of Change and to tease out some of the underlying assumptions that 
were contributing to the choice of particular pathways and sets of interventions and envisaged 
outputs, outcomes and impacts. Fieldwork in Kenya provided an opportunity to conduct an 
analysis of two carbon programmes and identify areas of overlap with the FCS (in approach, 
design, and outcomes) but also some fundamental mismatches. This pointed to the challenges of 
producing a standard broadly applicable amongst a diversity of project designs, organisational 
set-ups and contextual specificities and the need to undergo a critical reflection as to which 
elements of the Fairtrade approach are still applicable in the context of carbon credits.  
7.3.2. Core aspects in the FCS Theory of Change 
Core aspects of the Theory of Change methodology have been summarised by Vogel (2012 p4). 
Table 7-1 presents these in relation to the FCS Theory of Change. 
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Table 7-1: Assessment of core Theory of Change aspects in the FCS Theory of Change 
Context for the initiative 
FCS was developed in the context of the Fairtrade Climate Strategy, which underscores 
the need to support producers with adaptation and mitigation (Fairtrade International, 
2015c: p3).  
Rationales are given in the 1st FCS consultation document in terms of enabling those 
who have contributed less to climate change but are most exposed to its impacts to 
benefit from carbon finance; and in terms of applying Fairtrade’s unique approach to 
carbon, particularly regarding producer community involvement and right to financially 
benefit from carbon credit sales (Fairtrade International, 2014 pp2-4). 
Long-term outcome that the initiative seeks to support and for whose ultimate benefit 
The joint ambition shared by FTI and GSF is ‘to create an enabling, fair and 
empowering carbon market’, ensuring that producers and rural communities benefit 
from mitigation and adaptation activities, and play an increasingly active role whilst 
receiving technical support (Fairtrade International, 2015c p3). 
Process/sequence of change anticipated to lead to the desired long-term outcome 
The links between interventions, outputs, outcomes and impacts envisaged in the FCS 
Theory of Change are very rudimentary- they are laid out in blocks but there are no 
arrows tracing out pathways between them (Figure 7-1). More understanding and 
hindsight is needed in order to begin to articulate the pathways through it, and to make 
sense of the contextual factors unique to each carbon project which will shape them.  
Assumptions about how change(s) might happen 
Several aspects in the FCS Theory of Change relate directly to Producers and their 
Organisations but Project Facilitators are also seen as playing a pivotal role in the 
achievement of desired outcomes (Fairtrade International, 2015c). Box 7-1 shows my 
analysis of key assumptions apparent in the FCS Theory of Change, numbered on 
Figure 7-1. 
Diagram and narrative summary 
See Figure 7-1. In the published FCS, there was no narrative summary but reference is 
made to the FTI website where more information is given on the Fairtrade general 
Theory of Change. 
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Assumption 1: Carbon project participants are ‘producers’ and self-identify as such 
Assumption 2: ‘Producers’ are in organisations 
Assumption 3: People involved in delivering the project or supporting delivery are 
‘facilitators’ and self-identify as such 
Assumption 4: In addition to the support from the Fairtrade system, producers receive 
support from facilitators to build organisations and (via the project manager) to increase 
their knowledge and capacity in the implementation of carbon projects 
Assumption 5: Producer organisations acquire the knowledge and capacity to take on more 
tasks within the project (at least monitoring tasks) and this leads to them exerting a greater 
control over it and receiving a larger proportion of the project revenue. These aspects are 
enjoyed not only by those that do the tasks, but by the organisation and community as a 
whole. 
Assumption 6: Efforts to build capacity extends (beyond the project manager) to the whole 
organisation 
Assumption 7: Taking on more tasks within carbon projects contributes to producers 
gaining influence and status within the carbon sector. This impact is felt at an individual 
level (as well as within organisations and communities).  
 
 
 
Box 7-1 Analysis of the assumptions embedded in the FCS Theory of Change 
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Figure 7-1: FCS Theory of Change annotated with embedded assumptions and aspects 
explored in this chapter outlined.  
N.B. The ‘pathway’ between the outlined aspects under analytical focus has deliberately not been drawn 
out because I would like to emphasise that without further articulation of the sequence of change, they 
are more like stepping stones, requiring leaps of uncertainty between them. The impact pathway I explore 
involves a vertical progression from the bottom towards the top of the figure, passing by each of the 
outlined aspects.  
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7.4. Results part 1: Analysis of assumptions about Hot Topic 3 
(Project Actors and Roles)  
7.4.1. Assumption 1: Carbon project participants are ‘producers’ and self-
identify as such 
The FCS is aimed at the same marginalised small-scale producers who were historically 
targeted by Fairtrade until agricultural workers begun to share the stage more recently (Reed, 
2009). However the FCS defines them on the basis of the amount of carbon credits generated 
rather than by the amount of land, time spent on and income derived from the farm (as in the 
Standard for Small Producer Organisations)35. The new definition is necessary as agricultural 
projects are not within the FCS scope, and because carbon project participants are unlikely to 
spend the majority of their time or derive a substantial part of their incomes from generating 
carbon credits. The FCS acknowledges that small-scale producers can be households, 
smallholders, micro-enterprises etc. (Fairtrade International, 2015c). In doing so, it allows for 
flexibility in the application of the term ‘producer’ but also ambiguity- it can apply to both the 
households using an energy-efficient appliance (who in the carbon context would be referred to 
as ‘users’ or ‘stakeholders’) or the smallholder planting trees on-farm, but also potentially to the 
enterprise producing energy-efficient cook stoves or fitting and maintaining biogas digesters.  
7.4.1.1. Mixed evidence from people participating in the FCSSP 
Hot Topic 3 was characterised by divergent assumptions about whether or not carbon project 
participants are ‘producers’ particularly between stakeholders from within the Fairtrade system 
and stakeholders familiar with the carbon market (see Table 7-2). 
. 
  
                                                     
35 Defining small producers on the basis of the amount of work done by family or co-operative members 
or neighbours is common to both the FCS and the Standard for Small Producer Organisations. 
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Table 7-2: Extracts of FCSSP discussions illustrating assumptions about 'producers'  
Carbon stakeholders Fairtrade stakeholders 
1. ‘one thing that really jars, is the 
constant use of the word “producer”. 
Some of us are using these cash crop 
groups because they’re useful, but many 
of the people we work with are not 
clustered according to what they 
“produce” so we consider them more as 
“users”… people are not going to 
immediately see that they are “small 
producers” and we’ve had to unpack that’ 
(T.PFS.B.d, p1) 
4. ‘Sometimes the words used are not 
neutral. When we use the term producer, 
it’s with a purpose- we’re thinking about 
clustering of producers [i.e. into 
organisations] and we’re forcing a bit the 
concept, because we want to emphasise the 
idea that we’re trying to create a model 
that is empowering, so they can call 
themselves producers of a commodity 
going to market’ (T.PFS.B.d, p2) 
2. ‘So in a cookstove project, the user 
becomes the producer…In a borehole 
project, the “producer” is the person 
drinking the water, because by using the 
borehole they are no longer boiling the 
water- [this is what] creates the carbon 
credit?’ (T.PFS.B.b, p6) 
5. ‘FLO-ev is an international association 
of Fairtrade producers. As a producer you 
join a national platform, and can speak at 
the national and international level. 
FLOev is a democratic organisation. 
That’s why we talk about producers, and 
organised producers…that’s why some of 
us are very reluctant to erase the word 
producer. It’s part of our governance, our 
raison d’être. You have to understand us, 
how we work, how we are structured, and 
why the word “producer” rather than 
“user” is used’ (T.PFS.B.d, p3) 
3. ‘For me, the producer is the one who 
makes a credit out of the wood savings’ 
(T.PFS.B.d, p2) 
6. ‘I support the term “producer” 
remaining in the standard, because what 
Fairtrade does, is it deals with producer 
organisations.’ (T.PFS.B.d, p3) 
Quotations 1-3 point out the contextual specificities for different types of carbon, and the 
different tasks involved in creating the carbon credit, suggesting that where the line is drawn 
depends on each project, and that ‘user’ and ‘producer’ are interchangeable but producer is 
inappropriate as an identity. While there is recognition from Fairtrade staff that the ‘producer’ 
concept is not totally appropriate (see quotation 4), quotations 4-6 illustrate the value-laden 
assumptions upon which the producer concept is based and therefore why it must remain. These 
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include membership in a system and ideas about how change happens through producer 
organisations.  
7.4.1.2. Contextualising the ‘producer’ debate: evidence from carbon 
programmes 
The impact of the Fairtrade approach is dependent on the characteristics of each Fairtrade 
commodity and how it is traded as well as the socio- economic context (Nelson and Martin, 
2012, McEwan et al., 2014). Like other commodity chains, ‘production’ of a carbon credit 
involves several layers starting with activities to create the emissions reductions, through to 
activities that successfully transform these reductions into fungible carbon credits. Activities 
vary in tangibility, requiring different tools and knowledge bases, and considerable resources, 
often necessitating an ongoing role for different actors (Gupta et al., 2012) such as external 
scientists, consultants and investors. On the basis of their commodity characteristics, carbon 
credits can be differentiated from other commodities in that it is harder to ascertain ‘when’ the 
production happens, and therefore ‘who’ is the producer in different carbon resource contexts.  
Figure 7-2 illustrates the layers of production (including actors and tasks) involved in the two 
example programmes as of 2014 when data was collected. The TIST programme shows that it is 
possible for ‘small producers’ in the original Fairtrade sense (i.e. small farmers) to be involved 
in the majority of the layers of production, supported by a permanent role for the U.S. partner in 
layers 5-7. Layers 3 and 4 are managed by trained contractors who are also member farmers. 
Meanwhile, in KENDBIP, the producers of the emissions reductions (layers 1 and 2) are 
decoupled from the rest of the chain (by nature of them being ‘users’ of the digesters or ‘clients’ 
of the entrepreneurs who install them). This is in preparation for the eventual withdrawal of 
both the Dutch and Kenyan partners, the entrepreneurs are expected to incrementally perform a 
more active role in ensuring the production of carbon credits, by taking on some monitoring 
tasks previously performed by the national implementing partner (level 4).  
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Figure 7-2: illustration of how carbon credits are produced and who is involved in 
production in example carbon programmes 
 
7.4.1.3. Self-identification as a producer? 
FTI is triggering a shift in language in the carbon market by naming those who produce the 
emissions reductions as producers but this reframing is still quite theoretical. This could either 
help increase the dignity and confidence of these ‘producers’ or it could create confusion, 
especially when the ‘producers’ do not self-identify as such (see quotation 1 in Table 7-2) or 
when programme managers choose not to disclose technical details about carbon credit 
production to programme participants. In the TIST programme, farmers are taught that they are 
in the carbon business and some farmers articulate quite clearly what this means but there is still 
ambiguity about how much carbon they are producing because the actual quantities of carbon 
stored by different trees in different environments within the programme region are still being 
studied by US staff. With tangible commodities delivered by weight and distinguished by 
visible quality criteria, there is less ambiguity. In KENDBIP, I met farmers who knew about 
carbon credits through being members of TIST, but had not been told that their digesters would 
be generating carbon credits. 
Differences between the two programmes also relate to the materiality of the carbon resource 
and the work required to ensure its permanence in each case. The TIST example involves an 
ongoing relationship between farmers and the other layers of production because maintaining or 
increasing their tree stock necessitates ongoing training, monitoring and payment of regular 
financial incentives, all of which are facilitated by aggregation of farmers into groups. In the 
KENDBIP example, the relationship between the users and the other layers of production is 
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most significant when the digester is being built, after which (if properly installed and 
appropriately used) it is assumed to function for 10-20 years. The presence and functioning of 
the digester is the main proxy for calculating emissions reductions36. The user does not need to 
be continually engaged in follow-up activities in the same way as tree-planters - an occasional 
call suffices. Meanwhile, entrepreneurs, whose livelihoods depend on continuous installation of 
new digesters, have a reason to be continually engaged in production activities. The next section 
discusses implications of different carbon resources on the level at which any types of 
‘organisation’ are formed.  
7.4.2. Assumption 2: ‘Producers’ are in organisations 
The FCS introduces an innovative concept of the Producer Organisation to the carbon market, 
understood as the organisation producing the carbon credits. Formation and building up of 
Producer Organisations has been at the heart of the Fairtrade approach since the 1980s (Smith 
and VanderHoff Boersma, 2013). Small Producer Organisations continue to be the main form of 
organisation for small-scale Fairtrade producers (although other forms of organisation are 
controversially gaining ground within the Fairtrade movement37). The Producer Organisation 
was described in the FCS consultation draft as an attempt to ‘bring increased socio-economic 
and community empowerment elements in the carbon world, and put producers at the heart of 
the decision-making for their project, lives and communities’ (Fairtrade International, 2014 
footnote 3, p15). Despite objections to the organisational structuring requirements38 and the 
resulting decision to relax the requirements for some types of projects, FTI persisted with the 
Producer Organisation concept, explaining that ‘one of the core benefits of the FCS should be 
that producers join or form producer organisations to achieve economies of scale, be better 
positioned to negotiate prices and progressively take on carbon trading tasks or carbon project 
management responsibly’ (Fairtrade International, 2015b p5). The FCS states that mandating 
that individual producers are part of an organisation is a way to ensure that project benefits 
reach them (Fairtrade International, 2015c p20).  
                                                     
36 This is on the basis of calculations about how much biomass fuel is saved by using the biogas as a 
replacement fuel. Nevertheless, these calculations may involve assumptions that the farmer will no longer 
use biomass fuel for cooking needs, which may not be the case.  
37 Such as Hired Labour set-ups and Joint Bodies within the Hired Labour Standard, Producer 
Organisations and Promoting Bodies within the Contract Production Standard and looser forms of 
organisation accepted under Fairtrade USA’s requirements. 
38 The consultation synopsis states that the majority of participants of the first consultation disagreed on 
the basis that that they were too demanding in the context of carbon projects, and that small producers of 
Fair Carbon Credits did not necessarily have the ambition to join or form strong organisations, especially 
in the context of domestic energy projects involving usage of cook stoves or water filters. 
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7.4.2.1. Academic research evidence on Fairtrade Producer Organisations 
and farmers organisations 
The emphasis on the Producer Organisation resonates with other commodities, where there is an 
implicit assumption that improvements to the quality of individual producers’ lives happens via 
producer organisations (Ronchi, 2002) and that producer organisations are willing to channel 
benefits to members and the wider community (Phillips, 2014, Blowfield and Dolan, 2010). 
However, there is insufficient empirical evidence both within literature on Fairtrade producer 
organisations and also farmer organisations more generally, as to the organisational structures 
and mechanisms via which such improvements happen (Ruben et al., 2009, Hannan, 2014, 
Fairtrade International, 2015a), how this varies across geographical specificities (Nelson and 
Pound, 2010), different commodities and different forms of farmer organisation and to what 
extent improvements noted are predetermined by pre-existing conditions (Tallontire et al., 
2012). Given that the FCS introduces a new degree of flexibility around organisational forms 
(both in terms of what they might look like when projects are first certified, and in terms of how 
they evolve over time- see below), there is even greater need to understand organisational 
development processes and internal/ external factors within the context of carbon projects.  
7.4.2.2. Mixed evidence from Q interviews: 
‘I think the principle of organised communities in terms of carbon credits doesn't 
necessarily work in the same way as when you're speaking about co-operatives of 
agricultural producers- that concept doesn't translate’ (carbon project technician, 
Q interview, August 2014). 
The Producer Organisation concept was called into question during Q interviews, FCSSP 
workshops as well as in the consultation, but it is central to the Fairtrade approach (see 
quotations 4, 5 and 6 in Table 7-2). My Q study created space to explore the narratives and 
counter-narratives in more detail. Figure 7-3 presents a range of opinions on ‘organisation’ 
which were voiced during Q interviews with Fairtrade and carbon market stakeholders. The 
matrix is based on a compilation of opinions voiced by 15 people- 8 from within Fairtrade and 7 
from the carbon sector in reaction to 5 statements in a Q sort interview that related to 
organisation of communities and/or producers. 
  
2
1
9
 
 
Figure 7-3: views on organisation elicited during Q sort interviews 
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Figure 7-3 shows the following aspects 
 The horizontal string of opinions across the middle of the matrix are non-committal 
about whether organisation is essential from the outset or not, but can be differentiated 
in terms of moral arguments for enabling non- or less organised communities to enter 
the Fairtrade system, and pragmatic arguments which acknowledge the limits to 
organisational requirements in particular contexts.  
 The majority of opinions stated by stakeholders from within Fairtrade agree that 
organisation is important, even if it is not always feasible from the outset, but some 
question what is meant by ‘organisation’. This reflects broader discussions within the 
Fairtrade movement. One of the reasons for Fairtrade USA’s split from FTI was 
because the Latin American Producer Network did not agree with their proposal to open 
up the system to include unorganised producers (Bennett, 2012).    
 Few stakeholders from the carbon market are positive about organisation and several of 
them point out negative aspects of organisation.  
7.4.2.3. Contextualising the ‘organisation’ debate: evidence from two 
carbon programmes 
7.4.2.3.1 TIST: a movement composed of multiple representative nodes 
TIST-Kenya is sometimes described by its members as more of a movement, reflecting its 
dynamic and fast-expanding nature. It is not a formal organisation, but its form does allow for 
democratic, transparent decision making and elections, communication and feedback and record 
keeping about membership and participation required by the FCS. It is composed of multiple 
nodes of farmers aggregated at different levels, and a series of coordinating activities and 
feedback mechanisms between levels (Figure 7-4). Farmers meet regularly in small groups and 
during ‘Cluster’ meetings to share best practices and technical advice. Clusters assemble 
farmers living within walking distance while ensuring efficient service delivery and relay of 
information. Each Cluster is appointed a ‘servant39’, who is contracted to collect monitoring 
data, relay information, oversee financial transactions, deliver training and nurture the Cluster 
and its elected leaders40. Internal auditors visit the Clusters to monitor progress, identify training 
needs, problems or incomprehension, and arrange visits to individual farms to cross-check data 
                                                     
39 This name is based on the TIST principle of members being servants to one another. 
40 Clusters practice rotational leadership. They elect members to three consecutive leadership positions, 
each of which is normally occupied for 3 months before moving on to the next, and eventually standing 
down.  
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collected by Cluster Servants. Additional aggregation occurs at Group of Clusters Councils, and 
at the Leadership Council, where senior TIST members meet to manage field operations and 
take operational decisions.  
The eventual aim is that Clusters self-govern, self-report and manage their own payment 
distribution, in order to minimise related costs, bring services closer to the membership, and pay 
them bonuses for the additional tasks taken on. Since year 8 (2013), Clusters were encouraged 
to transform into legally recognised entities, such as Associations, Community Based 
Organisations (CBOs) or Savings and Credit Cooperative Societies (SACCOs) and open bank 
accounts. By year 9, most Clusters had begun this process of their own accord, but by 2016 
many had experienced difficulties with the registration process and were questioning the futility 
(personal communication with CAAC, June 2016). Participants of the Participatory Policy 
Analysis workshop considered that having a formal Producer Organisation could be important 
for protecting the producers against unscrupulous facilitators but in TIST’s case groups were not 
required to formally register when joining the programme because of the cost inhibition and 
because farmers needed time to know each other, receive training, get to know the carbon 
business they were engaging in, and develop managerial capacities (TIST.PPA). 
 
 
7.4.2.3.2 KENDBIP: attempts at top-down organisation-building 
In the KENDBIP programme, organisational development is a top-down strategy initiated by 
the Dutch and Kenyan partners and focussed at the level of the entrepreneurs. The programme 
funding was ending in 2016, and therefore was aiming ‘to devolve activities to the private sector 
in order to ensure durability, serving as a temporary interface... enabling [biogas entrepreneurs] 
to take additional steps in the value chain’ (KEND.Int1).  
Figure 7-4: Levels of aggregation within TIST-Kenya 
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They initiated the National Biogas Association and nine Regional Biogas Associations during 
2013 (year 5 of the programme) as a step towards devolvement. Visions for these associations 
included building their capacities to conduct their own marketing; raise their own funds to 
support digester installation costs; self-regulate quality management within the sector; collect 
their own monitoring data; deal with the external carbon auditors (validators and verifiers) and 
eventually put their own credits on the market, aggregating them at the national level. Other 
functions performed by the Dutch and Kenyan partners would potentially be transferred to the 
Dutch organisation coordinating the carbon Programme of Activities they were expecting 
KENDBIP to join. 
However, by mid-2014 the National Biogas Association was just a framework, and the vision 
had not been ‘internalised’ by the biogas entrepreneurs (KEND.Int1). Members of one of the 
regional associations were struggling to formally register their association because of a shortage 
of people willing to pay membership fees and attend meetings. One of them commented ‘I 
haven’t seen any benefits by now, but we were told it is better to form an association’ 
(KEND.Int3). Relating to this struggle, one of the programme management staff noted that ‘the 
association still needs to be made relevant for them. Coming to a meeting is perhaps not a 
priority- they want to construct biogas and make money’ (KEND.Int1). Notably, the 
organisation envisaged by the Dutch and Kenyan partners is more of an industrial association of 
biogas entrepreneurs, composed of independent owner operators. There may be fewer benefits 
and higher costs related to collective action or participation in an organisation compared to the 
typical Fairtrade Producer Organisation. In the case of the former, associating is promoted as a 
strategy for enhancing reputation, but there is also a risk that this could weaken individual 
entrepreneurs’ business strengths (for example personal reputations, relationships with clients) 
or allow weaker entrepreneurs to free-ride. 
A National Biogas Users’ Association was also initiated by the programme, but this consisted of 
a number of geographically dispersed enthusiastic biogas users and the association’s field 
presence was minimal because the numbers of users were still few within any one local 
population (KEND.Int1). KENDBIP programme staff commented that groups at the user level 
do indeed serve many purposes and make life easier for most service providers (trainers, credit 
providers and biogas technicians). They can also serve as platforms for conducting monitoring 
and evaluation, for example because farmers compare notes on the performance of their 
digesters. However, farmers often take part in multiple groups already, and these groups can be 
used as platforms rather than attempting to unite people in one locality purely on the basis of 
them being digester-users.  
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7.4.3. Assumption 3: People involved in delivering the project or supporting 
delivery are ‘facilitators’ and self-identify as such 
The FCS and its Theory of Change recognise that Producer Organisations might not be able to 
manage all the tasks related to the project and certification by themselves, at least initially. 
Producer Organisations can therefore receive assistance from an external actor called the Project 
Facilitator who supports the Producer Organisation (via a Project Manager appointed by the 
Producer Organisation) to gradually take more ownership. This actor is a transformation of the 
role of a project proponent, project owner or project developer in carbon terms. The relationship 
between the Producer Organisation and the Project Facilitator was initially considered 
temporary (RRf.1), but concerns expressed during the second consultation by certain 
stakeholders who would take on the role of Project Facilitator, that they were being ‘withdrawn’ 
from the project (Fairtrade International, 2015b) led to a new guidance note in the final FCS 
indicating that the transfer of capacities does not mean the Project Facilitator ‘will fully 
disengage from the process over time, but that her/ his role should decrease over time, while the 
Project Manager continuously develops his/her capacities and skills’ (Fairtrade International, 
2015c p22, guidance note for 2.2.1). In practice, the Producer Organisation may grant the 
Project Facilitator substantial discretionary powers. For example, the Project Facilitator can be 
the certificate holder, open the project bank account, manage the project and certification, 
manage funds on behalf of the Producer Organisation (including receiving the Fairtrade 
Minimum Price and deducting their own costs, receiving the Premium and transferring it to the 
Producer Organisation) and manage trading of carbon credits. The FCS mandates a contractual 
agreement between the Producer Organisation and the Project Facilitator to formalise and render 
transparent their relationship. 
7.4.3.1. Mixed evidence from people taking part in the FCSSP 
When a group of carbon and Fairtrade stakeholders were asked by the Project Team, ‘So do we 
all agree that the Producer Organisation should have an increasing role, and the Project 
Facilitator a decreasing role over time?’, several responded ‘No!’ (T.PFS.B.b, p8). I interpreted 
this reluctance as motivated by self-interest and a desire to maintain a function for oneself, as 
well by the view that the work and existence of the Project Facilitator remains necessary for the 
success of the project (Box 7-2): 
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Discussions at the workshops with carbon market stakeholders and project implementers were 
often dominated by those who had limited or no experience of projects where participants really 
were playing a leading role in delivering the project or were even substantially organised, but 
there were occasional examples of where this does take place (see Box 7-3, from T.GE.09.14, 
p19). Similarly, a Latin American producer representative advocated against the role of an 
external facilitator and expected the support required to come from FTI. He said that if Producer 
Organisations have to hire an external facilitator they will not accept carbon projects under this 
condition (T.PFS.B.b, p9). 
 
Box 7-3: Dialogue from a subgroup discussion 
This dialogue was about whether the community organisation really needed to be the formal 
owner of the carbon credits, registered under their name in a carbon account. On the left are 
comments from a carbon project consultant working with Fairtrade producer organisations. 
On the right are comments from others in the subgroup (text in bold is my own emphasis):  
But the community organisation is supposed to do the project 
This will be complicated. It may be [done] on behalf of them 
In our case, the cooperative is the owner of the carbon account. We’re just supporting them 
to own and manage 
This might be a rare case 
But isn’t the idea that the community contracts the carbon facilitator. So the community is 
really taking decisions and everything is supported by the facilitator? 
That’s the ideal scenario. My opinion is that your set-up is the minority 
And you’re talking about situations where you have already organised groups  
 
‘the women using the stove…must have a feel of what is going on, but she won’t become a 
carbon expert… you will never get the [coordinator/ organisation that registers the 
programme] withdrawing because we monitor (statistical work and all the complicated 
stuff), and we will always do that’ (T.PFS.B.b, p8). 
‘It’s unrealistic to withdraw the project facilitator at any time during the crediting period of 
the project activity… some of [the roles they offer] could be handed over, but in 99% of 
projects, people don’t even know what carbon is’ (T.PFS.B.b, p7). 
 Box 7-2: Quotations from participants of the Producer/ Field staff workshop in Bonn 
about roles of Project Facilitators and involvement of project participants 
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7.5. Discussion: Project Actors and Roles 
This part of the chapter has begun to address questions 1.3 and 1.4 of this thesis by unpacking 
the evidence and assumptions within the FCS Theory of Change that relate specifically to Hot 
Topic 3 (project actors and roles) and turning to two example carbon programmes for insight on 
possible pathways to outcomes and impacts envisaged by the Theory of Change. Thus far, the 
analysis has unpacked the first three assumptions. The next part of the chapter does the same for 
assumptions 4-7 and links them to Hot Topic 4. The Theory of Change and the envisaged 
impact pathway is firmly rooted in the concepts of Producer, Producer Organisation and Project 
Facilitator. However, evidence from example carbon programmes combined with views 
expressed by stakeholders involved in the FCSSP (some of whom are likely to be involved in 
implementing some of the first carbon projects to become Fairtrade certified) cast some doubt 
on the solidity of all three concepts and demonstrate how they are shaped by context and 
intentions.  
Sections 7.4.1 and 7.4.2 problematised the applicability of the label ‘Producer’ and the 
practicality of organisation at the base level of production in some contexts. The TIST-Kenya 
example illustrates the dynamic and long term nature of organisation-building and formalising, 
and the advantages and disadvantages of legal recognition of a Producer Organisation at the 
outset. KENDBIP shows that organisation is not intuitive at the lowest level of production, 
though it may serve the service provider. When initiated from top-down, it may not have 
genuine ownership by the people who have been ‘told’ to organise themselves. This point also 
problematises assumption 5 (see Box 7-1), explored later in the chapter. 
These findings have the following implications. Firstly, the purpose of the Producer 
Organisation cannot be assumed as this may vary across projects and carbon resources. The 
benefits of being in a Producer Organisation are apparent when it allows individual producers of 
small undifferentiated quantities of products to aggregate their production and bargain for more 
favourable collective sales. This could be translated to a group of people generating small 
amounts of emissions reductions which need to be aggregated to create saleable tonnes of 
carbon credits. However, building collective bargaining power first requires a strong sense of 
identity as a ‘producer of emissions reductions’, the challenges of which are outlined above. 
Where ‘producers’ are dispersed over a large geographical area, the monetary value of the 
emissions reductions that each one is delivering is relatively low and the carbon aspect which 
unites them does not constitute a major part of their livelihood, this collective identity may be 
even harder to develop unless people are already united for another purpose. This finding is 
supported by McEwan et al.’s (2014) research with a raisin-producing co-operative in South 
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Africa. They recognise that it has been difficult to establish an effective and representative 
Producer Organisation in a context where capacity and confidence of the membership is low, 
producers are geographically dispersed and community cohesion is problematic. As the 
Producer Organisation alone has been unable to foster community development along Fairtrade 
lines, they recommend building on pre-existing positive elements of community life such as 
friendship and support networks and churches as a means for improving lines of communication 
between members. Throughout this chapter, evidence from the TIST programme is used to 
illustrate the value of incrementally building up a strong producer base united by common 
principles as a result of ongoing learning and adjustment and the crucial work of lots of people 
who move between the layers. While organisation-building is often assumed to be a key strategy 
for value chain development (Albu and Griffith, 2005), it is important to accord programmes the 
space and time to define themselves the most appropriate kind of organisation and division of 
roles. This is supported by van Beuningen and Knorringa (2009) who note that a producer 
organisation’s structure may need to evolve as the group, its performance and level of trust 
develop or when problems arise. The FCS accords slightly more flexibility to Producer 
Organisations compared to the Standard for Small Producer Organisations but this may not be 
sufficient for an evolving organisation like TIST-Kenya and suggests the potential for 
exclusion. 
Secondly, Fairtrade imagines a role for the Producer Organisation as a pivot for empowering 
producer communities and for channelling benefits of Fairtrade to its members and the 
surrounding community. For example, the Producer Organisation is a forum for deciding 
democratically on how to spend the Fairtrade Premium, attached to sales of Fairtrade products. 
The KENDBIP example suggests that forming an organisation at the level of the service 
provider (the Biogas Association) rather than the level of the emissions-saver may prove more 
practical. In such cases, it is unclear where the focus of empowerment and spending of the 
premium should be targeted (e.g. with the entrepreneurs or with the users of the biogas 
digesters), who constitutes the surrounding community, and how empowerment or benefit-
sharing are expected to flow between actors if at all. The Premium is a key intervention in the 
FCS but is beyond this chapter’s scope. 
Section 7.4.3 has suggested that the imagined role of the Project Facilitator and his/ her 
relationship with the Producer Organisation is contingent on the Project Facilitator’s intentions, 
the degree of organisation of the Producers, and their actual or assumed capacity, all of which 
are likely to vary across contexts. This warrants closer examination, and is therefore explored in 
the next part of the chapter with respect to the TIST programme.   
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7.6. Results part 2: Exploration of Hot Topic 4 (Transfer of 
Knowledge and Capacities) 
This part of the chapter continues to use the Theory of Change approach to shed light on Hot 
Topic 4. I unravel further the envisaged impact pathway in the FCS Theory of Change through a 
more detailed examination of the five assumptions related to the transfer of knowledge and 
capacity from the Project Facilitator to the Producer Organisation, and its relationship to 
organisational strengthening and empowerment of individual members.   
Assumptions 4-7 from Box 7-1 are explored, some in more detail than others: 
 Assumption 4: Producer Organisations acquire the knowledge and capacity to take on 
more tasks within the project (at least monitoring tasks) and this leads to them exerting 
a greater control over it and receiving a larger proportion of the project revenue. 
 Assumption 5: The benefits of greater control and a larger proportion of the revenue, are 
enjoyed by not only those that do the tasks but by the organisation and community as a 
whole. 
 Assumption 6: Efforts to build capacity extend their impact (beyond the project 
manager) to the whole organisation. 
 Assumption 7: Taking on more tasks within carbon projects contributes to producers 
gaining influence and status within the carbon sector. This impact is felt at an individual 
level (as well as within organisations and communities).  
I also identify 9 mechanisms within the FCS which are intended to incentivise, ensure or 
measure this transfer (Table 7-3) and explore each one in relation to evidence from TIST-
Kenya. As an exemplary project, TIST-Kenya illuminates how some of the envisaged 
mechanisms have been successfully operationalised, but also which contextual factors shape 
them, and where alternative approaches have resulted in comparable outcomes. At the end of the 
section, I summarise some potential limits to the FCS mechanisms for transfer of knowledge 
and skills and signal areas for FTI’s attention as the FCS is rolled out.  
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Table 7-3: Mechanisms for transfer in the FCS (Fairtrade International, 2015c) 
A Committing intentions to transfer 
Contractual agreement (year 0) must include this as a clause.   
B Framing of the relationship between Project Facilitator and Producer 
Organisation 
Introduction to FCS: allows requirements to be ‘outsourced’ by the Producer 
Organisation to the Project Facilitator if the Producer Organisation is unable to 
carry them out. 
Contractual agreement (year 0) must include the clause that the Producer 
Organisation commissions the Project Facilitator to perform a support role, and is 
able to replace the Project Facilitator if they do not fulfil their function.  
C Planned transfer 
Contractual agreement (year 0) must specify how and when knowledge will be 
transferred for which activities. 
Core requirement (year 1): the Project Facilitator develops a plan for transfer with 
specific indicators 
D Transfer via the Project Manager, to the Producer Organisation 
Core requirement (year 3): the Producer Organisation designates Project 
Manager(s) who should be internal to the Producer Organisation, to take 
responsibility for project management and implementation. The Project Facilitator 
works closely with the Project Manager(s) 
E Mandatory taking over of responsibilities by the Producer Organisation  
Core requirement, which must start happening gradually as from year 3, applies at 
least to monitoring of carbon performance. 
F Time limit for transfer in certain project types 
Core requirement 2.2.12 (year 0): the contractual agreement cannot last more than 
1/5
th
 of the crediting period for Afforestation/ Reforestation projects (for example 
year 6 or 8), suggesting that the Project Facilitator should no longer be involved in 
management after this. 
G Increasing participation of Producer Organisation members in internal 
control of their organisation 
Development requirement (optional, year 3)  
H Clarity and transparency regarding ownership of assets, documents, 
investments, costs incurred, payment for services 
Contractual agreement (year 0) must specify these and they should be discussed in 
regular meetings between the Project Facilitator and the Producer Organisation. 
I Financial incentives for the Producer Organisation to take on more tasks  
(Contractual agreement and core requirement 5.5.3, both year 0): the FMP is shared  
between the Project Facilitator and Producer Organisation based on the costs of the 
tasks they each conduct  
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7.6.1. Roles, relationship and transfer between the Project Facilitator and 
the Producer Organisation: an in-depth look at the TIST programme 
The TIST-Kenya example offers particularly valuable lessons given their 10 years of experience 
and the programme’s relative success in achieving some of the outcomes which are at higher 
risk of non-delivery within the FCS or have been found to fall short within other Fairtrade 
certification contexts. While some of the programme features are based on parallel Standards 
frameworks (the Verified Carbon Standard and the Climate, Community and Biodiversity 
Standard), other features are the result of a careful and incremental crafting to fit the cultural, 
social, political and economic context; the evolving needs of the programme and TIST 
members; and underlying core values and principles.  
7.6.1.1. TIST Programme Structure, Design and Intentions to Transfer  
Table 7-4: Assumptions 4/5 and Mechanisms A-D 
 
Table 7-4 indicates the assumptions and mechanisms explored in this section. The TIST 
programme and evolving structure is not designed with the intention of complete handover to 
the Producer Organisation. Instead, the aim is to enable participation and maximise returns to 
farmers, through a strategy involving minimising management and operational costs. Five of the 
initial eight staff in the US supporting the programme have gradually devolved their duties to 
Kenyan staff, while Kenyan office staffing has reduced from an administrator and four staff, to 
two permanent staff. TIST members have worked hand-in -hand with the founder (hereafter 
referred to as Project Facilitator) from the outset to design and implement the programme, and 
have gradually increased their capacity to do so but this is a delicate and incremental process, 
and ten years after the programme was initiated, Clean Air Action Corporation and the office 
staff and Leadership Council continue to take management and operational decisions together, 
providing opportunities for other TIST members to contribute during seminars, Council and 
Assumptions Mechanisms 
4. Producer Organisations acquire the 
knowledge and capacity to take on more tasks 
within the project (at least monitoring tasks) 
and this leads to them exerting a greater 
control over it and receiving a larger 
proportion of the project revenue. 
5. The benefits of greater control and a larger 
proportion of the revenue, are enjoyed by not 
only those that do the tasks but by the 
organisation and community as a whole. 
A: Committing intentions to transfer 
B: Framing of the relationship between 
Project Facilitator and Producer 
Organisation 
C:  Planned transfer 
D: Transfer via the Project Manager, to 
the Producer Organisation 
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Cluster meetings. The Leadership Council now meets without the presence of the Project 
Facilitator but he is in regular contact with them and visits annually. His financial investments 
are still tied up in the project, and there is continued uncertainty about the amount of carbon 
stored, credits to be generated and associated risks; and he intervenes to ensure the programme’s 
commitments to its values, members and partners. As an example, the election of new members 
of the Leadership Council in June 2014 was the result of what the Project Facilitator called 
‘guided democracy’ whereby he intervened to ensure that the members proposing the criteria for 
the election process had properly examined their implications. Once inclusive criteria had been 
agreed, members were left to facilitate their own decision-making process.  
Members of the TIST Leadership Council endorsed the idea of a Producer Organisation and a 
Project Facilitator working hand-in-hand, with a gradual transfer of capacities from the latter to 
the former (policy appraisal workshop). However, they feared that a standard which was too 
prescriptive on the nature of the relationship between the two, or too stringent on the timelines 
for handover, might damage a project or create complications for both parties.  
‘When you come up with a standard, you always choke innovation, because people 
no longer think out of the box about the best way to go...so in the framing of the 
standard... it should be clear that it can accommodate innovations, and even 
support them. It should enable people to explain why they did things the way they 
did’ (TIST member, TIST.PPA). 
The contractual agreement in the FCS does leave room for discussion between actors in a 
particular project as to which activities they intend the Producer Organisation to take on and 
when. However, circumscribing them from the outset (in year 0 when the contractual agreement 
is signed) may choke flexibility and adaptation. The actors involved in implementing the TIST 
programme operate more like a football team, where the division of roles is clear-cut, and each 
player is recognised for his/her function and contribution. The farmers in defence save the 
emissions, the contractors help make the emissions reductions marketable, and the Project 
Facilitator on the attack scores goals for the whole team by selling credits on the market 
(analogy developed with TIST members). The Project Facilitator’s ultimate responsibility for 
certification, financial management and sales is seen as a (semi-) permanent arrangement, as he 
himself testified:  
‘I’m going to be doing this for the rest of my life’ (TIST.Int1) 
A TIST contractor pointed out that they needed someone playing the role of investor/ facilitator 
to offer money to pay for developing project documents, developing the methodologies, making 
pre-payments, paying for monitoring, validation and verification, and selling credits and that 
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this actor should be compensated. She noted that it is complex and takes time and resources to 
generate credits and sell them and only if the market was stable could they do more themselves. 
She and colleagues have tried to sell credits in Kenya but potential clients have struggled to 
understand the concept of carbon credits.   
7.6.1.2. Involving TIST members in monitoring  
Table 7-5: Assumption 5 and Mechanism E 
Table 7-5 indicates the assumptions and mechanisms explored in this section. TIST Kenya has 
worked hard to instil accuracy and develop monitoring (Figure 7-5) and has exceeded the 
requirements of the FCS by involving members in monitoring from the outset (rather than from 
year 3). The system has evolved in terms of human resources and technology. Figure 7-6 
indicates the system in 2014 (year 9). At this point the programme had been providing training 
and running trial exercises. These aimed at building the capacity of the Group of Cluster 
Councils to collect their own monitoring data on tree size, species, but the trials produced some 
inaccurate results (including lots of cases of exaggerated numbers of trees). This demonstrated 
that a premature handover is dangerous to the programme at large but a gradual transfer of 
responsibilities based on incremental building up of both human and technological capacity has 
worked well in TIST-Kenya’s case. This is facilitated by the extent of internet coverage in rural 
Kenya.  
 
 
Assumption Mechanisms 
5. The benefits of greater control and a larger 
proportion of the revenue, are enjoyed by not only 
those that do the tasks but by the organisation and 
community as a whole. 
E: Mandatory taking over of 
responsibilities by the Producer 
Organisation 
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 Figure 7-5 Accuracy: one of the TIST programme values 
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Figure 7-6: TIST-Kenya system for monitoring 
Step Actors 
Yearly quantification of trees in each grove41 
(parcel(s) of land assigned to tree planting by 
TIST member): 
Location of tree grove created in the database 
and GPS coordinates recorded 
Number of trees quantified by age and species, 
using local and scientific names 
Circumference readings taken for trees above 
breast height and used to calculate diameter; 
photos taken 
Data synchronised via palm computer- goes to 
database and online 
Cluster Servants in each local 
area 
 
Cluster Servant measuring tree 
diameter 
Desk audit, checking for errors in each grove 
against a baseline. Any errors queried by phone. 
If data is complete, the tree grove is next due for 
quantification a year later. 
TIST contractor responsible for 
Kenyan data management and 
audit coordination 
Preparation of monthly audit schedule (9 
auditors do audits during the first fortnight of 
every month) 
Random sampling of groves: 
GPS coordinates recorded 
Trees re-quantified to ensure validity of data 
Data synchronised 
TIST auditors, 
accompanied by 
the local Cluster 
Servant  
 
Data recorded in 
palm computer 
Database management and preparation for visits 
by verifiers 
Clean Air Action Corporation 
staff in US and Tanzania 
  
                                                     
41 In 2014 this was in the process of shifting to a three-yearly quantification as a cost-reduction strategy, 
based on observations that trees in TIST member’s small scale agroforestry systems were at low risk of 
being cut. 
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TIST Timelines for transfer  
Table 7-6: Assumption 5 and Mechanism F 
Table 7-6 indicates the assumptions and mechanisms explored in this section. Despite TIST-
Kenya’s progress in transferring knowledge and capacity to Producer Organisation members, as 
an afforestation/ reforestation project it would be at risk of decertification because the Project 
Facilitator continues to be involved beyond the timeframe of 6 years mandated in the FCS. 
Table 7-7 compares the FCS timeline with the actual accomplishment of tasks and evolution of 
roles within TIST-Kenya, assuming the programme was launched in year 0. While some aspects 
of the FCS timeline were effectively reached early (for example involvement of farmers in 
monitoring from the outset), other aspects have taken much longer (such as the formalisation of 
the clusters) or have not been achieved.  
TIST members noted the timeframe for achieving milestones, learning skills and taking on 
additional aspects of the management and implementation process relate closely to the nature of 
the carbon resource (TIST.PPA). Tree planting projects require a longer timeframe because it 
takes several years of tree growth before carbon can be reliably measured, whereas with biogas 
digesters, emissions savings can be calculated from the moment the digester is installed and 
operational. Different project types also require different frequencies of external auditing, so if 
the Producer Organisation is going to learn these skills, in a tree-planting project they may have 
to wait longer to witness the first audit and take on a more active role in the second one42.  
The key lesson from this section is that transfer of capacities and handover of tasks takes time, 
and is not necessarily in the interests of the people expected to take on the tasks, especially 
when the handover is premature. There is a danger that the FCS requirements could instigate 
premature handover by putting pressure on a programme to hand over tasks sooner than the 
realities on the ground allow.  Rigid prescriptions about how and when activities should be 
taken on by the Producer Organisation would run the risk of excluding programmes at the outset 
or delisting them during subsequent audits. Certification has already been criticised as being 
more about proving compliance rather than improving performance (Tallontire et al., 2012). FTI 
                                                     
42 However in the TIST case, because the programme in Kenya is registered as a number of different sub-
programmes, each with their own auditing cycle, there is a higher frequency of audits on the ground 
compared to a project only registered once.   
Assumption Mechanism 
5. The benefits of greater control and a larger proportion of 
the revenue, are enjoyed by not only those that do the tasks 
but by the organisation and community as a whole. 
F: Time limit for 
transfer in certain 
project types 
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has factored in the need to be flexible by setting the majority of tasks that the Producer 
Organisation should take on as development requirements but these are contingent on decisions 
made by the auditor FLOCERT. It is important that the lessons learned from existing 
programmes are taken into account when setting out the development criteria, especially in term 
of how long it has actually taken to build capacity of Producer Organisations.  
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Table 7-7: Comparison between timelines in the FCS and temporal evolution of TIST-
Kenya 
FCS timeline TIST-Kenya 
Producer Organisation set up* 
(year 0) 
Some form of farmer groups and aggregated groups set 
up from year 0 but not legally recognised and had no 
bank accounts. In year 8, Clusters began taking steps to 
formalise into CBOs and Cooperatives (legally 
recognised, eligible for bank accounts). 
Certification 
Project Facilitator responsible 
for certification (year 0) 
Producer Organisation appoints 
their own certification manager 
(year 3) 
Clean Air Action Corporation was initially responsible 
for collating initial project and certification 
documentation, with assistance from project 
administrator/ TIST-Kenya contractors. Documentation 
was developed between years 2 and 7. First audit was in 
year 5 and the programme received its first certification 
in year 6.  
During subsequent audits in years 7 and 9, TIST 
contractors took on some tasks, but Clean Air Action 
Corporation continues to manage certification. 
Project Management 
Project Facilitator and 
Producer Organisation sign 
contractual agreement (year 0) 
Project Manager appointed 
(year 3) 
Project Facilitator develops 
plan for transfer of skills and 
capacities to Producer 
Organisation (year 1) 
Project Facilitator gradually 
transfers management to 
Producer Organisation (year 3) 
Producer Organisation 
increasingly involves its 
members (year 3) 
Project administrator was appointed in year 0 and 
worked for 3 years before leaving. A number of office 
staff have also been employed since the outset and other 
key tasks are done by TIST contractors (recruited from 
the TIST farmer membership). 
From outset, Clean Air Action Corporation and the 
Leadership Council have taken management decisions 
and involved TIST contractors and farmers during 
seminars, Councils and Cluster meetings. 
Contractual agreements signed between individual 
farmers and Project Facilitator, not with TIST-Kenya. 
No specific plan for transfer- this has evolved 
organically.  
Monitoring 
Producer Organisation 
gradually develops skills and 
capacities to monitor carbon 
performance (from year 3) 
TIST farmers have been involved in monitoring since 
year 0. In year 9, TIST began making attempts to 
transfer greater responsibility to the Clusters but 
concluded that more training was needed 
*Producer Organisation must have at outset: a) a form of structure enabling democratic and transparent 
decisions and democratically elected representatives, b) established communication and feedback system, 
c) clear written rules and records of membership and project participation, d) a bank account if Producer 
Organisation is a legal entity (otherwise this can be held by the Project Facilitator) 
Core requirements (must be met); Development requirements (must achieve a minimum number- 
determined by FLOCERT, the auditing organisation)
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7.6.1.3. Extending knowledge and capacities to the wider Producer 
Organisation: Rotational Leadership and Kujengana 
Table 7-8: Assumptions 5/6/7 and Mechanism D 
Table 7-8 indicates the assumptions and mechanisms explored in this section. The assumptions 
within the FCS are that building up the capacities of a Project Manager who is a member of the 
Producer Organisation will enable the Producer Organisation as a whole to increase their 
capacity (assumption 6), take on the project, exert more control and enjoy greater benefits 
(assumption 5) and that this extends out beyond those that do the tasks to organisation and 
wider community (assumption 7). This extension relies on mechanisms of transfer between the 
Project Manager and other members of the Producer Organisation and these are not specified 
within the FCS. However, in their absence, there is a danger of concentrating skills and 
knowledge in the Project Manager who could then leave, meaning that efforts to build his/ her 
capacity are not harvested within the Producer Organisation. TIST-Kenya’s early years 
exemplify this because the Project Manager initially appointed left after 3 years. He went into 
politics and later became Governor of his region and as he was a supporter and close ally of the 
programme, TIST-Kenya was able to continue harvesting the fruits of his leadership and 
management capacities, but not as originally envisaged.  
Meanwhile, from the outset, the TIST-Kenya programme design has incorporated unique 
mechanisms which do allow for an extension of leadership capacities beyond the initial core, 
primarily by means of Rotational Leadership and the best practice of ‘Building Up’ Leaders or 
Kujengana in Kiswahili. These practices are incorporated within all the layers of the 
organisation, from the Leadership Council down to the Clusters and Small Groups. In the 
Leadership Council, duration of service as Leader is six months, after which the leader rotates. 
In the Clusters, there are three leadership positions of Accountability, Co-Leader and Leader 
which are deliberate reframing of the titles Treasurer, Secretary and Chairman. A member 
begins the leadership cycle in Accountability, and remains for three months before moving 
along the cycle. After nine months in positions, the member rotates out but is on hand to support 
Assumptions Mechanism 
5. The benefits of greater control and a larger proportion of the 
revenue are enjoyed by not only those that do the tasks but by the 
organisation and community as a whole. 
6. Efforts to build capacity extend their impact (beyond the project 
manager) to the whole organisation. 
7. Taking on more tasks within carbon projects contributes to 
producers gaining influence and status within the carbon sector. 
This impact is felt at an individual level (as well as within 
organisations and communities).  
D: Transfer via the 
Project Manager, to 
the Producer 
Organisation 
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the people following him or her in the cycle. The rationale for rotational leadership is that 
community groups are often led by the same people throughout their existence, and are often 
dependent on them, or experience leaders who expropriate human resources (TIST.Int3). The 
idea came from church groups in Tanzania, where the TIST founders had worked as 
missionaries. Church group members had noted that if leadership changed regularly, it enabled 
women and quieter people to speak up and access positions that would otherwise have been 
concentrated amongst the same people more permanently (TIST.PO1). The result is that 
multiple people develop leadership skills and a group is not dependent on a leader in his or her 
absence.  
The practice of kujengana  is recommended within TIST as a way of ensuring that leadership 
skills and qualities are recognised and strengthened within particular individuals. It involves 
providing positive, specific appraisal to leaders or anyone who has contributed something to the 
group, based on observable behaviour. These comments are given publically, often when 
leadership is changing, or sometimes at every Cluster meeting. As unintended consequences, a 
co-leader sometimes tries to emulate all the qualities that a leader was praised for, and strive to 
do even more. These qualities sometimes become the values of a particular group. The quotation 
below is a testimony of a woman who initially lacked confidence and hesitated to come forward 
as a leader but experienced the uplifting that Rotational Leadership and kujengana targets: 
‘Interacting with people has become easier. I used to find it difficult to interact 
with people but through the rotational leadership, I took a turn at being a leader, 
and people encouraged me by telling me good things about what I had done as a 
leader. This is good because through rotational leadership, everybody has a turn at 
being a leader, even if you are shy. Some don’t find it easy to be a leader but 
people encourage you and it builds you up’ (TIST.Test). 
These practices are highly innovative and harbour potential for application elsewhere. However, 
their success depends on how they are practised, in which context and under which conditions. I 
collected anecdotal evidence of their strengths, design features and limitations during research 
with TIST-Kenya and these warrant further exploration but it is beyond the thesis scope to 
include them here. Nevertheless TIST’s Rotational Leadership practices were commended by a 
District Forest Officer who listed many of the same advantages mentioned by TIST members. 
He noted that it is cultivating leadership growth amongst TIST members, enabling more people 
to have management skills, and encouraging the co-existence of leaders. This is an important 
non-financial benefit which the literature review in chapter 2 did not pick up on.  
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7.6.1.4. Increasing participation of TIST members  
Table 7-9: Assumption 6 and Mechanism G 
Table 7-9 indicates the assumptions and mechanisms explored in this section. In the FCS, 
Producer Organisations have the option of whether or not to promote producer participation in 
the internal control of the Producer Organisation (development requirement from year 3). 
Several stakeholders taking part in the FCSSP (including those who loaded on factors 2 and 3 in 
the Q study, see chapter 5) disputed the value of this in some circumstances. Participation in 
internal control of a carbon project requires willingness, access to information, and the capacity 
to understand it. Some stakeholders claimed that project participants do not want to get more 
involved, or that the majority do not understand what carbon is (see quotations in Box 7-2) but 
the carbon awareness amongst TIST-Kenya members serves as counter evidence. TIST-Kenya 
has put a strong emphasis on training, information sharing and checking whether people have 
understood, especially when they are new to the programme (for example during pre-
membership training, seminars, newsletters, Cluster meetings, audits of training and Cluster 
meetings). This has not been straightforward, as two of the pioneers involved in TIST in its 
early days in Kenya recollect:  
‘It was rocket science at the beginning, fighting ignorance- “how do you carry the 
carbon from that tree?” how to convince people that that “money is good money”. 
It was a challenge to get people to understand, because even the foresters do not 
understand, and community rely on them for information on forests. Also, because 
the carbon market is dynamic, we cannot say it will be this way tomorrow’ 
(TIST.Int2) 
‘[The idea of TIST] was not very interesting [to me] at first. We were hearing 
about the sale of carbon- how can we sell? It’s like wind. But with training, I came 
to learn that it was a business. Some people in the training said it was a devilish 
thing… they were saying “how can you sell the wind?” I told them ‘those that are 
learned know that trees breathe CO2 and when there is less in the atmosphere, we 
can breathe fresh air and retain the rain’. When we first planted trees, there was 
no rain, but now there is more. Even those ones not wanting to join saw fruits’ 
(TIST.Int2) 
Assumption Mechanism 
6. Efforts to build capacity extend their impact (beyond 
the project manager) to the whole organisation. 
G:  Increasing participation of 
Producer Organisation members 
in internal control of their 
organisation 
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I encountered TIST members who were able to articulate the links between planting trees in 
Kenya, industrial pollution in the north, cleaner air (or a reduction of greenhouse gases) in the 
atmosphere and local weather patterns, while others engaged me in conversation to try to learn 
more. Nevertheless, increasing participation in internal control is still contingent on members’ 
capacity and willingness to attend forums where information is shared; and the accuracy of the 
information transmitted. The TIST-Kenya programme design has made adjustments to 
encourage and enable members to attend but meetings often clash with other community events 
and personal commitments or simply do not grab everyone’s attention. I came across examples 
of Cluster Servants misrepresenting information because they had not understood it properly or 
had not updated it. Auditors can pick up on misinformation during Cluster Audits but as these 
are infrequent it remains a challenge to ensure that all the people involved in communicating 
have heard and understood the messages, and are passing them on accurately. 
 
7.6.1.5. Clarity, Transparency and Financial Incentives for transfer of 
responsibilities  
Table 7-10: Assumptions 5 and 6 and Mechanisms H and I 
 
Table 7-10 indicates the assumptions and mechanisms explored in this section. The contractual 
agreement in the FCS mandates clarity and transparency between the Project Facilitator and 
Producer Organisation regarding ownership, costs and payments. This follows on from the 
previous discussion because participation in a Producer Organisation’s internal control is 
probably a useful precondition for making sense of the arrangement between the Project 
Facilitator and the Producer Organisation. With TIST-Kenya, efforts are made to uphold 
transparency and clarity not only between the Project Facilitator and Producer Organisation but 
amongst all its members. The programme operates according to the TIST values of being 
Assumptions Mechanisms 
5. The benefits of greater control and a larger proportion 
of the revenue, are enjoyed by not only those that do 
the tasks but by the organisation and community as a 
whole. 
6. Efforts to build capacity extend their impact (beyond 
the project manager) to the whole organisation. 
H: Clarity and transparency 
regarding ownership of assets, 
documents, investments, costs 
incurred, payment for services 
I: Financial incentives for the 
Producer Organisation to take on 
more tasks  
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honest, accurate, transparent, mutually accountable, and being servants to each other. One of the 
members of the Leadership Council emphasised the importance of this basis: 
‘Clarity from the beginning is important. The principle lessons we have learnt are 
that the bedrocks (values) of the programme need to be laid first: give right and 
accurate information from the word go’ (TIST.Int3). 
Adhering to these values requires a number of functioning channels, forums and brokers for 
relaying information and discussing its significance, as well as sanctions where the values are 
not upheld (such as excluding Auditors and Cluster Servants who have not been honest with 
money matters). Key steps in developing clarity involve a) training potential members and 
checking their understanding of what it means to be a member before they sign up to TIST; b) 
signature of an agreement between the Project Facilitator and each TIST small group that 
specifies obligations for both parties, ownership and transfer of assets, payments and share of 
the net revenue. TIST’s model of revenue-sharing involves pre-payments to TIST members 
(0.0202 USD/year/tree) on the basis of trees planted, and promise of a share of future profits to 
the ratio of 70% to farmers, 30% to the investor. In 2014, the profit share was expected to 
become available in the next year or so, once income from carbon credits was exceeding the 
costs of creating the carbon credits and operating TIST (including making the prepayments) and 
investments had been recuperated. The rationale for this arrangement was that the Facilitator 
wanted to end up with ‘as much financial alignment as possible’- the profit share model would 
motivate everybody involved in the programme (farmers, people contracted by the Producer 
Organisation, and the investor) to keep costs down and profits up.  
Nevertheless, some aspects remain elusive to TIST farmers (especially as the first share of the 
profit is still to come) and Cluster Servants and Auditors are frequently asked to clarify 
understandings during Cluster meetings. Figure 7-7 shows this happening during a TIST event.  
 
 
Figure 7-7: Display material produced to communicate the profit share model and 
programme budget to TIST members 
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In addition to the pre-payments and the promised profit-shares due to small groups, each Cluster 
also receives a small monthly budget for operational costs and is eligible for a bonus if they 
perform very well in terms of attendance, tree planting and other criteria. These bonuses have 
been awarded to a few select groups and are enough for implementing a Cluster project (e.g. 
developing a tree nursery or an income-generating activity) but have also been divided amongst 
small groups. Clusters make their own decisions about the use of the bonus, guided by the 
Cluster Servant.  
There are parallels between the Cluster budget and bonus and the Premium because it is 
governed autonomously by the aggregated group of farmers, and the amount is linked to 
performance. Meanwhile the profit share model contrasts with the Fairtrade Minimum Price 
approach. Arguably, the TIST approach may incentivise handover because if TIST members 
take on more tasks, they are likely to perform that at a lower cost than the Project Facilitator, 
meaning that both parties gain. However, a full analysis of the differences and implications of 
each respective approach is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
7.6.1.6. Monitoring, personal development and enhanced influence and 
status  
Table 7-11: Assumption 7, Mechanism E 
Table 7-11 indicates the assumptions and mechanisms explored in this section. In the FCS, 
monitoring should be taken on by the Producer Organisation as a minimum contribution to 
project management as a whole, and the assumption is that taking on more tasks contributes to 
an increase in influence and status in the carbon sector for individuals, organisations and 
communities (assumption 7). This is a long term impact and there are many aspects that could 
play a part in contributing to it. However, if monitoring is the only task that Producer 
Organisation members take on, it is questionable whether it is enough to start the journey 
towards this impact. I briefly explore the link between monitoring and personal development 
and enhanced influence and status amongst TIST members.   
When a Project Team member visited TIST Kenya and observed the monitoring tasks that TIST 
members were accomplishing, he commented that they were really ‘empowered’. Several 
Cluster Servants and Auditors I met testified how much they had gained through their 
Assumption Mechanism 
7. Taking on more tasks within carbon projects 
contributes to producers gaining influence and status 
within the carbon sector. This impact is felt at an 
individual level (as well as within organisations and 
communities). 
E: Mandatory taking over of 
responsibilities by the Producer 
Organisation  
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involvement with TIST. However, monitoring tasks are part of a whole body of skills that TIST 
contractors have developed and monitoring itself may be more of a means towards personal 
development than an end in itself, because it necessitates travel, having a handle on information 
and technology, learning tree species and interacting with lots of people. However, the 
predominant form of personal development mentioned in interviews with Cluster Servants was 
an increase in confidence and articulacy as a result of speaking to large groups of people during 
Cluster meetings (see Box 7-4). 
Box 7-4: Testimonies of personal development given by TIST contractors 
‘TIST has [enabled] many people to come together and socialise, and have courage to hold 
meetings. Cluster servants have gained confidence… TIST has helped me to stand and talk in 
front of meetings, be empowered, made us be leaders. TIST has …helped me to do so much… 
now I am very talkative. Farmers ask questions and I can answer them...TIST has made me 
have a big mind, my thinking capacity has increased…TIST has made me be a counsellor- I 
can meet people with problems and they can feel relieved after talking to me’ (TIST.Test) 
‘We struggled at the beginning [with using the palm computers and phones for quantifying, 
auditing and making payments], but once you are used to the technology, now we know the 
problems and how to fix them… We have also travelled, going around, holding meetings and 
interacting’ (TIST.Test) 
 ‘TIST has made me to be someone. It makes you to have courage, it’s difficult for many 
people to start to address the meeting. It empowers you to do that. No matter how big is the 
meeting, you learn to address them. It has changed my life’ (TIST.Test) 
Walking around Nanyuki, J knows a lot of people, and they always stop her and ask her 
questions about TIST and she is very happy. She likes working as a Cluster Servant because 
of the opportunity to meet people, and because of the comments they give her about her 
work, such as ‘you’ve taken us far!’ or ‘we have no complaints’. She also likes the 
opportunity to move around, and know people elsewhere. She has learnt many species of 
trees, and she has also become more courageous and sociable. This is because of interacting 
with lots of people of all types and learning how to work with not only the good ones and the 
polite ones, but also the difficult and rude ones. People are especially difficult when they’ve 
not been paid, and have failed to understand why. She has to convince them of why this 
might be (TIST.PO3) 
According to one TIST contractor, her monitoring tasks involve following the Project 
Facilitator’s instructions, but these do not come with any explanations as to why they are doing 
things and why the data is necessary and what the standards require. She had found it beneficial 
to learn this information during her involvement in the FCSSP because it had enabled her to 
contribute her own experiences. In her case, there was capacity and interest in taking on more 
than just monitoring, but if the FCS does not require any more than this, some Project 
Facilitators might not be incentivised to build the Producer Organisation’s capacities to take on 
additional tasks. Notably, she already had a rich calibre of experiences before joining TIST and 
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had continued to develop her competences through involvement in TIST over 10 years. 
Meanwhile, the Cluster Servants recruited to do the initial monitoring (amongst other tasks) are 
generally younger women and men43 and might not necessarily share her ambitions. 
This section has begun to identify some links between the tasks that TIST members take on, and 
some individual proclamations of self-development. It is clear that it is more than just 
monitoring that has led to these outcomes. Some programme-specific practices such as 
Rotational Leadership and Kujengana could be assumed to have had some influence, increasing 
the pool of people who benefit from leadership positions and helping them develop in 
confidence. However each individual I met had a very unique story. About 80 contractors out of 
a total of more than 60,000 members work for TIST, and those who are not contracted are 
perhaps likely to have a more diluted experience of programme benefits. A more detailed 
impact assessment with a wider pool of informants or a more extensive evaluation tool such as 
Most Significant Change44 would be necessary to make any firmer claims or trace out any 
plausible impact pathways.  
7.7. Discussion: Transfer of Knowledge and Capacities 
TIST provides evidence that the Fairtrade goal of involvement of the Producer Organisation in 
the management and implementation of a programme can be achieved with the support of a 
Project Facilitator working hand in hand with the Producer Organisation if this is the intention 
from the outset. However, the speed at which this has happened with TIST does not align with 
the FCS timeline and it was motivated by a different goal (to implement the programme in a 
way that maximised returns to the farmers, rather than to hand over as much as possible to the 
Producer Organisation).  Incidentally, this has meant that many of the operational tasks are 
carried out by the farmers themselves, but it also comes down to choices about programme 
infrastructure beyond the staffing. The relationship between the Project Facilitator and the 
Producer Organisation in TIST’s case is long term, and he has no time constraint in being 
involved (apart from the length of his life!). In contrast, programmes led by NGOs or heavily 
reliant on donor funding may have to work towards withdrawing as soon as their funding runs 
out: the KENDBIP example exemplified this but also that the organisation earmarked to take on 
additional tasks related to carbon was not motivated to do so (at least at the outset).There are 
other examples in East Africa of carbon programmes where the local organisation intended to 
                                                     
43  They are selected from TIST members or members’ sons or daughters and should be of a medium age 
and settling with a young family, based on observations that they are more likely to remain with the 
programme. 
44 This method was being used in some form to collect stories from trainees about how TIST had changed 
their life. There is potential to use it more systematically as an evaluation and learning tool.  
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take up programme management from the NGO has not developed the capacities within the 
envisaged timeframe (Deshmukh et al., 2014). Multi-stakeholder global forum discussions have 
pointed to the need for governments and donors giving support to co-operatives to consider how 
to provide long term support beyond the usual 2-3 year cycle of a development project (Global 
Forum on Food Security, 2012). Carbon projects do allow for a longer term role for external 
support, but the transfer process has to be carefully managed. As it may be difficult to predict 
how capacities within the Producer Organisation will evolve, planned transfer (mandated in the 
FCS) could lead to conservative commitments (i.e. avoid risks of not meeting targets) or 
unrealistic ambitions for transfer (at risk of being audited as non-compliant).  
The gradual building of capacities with the support of an external actor has precedence within 
the Fairtrade Standard for Contract Production, designed for small-scale producers who are not 
yet democratically organised. In this case, a Producer Organisation is created with the support of 
an actor called the Promoting Body (an exporter, NGO, etc). Research with a cotton Producer 
Organisation formed by a Promoting Body in India showed that seven years after its 
establishment, the Producer Organisation had achieved significant organisational development, 
but still required significant capacity building before it could achieve full independence from 
the Promoting Body45 (Nelson and Smith, 2011). This one example suggests that the timeline 
for handover to the Producer Organisation in the Contract Production Standard is ambitious but 
more evidence is needed its certification outcomes compared to other Fairtrade standards and 
certification schemes (Nelson and Smith, 2011). Similarly there is need for more evidence on 
outcomes related to the transfer of knowledge and capacities from Project Facilitator to Project 
Manager and Producer Organisation and possible timelines for this, in the context of the FCS. 
The FCS is missing mechanisms for ensuring transfer not only between the Project Facilitator 
but also amongst the wider membership of the Producer Organisation. TIST-Kenya 
demonstrates some innovative practices for extending the benefits of leadership and increased 
responsibility outwards to a wider pool of members, but more understanding is needed of the 
extent of these ripples as my research concentrated on those who were active at the programme 
level. Systematic reviews of Fairtrade impact have pointed to the need to put more attention to 
involving wider numbers of individual producers rather than focussing on existing powerful 
leaders, and to capacity building (Nelson and Pound, 2010, Fairtrade International, 2015d), and 
this need is echoed for co-operatives in general (Global Forum on Food Security, 2012), where 
support is needed for them to develop skills and capacities to their members, and such skills 
development should not be limited to co-operative management. In the context of a new market 
                                                     
45 The Contract Production Standard envisages that POs reach Small Producer Organisation status by 
year 6, although this is a development requirement. 
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opportunity, a Participatory Action Research project demonstrated a crucial role for change 
agents who can impart the skills and encourage the innovation needed to engage with markets 
and achieve long term market linkages (Kaganzi et al., 2009). 
Perhaps the weakest of links in the FCS are those that extend the benefits of involvement in a 
carbon project beyond managers and people taking on specific tasks, to the organisation as a 
whole and the wider community. Researchers have already noted the need to unpack 
assumptions about community in Fairtrade as empowerment outcomes are specific to place, 
product and starting point, and it cannot be assumed that producers are willing to share benefits 
with the wider community (Phillips, 2014, McEwan et al., 2014).  
7.8. Conclusion to chapter seven: addressing gaps in knowledge 
about Fairtrade carbon as a commodity 
In this section I reflect on what the findings from this chapter say about Fairtrade carbon as a 
commodity, drawing on the literature introduced in section 2.2. The commodification process 
involves abstracting carbon from its place specificity (through carbon measurement 
technologies) and considering all carbon as generic (Bumpus, 2011a). Certification technologies 
also involve abstraction, as locally relevant social forms are translated into audit checklists 
legible for surveillance by actors from the global North (Blowfield and Dolan, 2008, Wright and 
Shore, 2000). This ‘governing at a distance’ is usually portrayed in political economy analyses 
as a form of control over production and producer knowledge in the global South by standards 
organisations and companies in the global North. Commodification approaches bring attention 
to carbon as a commodity produced in specific places and imbued with social relationships but 
there has been less attention to how different types of carbon resource entail different types of 
social relationships or how different carbon projects might involve different dynamics of control 
or marginalisation. Attention to place and commodity specificity has also often been missed in 
research on Fairtrade certification and assumptions about how it is supposed to work (Getz and 
Shreck, 2006).  
This chapter has addressed these gaps through analysis of two carbon projects and their place-
based implications of the commodification process and two types of carbon resource and their 
different implications on the scale, form and purpose of social organisation. These examples 
support the view that the commodification process and the material characteristics of carbon can 
offer opportunities and difficulties (Bumpus, 2011a), and that it can strengthen or marginalise 
and constrain producers in the South.  
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7.8.1. Carbon, materiality and marginalisation 
One of FTI’s goals was to create alternatives to the problem of marginalisation or exclusion 
from the benefits of carbon credits. While carbon credits are often deemed complicated and 
difficult to understand because of their intangibility, they are in some respects much easier to 
transact than agricultural commodities because they do not require physical infrastructure to 
store and transport them and they allow production tasks to be decoupled from the physical 
context where the initial mitigation action is carried out. This makes a number of outcomes 
possible with respect to marginalisation- one is that the people generating the emissions 
reductions may be marginalised or inadequately acknowledged within the commodity chain by 
more powerful actors who register the projects, aggregate the credits and decide on benefits. 
This chapter has shown how in some instances, Project Facilitators are controlling project 
participants and their knowledge by claiming that the participants would not be able to 
understand what carbon is or become experts. With respect to KENDBIP, it is yet to be seen 
whether the involvement of other actors in the production of credits will lead to the 
marginalisation of those doing the mitigation action. Meanwhile, the TIST project suggested 
another possible outcome: that the tasks related to transforming emissions reductions into 
tradable commodities can be divided between those who are best able or most efficiently able to 
carry them out, regardless of their position across the globe. In this case, the Producer 
Organisation is able to play an active, conscious and sophisticated role in the delivery of the 
project hand in hand with the Project Facilitator. What appears to be essential with this second 
outcome, is that the programme can demonstrate that such decisions have been made with the 
interests of the people generating the emissions reductions in mind, that they are treated with 
respect, and that adequate explanations and information are provided. The TIST project does 
demonstrate these aspects, but detailed explorations also need to be conducted with projects 
involving different histories, relationships between actors, and contextual factors.   
7.8.2. Extending Fairtrade: checking claims and assumptions  
Fairtrade Carbon Credits lie at the interface between agricultural commodity chains, and 
development projects. They are a tradable commodity, but revenue from carbon credits is 
becoming a strategy to fuel development projects and enable low carbon development. Existing 
literature has already identified the challenges and opportunities associated with extending 
Fairtrade to new commodity types, different types of supply chain and specific geographical 
areas (section 2.2.3) but this chapter has filled a gap by providing a detailed analysis of how 
Fairtrade might apply to carbon. In particular, findings from this chapter resonate with research 
on Fairtrade gold in Sub Saharan Africa, which has flagged up the difficulties of applying 
requirements about producer organisations in contexts where people are rudimentarily organised 
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and lack organisational support structures (Hilson and Kamlongera, 2013). Through a critical 
exploration of the role of the Project Facilitator in building organisations and transferring 
capacities, I have shown that assumptions of how Fairtrade certification can result in stronger 
organisations, need to be reality-checked in specific contexts. Outcomes are linked not only to 
the rules and procedures in the standard, but also to a number of context-specific interactional, 
temporal and structural factors including relationships, intentions, evolving organisational 
models and systems to mediate capacity transfer and information exchange.  
This chapter has raised question marks surrounding the roles, responsibilities and expectations 
assigned to Project Facilitators and Producer Organisations and the change process that the FCS 
is expected to result. This links to other research which has pointed to the gaps between ethical 
intentions and expectations raised by labels, and experiences in specific contexts. Doubt has 
been cast for example on expectations that business can play the role of development agent 
(Blowfield and Dolan, 2010); that Fairtrade producers can trade on their own terms (Getz and 
Shreck, 2006); that a producer organisation founded on commodity production is enough to 
create strong social ties when members are geographically dispersed and social cohesion is 
weak (McEwan et al., 2014); and that members of producer organisations will share the benefits 
of Fairtrade with the wider community of non-members (Blowfield and Dolan, 2010, Phillips, 
2014). Overall, this suggests the need to be cautious in claims-making during communication 
both with customers and producers of Fairtrade carbon credits. 
7.8.3. The relational aspects of carbon, and fairness implications  
Sections 7.8.1 and 7.8.2 have both underlined the relational aspects in the commodification of 
carbon and the implementation of carbon projects. Commodification approaches bring attention 
to the social relationships the commodity is imbued with and I would argue that in the case of 
Fairtrade carbon credits, the social relationships are more tangible and perhaps also more 
significant than the carbon itself. Clearly the carbon credits must be generated for the project to 
take place, but the Theory of Change and expected outcomes and impacts of the project and sale 
of the commodity are so tied to the way that relationships are enacted in particular contexts that 
they deserve more focus, both empirically and theoretically. This is necessary both for 
understanding how they shape the Theory of Change and also how they shape perceptions of 
fairness in carbon projects.  
The Multi-Dimensional Fairness Framework I chose to use to explore fairness begins to make 
room for consideration of these aspects within the dimensions of Fair Access and Fair 
Procedures, recognising that Fair Access includes power relations and Fair Procedures includes 
negotiation processes. Nevertheless, the aspect of how people choose to treat one another and 
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what they choose to share with one another is perhaps missing. This gap was already alluded to 
in section 5.6.2 and I return to it in chapter 9.  
7.8.4. Summary of key messages and contributions. 
The ‘Theory of Change’ is not a static framework but a set of questions to guide 
continuous reflection, assumption-uncovering and reality-checking. Findings suggest that 
FTI should continue cross-checking and adjusting their Theory of Change and standard 
guidelines in response to evidence, especially as there is still limited knowledge within Fairtrade 
about how carbon works as a commodity. 
The translation of standards from agricultural commodities to carbon is a messy and 
complicated process and attention to context is crucial. FTI’s collaboration with GSF 
facilitates this work of translation, but the two organisations and their networks had very 
different frames of reference and standard approaches, and entry into carbon projects with 
smallholders, was unchartered territory for both organisations, requiring adjustments to existing 
approaches for both organisations. 
Concepts of ‘Producers’ and ‘Producer Organisations’ do not fit neatly to the carbon 
context. The function and form of the Producer Organisation also varies between different types 
of projects. The FCS will need to be able to take into account different types of producer and 
producer organisation. 
Mechanisms of transfer from the Project Facilitator to the Producer Organisation are 
context specific and need careful monitoring to understand their operationalisation and 
improve their robustness. Divergent role repartition, and specific relationships, motivations 
and capacities in each project context are likely to significantly shape outcomes, including 
perceptions and experiences of fairness.  
Organisational Justice theories add a useful dimension to understanding fairness in 
Fairtrade carbon projects by attending to the interactional elements in the enactment of 
procedures and the conveying of information on decisions made. These aspects are context 
and project specific and are likely to have an impact on how fairness is perceived as well as how 
the changes expected in the Theory of Change match actual outcomes. 
 
 
250 
 
Chapter 8 Reflective discussion of the research process 
8.1. Introduction to chapter eight 
This chapter addresses objective 3, to assess the value of action-oriented research in 
collaborative standard-setting processes. Chapter 1 associated this objective with two key 
pathways components- engaging in path-building, and enhancing reflexivity. By linking my 
research design, approach, tools and experiences to academic reflections and approaches used 
by other scholars, I contribute to methodological innovation. Documents drawn on in this 
chapter’s analyses are listed in Appendix 2. The analytical approach was described in chapter 4. 
This chapter is structured around questions 3.1, ‘how can action-oriented multi-sited research 
enhance reflection amongst stakeholders involved in the research, and how does it shape 
emergent outcomes?’ and 3.2, ‘what can be learnt about conducting collaborative research on 
standard-setting processes through this thesis?’ Question 3.1 is divided into two parts, dealing 
with ‘reflection’ and ‘outcomes’ separately. I begin by underlining the importance of reflection 
and the challenges of enhancing it, and then discuss the attempts I made with different 
stakeholders in the FCSSP and relate these to literature on post-positivist forms of policy 
analysis. I then move to reflect on how my research shaped outcomes, using the structure of the 
four hot topics as a basis. The remainder of the chapter addresses question 3.2, serving as a 
summary of lessons learnt from this collaboration. This part of the chapter was written as FTI 
were drafting a student research policy, and insights fed directly into the policy process. The 
section summarises key aspects to consider in future collaborative research, structuring them 
around the metaphor of a building plan.  
The first part of this chapter addresses question 3.1. In chapter 4 I explained my rationale for 
taking a critical approach to research on the FCSSP, despite the RPOs’ initial hopes that I would 
provide support to make the FCS a ‘better’ standard and that my conclusions would show how 
their collaborative approach had resulted in a better standard. What they wanted would have 
equated with more of a problem-solving approach. At the beginning of the process I was 
agnostic as to whether the FCS was going to lead to greater benefits for small-scale producers as 
they had promised (see chapter 2 and Appendix 6). I established with staff at FTI that we shared 
a common view that the carbon market was rife with problems and unfair mechanisms, but also 
shared an optimism that some changes could be made which might shift the balance of benefits 
in favour of those who were benefitting less. By choosing to partner with GSF and develop a 
joint approach, FTI was actively choosing to work within the carbon market rather than against 
it, but the partnership between two innovative and influential organisations (both committed to 
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bringing in the missing dimensions from conventional trade in their sectors) held potential for 
developing alternative pathways within the carbon market. For most of the collaboration I chose 
to uphold my critical stance46 in a friendly way that I hoped would facilitate reflection and 
support learning throughout this journey. I did this from the position of an external to FTI and 
GSF, acting as ‘friendly outsider’ (see chapter 4) with a reserved right to be critical. 
I reflect on the research approach I took, i.e. action-oriented research from a critical perspective- 
in terms of whether and how it facilitated reflection for stakeholders involved in the research, 
and how it might have shaped the emergent outcomes. Before doing this, I acknowledge a 
caveat. Attribution is always problematic when espousing explanatory theories about causality 
(Ton et al., 2014). I do not make any claims to have directly and unilaterally enhanced reflection 
or outcomes myself; I seek to identify ways by which the research design may have contributed 
to these. Here it is important to acknowledge the presence of ‘super-rival’ and ‘commingled’ 
rival explanations (see section 4.4.5.2). Firstly, the design was co-produced and co-implemented 
so any role that the design might have had is attributable to these collaborative efforts and not to 
me alone. Secondly, any enhanced reflection and emergence of outcomes must be understood 
within the broader context of (i) existing mechanisms for reflection and learning within GSF 
and FTI; (ii) the learning journeys that the two organisations embarked on when they first chose 
to collaborate and bring together their respective cohorts of partners and stakeholders; (iii) the 
context of a changing context within global climate change governance and the carbon market; 
(iv) a number of additional contextual and institutional factors beyond the scope of this thesis. 
My focus is mainly amongst the FTI staff involved directly in the FCSSP and some brief 
thoughts on possible reflection and learning for other stakeholders in the FCSSP. My intention 
throughout this reflective discussion is to transparently acknowledge both the strengths and 
weaknesses in the design and implementation of this collaborative research process.  
8.2. Facilitating Reflection- what, when, how and for whom? 
8.2.1. Critical reflection within organisations 
In this chapter I explore several types of reflection and reflexivity, defined in Table 8-1.  
 
 
  
                                                     
46 This oscillated between optimistic critique with the intention of helping both organisations to make it 
work, particularly for small scale farmers, and scepticism. I tried my best to be encouraging and to frame 
my critique constructively, but sometimes it was a struggle to be transparent, integral and constructive.  
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Table 8-1: Definitions of reflection and reflexivity deployed in chapter 8 
Reflection and reflective 
practice 
the practice of ‘periodically stepping back to ponder the meaning of 
what has recently transpired to ourselves and to others in our 
immediate environment’(Raelin, 2002 p66) 
Critical reflection and 
reflexivity47 
‘Making an assessment of the validity of one’s assumptions, 
examining both sources and consequences’ (Gray, 2007 p497); 
Self-confrontation with the unintended consequences of one’s 
actions (Voss et al., 2006) 
Organisational critical 
reflection  
‘a ruthless and courageous examination and deconstruction of 
assumptions, norms, expectations, limitations, language, results and 
applications of one’s work’ (Boyce, 1996 p9) 
Reflective processes within organisations have been shown to have a significant bearing on 
learning and self-understanding at the management level, but the process of critical reflection 
involving the surfacing and critiquing of tacit or taken-for-granted assumptions and beliefs may 
not come naturally to many managers and may have to be learned or facilitated (Gray, 2007). 
One reason for this is that workplace pace and demands limit space for reflection (Raelin, 
2002), but also that reflection can lead to scepticism, the questioning of long established beliefs, 
anxiety and even threats to one’s (individual or organisational) identity (Gray, 2007). Reflection 
is the bridge between experience and learning (Boud et al., 2013) and FTI has a good 
foundation for embedding reflection given the value placed on learning. The organisation has a 
unit dedicated to Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (MEL); they have a week of the year 
dedicated to learning; they have developed Theories of Change to make explicit their 
assumptions about how interventions are supposed to contribute to outcomes (see chapter 7), 
and staff (especially within the MEL unit) are encouraging research which supports them to 
critically assess and improve their Theories of Change (Fairtrade International, 2015a, Fairtrade 
International: MEL Unit, 2015).  
Reflection is a fundamental part of action-oriented research, and the infrastructure or processes 
for embedding competencies in problem solving and reflection amongst staff lie at the hub of 
the wheel in the action research cycle depicted by Susman (1983), see Figure 8-1. However, less 
is known about the mechanics of how this can be achieved (Gray, 2007). 
 
                                                     
47 Some authors define reflexivity differently, but I consider that the definition provided by Voss and 
colleagues is sufficiently similar to the concept of critical reflection to be amalgamated for the purposes 
of my analysis.  
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Figure 8-1: Action reflection cycle  
Based on Susman (1983). The words in the centre have been adapted from Susman's model which refers 
instead to a 'client system infrastructure' 
Susman and Evered (1978) recognise that action research facilitates the development of the 
necessary practical knowledge in terms of how to create settings for organisational learning, 
how to review, revise and refine systems that one is a part of, and how to formulate useful 
metaphors, constructs and images for articulating a more desirable future. Gray (2007) has 
compiled a set of tools that can be drawn on by people engaged in assisting the learning process. 
In my experience, the research process has enabled me to innovate tools to facilitate reflection 
as a prerequisite for learning. These have been developed intuitively rather than according to 
any guidelines from scholars or academic training, but in hindsight most of them can be 
understood as applications of Gray’s toolset.  
8.2.2. Facilitating reflection within the FCSSP team at FTI 
I held two team sessions with the Standards Unit and FCS Project Manager aimed at facilitating 
organisational critical reflection. The first (the ‘House Exercise’) came during the 
Research/Drafting phase (phase 2) and was a reflection on content. The second was a process 
reflection (entitled ‘Mirror on the Standard Setting Process’) held after the FCS had been 
published. In addition, I held Q interviews with two members of the FCS Project Team and one 
staff member from GSF, which were also aimed at supporting reflection (see chapter 5). 
The House Exercise was designed as a tool for (1) reflecting on the work done on the FCS and 
the supporting scheme and to relate this to the original aims and initial propositions, (2) 
identifying the variety of options that had been proposed for achieving the various aims, (3) 
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assessing which options had already been selected and why; and (4) mapping out conceptual 
connections between the different components including identifying when and where they 
would be dealt with and what else each one was contingent on. The exercise was scheduled to 
take place as the consultation version of the FCS was reaching completion. The staff member 
who had managed the work to develop the FCS draft said ‘as the standard goes out for public 
consultation, there is a good opportunity now to reflect on the bigger picture again… [the 
exercise] will be useful for us to reflect on the FCC overall work…’. This staff member 
encouraged three other colleagues to participate in this 3-hour session. I had devised the 
exercise as a way to communicate and discuss the connections I had been trying to make 
between the various components of the standard and scheme, but also as a way to explore the 
team members’ rationales for choosing different options and rejecting others. This latter 
objective was only superficially met- although the team shared some rationales, one staff 
member said midway through the exercise ‘we’re not talking much about the “why”, because 
this takes time’. This is a common workplace challenge (Raelin, 2002). The completed ‘House’ 
is depicted in Figure 8-2. 
The house and surroundings was used as a Reflective Metaphor (Gray, 2007) which I had 
proposed and the team adopted. Metaphors can be powerful mediums for ‘understanding and 
presenting ideas, insights and intuitions’ (Gray, 2007), opening up new ways of seeing 
organisations and generating creative possibilities (McCourt, 1997). Exploring connections 
between items in a visual manner was a variation on Concept mapping (Gray, 2007), a graphic 
technique used to tease out people’s cognitive frameworks. Concepts are mapped hierarchically 
and then linked with arrows labelled with explanatory phrases. The technique focuses on the 
‘how’ and ‘why’ of links. The ‘House and Surroundings’ picture, transcript of discussions and 
accompanying spreadsheet document portrayed at least some of the how and why of links 
between components but in a different format from the concept map. Whole-team discussions 
on which options had been chosen marked the beginning of Reflective Dialogue (Gray, 2007) 
which involves sharing thoughts and feelings on a subject within a group followed by group 
members self-reflecting on themselves and reacting to the dialogue of other participants. While 
the reflection within the exercise mainly focussed on content, there was some meta-reflection on 
the task of reflecting and the impact this had had. In particular, the team acknowledged how 
they felt about how much was still undecided but also how the greater clarity gained through the 
exercise about which aspects were uncertain would help them in preparing for the consultation.  
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Figure 8-2 The completed House Exercise 
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The Mirror on the Standard Setting Process was designed as a feedback session to share my 
interpretations of how the FCSSP had been governed, which interests had (from my 
perspective) shaped outcomes and whether the final standard reflected its original stated goals 
(based on the findings in chapter 6). My feedback involved both positive appraisal as well as 
acknowledgement of the instances when the FCSSP had been governed in a less than optimal 
participatory manner; gaps between original expectations or interests of key actors and final 
outcomes; and possible reasons for this. The key reflective tools I used during this session were 
(1) reflecting on critical incidents (2) use of reflective metaphors and (3) reflective dialogue.  
Reflecting on Critical Incidents involves firstly providing a description of an incident and 
secondly providing an interpretation which frames this particular incident as significant for 
underlying trends, motives, structures or a wider social context (Gray, 2007). I interpreted the 
Standards Committee meeting for approval of the FCS (quoted in Table 6-7) as a critical 
incident and shared some extracts from the meeting alongside my interpretations of what I 
thought was going on. From this, the following dialogue emerged: 
Staff 1: were you in that meeting or were you calling in? 
Researcher: I was there 
[Silence, followed by laughter] 
Staff 2: then there’s no point in saying it wasn’t like that 
[This comment was followed by recollections of that meeting from each of the staff 
members who had been present] 
The discussion triggered by my portrayal of this event allowed the staff to recognise themselves 
that this particular meeting had fallen short in terms of process, but also to provide their own 
explanations as to why they had used strategy to get the decision passed.  
I introduced the Reflective Metaphors of ‘rug-tugging’ and the protective belt (Figure 8-3)  
interactively during the session, explaining the rug in a story format and encouraging the team 
to uncover the interests ‘under the belt’ of the protectionist culture. Although metaphors can 
focus attention towards one set of interpretations to the neglect of others (Gray, 2007), by 
contextualising the protectionist culture in the context of the other rings on the target diagram, 
and by noting that it had only come into play during certain instances during the FCSSP, the 
team began reflecting themselves on the salience of this interpretation. During a break in the 
session, the Project Manager asked the Director of the Standards Unit whether similar dynamics 
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Figure 8-3 the target diagram  
 
were recognisable in other Standard Setting Processes at FTI, in other words whether the target 
diagram had resonance beyond the FCSSP. The reply is quoted below Figure 8-3.   
 
 
‘Yes, the green and blue circles are about building an aligned position, and you think that 
everyone is aligned and …that they share the goals, but then everyone comes from their 
own position and have their own defensive areas, “there’s a red line I don’t want to 
cross, these are my limits in terms of operational needs” etc, and then everybody needs to 
adapt from where you are to the new position, and…it’s always around a couple of hot 
topics…there’s always between 1 and 5 areas where 99% of the debate is happening. It’s 
pretty standard. It’s probably a reflection of our journey- we say we want to go from A to 
B, but there are always buts, and these are always concentrated around a certain number 
of hot topics… Having said that, it sounds like it is all logic and you can make it up from 
the beginning. That is exactly what you can’t [do]. You can have these [concentric rings], 
and some type of thing[s] [referring to the protectionist culture interests] will come back 
every time, and there might be a 6
th
, 7
th
 and 8
th
 thing [in the protective culture belt], and 
the hot topics are always different. But you can’t predict. This is only logic retroactively. 
You can’t draw this for your next project. But you can have an empty diagram like that 
and you know at the end how to fill it’ (RRf.4, slide 23) 
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The team then proposed that next time they could use the diagram at the beginning of future 
processes and predict which hot topics and interests might come up, and then do a comparison 
in hindsight. This was a key learning moment: they appropriated the target diagram as a visual 
conceptualisation of a new mental model about how standard setting processes unfold, and were 
intending to use it as a guiding framework in future processes. 
Throughout the session, I used Reflective Dialogue by inviting the team to reflect on my 
interpretations, the questions it raised, how they felt about it, and to provide their own 
interpretations of what had happened and why. They continued to use the target diagram to 
explain their actions. In a reflection on the final outcome for pricing mechanisms, one team 
member said ‘we stay loyal to these outer circles, and then we need to go over the red lines of 
people sometimes, and if we’re not losing them on the journey because at the end the concept is 
ok (and it still needs to be demonstrated…) then I think it’s still good’. The team member went 
on to reflect on the difficulties they had with price-setting for a first-time commodity but 
acknowledging that in hindsight, they should have started sooner on the pricing work. They had 
underestimated the time it would take for other people (especially those from outside the 
Fairtrade system) to go on the necessary learning journey about the Fairtrade Minimum Price 
and how it could work in the context of carbon credits.  
I designed a third session in the form of an interactive game, to hold with the FCSSP team to 
reflect on the assumptions, evidence base and plausible links within the Theory of Change 
devised for the FCS. This session was based on the findings in chapter 7, and would involve 
facilitating a dialogue between the people involved in developing the Theory of Change and 
those who had been involved in collecting evidence for it during the FCSSP. This was still due 
to take place at the time of completing this thesis.  
8.2.3. Facilitating learning and reflection amongst particular participants in 
the research 
I recognise that I did not make efforts to facilitate reflection amongst all the various 
stakeholders in the FCSSP to the same extent as I tried to with the Project Team, but I did make 
two participatory or democratic attempts to open up inputs and create space for the 
consideration of alternatives. These were (i) the Q study undertaken with a broad spectrum of 
people participating (directly or via their organisations) in the FCSSP (see chapter 5) and (ii) the 
Participatory Policy Analysis Workshop. I reflect briefly on the latter here as it has not been 
described in detail elsewhere in the thesis. This workshop, which was synchronised with the 
first FCS consultation and came after a month of fieldwork with TIST-Kenya, served multiple 
purposes: 
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Firstly it was an opportunity for me to reflect back to the workshop participants my 
interpretations of the programme thus far in order to seek validation, correct any 
misinterpretations, fill in gaps, and triangulate evidence collected from key informants. I did 
this on the basis of the themes within the FCS, focussing in particular on roles and relationships 
between actors. This purpose was primarily about me learning from them.  
Secondly, I supported TIST members to make sense of the FCS, its potential implications for 
their programme and existing practices if they were to apply it (including where it would or 
would not potentially fit, and which practices might be recognised or ignored). This reflection 
was aided by the insight I brought to them about the standard content, which I linked to what I 
knew of the TIST programme. Rather than assuming they were interested in the standard, the 
workshop began with a listing of what would make the standard interesting to them. This 
involved taking on a novel role as facilitator-researcher, where the task is to help people to 
establish basic connections (in this case between the FCS and their lived experiences as farmers 
and programme contractors), posing questions in their everyday language and deciding issues 
important to themselves (Fischer, 2003a).   
Thirdly, the workshop enabled us to co-produce feedback for the FCS-consultation from a 
programme which had already generated many useful lessons, by establishing common 
perspectives amongst the participating TIST-Kenya members and articulating these in the 
format of the FCS consultation document. This involved me playing the role of translator 
(Throgmorton, 1991), bridging the experiences and framing used by the participants, and the 
language of the Standard. At the end of the workshop, participants requested that I write the 
feedback on their behalf based on their workshop inputs, share it with them, make any 
amendments (of which there were none) and then send to FTI. This purpose supported the 
Project Team to gather more feedback but it also served my normative objective to make 
stronger the more hidden voices during the consultation process. 
8.3. Discussion- evaluating my contributions to reflection 
Chapter 1 highlighted the importance of reflection in pathway-building processes such as the 
FCSSP, and the potential for researchers to enhance reflection. In this section I situate the role I 
played within academic approaches to policy analysis, and assess its merits. The interventions I 
undertook to actively influence the reflection and learning within the standard-setting process 
can be theorised as steps towards novel forms of policy analysis.  
260 
 
The role I played is linked to the concepts of deliberative and participatory policy analysis48. Li 
(2015) describes the tasks of a deliberative policy analyst as involving observation, facilitation 
and mediation within a process, giving attention to people and processes as well as the policy 
problem. The targets of analysis are the values and interests, dialogue, argumentation and 
deliberation and the desired outcome is that all stakeholders- policy-makers (or standard-
setters), citizens and organised stakeholders- can reach a better understanding of the values, 
interests and discourses in the context of the policy or standard. This learning process is 
documented in the form of a report which is made available to everyone, and consequently can 
be used to inform broader public debates. Unlike traditional policy analysis, deliberative policy 
analysts are ‘socialized to serve the “all”’ rather than only the policy actors at the “top” (Li, 
2015 p30).  
There are close parallels between Li’s deliberative policy analysis and Fischer’s (2003a) 
participatory policy analysis in that both are aimed at bringing local knowledges into the policy 
process and enabling learning processes through the active involvement of the policy analyst as 
facilitator and translator between different knowledges and epistemic communities. However, 
whereas Li depicts a role for a team of deliberative policy analysts to instigate and coordinate 
the whole deliberative process, Fischer depicts the role of the participatory policy analyst in 
terms of facilitating ‘the development of a learning process which, once set in motion can 
proceed on its own’ (Fischer, 2003a p217). I interpret that in Fischer’s view, the policy analyst 
should be a catalyst, rather than a bolt in the learning process.  
In the sections below I reflect upon the FCSSP and the TIST sessions in turn. 
  
8.3.1. Strengths of the reflective sessions with the FCSSP team 
Forging and facilitating timely spaces for reflection and team coherence  
Both exercises described above were timely because the first coincided with a rejigging of 
responsibilities between members of the Project Team and the involvement of an additional 
staff member, and the second was held shortly before two of the team were due to relocate or go 
on extended leave. Aside from the aspects mentioned above, the team appreciated the House 
Exercise because it was fun, and because of its value of keeping them ‘on track’ and requested 
that we organise to do it again a few months later. When I proposed leaving them the tools for 
them to use themselves, one member said ‘but it’s good that you are here, because you have the 
                                                     
48 As a form of post-positivist policy analysis 
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external eye that we don’t have. It’s a matter of keeping us in line!’49 The second session was 
appreciated as a way to help the team put the work completed into perspective. It also resulted 
in them deciding to adopt the target diagram as a new framework for guiding future reflection 
on standard-setting processes. They noted that the value of both exercises was that they brought 
the team together to reflect collectively, which they said was rare. Coming together also enabled 
them to combine their insights as they all had different roles and vantage points on the process. 
Their relationships to one another (for example as ‘colleague’, ‘assistant’, ‘boss’ or ‘line 
manager’) were apparent during the dialogue and shaped who spoke more or less, but both 
events provided opportunities for those supervising or assisting to better understand the work 
and rationales of those who had been managing and working on the project on a daily basis. 
This shows that action-oriented research and deliberate attempts to forge and facilitate specific, 
occasional and timely spaces for reflection, combined with willingness of staff members to 
participate in these sessions did help to develop at least a temporary infrastructure for reflection 
and to provide tools for a more embedded reflection. This is in spite of the tendency for  
workplace busyness to crowd out reflection opportunities (Raelin, 2002).  
8.3.2. Limits to reflection 
Time, capacities (staff members and researcher) and target group 
The reflection opportunities were nevertheless squeezed into timeframes that were insufficient 
for a thorough reflection on the material I brought to the discussions. This was a lesson for me 
as facilitator, in terms of how to best make use of limited time, but it also signalled that time is a 
precious resource for staff members with multiple meetings and deadlines scheduled.  
Another limitation of the support I provided in reflection was perhaps that my insights on 
governance dynamics, interests and hot topics mostly came after the FCS was complete, when 
actually it might have been more useful to share these insights as it was being developed. Also, 
a deliberative policy analysis approach would have entailed making insights available to all the 
various stakeholders in the process while the debates were happening as this could have enabled 
a better understanding and more chance of reducing conflicts and establishing consensus (Li, 
2015). As a single researcher following the process and endeavouring to cover multiple 
perspectives gathered at multiple sites, I had limited capacity to analyse and deliver results 
sooner than I did. However, the punctual feedback I gave to the Project Team after the initial 
external stakeholder meetings did help to flag up potential conflicting interests. In hindsight, 
                                                     
49 The exercise was not repeated mainly because one staff member began working remotely, limiting the 
opportunity to hold another whole-team face to face interactive session.  
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this might have been useful insight to share with all the stakeholders involved but I had not 
considered or discussed this with FTI at the time.  
8.3.3. Further opportunities for reflection within the FCSSP team 
Reflection coaching 
The team’s appreciation of the reflective sessions suggest that my role was necessary as a kind 
of reflection coach, creating spaces and bringing in tools to facilitate reflection which would not 
otherwise happen. I recognise that this coaching support could have potentially extended to a 
closer engagement with individual staff as well as more team sessions to facilitate both 
individual and organisational critical reflection and appraisal as the process unfolded. This was 
perhaps especially necessary as the FCSSP involved a novel product and market that FTI staff 
were completely new to and the learning journey is ongoing. Gray (2007) notes that supportive 
mechanisms (from a coach, mentor or colleague) may help to reduce likelihood of feelings of 
helplessness, frustration and burnout.  
Despite this argument that a greater role for an external reflection coach might have been 
beneficial, the challenge noted by Fischer (2003a) is to catalyse a learning process that can 
continue by itself, without the need for an external party. The goal of a coach then would be to 
support staff and teams in developing the habit of reflecting and coaching themselves and each 
other, and helping them to equip themselves with tools (such as the target diagram) to use for 
this. For this to happen, it would require more time and commitment to reflection from FTI and 
individual staff, clear planning as to when and how to use this time, and a reframing of the 
relationship with the researcher who would need to be equipped with the skills to offer this kind 
of support (such as coaching, mediation and facilitation skills).  
8.3.4. Strengths of the reflective sessions with TIST-Kenya 
Enhancing awareness and gathering experiences of underrepresented stakeholders 
At the end of my fieldwork period with TIST-Kenya, one key informant confirmed the value of 
such an opportunity (referring not only to the workshop but to the multiple discussions we had 
had since my first visit to TIST-Kenya 6 months prior). She said that seeing the Standards and 
Guidelines, and gaining an awareness of why they (as programme contractors) might be doing 
things and how this relates to Standard requirements, is not something they had been given the 
chance to do before. With respect to the Standards they were already certified against, they had 
just been given instructions about which information to collect without seeing the Standards 
themselves. In discussion, we agreed that when you not only see the Standard but participate in 
discussions about what it will look like, and take part in trying it out at a point when it can still 
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be shaped, you can then know what the Standard Setting Organisations are trying to achieve, 
and suggest alternative ways of achieving that, based on your experience. Ensuring the inclusion 
of TIST-Kenya’s point of view at this point proved especially important as the TIST-Kenya 
representative was denied a visa to attend the follow up workshop. Her voice would have 
carried a lot of importance as the only female invitee, and the only person in the room who 
might have been able to testify on the basis of her own experience some of the assertions and 
assumptions being made about carbon project participants, especially women (for example that 
they did not know anything about carbon and did not want to be more actively involved). 
8.3.5. Limits to reflection on Standards by targeted beneficiaries 
Language, accessibility and translation  
FTI had been concerned about not getting enough feedback based on experiences with other 
Standards consultations. The majority of feedback received by FTI during the consultation came 
from the European-based Group of Experts who were mostly active in project development and 
trade rather than from people involved in project implementation on the ground, despite FTI’s 
efforts to engage the latter during the Producer/ Field staff workshops50. The dearth of feedback 
during the consultation from Fairtrade producers and potential FCS project participants points to 
the need for different ways of engaging people and doing the work of translating between policy 
(or Standards) and the everyday language of people. I prepared the participatory policy analysis 
workshop with TIST because I recognised that the FCS 46-page document, which needed to be 
read alongside GSF’s consultation document (which had taken me several hours to download 
with a slow internet connection) was not going to be easy for a team of part time field-based 
workers to read, make sense of and comment on. I wanted to support the TIST-Kenya team to 
put their viewpoints into the consultation, and if I had not intervened, this reflection would not 
have happened and their insight probably would not have reached FTI.  
8.3.6. Further opportunities for supported reflection 
Participatory policy analysis workshops  
The Project Team welcomed the detailed FCS consultation input I brought to them from TIST. 
More workshops of this type could be facilitated by researchers equipped to translate between 
Standards and specific contexts by researchers operating as I did within a specific standards-
                                                     
50 Feedback from Fairtrade internal stakeholders was later gathered by other means in the months 
following the first approval of the FCS. The Project Team described this as going through the ‘Fairtrade 
check’ and as a result, several mechanisms within the FCS changed substantially before it was published. 
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setting process. However, generating detailed feedback in this format from a sufficiently varied 
and diverse group would require scaling up workshops and would be difficult to do by one 
researcher alone. This could be done by developing a workshop facilitation guide (based for 
example on my workshop protocol) and briefing additional researchers or consultants who are 
familiar with particular producer organisations and contexts, on key aspects on which to gather 
detailed comments51.  
8.4. Tracking possible researcher influence on outcomes  
In this section I address the second part of question 3.1- How can action oriented multi-sited 
research contribute to emergent outcomes?  
It is inherent within action-oriented research that one’s presence as a researcher will influence 
the outcome of the process, and that the ‘construction of new knowledge is built on the premise 
of… mutual engagement’ (Greenwood and Levin, 1998:78). Reflexivity or critical reflection, 
defined in Table 8-1, is important for recognising where and how such influences play out and 
taking responsibility for them where possible. It also involves considering the power and 
politics of the researcher’s relation to the setting and actors that are the focus of the research 
(Yanow, 2007), and how such relationships shape what is learned and concluded (Small and 
Uttal, 2005). In section 4.6 I reflected on how my positionality shaped the data collection and 
analysis process. In this section I reflect on my choice to act as ‘friendly outsider’ and to 
contribute to the FCSSP (but without committing to make it a better Standard), and make some 
tentative suggestions as to the types of influence my role and contributions may have had on 
emergent outcomes of the FCSSP.  
8.4.1. The Four Hot Topics 
The four hot topics at the centre of the target diagram (Figure 8-3) had all been identified during 
my analysis of the first Group of Experts meeting in September 2013 but continued to remain 
salient when conducting the longitudinal analysis of the FCSSP52. My choice of four hot topics 
was validated by FTI and GSF when I shared findings with them, although GSF suggested that 
in hindsight a fifth hot topic could be added (see section 8.4.2). I provided inputs on each of the 
                                                     
51 Note that the Project Team had asked me to guide them with questions that could be used in the 
consultation document. I declined because of time constraints, but they found that the questions I posed in 
the House Exercise were useful to draw on in the consultation document.  
52 Notably, if I had conducted equally detailed analyses of meetings with other stakeholders as I did after 
the first Group of Experts meeting, I might have stayed more open to picking up on other topics and 
keeping them on my radar as well. 
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four topics at different points. Below I reflect on how I may have shaped the debates and where 
this may have had intended or unintended consequences.  
8.4.1.1. Project Actors, Roles and Transfer of Knowledge/ Capacities 
My feedback on the role of the project facilitator and the degree to which project participants 
could be expected to organise themselves and take an active role in project management evolved 
throughout the FCSSP as I was exposed to different views and working examples. In initial 
feedback reports I had flagged up the potential that those playing the role of Project Facilitator 
might want to maintain a permanent role for themselves and that FTI should pay attention to 
how the process of transfer of capacities to the Producer Organisation would happen. However, 
during my research with TIST-Kenya I came across a model where it seemed to be working for 
everyone for the Project Facilitator to play a long term role and to have managed the carbon 
project development process. When I completed my own Q sort in September 2014, the 
statements I agreed most strongly with were that ‘in a Fairtrade carbon supply chain, 
intermediaries are acceptable as long as fair distribution of the benefits from sales is ensured’; 
and that ‘people involved in generating Fairtrade carbon credits should not need to take on the 
carbon project development process’ (statements 5 and 21). At the time, I recognised the 
influence of the TIST programme on my responses- and my optimism that a relationship of 
support and skilling up of the Producer Organisation was possible even with the sustained 
presence of the Project Facilitator. I came across some counter evidence at a subsequent 
stakeholder meeting. I heard Project Facilitators deny that project participants were interested or 
capable of taking on more tasks, and I also heard strong views against the sustained 
involvement of a Project Facilitator from Latin American producers. When I conducted a more 
detailed analysis of the mechanisms for ensuring transfer of knowledge and skills to Producer 
Organisations in the final FCS, I identified that there were some shortcomings. In my choice to 
deepen my understanding of carbon projects and relationships between actors on the basis of 
detailed research with one particular programme where relationships were apparently very 
healthy, I may have blinded myself to other scenarios, such as strong co-operatives of producers 
who would like to manage the project entirely by themselves; project participants who 
genuinely do have little interest in taking on more responsibilities; and project participants who 
would like to have more responsibility but for whatever reason are not being given this 
opportunity.  
8.4.1.2. Financial mechanisms 
I had become aware of diverse viewpoints on a possible Fairtrade Minimum Price (FMP) for 
Fairtrade Carbon Credits before I formed any of my own opinions, and felt on several occasions 
that the counterarguments or alternative propositions were being ignored or downplayed, 
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perhaps because the Fairtrade Minimum Price was so embedded in the Fairtrade system that it 
was never an option to not include it. Nevertheless, I flagged up the disagreements on the FMP 
during feedback reports and made space to explore them further during the Q study, feeding the 
results back to FTI and GSF. During my research with TIST-Kenya, I noted that the FMP was 
unlikely to work in that particular context but foresaw that the alternative financial benefit 
sharing mechanism that TIST had customised could possibly work elsewhere as well. I 
suggested the difficulties in applying the FMP to carbon contexts and advocated for alternatives 
to the FMP in various forms of feedback to FTI (consultation documents, papers and a webinar) 
but chose not to write in detail about it in this thesis. This example illustrates that the wider 
politics within FTI and the unlikelihood of a fundamental shift in approach (i.e. alternatives to 
the FMP) shaped my choices about what to include in my analysis and limited the influence of 
my inputs on the FCSSP. 
8.4.1.3. Scope  
In May 2013, I produced a report highlighting the critical views on the carbon market, 
particularly on agricultural carbon projects. This had been requested by FTI so they could begin 
to prepare arguments in response to the critique which they expected would be directed at them. 
The Project Manager asked me to resend this report before the series of CSO meetings in 
August-October 2014, where critique of this nature was expected. The CSOs’ views expressed 
during these meetings had a heavy influence on FTI’s eventual choice to exclude agriculture 
from the scope. In hindsight, my one-sided report may have contributed to FTI’s decision to 
exclude agriculture. A more balanced report presenting both sides of the argument might have 
supported FTI to be better prepared for the debates with CSOs.  
I had expected agricultural projects to be included within the scope given FTI and GSF’s 
original objectives and the centrality of agricultural activities for Fairtrade producers. I had 
noted on several occasions in my feedback that they were at risk of being forgotten or that the 
FCS was at risk of being shaped towards the interests and specificities of cook stove projects 
(because they were the predominant project type to be represented by carbon actors in most of 
the stakeholder meetings). I had been aware of the challenges of implementing viable and robust 
smallholder agriculture projects since the first months of my PhD and had continued to remain 
sceptical as to whether FTI and GSF would find a suitable way to address these challenges. 
However I discovered when presenting my findings that FTI and GSF had been aware of the 
acute challenges related to agriculture from early on in the process. Perhaps by choosing to 
frame my feedback in terms of ‘don’t forget agricultural projects!’, I might have unintentionally 
helped to temporarily smother the more critical topic of ‘are you going to be able to address the 
problems related to them?’.  
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Nevertheless, in the findings sharing sessions with both RPOs I initiated a discussion about the 
disappearance of agriculture from the scope. I framed this as a mismatch with initial public 
communication about the FCS but also raised the question of the challenges related to 
agricultural carbon projects. In both sessions, raising the question triggered both RPOs to 
acknowledge the learning about smallholder agriculture and carbon projects they had had to do 
since making the initial announcements, and admit that fundamental barriers still remained. 
Having spent the last two and a half years developing a Standard for agriculture, GSF had 
gradually gone full circle in their own organisational learning and concluded that agricultural 
carbon projects were unlikely to have a positive impact for smallholder farmers and that what 
they actually need is a means to support them to increase yields and adapt to climate change, not 
to engage in mitigation projects (RRf.5).  
8.4.2. A Fifth Hot Topic?  
When I shared my analysis of the four hot topics with GSF, I received feedback that an 
additional hot topic could be added- one that only emerged in late 2014. This was the question 
of whether commodification and the use of offsetting was really right for what GSF and FTI 
wanted to achieve- which at the outset, was to help smallholder farmers adapt to and mitigate 
climate change. This topic had influenced the FCS heavily in the approval phase, resulting in 
two major changes- one was the name change, from the Fairtrade Carbon Credits Standard to 
the Fairtrade Climate Standard, and the other was the addition of mandatory requirements for 
buyers of Fairtrade Carbon Credits to reduce their own emissions, not only to offset. Both were 
attempts to dilute the focus on offsetting and to bring more of a social justice element into the 
FCS. However during this discussion, the GSF staff member raised the question as to whether a 
standard for certifying projects to create carbon credits and sell to buyers in the north really was 
the right approach for achieving their joint goals, and whether another mechanism such as a 
carbon tax on Fairtrade products might not have been appropriate53. The ability to recognise the 
limitations of their jointly crafted intervention this far on in the process had come as a result of a 
learning journey that still continues for both organisations. It coincides with changes in global 
climate governance, evolving carbon markets, and debates within civil society about the place 
of offsetting. GSF acknowledge that there is still more work to do to design more appropriate 
and beneficial mechanisms to support smallholders in adapting to climate change, and are 
working with FTI and other organisations on this.  
                                                     
53 The issue at stake here arose in the Q study when participants were asked to respond to the statement 
‘we cannot talk about fairness if we are asking poor people to reduce their emissions when high emitters 
have not made commitments to do the same’. At the time, views varied from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly 
disagree’ but the statement elicited an ethical dilemma for many participants.  
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In hindsight, my choice to play a critical role and support critical reflection may have served as 
a more useful accompaniment during this learning journey than the role that the RPOs had 
asked of me at the outset. Although I make no claims to have triggered such a striking example 
of organisational critical reflection, I am grateful to have witnessed it, and to be able to record it 
as this story comes to an end.  
 
8.5. Synthesis of learning from the research process 
The final part of this chapter synthesises the learning that has arisen from completing the first 
ever PhD research project embedded within an FTI Standard Setting Process, addressing 
question 3.2: What can be learnt about conducting collaborative research on standards setting 
processes through this thesis?  
This learning has been based on trial, error and willingness from all parties to navigate arising 
issues and try to accommodate each other’s needs. Given the interest in this form of action-
oriented research both from within FTI and amongst fellow researchers, my aim is to summarise 
aspects which should be considered when designing and implementing future collaborative 
research projects between researchers (specifically PhD students) and Standard Setting 
Organisations or other Research Partner Organisations (RPOs). By making links between our 
experiences (my own and those of the RPOs) and academic literature on action-oriented 
research and post-positivist forms of policy analysis I identify aspects which may be common to 
other similar forms of collaborative research.  
This summary has been developed by documenting the iterative phases of this particular 
collaboration, what was discussed or generated at each phase, and reflecting on what helped and 
what hindered the collaborative process and other aspects that are worth bearing in mind in 
future collaborations. I present this below in the form of a reflective metaphor of a building 
plan54 (Figure 8-4), emphasising the constant iterations between the different zones and the 
need to be flexible and ready to reassess throughout the process.  
 
                                                     
54 Not to be confused with the House metaphor in Figure 8-2. 
269 
 
 
Figure 8-4: The 'Building Plan': spaces to negotiate, design and reflect on collaboration 
8.5.1. Zone 1, Entrance porch: discussions at the initiation of a potential 
collaboration 
The Fairtrade movement receives many research requests from students and other researchers 
and thus far Fairtrade has had no clear process to guide their responses to different types of 
requests (personal communication, MEL consultant). My request was initially met with a 
favourable response because the Project Team saw a synergy between my research focus and 
their work plan. They identified the value of an external eye providing useful inputs as they 
embarked on a journey to develop an entirely new Fairtrade product. Nevertheless, the 
following aspects were important to clarify at this early stage in the collaboration before we 
mutually agreed on the collaboration. These were important for establishing a baseline of trust, 
and being clear about needs and constraints (Small and Uttal, 2005): 
 Establishing purpose of research project and all parties’ intentions and motivations for 
collaboration 
 Clarifying boundaries of the research (e.g. spatial and temporal) 
 Reflecting on expectations about roles/ functions that the researcher and the RPOs may 
take on within the research, and reassess as process unfolds. 
Situating these aspects at the entrance porch is a reminder that these aspects are a first port of 
call but will need to be revisited as the process unfolds. This was particularly necessary in our 
case regarding the roles and functions I took on; the roles proposed by the Project Team that I 
declined to take on; and also the roles that the RPOs found themselves playing. Schut (2012) 
proposes a tool for use ex ante or ex durante for navigating dynamic research configurations in 
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action-oriented research processes where researchers are required to be aware of, and reflect on 
the consequences of fulfilling multiple roles. Unfortunately I discovered this tool only at the end 
of my research and found it relevant but in need of some adaptation to the context of research 
with SSOs. 
8.5.2. Zone 2, Building exterior: designing collaborative infrastructure and 
institutional embedding  
These are the collaboration-specific details that need to be placed in the centre of the action-
research cycle depicted by Susman (1983) in Figure 8-1. In our case, institutional embedding 
involved the following aspects: 
 Research agreement 
 Communication mechanisms and coordination arrangements 
 Structures, opportunities and resources to draw on from within each institution 
The research agreement in particular was a key outcome welcomed by a colleague at the 
Sustainability Research Institute who used it as a model for developing her own agreement with 
another organisation, and staff members in the Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (MEL) 
Unit of Fairtrade who drew on it when developing a student research policy. Pre-existing 
template agreements established by FTI and GSF for use with consultants and interns were 
inappropriate for usage, and prior negative experience of researchers who had misrepresented 
one of the organisations in academic work underscored the need to lay down safeguards and 
establish mutual understanding about intellectual property, the right to be critical, the right to 
review, and treatment of confidential/ sensitive information. Our research agreement was tailor-
made for this collaboration at the outset without a precedent to draw on, but with a minor 
amendment (adding more detail to the procedures for article-reviewing based on experiences of 
the review process) proved to be appropriate for navigating the research.   
Communication and coordination is likely to be person- and situation-specific but our 
collaboration was facilitated by monthly coordination calls during the main collaborative 
phases. My repeated requests for responses to my (often long-winded) emails and the RPOs’ 
recommendations for shorter emails or quick phone calls demonstrated that we all had different 
communication styles based on our own institutional and professional embedding and other 
tasks to manage. Our collaboration was limited by me not being more widely connected with 
FTI as a whole at the outset. In hindsight, the MEL Unit expressed that they would like to have 
been involved in coordinating the research relationship as well as the Standards Unit. By 
locating this aspect at the exterior of the building, it is a reminder that a whole organisation 
approach to collaboration rather than a bilateral collaboration with a particular Unit at FTI might 
allow for a more systematic and coordinated collaboration infrastructure.  
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The collaboration was facilitated by support from within the University of Leeds and the 
Sustainability Research Institute (such as enthusiastic supervisors with experience of 
collaborative research, legal advice from the University’s Research and Innovation Service, and 
departmental motivations to achieve Impact Agenda goals). Similarly, this collaboration timed 
with a growing interest from the MEL Unit within FTI in action research and research on and 
programmes as opposed to former primary interest in products (Fairtrade International: MEL 
Unit, 2015).  
8.5.3. Zone 3: In the waiting room- considering timelines, time 
commitments and available resources 
Waiting rooms are necessary in buildings because of a culture of operating to tight schedules 
that overrun, overcommitting ourselves, and underestimating how long things will take, 
sometimes leaving other people waiting. Initial concerns expressed by the RPOs about the 
different timelines for PhD research and standard-setting processes; and by myself and my 
supervisory teams about the uncertain timeframe of the FCSSP were addressed by the following 
actions:  
 Forecasting and regularly reassessing timelines of standard-setting and research 
processes 
 Defining time commitments  and available resources and reassess as these evolve 
 Incorporating different needs for more punctual results versus longitudinal overview 
into research design 
The collaboration was helped by regular coordination meetings to provide updated timelines 
and plans from all parties; financial resources from my sponsors and from FTI and GSF for 
enabling my attendance at most FCSSP events (allowing for regular face-to-face contact); and a 
flexible research design (see chapter 4). Regarding time and resource commitments, it would 
have been useful for me to keep a better track of the time I spent producing inputs for FTI and 
GSF. The Human Resources department at FTI had asked me to estimate the number of hours I 
would spend but the figure I gave at the outset was arbitrary as I had no basis on which to 
estimate. Nevertheless, in the future, an initial discussion about numbers of hours expected of 
the researcher and RPOs could serve as a useful benchmark for reassessing further down the 
line what was reasonable, feasible and ethical and how to best make use of each party’s time 
and resources. As far as I know, resources spent on supporting or liaising with me had also not 
been quantified by the Project staff with whom I dealt. The Project Manager did however 
recognise that they could have made more use of my support if they had been able to accord 
more time to working with me. One particular underestimated resource implication was the time 
required and short time frame on offer for FTI and GSF to review my academic papers. At the 
time of writing this chapter, FTI was seeking to gain an understanding of the internal resource 
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implications of different types of collaboration and support provided to students. Fairtrade 
would also like to ensure that Fairtrade stakeholders can benefit in return for their engagement 
with student researchers (personal communication, MEL consultant).  
8.5.4. Zone 4: In the canteen- assessing potential stakeholders in the 
research and how they will be involved 
 Assess stakeholders both internal and external to the collaborating organisation(s) 
Canteens in large organisations and institutions are places for interacting with both non-familiar 
and familiar people and this changes the longer you are around. Researchers commonly 
approach Fairtrade organisations with requests to access stakeholders within the Fairtrade 
system but Fairtrade recognise that clearer procedures need to be established regarding what 
stakeholders can expect in return (personal communication, MEL consultant). From my 
perspective, it would have been useful to map relevant and interested stakeholders internal to 
the Fairtrade system to ensure that all those who were interested in the research and outputs 
knew about them. Instead, I came into contact with other staff members fairly organically. 
Sometimes this resulted in messy or uncoordinated communication or people discovering the 
collaboration and outputs late on in the process.  
My involvement in the FCSSP also brought me into contact with a wide range of external 
stakeholders who were willing and relevant participants in my research, but it was important to 
manage these relationships in close communication with the Project Team. I mainly drew upon 
these contacts during the Q study. I attended to the Project Team’s concerns about 
overburdening FCSSP stakeholders by giving each person ample opportunity to decline 
participating and ensuring that I provided something of benefit in return (i.e. support with 
reflection and sharing of findings). 
8.5.5. Zone 5: In the office- discussing questions, tools and contributions 
Offices are often where organisational or professional culture prevails and strongly differs from 
one office or organisation to the next. Action-oriented research often involves navigating the 
conundrum that RPOs and academic partners might frame their questions in different ways, and 
have different needs and concerns regarding research design and outputs (Small and Uttal, 
2005). The following aspects were important to discuss at the outset and to regularly evaluate 
and reassess: 
 Establishing any common questions for research and establishing degree of 
collaboration versus independence for gathering data 
 Designing and creating a set of mutually useful contributions (and reassessing 
usefulness) 
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In my case, I entered into the collaboration with a desire to be as useful and available to respond 
to research needs as possible but later found myself struggling to respect my commitments to 
FTI and GSF as well as my own PhD targets. I dealt with this through a mid-term review and 
follow-up conversations with FTI. This led to clarity about expectations, roles, available 
resources and our mutual and distinct research agendas, all parties’ needs, expectations, 
available resources and a decision on the extent to which we should align our research tools.  
Initial expectations about which inputs would be mutually useful had to be reassessed in 
hindsight. Mutually useful inputs I provided included transcripts of meetings; feedback, notes 
and comments during the process (on standards, meetings and the process); brief syntheses of 
research findings aimed at increasing breadth or diversity of inputs to the FCSSP; and 
interpretations of the FCSSP in hindsight (RRf.5 and SDe). These are summarised in Appendix 
7. 
8.5.6. Zone 6: in the meeting room- sharing findings and supporting 
reflection 
At the outset, we established the importance of sharing findings punctually rather than only at 
the end of the PhD process and planned various moments where research inputs and findings 
could be shared. However, in hindsight our initial plans lacked sufficient discussion on how 
research inputs could most usefully be shared, and with whom. I was often left to work this out 
for myself, and sometimes wasted time producing outputs in less useful formats or missing 
opportunities to share findings with interested and relevant stakeholders. Therefore I 
recommend that future collaborations incorporate the following aspects: 
 Design of appropriate tools for supporting reflection and sharing findings 
 Clarification of how results will be shared and with whom 
One of my own major skill acquisitions from this collaboration was about how to create settings 
for organisational reflection (see section 8.3) and how to synthesise and share results in a 
meaningful way with RPOs. We found that the most effective and enjoyable method was 
interactive sessions combining reflections with syntheses of the process so far, or of general 
findings, as these brought together whole teams and were mutually beneficial for engaging with 
and validating findings (RRf.5 and SDe). Webinars were a suitable second best when we could 
not meet face-to face. Metaphors and images were also useful for facilitating reflection, which is 
why I have chosen the Building Plan as a metaphor for discussion here. Overall, it is important 
to take a frequent look at your framework and what it means to operate within it in practice. 
This Building Plan is missing a phone line, and a web-based platform where researchers and 
RPOs can communicate more regularly and share documents, and a garden to relax in and step 
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back from the workplace and research busyness. However, I have deliberately incorporated the 
space for reflection into the building to emphasise that this needs to be a central part of 
organisational culture and ideally is done collectively in the meeting room as well as 
individually.   
8.6. Conclusion to chapter eight 
Researchers engaging in action-oriented research based on the pathways approach are called to 
engage in pathway-building processes and activities to enhance reflection. We need to critically 
reflect on the dynamic roles and positions we take on and how this shapes process and 
outcomes, and we can also provide support to others in critically reflecting at an individual and 
organisational level (for example about what is happening and how it relates to one’s actions; 
the validity of one’s assumptions and norms; and how these might compare or conflict with 
others’ assumptions and norms). Less is known however about how to do this (with whom, when 
and where, and using which tools). Creating the infrastructure for this is a key aspect of action-
oriented research, resulting in the acquisition of practical knowledge necessary for addressing 
the how question. The knowledge originates from work within particular contexts, but has 
broader applicability. Susman and Evered (1978 p599) call it ‘practics’ and describe it as 
including the know-how necessary for creating settings for (i) organisational learning, (ii) acting 
in un-prescribed non-programmed situations, (iii) generating organisational self-help, (iv) 
establishing action guides where none exist, (v) reviewing, revising and refining the systems we 
are part of and (vi) formulating useful metaphors, constructs and images for articulating a more 
desirable future. This particular collaboration and research design enabled me to develop skills 
in each of these areas, especially (ii), (v) and (vi) (through my engagement in the FCSSP and 
tools to support reflection). The research agreement I developed with legal advice and support 
from my supervisors is an example of (iv); and the facilitation of reflection and sharing of my 
interpretations with the Project Team were contributions towards (i) and (iii).  
I noted that the limitations of the research design and the collaborative context included my 
limited scope to enhance reflection amongst other stakeholders in the FCSSP to the same extent 
as I supported the Project Team; and staff members’ limited time to engage in reflection 
processes or incorporate them into their organisational culture without relying on my presence 
as an external facilitator. This points to the need for researchers to ask themselves who they are 
intending to serve at the beginning of a research process and to position themselves accordingly, 
and for researchers and RPOs to be realistic and honest about capacities and expectations 
throughout a research process. One unresolved issue of capacity I encountered, was that as a 
single researcher, I was unable to reflect back to all stakeholders my interpretations of the 
governance dynamics and conflicting interests at a time when they could have made use of them 
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to navigate the FCSSP. I did this mainly ex post, with the Project Team only. Li (2015) 
recommends that a team or a think-tank of researchers and analysts is necessary for producing 
and delivering such reflections in real time.  
Strengths of this design and collaborative context included opportunities to bring in localised 
knowledge to the FCSSP, assemble and reflect back diverse viewpoints, create temporary 
spaces for reflection and develop salient constructs and metaphors, at least one of which was 
taken on board by the Project Team as a tool for reflecting on future standard-setting processes 
(section 8.2.2). I recommended in this chapter that a more active role in standard-setting work 
for action-oriented researchers with appropriate skills could involve designing and/or facilitating 
participatory policy appraisal workshops and serving as reflection coaches for staff and team 
members, particularly when the work involves significant questioning of assumptions, steep 
learning curves and major uncertainties. Overall, the research serves as an example of a 
mutually beneficial collaboration and basis for FTI to draw on in their work to develop policies 
and infrastructure for future collaborations with researchers. 
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Chapter 9 General Conclusion 
The overall aim of this thesis was to unpack fairness in standard setting processes and carbon 
projects through action-oriented research. A pathways approach was adopted in order to both 
critically assess, and engage with the processes of defining, framing, bounding of fairness and 
governing the FCSSP. This chapter summarises the contributions towards this aim, structuring 
the discussion around the three research objectives. This is followed by a brief discussion of 
how this thesis advances both theory and pathways research, followed by a thematic discussion 
of how it contributes to bridging a number of key literature areas and academic approaches. The 
chapter concludes with recommendations for future collaborations between researchers and 
standard-setting organisations and future research.  
9.1. Addressing the research objectives 
Objective 1: To uncover the debates, perspectives and different options for achieving 
fairness within carbon projects, and explore them in relation to the FCS 
Objective 1 was addressed through four questions: (1.1) how is ‘fair carbon’ understood and 
defined by different people involved in the FCSSP? (1.2) whose definitions and understandings 
are incorporated into the FCS? (1.3) which assumptions and evidence is the Theory of Change 
for the FCS based on? and (1.4) what can example carbon projects tell us about possible 
pathways to the outcomes and impacts articulated in the Theory of Change as the FCS is 
applied? Questions 1.1 and 1.2 were set based on an observation that the concepts of ‘fairness’ 
and ‘carbon’ were being combined (by FTI, GSF and other actors) without sufficient clarity on 
what was meant by this. Chapter 1 recommended an empirical analysis of these concepts and 
their usage, particularly necessary because of the ethical debates about whether ‘carbon’ could 
be ‘fair’ (chapter 1) and the series of challenges that FTI and GSF would need to address if they 
were to achieve what they set out to (chapter 2). 
Chapter 1 adapted an existing framework for exploring dimensions of fairness. This involved 
seeking a better understanding of how the various dimensions of fairness interact with one 
another, an aspect which had been noted as a knowledge gap in the original framework 
(McDermott et al., 2013). In particular, I made links between Fair Procedures and Fair 
Parameter-setting so that the analytical lens could be placed simultaneously on fairness within 
carbon projects and within standard-setting processes. This was a unique contribution that built 
on the work of previous scholars who had applied equity frameworks either to carbon projects 
(e.g. Mulyani and Jepson, 2015), or to standards governance and standards content (McDermott, 
2013, Pinto and McDermott, 2013). As such, my own Multi-Dimensional Fairness Framework 
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was used to navigate an exploration of fairness definitions and mechanisms used within, or 
relevant to analyses at, different levels (within projects, within standards content, and within 
standard-setting processes). The framework provided a structure for understanding the interplay 
between different notions, contexts and practice, and identifying tensions between multiple 
notions co-existing at different scales, and therefore shaped the analytical lenses for the 
remaining chapters of the thesis. In section 9.2 I discuss the potential extensions to this 
framework. 
Chapter 2 operationalised FTI and GSF’s concept of ‘fair carbon’ by exploring the aspects they 
had originally suggested it might include and relating these to theory and literature. ‘Access’, 
‘benefits’ and ‘participation’ were linked to the three elements in the core of the Multi-
Dimensional Fairness Framework and examined in the context of literature on carbon projects 
involving agriculture and forestry in Sub Saharan Africa. This review pointed to challenges that 
FTI and GSF would need to grapple with in developing the FCS which was due to be targeted at 
smallholders and communities; as well as existing tools and approaches already deployed within 
standards and certification. The Multi-Dimensional Fairness Framework and literature review in 
chapter 2 laid the groundwork for the empirical contributions of this thesis linked to objective 1.  
Chapter 5 addressed questions 1.1 and 1.2 by means of a Q study with 26 participants selected 
from the pool of stakeholders participating in the FCSSP. The study supported participants in 
reflecting on and articulating their own notions of fairness. Interpretation of the data resulted in 
three distinct factors or sets of shared viewpoints. These then served as a benchmark for 
exploring which definitions were eventually included in the final FCS (see section 5.6) and 
which ones were left out. This Q study was a unique contribution in terms of unpacking 
multiple perceptions of fairness, which were otherwise glossed over during the more narrowly 
focussed stakeholder discussions on standards mechanisms convened by FTI. Communication 
of the results to FTI, GSF and all the participants enabled a more open and inclusive standard-
setting process. It was a way of assembling plural notions and demonstrating the tensions 
between them, reflecting them all back to the proponents of these notions, and providing a wider 
yet manageable set of inputs for the FCSSP. By contributing towards greater clarity on the 
dimensions of fairness that the FCS incorporates, the study results may be useful to FTI as a 
benchmark for evaluating performance and fairness outcomes with respect to each of these 
dimensions. The study also increased FTI’s awareness of a methodological tool that could be 
useful for future explorations of diverse viewpoints on contentious topics arising in standard-
setting processes (see section 9.5). The main limitation of this study was that by choosing to (i) 
select statements from material articulated in the context of the FCSSP and (ii) target 
participants I had encountered within the FCSSP activities, I missed an opportunity to explore 
notions of ‘fair carbon’ amongst a broader population. Also, the breadth of dimensions explored 
278 
 
in the Q study were limited by my use of the Multi-Dimensional Fairness Framework, which 
was my own (theoretically-driven) attempt at framing fairness and setting boundaries around 
what I explored. For the most part this proved useful and adequate, but in hindsight I recognise 
that I may have neglected attending to the more relational and dynamic aspects of fairness 
perhaps better captured within Organisational Theories of Justice (see section 9.2).    
Chapter 7 moved beyond definitions of fairness to an exploration of different assumptions and 
evidence about how it might be achieved in carbon projects, tackled through questions 1.3 and 
1.4. These questions were set in acknowledgement of a reflection gap regarding the FCS Theory 
of Change (it had not been adequately discussed with diverse stakeholders during its 
conception, see chapter 7). Also, FTI welcomes research that helps them to better understand, 
test and improve their Theories of Change (Chapter 7) and my research is the first example of a 
systematic critical unpacking of the FCS Theory of Change. Question 1.4 in particular was 
developed in response to a dearth of empirical data on the impact of carbon standards and their 
ability to produce changes in projects (chapter 1, research gap 2) and in recognition that it was 
still relatively unknown how the proposed fairness mechanisms in the FCS would apply to 
carbon projects. Chapter 2 identified knowledge gaps in the literature regarding (i) different 
types of organisational structures in carbon projects and how these interact with standards 
requirements, and (ii) non-financial benefits in particular. The original study design involved 
empirical work on the application of the FCS within pilot carbon projects (chapter 4) but as this 
proved not to be temporally feasible, chapter 7 is thus based on alternative empirical evidence 
collected from two independently selected carbon programmes55 which offer useful 
hypothetical lessons about how the FCS would play out if applied by either programme. This 
empirical work served to contextualise the FCS and increase the pool of evidence relevant to the 
FCS Theory of Change.  
Analysis for this chapter led to the identification of seven embedded assumptions, divergent 
evidence (both corroborating and contradicting the logic in the Theory of Change), only partial 
support for some of the key concepts in the Theory of Change (such as Producer, Producer 
Organisation and Facilitator) and potential weaknesses in the mechanisms expected to result in 
transfer of knowledge and capacities to producer organisations. Analysis of empirical work in 
Kenya illuminated the opinions, knowledge and unique approaches of those implementing 
carbon programmes and contributed new empirical insight on the dynamic roles and 
                                                     
55 When this work was presented at the Fair Trade International Symposium in Milan in 2015, an 
audience member from Fairtrade Foundation (one of the National Fairtrade Organisations) appreciated in 
particular that my research had involved independent fieldwork (not commissioned by FTI and with 
carbon programmes not selected by FTI for piloting the FCS) as in her opinion, the latter was likely to be 
more biased.  
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relationships between different actors in carbon projects; organisational structures appropriate 
for carbon projects; and different types of non-financial benefit such as increase in skills and 
capacities and mechanisms for extending these benefits beyond the core management team 
within an organisation. This empirical data pointed to the relational elements within carbon 
projects and their impact on perceptions of fairness and change outcomes. This again led me to 
question the adequacy of the Multi-Dimensional Fairness Framework and look to 
Organisational Justice Theories for a better understanding (see 9.2). Overall, the analyses in 
chapter 7 serve as a basis for FTI to learn from and underline aspects to monitor as the FCS and 
its Theory of Change are reviewed and revised.  
Objective 2: To describe and analyse the process of collaborative development of the FCS 
The second objective and three associated questions were set in acknowledgement of the 
following weaknesses within, and knowledge gaps about the practice of standard-setting. 
Chapters 1 and 3 articulated the critique that producers or other stakeholders expected to comply 
with standards on the ground, are often not accorded sufficient space to articulate their views; 
and questioned the inclusivity, accessibility and participatory nature of standard-setting 
processes including those led by FTI. Chapter 1 pointed to the knowledge gap about how FTI 
standards are set and criteria are defined and the need for greater transparency and critical 
assessment of standard-setting processes. This was deemed particularly necessary in the context 
of an initiative seeking to define and legitimise the controversial matter of ‘fair carbon’ (chapter 
1), which was led by the central organisation in a fair trade movement already beset with 
tensions regarding definitions of fairness (chapter 1 and 5).  
Chapter 6 presented the empirical material for addressing objective 2 and questions 2.1-2.3 
(what did the FCSSP look like in terms of forums for input, debates and interests? How did the 
FCS reflect stakeholder input and what shaped this? What does this say about participatory 
governance in practice?). It provided the first in-depth exploration of a complete standard-
setting process (building on action-oriented and/or ethnographic research on particular decisions 
within FTI standard- and price-setting processes provided by previous researchers). This 
involved the following contributions: 
 Providing a better understanding of standard setting processes as sites of conflict, 
tension and negotiation. This included surfacing and exploring inherent conflicts and 
non-consensus between stakeholders whose interests or opinions appeared on the 
surface to be shared, and understanding how conflicting views were able to co-exist, be 
transformed or remain opposed.  
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 Developing a heuristic for mapping governance dynamics in the context of the FCSSP, 
also considered by the Standards Unit at FTI to be relevant for navigating future 
standard-setting processes. This included developing a new concept of rug-tugging. 
 Tracking the decision-making process regarding key topics of standard scope and 
pricing mechanisms. This included identifying attempts by different actors (including 
myself) to open up deliberation, counterbalance dominant interests and powers and slow 
down decisions; as well as attempts to steer towards decisions.  
 Identifying the disjuncture between deliberation and decision-making that appeared in 
the FCSSP in interaction with FTI governance provisions, and the onus this placed on 
the Project Team to bridge the disjuncture, be accountable to all and craft a standard 
accepted by as many of the stakeholders as possible.  
Overall, my empirical work and position with respect to the FCSSP allowed for an external 
eye as an extra measure of accountability vis à vis the Project Team and their onerous task; 
provided a transparent documentation of the FCSSP; and contributed towards a greater 
understanding of the strengths and limits of FTI’s participatory governance approach in 
practice. My accompaniment of the FCSSP was recognised as valuable by the Project Team 
but also other staff within the Fairtrade system such as the Monitoring, Evaluation and 
Learning Unit and staff at Fairtrade Foundation (the UK National Fairtrade Organisation)56 
particularly because of its nature as an innovative process involving embarking on a 
learning journey. 
Objective 3: To assess the value of action-oriented research in collaborative standard-
setting processes 
Objective 3 and questions 3.1 and 3.2 (How can action-oriented multi-sited research enhance 
reflection amongst stakeholders involved in the research, and how does it shape outcomes? 
What can be learnt about conducting collaborative research on standard setting processes 
through this thesis?) were formulated because of the centrality of reflection (self-reflection and 
supporting others to reflect) in action-oriented research processes (see chapters 4 and 8). Also, it 
was paramount to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the methodological innovations and 
unusual role of the researcher enacted in this research process, and to glean lessons. This 
objective contributes to addressing two particular gaps in know-how (see chapter 1). The first 
gap is how to engage in pathway-building processes, including opening them up to receive a 
broader set of inputs and convening processes of deliberation at different levels. This gap was 
                                                     
56 Evidence based on comments provided at the Fair Trade International Symposium during a 
presentation of my work and subsequent discussions between researchers and Fairtrade staff.  
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pertinent in the case of this thesis because researcher engagement with a complete standard-
setting process led by FTI had never been done before. The second gap is how to enhance 
reflection and reflexivity in path-building processes, in terms of (i) allowing destinations, routes 
and directions to be considered by multiple people; (ii) developing infrastructure for reflection 
in organisations (see chapter 8) and (iii) acknowledging our own positions and influences vis à 
vis the pathway-building process and communicating honestly about them in an academically 
appropriate format.  
Chapter 8 summarised my reflections on research design, efforts to support reflection, 
researcher roles, positionality and influence. The main contributions of this thesis regarding 
reflection were the tools and examples of attempts to enhance reflection assessed in chapter 8, 
and the Q study (chapter 5). Overall, I have demonstrated a role for researchers in (i) supporting 
people to reflect themselves, and (ii) reflecting back interpretations of what happened to those 
who lead an innovative process. Designing and conducting the research also enabled me to 
develop the practical skill-set for facilitating reflection (see chapter 8). The second part of 
chapter 8 discussed what can be learnt about conducting collaborative research (question 3.2). 
Infrastructure and learning from this particular collaboration is likely to contribute to future 
research processes (concretely in terms of creating a research agreement template and providing 
input for FTI’s researcher-engagement policy making work). One of the key considerations to 
address each time a researcher intends to enhance reflection in a collaborative research context 
is who is the researcher serving- i.e. enhancing reflection for whom? A remaining challenge is 
how to temporally organising the reflecting-back and the trade-offs between doing it during the 
deliberative process when stakeholders can use the researcher’s interpretations to make sense of 
the process as it unfolds; and doing it ex post (allowing the researcher to step back and conduct 
a holistic process analysis). Each has different implications on researcher capacity and the 
former in particular may require a team of researchers or a bigger time commitment from a 
single researcher, so that data collection, analysis, and feeding back can all happen in a short 
space of time.  
9.2. Advancing Theories on Fairness 
The Multi-Dimensional Fairness Framework I used throughout this thesis was useful for 
exploring perceptions of fairness across the six dimensions included in the framework, but 
empirical work pointed to a more dynamic and relational aspect of fairness that was perhaps not 
adequately captured within my original framework. Fair Access in my framework (see Table 
1-1) attends to the way that people participate based on power, wealth and resources but easily 
leads to an assessment of pre-existing conditions rather than seeing these elements as dynamic, 
shifting and actively shaped. Fair Procedures attends both to the procedures themselves, and the 
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ways that they shape people’s participation and negotiation processes. However, once again, it 
is tempting to consider the procedures as static and to understand participation only in terms of 
the possibilities created by the procedures. The empirical evidence I gathered in this thesis (in 
the Q study interviews, during observations of the FCSSP and during programme observations 
with TIST), corroborates the assertion that ‘the interpersonal implementation of procedures need 
not (or cannot) be separated from their structural aspects’ (Colquitt et al., 2001 p427).   
Having considered the limits of the Multi-Dimensional Fairness Framework, we can reflect in 
more depth on the dynamics of social relationships and their impact on fairness by looking at 
theories of Organisational Justice. While these began in the mid-1970s with a lens on procedural 
and distributive fairness (Colquitt et al., 2001), they began taking interactional fairness into 
account in the mid-1980s (initially by Bies and Moag, 1986). This involves a recognition that 
the ongoing experience of relationship and the quality of treatment within interactions has an 
effect on the way that fairness is perceived (Ariño and Ring, 2010). Views differ among 
Organisational Justice theorists on the way that interactional fairness overlaps with procedural 
fairness and how best to conceptualise it. Some authors have found it useful to refer to two 
separate elements of informational fairness and interpersonal fairness and explore them 
alongside procedural and distributive fairness (Ariño and Ring, 2010, Colquitt, 2001) whereas 
others have considered elements of interactional under the banner of procedural fairness (see 
Colquitt et al., 2001). Notably, within Organisational Justice theories there is no notion of ‘Fair 
Access’ (or related concepts used by Environmental Justice scholars such as equity of access or 
contextual equity, see Table 1-1) and so there has been no analysis of how interactional fairness 
and Fair Access might overlap. Colquitt et al. (2001 p427) define interpersonal fairness as the 
treatment of people with politeness, respect and dignity by those who are involved in executing 
procedures or determining outcomes; and informational fairness as the explanations given to 
people that convey information about why procedures were used in a certain way or why 
outcomes were distributed in a certain fashion. They see that the former is most likely to alter 
reactions to decisions on outcomes, and the latter is most likely to alter reactions to procedures. 
Connections between dignity, participation and justice or fairness have also been made within 
Peace Studies: drawing on the centrality of the concept of dignity in the Zapatista movement; 
Bühler (2002) proposes a focus on dignity as a way of moving on from the ‘tyranny’ of 
participation (see Cooke and Kothari, 2001). 
These interactional dimensions of fairness are relevant both to standard setting processes led by 
FTI, and to the implementation of the FCS within carbon projects as both involve dynamics 
where some people have a greater hold on information and are more in control of procedures 
than others. For example, I perceived an informational shortfall in the FCSSP when the Project 
Team failed to provide sufficient feedback or a rationale to those who had taken part in the 
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earlier phases of the FCSSP, for eventually excluding agricultural projects from the scope in the 
final phase of the FCSSP (section 6.6.1.4.). It would be useful to assess perceptions of 
informational and interpersonal fairness amongst others who took part and to understand how 
this might have shaped their perception of fairness within (i) the procedures, and (ii) the 
outcomes of the FCSSP.  
With respect to projects applying the FCS, their written procedures (such as the contractual 
agreement between the Project Facilitator and Producer Organisation) are the primary indices 
that the FCS relies on for assessing relationships. However, my analysis has shown that these 
are probably insufficient for understanding whether producer organisation members are satisfied 
with the arrangements with the Project Facilitator, the way they are being treated by others in 
the project and with the way that information is conveyed57. Also, experiences of social 
relationships are likely to be more material and tangible than notions of the carbon for many 
project participants. Further consideration of the dimensions of fairness (supported both by the 
Multi-Dimensional Fairness Framework and additional insight from Organisational Justice 
theories) suggests that focussing on the relationship aspects of the project might be more 
effective than focussing on the carbon, as a means for understanding what the project is all 
about and why it is Fairtrade. 
Findings from chapter 7 also support the view that interpersonal fairness is linked to fair 
benefit-sharing (or in the language of Organisational Justice theorists, distributional fairness) 
(Colquitt et al., 2001). In section 7.6.1.3 I described some of the experiences reported by TIST 
members as a result of programme participation, including feeling uplifted, less shy and finding 
it easier to interact: these interpersonal dimensions were qualified as programme benefits. The 
FCS Theory of Change recognises dignity and self-esteem amongst the expected impacts of 
Fairtrade carbon projects Figure 7-1. A focus on interpersonal fairness might help to postulate 
plausible theories about how such impacts might be attained.   
9.3. Advancing Pathways research, Opening up Pathways? 
In section 1.3 I introduced the normative goal of pathways research, to ‘open up’ the space 
which may allow for recognition of the pathways which support the goals and ambitions of 
particular groups of poorer and marginalised people, and allow these to flourish (Leach et al., 
2010). I have attempted to do this through the use of six pathways components. The first four, 
which were concerned with uncovering and identifying, aligned with a more typical style of 
                                                     
57 Perceptions of fairness may not be the only factor that people draw on to determine their satisfaction 
with the relationship. 
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academic analysis done by social scientists. In contrast, the last two required me to take on a 
more active role in the path-building process- to engage with it and enhance reflexivity. This 
required a more novel role and less is known, even by those who advocate it (Gray, 2007, 
Stirling et al., 2007), about how to do this. I dedicated chapter 8 to a detailed reflection both on 
how I did this, as well as which possible impacts it might have had on the path-building process 
and where further opportunities to enhance reflection might be possible. Conceptualising the 
FCS as a universalising pathway, I have acted to resist temptations for ‘fairness’ to be co-opted 
in the carbon market without adequate reflection on what it means; I have tried to hold FTI 
accountable to their own governance processes and point out where perspectives were being 
forgotten or discounted; and I have sought to identify where the FCS pathway may not be 
appropriate or may not sufficiently recognise alternative approaches to achieving the same 
overarching goals. While FCS will always be generalising, by nature of it being a standard, its 
potential for dominance is yet to be seen, as this depends on whether and how it gains ground, 
both amongst potential licensees, and within the market.   
9.4. Overall knowledge contributions: towards integration 
By collaborating, FTI and GSF attempted to integrate the previously separate fields of fair trade 
and carbon and draw together a new combination of networks, knowledges, concepts, 
procedures, governance structures and certification systems. Taking this practice-based example 
of integration as the focus of enquiry, this thesis makes an important contribution to 
sustainability science as a practical example of ‘integrative research’- research that attempts to 
counter the fragmentation between disciplines, between researchers and practitioners, and 
between research-based knowledge and action (van Kerkhoff, 2014). Researching this topic has 
involved combining literature from sustainability standards and carbon projects, and drawing on 
a broad set of disciplines such as environmental justice, environmental and sustainability 
governance, the geography of commodities, climate policy, participatory and deliberative policy 
analysis, mediation and conflict resolution, ethics, organisational change, organisational justice 
and management learning. In the paragraphs below I summarise briefly the main links made 
between these fields and my specific contributions (the details of which were provided in each 
empirical chapter).  
9.4.1. Environmental Justice, Organisational Justice and theories on 
Fairness, Justice and Equity  
This thesis has contributed to the body of social constructionist work on fairness, equity and 
justice. Under this approach, understanding particular framings is more important than the exact 
terminology (Schroeder and McDermott, 2014). I have chosen to use the concept of fairness 
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throughout but have sketched out the main overlaps and differences with respect to equity and 
justice. By applying Sikor et al.’s (2014) approach to a new area of standard setting, I have 
explored multiple empirical notions of fairness in practice, using theory to help identify and 
make sense of them, and I have examined their implications in different places. I have outlined a 
potential new bridge between Organisational Justice and Environmental Justice (see 9.2), but 
there is still more work to be done in discriminating between the constructs used in each field 
and understanding what they mean to people, how they link together and how they shape 
outcomes. Overall, this thesis has contributed to what Schlosberg (2004:517) calls a ‘plural yet 
unified theory and practice’ – of justice in his words, and of fairness in my own.  
9.4.2. Carbon trading, standards and projects 
In chapter 1 of this thesis I outlined the opposing views on the carbon economy, which are 
generally based on ethical or efficiency rationales. Some scholars have suggested ways to move 
on from the gridlock between views, for example by ensuring that any ethical appraisals are 
sensitive to the forms that carbon trading can take (Caney, 2010) and by examining what the 
people involved in carbon schemes consider as fair and legitimate (Caney, 2010, Page, 2012). 
However, their own analyses have remained at the level of carbon trading generally, as opposed 
to the instruments used to facilitate this trade or the actors involved in it. Other authors have 
recommended seeking a more nuanced understanding of how carbon instruments operate in 
particular places and linking this to justice debates (Corbera and Martin, 2015). There is fairly 
wide agreement amongst authors approaching the subject from different angles, that the carbon 
economy is not currently meeting intended objectives and that it needs to transform (Boyd et al., 
2011, Bumpus, 2011a, Ciscell, 2010, Corbera and Martin, 2015), though there are fewer 
suggestions as to how, or research on instances where it is being transformed. My work has 
taken on board these concerns and has sought to consider ongoing processes to enhance fairness 
in the carbon sector. I have addressed the scalar fragmentation between research on carbon 
projects, and research on carbon standards by looking at how the requirements and approach 
within the FCS played out in the context of particular carbon projects, through empirical 
research. This bridges the contributions of scholars (such as Fisher, 2012, Mathur et al., 2014, 
Jindal et al., 2012, Reynolds, 2012) who focussed their analyses on carbon projects; reviews of 
carbon standards (such as Peters-Stanley and Gonzalez, 2014, Sterk, 2009, Kollmuss et al., 
2008, Wood, 2011); and desk reviews of carbon projects and standards mechanisms (e.g. 
Suiseeya and Caplow, 2013). Overall I have contributed to the recognised need for multi-
faceted and multi-dimensional explanations of how the carbon economy functions and for 
whom as well as how it might be transformed (Boyd et al., 2011), by focusing on and drawing 
lessons from one particular niche. 
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9.4.3. Fairtrade, governance and standard setting 
By exploring an entire Fairtrade standard-setting process based around the development of a 
novel Fairtrade product, my work has contributed to the literature on Fairtrade, participatory 
governance and the politics of standard setting.  
Several authors have suggested the opportunities and challenges for applying Fairtrade to other 
commodities (Ciscell, 2010, Klooster, 2006, Taylor, 2005a, Hilson and Kamlongera, 2013) or 
making existing product standards more appropriate to particular regions (Hilson and 
Kamlongera, 2013). Although Fairtrade has subsequently undertaken work to develop or modify 
standards to make it applicable in each of the recommended areas, no other authors have 
documented these processes. My work on extending Fairtrade to carbon contributes to a more 
integrated understanding of the Fairtrade movement and its evolution by linking debates that 
arose within the context of the FCSSP with broader debates across the Fairtrade movement (e.g. 
mainstreaming, commodification, governance) (Doherty et al., 2013, Raynolds and Greenfield, 
2015, Renard and Laconto, 2013, Renard, 2015), and key concepts and mechanisms within the 
FCSSP. In this case, linking the concepts has also involved identifying where there are still 
significant differences in what they mean and how they apply in different contexts where 
Fairtrade certification is applied. This builds on points made by Blowfield and Dolan (2010), 
Getz and Shreck (2006), Nelson and Martin  (2015), Phillips (2014), about the specificity of 
each Fairtrade commodity and geography where Fairtrade certification is applied and the need 
to be careful about claims made about ethical labels (see 9.6 for recommendations about which 
aspects of the FCS and its Theory of Change need to be better understood before any strong 
claims can be made about them in Fairtrade communications).  
In terms of standard setting, my work extends a series of contributions by scholars (such as 
Bacon, 2010, Reinecke, 2010, Reinecke and Ansari, 2015) who looked at discrete decision-
making processes on particular aspects of Fairtrade certification that had historic significance. It 
also builds on analyses of other standard setting processes where authors have also looked at the 
application of particular governance and decision-making tools and the management of 
participation in multi-stakeholder processes (Cheyns, 2011, Djama et al., 2011, Murphy and 
Yates, 2011). In an effort to move beyond some of the more critical approaches to the politics of 
standards (Blowfield and Dolan, 2008) where there is a tendency to focus on power as primarily 
concentrated in the global north, I have attended to the power and politics of standard-setters but 
also countervailing power and counter-politics in standard setting processes. This is an 
important part of pathways research (Leach et al., 2010) and builds on authors such as 
(Goodman and Herman, 2015) and (Renard, 2015, Sutton, 2013) who have acknowledged the 
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strategic use and/or transformation of Fairtrade by actors in the global south and the existence of 
countervailing power across the fair trade movement.  
9.4.4. Commodification of carbon and fairness 
My work made use of commodification approaches, both commodity-general (Castree, 2004) 
and specific to carbon (Bumpus, 2011a, Goodman and Boyd, 2011, Lovell et al., 2009) These 
have been necessary for rendering carbon into an analytical category; drawing attention to the 
social relationships it is imbued with and the neoliberal system that promotes and facilitates 
commodification. By combining this with literature on the commodification of Fairtrade 
(Guthman, 2002, Goodman, 2004, Lekakis, 2012), I have contributed to a better theoretical 
understanding of what it means to commodify ‘fair carbon’. My practical and grounded 
approach has enabled a better empirical understanding of what the constitution and 
commodification of fair carbon means to the people actively involved producing, transacting 
and governing this new commodity and who has a hold on what carbon means. This has enabled 
a more nuanced understanding of the commodification process, recognising that it provides both 
opportunities and difficulties (Bumpus, 2011a), and that access to opportunities or experience of 
difficulties depends in part on the interpersonal relations between people in the project and the 
efforts to convey information. I have shown that more of a focus on what the ‘fair’ part of fair 
carbon means to the people involved in producing and transacting it might be more effective 
than expecting people to learn how to articulate exactly what the ‘carbon’ part means.  
9.4.5. Bridging theory and practice: research-based knowledge and action 
By situating myself amidst the FCSSP and taking a collaborative and process-oriented approach 
to knowledge creation, I have been well-positioned to address the arising knowledge gaps and 
deliberative shortfalls within the FCSSP and explore the trajectories of decision-making 
processes and outcomes. Producing knowledge in interaction is one way of attempting to 
increase the salience, legitimacy and credibility of knowledge (Cash et al., 2006, Miller, 2013)- 
in this case making this thesis more relevant, contextual and useful to the practitioners who are 
taking the action to develop and roll out the FCS. In order to test this, the main findings, 
frameworks and heuristics in each chapter were discussed interactively with FTI and GSF in 
order to validate them before completion. Working in this way is a contribution towards 
bridging the gap between research-based knowledge and action. My positionality is more 
similar to that of Reinecke (Reinecke, 2010, Reinecke and Ansari, 2015) and Bacon (2010), 
although in each case, the relationship and any prior history or future involvement with 
Fairtrade was unique. We have each found Fairtrade standard setting or price negotiation 
processes to be highly contested, negotiated and shaped by constraints and convictions, and we 
have each situated these processes as pathways shaped by historical trajectories and shaping 
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future trajectories. This highly engaged approach perhaps lends itself to recognising the 
individuals, the contradictions and dilemmas, the internal politics and interpersonal 
relationships that shape and characterise standard setting.  
There are of course other options for producing knowledge about standards, certification and 
multi-stakeholder initiatives and I have used the insights gathered from alternative approaches 
throughout this thesis. These include the more critical and/or detached approaches where the 
research is conducted without a commitment to deliver findings to the SSO (Blowfield and 
Dolan, 2008, Cheyns, 2011), research completed as part of consultancies commissioned by FTI 
(Nelson and Smith, 2011, Nelson and Martin, 2011, Nelson and Pound, 2010), independent 
research conducted by scholars who maintain an ongoing relationship with FTI (Tallontire and 
Nelson, 2013, Tallontire, 2009) and research conducted by Fairtrade or ex-Fairtrade 
practitioners (Doherty et al., 2013). In each case, positionality has an impact on the researcher’s 
access, framing choices and decisions about what to write, who should validate and where to 
publish. I recognise the value of each approach (and indeed many of the researchers cited here 
have conducted research from multiple angles). In my case, building relationships with the 
people who had a stake in the research and its outcomes and interacting in positive and 
productive ways helped to bridge the gap between researchers and practitioners, leaving the FTI 
and GSF staff with whom I interacted with a positive impression of what can arise from 
collaborating with researchers.  
9.5. Recommendations for future standard setting processes 
This thesis highlights a number of opportunities for enhancing participatory collaborative 
outcomes and engaging with researchers in standard-setting processes. These are given below, 
and are based on the four empirical chapters of this thesis. 
Chapter 6 acknowledged the problems arising when decisions need to be made on ‘hot topics’ 
but the decision-makers are isolated from the spaces where such topics are deliberated. This 
places a burden on the middle managers who need to bridge the disjuncture between 
deliberation and decision-making. The following points should be considered if FTI or GSF are 
designing a multi-stakeholder process for deliberation of the issues that remain unresolved in 
the context of the FSSSP, regarding smallholder adaptation, mitigation and agricultural carbon 
projects and development of effective and consensual approaches.  
Deliberators: during the FCSSP, those who had most opposing opinions on agricultural carbon 
projects did not get the opportunity to meet and discuss directly (chapter 6). Instead the process 
relied on the Project Team collecting opinions from separate participative forums and then 
encountering their non-reconcilability. The unresolved issues would benefit from being 
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deliberated by a range of stakeholders representing the spectrum of opinions. In the FCSSP, this 
would have meant combining members of the working group, civil society and Fairtrade 
producer organisations in one forum. Members of the Standards Committee would ideally be 
part of this deliberative process so that they could benefit from hearing and contributing to the 
spectrum of opinions, learning from the deliberative process and using this to inform their 
decision-making within the Standards Committee.  
Deliberative focus: assembling people to discuss whether agricultural carbon projects should 
be included within the scope of the FCS is likely to result in stalemate because some of FTI’s 
key partner CSOs are currently opposed to agricultural carbon projects while Fairtrade 
producers are likely to continue advocating for support for their agricultural activities. Instead, 
people could be assembled to discuss the question ‘what should be done to support small-scale 
farmers to adapt to climate change?’. This question would unite deliberators around a common 
focus.  
Inputs for deliberation: if FTI and GSF were to engage diverse stakeholders in a meaningful 
debate, they would need to pass onto them their lessons and evidence related to the issues of 
adaptation and mitigation, agricultural carbon projects and small-scale farmers in a way that 
would enable the deliberators to better understand the topic and come to their own conclusions. 
Such inputs could include (i) lessons from smallholder carbon projects in agriculture; (ii) 
assessments of sustainable agricultural practices and their relevance for small-scale farmers and 
mitigation projects; (iii) data from FCS-certified carbon projects about the application of the 
adaptation plan mandated by the FCS and which adaptation practices relevant to agriculture (if 
any) were being facilitated by it; (iv) data from FCS-certified carbon projects about any positive 
effects on agricultural adaptation facilitated by mitigation activities in the forestry or energy 
sectors. 
Chapter 5 demonstrated the value of Q as a method for opening up standard-setting processes to 
a broad but manageable set of inputs from diverse stakeholders. Below are ways that Q could be 
used in standard-setting processes. 
a) Q studies can be held before and after multi-stakeholder events in order to measure 
changes of an opinion on a topic and therefore support processes of reflection and 
learning. This Q study could be repeated with the same participants now that the FCS 
has been published, as a means of comparing individuals’ initial sorts with their second 
sorts and supporting them to reflect on what they have learnt through the FCSSP. 
Statements would need to be modified slightly to incorporate changes in wording.   
b) If the goal is to create a forum where diverse stakeholders interact and share in decision-
making, Q studies can help to identify which stakeholders need to be combined in a 
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deliberative forum in order to meet this goal. Researchers have used the results of Q 
studies as a tool for designing stakeholder input, in order to ensure the full coverage of 
perspectives on a topic are brought together in a discursively representative setting (see 
e.g. Cuppen et al., 2010, Dryzek and Niemeyer, 2008). The results of this Q study could 
be used to create a deliberative forum bringing together people from each of the factors 
to debate on remaining unresolved issues in a discursively representative setting (such 
as the adaptation-mitigation-smallholder-agriculture issue). It cannot be expected, nor 
would it be necessary, that there is consensus on the different dimensions of fairness. 
However, it remains important to acknowledge differences, to identify whose priorities 
and definitions are included or excluded in standards and projects aiming to enhance 
fairness, and to find ways of rebalancing this if it does not fit with the original 
intentions or has unintended consequences. Meeting together in the same forum can 
provide stakeholders with the opportunity to witness or directly debate with people 
voicing these alternative perspectives. However, in some cases there may be clear 
reasons for not bringing diverse stakeholders together in the same forum. In this case, 
the results of a Q study could be used to inform stakeholders of the alternative 
perspectives on a topic, in order that they still get the benefit of learning from one 
another and widening their perspectives.  
c) Q is useful for diagnosing conflicts and exposing their underlying bases which may be 
masked when opinions are only otherwise voiced in a meeting setting, and can also 
suggest opportunities for consensus building. Within the context of the FCS, a new 
study could be devised with statements relating specifically to the hot topics which 
emerged from the longitudinal analysis presented in chapter 6. Q could also be used as a 
research methodology for understanding diverse perspectives on a topic in future 
standard-setting processes. 
Chapter 7 recognised the value of critically unpacking Theories of Change and examining their 
assumptions and evidence. While this opportunity was largely missed during the FCSSP, future 
standard-setting processes could ensure that the Theory of Change language and methodology is 
brought more centrally into the standard-setting processes. For example, the staff developing the 
standard could be encouraged to make their own assumptions and logics more explicit when 
presenting drafts of standards to stakeholders, and stakeholders could be asked explicitly to 
provide diverse evidence supporting or contradicting these assumptions and logics. Together, 
they could examine competing assumptions, logics and evidence as part of the standard-setting 
process. This might require more training of standards and projects managers in Theory of 
Change thinking, and a rough sketching-out and sharing of a Theory of Change early on in the 
standard-setting process.  
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Chapter 8 highlighted opportunities for standard-setting organisations to deploy the services of 
suitably equipped researchers as reflection coaches, or for bigger teams of researchers to engage 
in deliberative policy analysis so that their interpretations and support with reflection could be 
made available to all stakeholders, during the standard-setting process. This would require more 
investment from the standard-setting organisation, identification of researchers with the 
necessary skill-sets, a reconfiguration of the relationship between the researcher and the 
standard-setting organisation and more specific goals for reflection. Similarly, researchers’ or 
analysts’ home institutions would need to accord them sufficient time and support to manage 
the dual tasks of reflection support and timely reflecting-back of results; and writing up their 
work for an academic audience.  
9.6. Recommendations for future research 
The following recommendations are based on observations of (i) mechanisms within the FCS 
and its Theory of Change that are still unproven or insufficiently validated; and (ii) unresolved 
tensions in debates about ‘fair carbon’. 
1. Chapter 7 contributed to a better understanding of how the FCS might operate in 
particular contexts through detailed empirical work on one particular carbon programme 
and illustrations from a second one. As the FCS is rolled out, it will be necessary to 
do more detailed empirical research on FCS application and outcomes within 
carbon programmes implementing activities in each of the sectors covered by the 
standard, and in a wider range of geographical locations and organisational set-
ups. Contrasting conclusions might be gleaned from doing empirical research on the 
application of the FCS by large cook-stove programmes involving relatively little 
engagement with the cook-stove users or by sophisticated producer organisations in 
Latin America who are providing the majority of member services themselves; in 
contexts where the FCS is being incorporated into a project design or in contexts where 
it is being grafted onto an existing programme. 
2. In chapter 7 it was noted that the FCS Theory of Change had been developed without 
sufficient input from stakeholders. I also recognise that my own interpretations of the 
assumptions and evidence behind it lacked the input and validation of a broad set of 
stakeholders as I was unable to share the findings with them before completing this 
thesis. These reflection gaps cannot be corrected, but each one creates an opportunity 
for a more thorough critical reflection on the FCS Theory of Change with the aim of 
enhancing its robustness. It will be important to continue unpacking the FCS 
Theory of Change and assumptions and evidence behind it as the FCS is rolled out. 
Such research would preferably incorporate inputs from carbon project 
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Facilitators and Producer Organisations who can contribute insight from their 
own projects, alongside people from the Fairtrade system who can draw on 
previous Fairtrade experiences and insight.  
3. Chapters 6 and 7 both highlighted mechanisms within the FCS which were not wholly 
supported by stakeholders expected to be the front-runners of FCS-certified carbon 
programmes (particularly the Fairtrade Minimum Price and the concept of transfer of 
knowledge and capacities). Both chapters also identified mechanisms which were 
highly dependent on programme evolution and the preferences of Producer 
Organisations and Project Facilitators. One example is adaptation activities, which 
depend on sufficient revenue and on Producer Organisations opting to finance 
adaptation rather than using the Premium for more pressing needs (chapter 6). Transfer 
(mentioned above) is another example which depends on the relationship and 
motivations of programme actors and the speed at which the programme passes through 
different stages of development, certification, auditing etc. Research on FCS 
implementation should focus in particular on the most contentious or uncertain 
mechanisms within the FCS, such as Fairtrade Premiums, finance for adaptation 
vs mitigation, project actors’ roles and transfer of knowledge and capacities.  
4. Chapters 5 and 7 identified the importance of the dynamics of social relationships and 
the sharing of information between people involved in carbon projects. In chapter 6 I 
demonstrated how the FCSSP was shaped not only by the structure of FTI procedures, 
but crucially by individuals and interactions between them. I have noted that these 
interactional dimensions of fairness are missing from existing multi-dimensional 
approaches to fairness, equity or justice already put forward within environmental 
justice scholarship. Future research should explore how the interactional 
dimensions of fairness (interpersonal and informational) might shape perceptions 
of fairness, and fairness outcomes in both projects and standard setting processes, 
as this analytical lens on fairness borrowed from Organisational Justice has not to my 
knowledge been systematically applied to either of these areas. 
5. Chapter 6 highlighted that the debate about agricultural carbon projects is currently 
unresolved and the development challenge of how to support smallholders to adapt to 
climate has only partially been addressed in the FCS. Future research should 
document ongoing discussions convened by FTI and GSF with their stakeholder 
networks to discuss remaining issues regarding smallholder adaptation, mitigation 
and agricultural carbon projects and develop effective approaches. Attention 
should be paid both to power relations and to instances of countervailing power in these 
debates, as the presence of the latter is necessary in order to govern in a participatory 
manner even if power relations are imbalanced.  
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9.7. Final remarks 
This thesis has documented the evolution of the FCS from its conception to its entry into the 
public domain as a published standard. This is a process that is rare to be witnessed by anyone 
but the staff responsible for developing it. Rendering this more transparent is of value to 
members of the Fairtrade system, as well as researchers and members of civil society such as 
those who engage with the concept of Fairtrade but may lack all the elements to make informed 
judgements. By nature, standards are necessarily universalising and generalising, and like other 
ideas within sustainability, are susceptible to becoming dominant pathways that are managerial, 
bureaucratic and unworkable for the complex problems they are intended to address (Leach et 
al., 2010). This can only be judged as the FCS is applied and taken up by the market and will 
require further research. I have taken an unusual position in my choice to contribute to it whilst 
researching it, but this lays groundwork for understanding the future trajectory of the FCS and 
for identifying potentially unworkable aspects before they become more deeply embedded. 
Engaging with the pathway-building process has enabled me to open up inputs for the standard, 
underline the forgotten opinions, provide critique but also concrete suggestions and 
recommendations, make sense of debates, divergent perspectives and incompatible opinions, 
and reflect this back both during the process and in hindsight. This has hopefully served as an 
additional reminder to the standard-setters of the complexities of the issues and pluralities of 
perspectives and contexts where the FCS may be applied. The courage and willingness of the 
project team responsible for developing this standard to enter into a research collaboration and 
allow their work behind the scenes to be put to scrutiny made it possible for this research to take 
place. In hindsight, they were grateful of all they received in return. Now that the standard has 
reached implementation stage and this thesis complete, FTI must continue to embrace openness 
to critique and opportunities to reflect and learn from their work, and I will endeavour to do the 
same.    
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Appendix 2: List of documents in case study database 
 
Doc code Key documents Date created Author Document category 
 
Data usage 
 FTI policies, plans and procedures in the public domain 
FP.1 Terms of Reference: FTI Standards 
Committee 
17.06.2015 FTI Public domain Used in analysis presented in 
chapter 6 
FP.2 Standard Operating Procedure: 
development of Fairtrade Standards 
12.01.2012 FTI Public domain 
FP.3 Growing Stronger Together: 
Fairtrade’s Partnership Strategy 
(2011-2015) 
No date (prior to 
2011) 
FTI Public domain 
FP.4 Project Assignment: development 
of Standard on Fairtrade Carbon 
Credits 
05.12.2013 FTI Public domain 
 Standards Committee Minutes 
M.SC.52 Meeting 52 (item 13) 19-20.09.2012 FTI Public domain Used in analysis presented in 
chapter 6 M.SC.55 Meeting 55 (item 9) 19-20.03.2013 FTI Public domain 
M.SC.60 Meeting 60 (item 7) 19-20.03.2014 FTI Public domain 
M.SC.61 Meeting 61 (item 10) 17-18.06.2014 FTI Public domain 
M.SC.62 Meeting 62 (item 13) 16-17.09.2014 FTI Public domain 
M.SC.63 Meeting 63 (item 5) 25-26.11.2014 FTI Public domain 
M.SC.64 Meeting 64 (item 13) 18-19.03.2015 FTI Public domain 
M.SC.65 Meeting 65 (item 6) 23-25.06.2015 FTI Public domain 
  
3
1
7
 
M.SC.66 Meeting 66 (item 8) 29-30.09.2015 FTI Public domain 
 Versions of the standard and consultation documents for Fair Carbon Credits 
SDr.1 V1.1 06.11.2013 FTI Standards Unit Shared with FCSSP 
stakeholders  
Used in analysis presented in 
chapter 6 
SDr.2 FairCarbonCredits Draft Standard 20.11.2013 FTI Standards Unit Shared with FCSSP 
stakeholders 
SDr.3 March 2014 version March 2014 FTI Standards Unit Shared with FCSSP 
stakeholders 
SDr.4 1
st
 public consultation document June 2014 FTI Public domain As above, also in chapter 7 
SDr.5 2
nd
 public consultation document Sept 2014 FTI Public domain 
FCS Published version 01.10.2015 FTI Public domain 
 
 Research Documents commissioned or conducted by FTI 
FR.1 External Feasibility Study 02.2011 Fairtrade internal/ 
external parties 
Confidential documents: 
researcher discretionary use 
for background only 
Used in analysis of pricing 
and scope decisions (chapter 
6); otherwise only used to 
provide feedback to Fairtrade 
International 
FR.2 Internal Feasibility Study- 
FairCarbonCredits 
30.01.2013 FTI Strategy and Policy 
Unit/ Standards Unit 
FR.3 Gap Analysis: Development of 
FairCarbonCredits 
15.06.2013 Consultant  
FR.4 FairCarbonCredits Standard: 
Assessment of Benefits and Terms 
of Trade 
28.06.2013 Consultant  Used to prepare reflective 
House Exercise and feedback 
FR.5 Cornerstones of the 
FairCarbonCredits Standard 
11.09.2013 Consultant (identity 
withheld from this 
thesis) 
Shared with stakeholders in 
the SSP 
Used to provide feedback to 
Fairtrade International 
 Working Group Minutes  
M.WG.1 Kick-off meeting (1) 28.03.2012 FTI Shared with members of 
the WG (researcher joined 
 
M.WG.2 Meeting 2 14.04.2013 FTI  
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M.WG.3 Meeting 3 05.09.2013 FTI partway through): used 
with discretion  
 
 
M.WG.4 Meeting 4 19.11.2013 FTI  
M.WG.5 Meeting 5 05.03.2014 FTI  
 Workshop and other meeting minutes  
M.PFS.LA Latin American pre-consultation 
workshop 
No date (held 
Dec 2013) 
FTI Shared with participants 
and with researcher   
Used to quantify 
stakeholders taking part in 
the FCSSP 
 
M.PFS.Af African pre-consultation workshop No date (held 
Feb 2014) 
FTI Shared with participants- 
researcher participated 
M.PFS.As Asian pre-consultation workshop No date (held 
Feb 2014) 
FTI Shared with participants 
and with researcher   
M.GE.03.14 Group of Experts 2
nd
 meeting No date (held 
March 2014) 
FTI Shared with participants- 
researcher participated 
Used in analysis presented in 
chapter 6 
M.CSO.08.14 UK Civil Society Stakeholder 
meeting 
No date (held 
Aug 2014) 
FTI Shared with participants- 
researcher participated 
 
 
 
 
As above 
 Transcripts from observed events (created by researcher unless indicated otherwise) 
 Event Document created Date created Creation/ sharing Data usage 
T.GE.09.13 Group of 
Experts 1
st
 
meeting 
Transcript  13.09.2013 Created by researcher, shared 
with FTI 
Building Q concourse, and 
analysis for chapter 6 
T.COP19.1 COP 19 events Transcript from COP 19 side event 14.11.2013 Created by researcher As above 
T.COP19.2 Transcript from Global Landscapes 
Forum parallel event 
17.11.2013 Created by researcher 
T.WG.4 Working group 
meeting 4 
Transcript 19.11.2013 Created by researcher, shared 
with FTI 
As above 
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T.SC.59 Standards 
Committee 
meeting 59 
Transcript 20.11.2013 Created by researcher As above 
T.PFS.Af.a African pre-
consultation 
workshop 
Transcript of plenary 04-05.02.2014 Created by researcher, shared 
with FTI 
As above 
T.PFS.Af.b Transcript of observed group 
discussions and feedback to plenary 
04-05.02.2014 Created by researcher, shared 
with FTI 
As above 
T.PFS.Af.c Notes and slides from other groups’ 
discussions, taken by facilitators and 
presenters 
04-05.02.2014 Shared by other group 
facilitators with researcher 
As above 
T.WG.5 Working group  
meeting 5 
Transcript 05.03.2014 Created by researcher As above 
T.GE.03.14a Group of 
Experts 2
nd
 
meeting 
Transcript of plenary 17.03.2014 Created by researcher, shared 
with FTI 
As above 
T.GE.03.14b Transcript of observed group 
discussions and feedback to plenary 
17.03.2014 Created by researcher, shared 
with FTI 
As above 
T.GE.03.14c Notes from other groups’ 
discussions, taken by facilitators  
17.03.2014 Shared by other group 
facilitators with researcher 
As above 
T.SC.60 Standards 
Committee 
meeting 60 
Transcript 19.03.2014 Created by researcher As above 
T.CSO.08.14 UK Civil 
Society 
Stakeholder 
meeting 
Transcript 11.08.2014 Created by researcher, shared 
with FTI 
Analysis for chapter 6 
T.GE.09.14 Group of 
Experts 3
rd
 
meeting 
Transcript from plenary and observed 
group sessions 
19.09.2014 Created by researcher, shared 
with FTI 
Analysis for chapter 6 
  
3
2
0
 
T.PFS.B.a Producer and 
Field Staff 
meeting (Bonn) 
Transcript from introductions 23-24.10.2014 Created by researcher, shared 
with FTI 
 
Analysis for chapters 6 and 7 
T.PFS.B.b Transcript from plenary day 1 23-24.10.2014 Analysis for chapters 6 and 7 
T.PFS.B.c Transcript from observed group 
discussions and feedback to plenary 
day 1 
23-24.10.2014 Analysis for chapters 6 and 7 
T.PFS.B.d Transcript from plenary and observed 
group discussions day 2 
23-24.10.2014 Analysis for chapters 6 and 7 
T.SC.63 Standards 
Committee 
meeting 63 
Transcript 25.11.2014 Created by researcher Analysis for chapter 6 
 Researcher Reports: Briefing, Scoping and Feedback reports  
RR.1 Scoping report 
on criticism of 
the carbon 
market 
Critical voices May 2013 Created by researcher for FTI Cited in thesis 
RR.2 Feedback on 
Group of 
Experts 1
st
 
meeting 
Researcher’s feedback report 21.10.2013 Analysis for chapter 6  
RR.3 Feedback on 
COP 19 events 
Researcher’s feedback report December 2013 Analysis for chapter 6 
RRp.4 Feedback on 
standard 
development 
work to date 
Perspectives, concerns and options 
still to consider in developing the 
FCC add-on standard and joint 
scheme 
02.12.2013 Analysis for chapter 6  
RRp.5 Briefing on 
visits to Kenyan 
carbon projects 
Spotlight on Carbon Projects in 
Kenya: Initial insights from a 
research scoping visit 
February 2014 Not used in thesis 
  
3
2
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 Notes and transcripts from facilitated exercises from researcher-facilitated reflection and feedback sessions 
RRf.1 House Exercise 
(FTI) 
Transcript, photos and outcome 
summary spreadsheet 
7
th
 May 2014 Created by researcher, shared 
with FTI 
Used to reflect on research 
design and collaboration, 
presented in chapter 8 
RRf.2 Findings 
webinar (GS & 
FTI) 
Typed transcript from discussions 18
th
 May 2015 Created by researcher, shared 
with FTI and GSF 
Used to validate early 
findings for chapters 5 and 7 
RRf.3 Call with FTI to 
reflect on 
collaboration 
Minutes from call 13
th
 July 2015 Created by FTI, researcher 
contributed details 
Used to reflect on research 
design and collaboration, 
presented in chapter 8 
RRf.4 Findings 
workshop (FTI) 
Powerpoint presentation with notes 
from discussions, transcript from 
discussions 
15
th
 March 2016 Created by researcher, 
Powerpoint presentation 
shared with FTI 
Used to validate analysis 
presented in chapter 6 
RRf.5 Findings 
webinar (GS) 
Typed transcript from discussions 4
th
 April 2016 Created by researcher, shared 
with GSF 
Used to validate analysis 
presented in chapter 6 
     
 Notes, minutes and transcripts of coordination calls/ meetings with Project Team (and GSF)  
CoordC.1 Calls/ meetings to discuss collaboration and 
research design 
Notes taken by researcher, 
shared with RPOs 
Feb-Jul 2013 Used to reflect on research 
design and collaboration, 
presented in chapter 8 CoordC.2 Coordination calls/ meetings during main 
collaborative phase 
Notes taken by researcher, 
shared with FTI 
Oct 2013, Jan, Feb, Apr, May, 
Jun and Jul 2014 
SDe Additional documentary evidence on 
collaboration gathered through survey 
monkey 
Participants’ scorings Mar 2016 Used to complement other 
data for chapter 8 
 Email correspondence with Project Team and GSF  
EmCorr.1 Email correspondence to discuss research 
agreement 
Jointly created (researcher, 
RPOs and other parties) 
Mar-Sep 2013 Used to reflect on research 
design and collaboration, 
presented in chapter 8 EmCorr.2 Email correspondence throughout the Jointly created (researcher and Feb 2013- May 2016 
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research  RPOs) 
 Reflective diary entries and reflective correspondence with supervisors  
RfD/C Adhoc diary entries Created by researcher, not 
shared 
Feb 2013- May 2016 Used to reflect on research 
design and collaboration, 
presented in chapter 8 Notes from monthly supervision meetings 
 
Created by researcher, shared 
with supervisors 
Adhoc correspondence regarding particular 
details of the collaboration and my role 
Jointly created 
 Semi-structured interviews, informal conversations and documentation provided by carbon market actors  
CMWeb.1 Position paper on fairness and carbon 
provided by a funder of the FCSSP 
Provided by the interviewee 
(also available online) 
Aug 2013 (accessed Oct 2013) Used to build Q concourse 
CMWeb.2 Statement of Fairtrade values Provided by the party in email 
correspondence (also available 
online) 
Sep 2013 (accessed Oct 2013) As above 
Int1 Funder of the FCSSP 
 
 
Typed transcript of semi-
structured interview 
Oct 2013 Used to build Q concourse 
and in analysis presented in 
chapter 6 
Int2 Carbon project implementer, Kenya 
 
Typed notes from semi-
structured interview 
Jan 2014 Used to build Q concourse 
Int3 Carbon project consultant, Europe Typed transcript from semi-
structured interview 
Jan 2014 As above and to prepare for 
carbon project scoping visit 
Int4 Carbon project consultant, East Africa Typed notes from informal 
conversation (1), checked back 
with the person 
Feb 2014 Used to build Q concourse 
Int5 Carbon project funder/ developer, Europe 
 
Typed notes from informal 
conversations (2), checked back 
with the person 
Feb and Mar 2014 As above and to prepare for 
carbon project case study 
selection 
Int6 Standards Organisation Typed transcript of semi- Mar 2014 Used to build Q concourse 
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structured interview 
Int7 Cookstove project promoter, U.S.A Typed notes from informal 
conversation (1), checked back 
with the person 
Mar 2014 Used to build Q concourse 
 Q sorts and interviews  
QInt 26 interviews Photographs of Q sorts and 
transcripts of interviews 
May-Sep 2014 Used in chapter 5 analysis; 
Chapters 6 and 7 used 
interviews only  
 Project level research in Kenya: a) TIST  
 Activity Data type Date(s) created (all 2014) Data usage 
TISTWeb Reading of publically available background 
material on TIST Kenya 
Website downloads from 
www.tist.org and project reports 
on 
http://www.vcsprojectdatabase.o
rg/#/projects and 
http://www.climate-
standards.org/2012/11/29/tist-
program-in-kenya-ccb-004/  
Various Read in advance of visiting 
the project, to inform my 
understanding and shape my 
choice of TIST as an extreme 
case study  
TIST.Int1 Introductory interviews with programme 
founders (Skype and face to face) 
Typed notes Jan and May 2014 As above 
TIST.Int2 Introductory interviews with TIST Kenya 
programme staff and contractors 
Typed field notes and 
programme documentation such 
as example contracts  
28
th
-30
th
 Jan, 3
rd
-5
th
 Feb 2014 As above 
TIST.Int3 Key informant interviews (project 
administrator and TIST pioneer) 
Typed field notes 7
th
, 8
th
, 19
th
, 23
rd
 and 24
th
 June; 
24
th
 and 29
th
 July 
Used to provide empirical 
principal carbon project 
evidence to test Fairtrade’s 
Theory of Change, presented 
in chapter 7 
TIST.PO1 Programme level observation (of 10 year 
celebratory event, leaders’ training and 
leadership council meeting)  
Typed field notes, photographs 
from 10 year celebratory event, 
and training materials 
2
nd
-4
th
 June 
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TIST.PO2 Participant observation of 9 cluster 
meetings  
Typed field notes 30
th
 Jan; 5
th
, 12
th
, 14
th
, 17
th
, 
18
th
, 19
th
, 20
th
 June; and 2
nd
 
July 
 
TIST.PO3 Participant observation in 2 GOCC 
meetings 
Typed field notes 1
st
 and 3
rd
 July 
TIST.Test Eliciting of personal testimonies from TIST 
programme staff and contractors (8) 
Typed field notes 30
th
 Jan; 2
nd
-5
th
, 12
th
 and 16
th
 
June; 1
st
 July 
TIST.PO4 Participation observation in meetings 
between TIST and their institutional 
partners 
Typed field notes 25
th
- 26
th
 June 
TIST.PO5 Participant observation during visit of FCS 
project team member to TIST Kenya 
Typed field notes 28
th
 July 
TIST.Test.C Reading of personal testimonies and most 
significant change stories collected from 
TIST members by CAAC and programme 
contractors 
Typed testimonies and stories  Used to inform my 
understanding, not used as 
data as permission had not 
been sought from storytellers 
TIST.PPA Participatory policy analysis workshop with 
TIST contractors 
Typed transcript and other 
workshop material generated 
24
th
 June As above, also used to 
generate feedback for the 1
st
 
consultation on the FCS 
TISTTz Informal interviews with TIST Tanzania 
programme founders and pioneers 
Typed field notes 8
th
-14
th
 July Used to inform my 
understanding of TIST 
Kenya as an extreme case 
 Project level research in Kenya: b) KENDBIP  
KEND.Int1 Introductory conversations with programme 
managers in the Netherlands (1) and Kenya (3)   
 11
th
 Feb, 17
th
 March, 13
th
, 23
rd
, 
26
th
 and 27
th
 May 
Used to provide empirical 
additional carbon project 
evidence to test Fairtrade’s 
Theory of Change, presented 
in chapter 7 
KEND.Int2 Interviews with field staff in Mount Kenya 
region (2) 
 6
th
 and 13
th
 June 
KEND.Int3 Interviews with entrepreneurs (2)  9
th
 and 13
th
 June 
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KEND.Int4 Conversations with extension service provider 
(1) 
 1
st
 August 
KEND.Int5 Interviews with users (10)  Various, June and July 
 Project level research in Kenya: c) other projects  
KYOP1 Visits to biogas project, coffee-A/R project and 
cookstove project 
 22
nd
-27
th
 Jan Used for writing briefing 
note for FTI(RRp.5) 
KYOP2 Interview with programme manager of an 
agricultural carbon project 
 18
th
 July Not used in thesis (used to 
inform feedback on GS CSA 
Standard) 
 Interviews with carbon consulting organisations in Kenya  
KYCon1 Carbon Africa   20
th
 May  Used to inform 
understanding of support 
structures for carbon projects 
in Kenya 
KYCon2 ACX   21
st
 July 
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Appendix 3: Protocol for participant observation and informal interviews (A) 
Events organised by FTI as part of the FCSSP 
Role clarification and consent procedures 
 Remind FTI/ GS that my role is observer rather than a discussant, but will provide 
commentated notes of the event afterwards.  
 Make my role clear to participants during the event: introduce myself within the 
meeting as a researcher of the FCSSP; introduce the aims of my research within the 
meeting, or write afterwards. Share concept note either in soft or hard copy. 
 Share consent forms either at the event or by email afterwards (based on what I agree 
with FTI and GSF) and ask people to return the form. If anyone does not give their 
consent, their contributions to the event will not be drawn upon as data 
 Subsequent meetings: make sure anyone who is new to the process knows who I am and 
seek their consent. 
Seating logistics  
Sit where I can see everyone in the room, be unobtrusive, but not forgotten about entirely, 
where I can charge my laptop when needed.  
Recording observations 
N.B. for each meeting, clarify whether there will be a designated rapporteur or minute taker; 
whether any report or minutes will be shared with participants; whether they would like my 
notes afterwards 
 Note-taking materials: enter meeting notes into an excel spreadsheet on my laptop, 
clearly recording intervenor and what they say  
 Have pen and notebook ready in case of any laptop failure or if need to write any 
private field notes. 
 Make mental or jotted field notes during the meeting, and write fuller notes when alone 
(by the end of the day if possible) 
Interactions with participants and the Project Team before, during and immediately after the 
event: 
 Be friendly and polite with participants, and transparent about my role as researcher 
 Take up opportunities to ask questions (from lists of possible conversational cues) if 
people are not apparently exhausted, in a rush, wanting to talk about other things or 
network with other people 
List of possible conversational cues for informal interviews with…  
a) Participants:  
 What brings you here?  
 What’s your particular interest in this meeting? 
 What do you expect from this meeting? 
 What do you feel you/ your organisation can bring to the process? 
 Whose interests are you representing/ advocating for at this meeting? 
 Have you/ has your organisation been involved with the process before now? How? 
 
b) Project Team: 
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Before the event 
 What are your goals/ what do you hope to gain from this meeting/ workshop?  
 Do you foresee any obstacles to meeting these goals?  
After the event 
 Impressions of the meeting 
 How does this meeting fit with the process as a whole?  
 What will be the follow up/ next steps? 
Initial analysis: elements to think about during the meeting and afterwards, and 
communicate in any feedback if relevant 
a) Reflections on the meeting (design and nature of interactions) 
 What was the goal of this meeting? Was it explicit? And stated from the beginning? 
 Did the participants have a common understanding of the issue at stake? 
 Was there an emergent or coherent joint vision? 
 How did the structure of the meeting shape the dialogue? 
 Were there any ground rules for communication during the meeting? Did these 
encourage people to listen, learn, be open, honest and considerate? 
 Did the design allow for increased creativity and innovation? 
 Did the design of the process allow for broad and meaningful participation? 
 How will the stakeholders’ input be fed into the process? Is it clear to them how their 
input will be used? 
b) Individual stakeholder analysis: (aspects to ask about or interpret, based on what people 
say) 
 How did they come to participate in this meeting? (invited, or responding to a call?) 
 Possible motivations for participating? 
 What are their expectations about the process or the end result? 
 Whose interests are they representing/ advocating for at this meeting? 
 What previous involvement, if any, have they or their organisation had with the process 
so far (e.g. contributing ideas, carrying out consultancies, offering support or critique)? 
c) Overall stakeholder analysis 
 What are the different areas/ orientations that the different experts bring? 
 Are inputs as wide as they could be?  
 What impact do inputs have on the process/ decisions? 
 Which are the different interests at stake? 
 How do these contrast/ complement/ brush up against each other? 
 Who are the brokers that can move between worlds, build trust or consensus among 
participants? 
 Who are the participants who are in direct competition? 
 Is participation equitable? i.e. 
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o Are there any resourceful groups gaining undue influence and recognition of 
their specific interests? 
o Do the stakeholders have equitable capacities (i.e an equal understanding of the 
process and structure) 
o Have they all had the same amount of time to look at the documents in 
advance? 
 Any apparent alliances or competition between actors? 
 Who are the movers, followers, opposers, bystanders? 
 How are stakeholders seated in the room 
 Any signs of obstacles to the process, such as unrealistic expectations; insufficient 
experience, knowledge and capacities; opposed priorities; competition; intolerance; 
external frameworks that limit possible options 
 
d) Stakeholder interactions: verbal and non-verbal behavioural cues to pick up on 
 Signs of conversations 
Views uttered one by one without reference to preceding speaker; Advocacy- making 
statements; No inquiry; Attempts to control outcomes; Trying to convince; Win-lose; 
Conversation stuck in opposites; Participants who aren’t involved are bored; Tension; Balanced 
inputs; Structured inquiry; Safe framework for discussion of undiscussables; Respect of 
difference and diversity; Pace of the conversation; Nature of the gaps in conversation: Silence as 
thoughtful, sacred, tense, awkward 
 Signs of conflict  
Lack of willingness to communicate or talk with each other; Insufficient involvement of 
hierarchy, or insufficient regard to autonomy of individuals; Clashes of interest/ ideological 
differences/ hidden agendas; Lack of transparency; Power differences; Lack of willingness to 
come to an agreement; Lack of resources to conduct an effective dialogue; Lack of willingness 
or of professional capacity to design/ facilitate an effective dialogue; Lack of understanding/ 
capacity to contribute; Lack of ownership/ appropriation of the process; Differences in 
‘language’; Lack of clarity of roles and responsibilities; Lack of trust 
e) Key principles of stakeholder participation and partnership: use headlines in coding strategy 
Accountability 
 Is there any discussion about how input will be used? 
 If there are decisions to be made, are the mechanisms clear and transparent? 
 Are discussions/ activities/ outcomes publicised in an understandable manner to non-
participating stakeholders, and/ or the general public? 
Effectiveness 
 Does the standard have the broad support of the participants? 
 Are the participants identifying with the outcomes of the meeting/ process? 
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 Are they committed to the process? 
Equity 
 Are everybody’s contributions equally valued?  
 Has everybody got equal access to information? 
Flexibility 
 How much flexibility does the structure of the meeting allow for?  
Inclusiveness 
 Are there provisions for all views to be represented? 
Learning 
 How is learning factored in to the process? 
 Which channels exist for learning from each other? 
Participation and engagement 
 Who received the information about the meeting? 
 How did people come to take part? Were they invited or did they volunteer? 
 Was anyone turned away? 
Partnership/ co-operative management 
 Are any of the experts encouraged or given the opportunity to take on additional 
responsibilities? 
 How is power shared between the various stakeholders? 
 Is there evidence of network/ cooperation between the stakeholders? Is this encouraged? 
 Which feedback mechanisms are put in place to keep participants in the loop as the 
process evolves? 
 How are the contributions of participants encouraged and valued? 
Voices and votes 
 Who has a voice?  
 Who has a vote?  
 How do existing mechanisms for voting interact with this? 
 
 
 
 
330 
 
 
Appendix 4: Protocol for participation observation and interviews (B) 
Events and visits within carbon programme research 
Role clarification and consent procedures 
 Introduce myself as a researcher at the start of any observed event- explain my purpose 
and give people an opportunity to ask any questions 
 When conducting formal interviews, go over the consent form or verbally cover its 
contents, and seek written or verbal consent 
 Check back over interview notes with the interviewee either at the time, or once written 
up if I have the possibility to do so 
Recording observations 
Make mental or jotted notes during events or in breaks; take photographs where this will not be 
invasive; and write fuller field notes in the evenings. Field notes to include items such as: 
 Chronological log 
 Things previously forgotten and now recalled 
 Analytic ideas and inferences  
 Impressions and personal feelings 
 Things to think about and do 
 Photographs 
Types of questions to ask and themes to explore: TIST 
Questions for visits and interviews 
 ‘Grand tour’ questions (Bailey, 1996), useful for gleaning a basic understanding of the 
programme, such as ‘why does this happen?’, ‘what is this?’, ‘what does this mean?’ etc 
 Programme overview questions (history, structure, scale, activities, quantification 
procedures, payment procedures, marketing of credits, networks) 
 Programme detail questions (best practices and programme values, policies, voting and 
decision-making procedures, functioning of the payment system, impact of the 
programme, expansion, flow of financial benefits, organisational structures and 
coordination mechanisms at different levels within TIST as a whole, gender, leadership 
and capacity-building, evolving programme structure, lessons and learning in hindsight) 
 Personal history questions (role in the programme, how/why did you get involved, 
which responsibilities have you/ do you have, impressions of the programme) 
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 Individual membership questions/questions to small-groups (length of involvement, 
motivation for being involved, individual land management practices, benefits from the 
programme, challenges, aspirations, participation in the cluster, training received) 
 Analytical questions, e.g. ‘how do you understand this phenomenon?’, ‘what do you 
think about this interpretation?’, ‘do you see a link between this and this?’ 
Things to observe during events 
 Purpose of the event/ activities that are taking place 
 Participation (profile, number, level of engagement) 
 Leadership (who leads, how are leadership/ coordination responsibilities shared 
between people) 
 Group dynamics 
 Questions asked/ topics discussed 
 Signs of best practices being observed 
 Signs of governance practices being enacted (e.g. rotating leadership) 
 Signs of things not working out as they should 
Topic lists for KENDBIP research 
Interviews with KENDBIP programme staff 
 Involvement in the sector/ motivation for being involved 
 Programme history/ background/ evolution and basic stats 
 Details on programme activities in general and mitigation activities in particular, 
including monitoring 
 Scope of the programme and interest of participants 
 Cost/ benefits of participation 
 Partnership/ networking activities 
 Project registration/ verification/ validation/ certification processes 
 Links with standards organisations, and Fairtrade 
 Roles of different actors 
 Carbon revenues, carbon rights 
Topic list for entrepreneurs 
 Professional background (route into biogas work, training received) 
 Details on biogas work (e.g. time spent, work done, responsibilities held, impressions of 
how well business is going, other activities done in parallel) 
 Finding clients (how, who, which age/ gender/ income stability) 
 Types of digesters installed and relative costs; decision-making about which type to 
install 
 Financing and subsidies 
 Training and aftersales services to client including maintenance 
 Association: membership/ relationship to it; understanding of it (interpretation of its 
function/ value/ reason for being set-up)  
 Awareness of carbon business and any thoughts on it 
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Topic list for users 
 How was it installed and when (was it part of a programme?) 
 What was the trigger for installing it?  
 What was the financing arrangement? 
 Choice of technology 
 Use 
 What benefits does it bring?  
 Have you had any difficulties with it? (How) were they resolved? 
 Does it meet your needs (in terms of size? Functioning) 
 How has it changed your energy use? 
 Did you receive any training? 
 After sales service 
 Use of slurry 
Themes explored in early findings report and discussion with programme manager 
 Overview: interviews, visits and sources of information 
 General impressions 
 Aspects of programme implementation that caught my attention  
 The role of groups 
 Visions for the biogas constructors associations  
 Different types of digester 
 Technical points on usage of digesters, slurry and household fuel (and possible 
implications on carbon) 
 Awareness about carbon and carbon credits 
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Appendix 5: Additional documentary evidence of impact 
 
Evaluation of the research collaboration on Survey Monkey ® 
The following text was given at the beginning of the survey 
‘This questionnaire invites you to comment from your perspective on the usefulness of the 
research collaboration between Fairtrade, Gold Standard and the University of Leeds (both in 
terms of specific inputs I provided, and more generally); and to make recommendations. I will 
also be filling it out myself and will be using the results to write the final chapter of my thesis 
and to feed into the development of Fairtrade’s research collaboration guidelines’. 
The survey then had the following 9 questions.  
1. Please comment on the usefulness of the background research I provided (three inputs 
listed and described) 
2. Please comment on the usefulness of the punctual written notes/ feedback I provided 
(three inputs listed and described) 
3. Please comment on the usefulness of the interactive sessions I facilitated with the 
Standards Unit/ Project Team (two inputs listed and described) 
4. Please comment on the usefulness of the interviews I conducted (Q interviews 
described) 
5. Please comment on the usefulness of the insights from carbon projects I provided (one 
input described) 
6. Please comment on the usefulness of my provisions of comments on draft versions of 
Standards (three sets of comments described) 
7. Please comment on the usefulness of the other approaches I used for sharing findings 
(aside from what has already been mentioned above) (four approaches described) 
8. Please comment on the usefulness of my overall engagement with the Fairtrade Climate 
Standard Setting Process (brief detail given on my engagement) 
9. Please add anything else that you think should be taken into account in order to maximise the 
usefulness of any future collaborations between your organisation and a University/ PhD 
student 
With questions 1-8, respondents were invited to tick one of the responses given below, and then 
had the option of providing comments. Question 9 consisted of a comments box.  
Options for response 
 ‘I wasn’t particularly aware of it’ 
 ‘It wasn’t that useful’ 
 ‘It was somewhat useful’ 
 ‘It was really useful’ 
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Appendix 6: Original research concept note 
 
335 
 
 
 
 
 
 
336 
 
 
Appendix 7: Actual research inputs 
Research tasks from proposal Actual tasks accomplished 
1. Reviewing and providing feedback on 
standards recommendations produced by 
consultants; 
1. Feedback incorporated into mid-term feedback 
document, see 9. 
2. Conducting some ad hoc research on 
specific aspects requiring further 
analysis, which are of mutual interest to 
the researcher and to FLO/ GSF; 
2a) Review of critique of the carbon market produced for 
FTI in May 2013 
2b) Quantitative analysis of carbon projects by country, 
region, technology type and standard, resulting in 
recommendations about where to locate producer/ field 
staff (PFS) workshops 
See also 5. 
3. Observing meetings of the joint 
standards development team and advisory 
panel and providing suggestions in 
commentated post-meeting notes; 
3. Observed the following events: 
Event No. Provided 
SC meetings 3  
WG meetings 2 Transcripts 
GoE meetings 3 Transcripts (+ report after 1
st
 
meeting) 
PFS meetings 2 Transcripts 
CSO workshop 1 Transcript 
COP 19 events 2 Independent report 
GS CSA Advisory 
Panel 
1 Feedback on draft 
4. Providing methodological input for 
workshops with producer representatives 
and outlining recommendations in 
commentated post-workshop notes;  
4a) Identification of some potential participants for PFS 
workshops  
4b) Facilitation of some discussion groups at Nairobi PFS 
4c) Transcripts shared with FTI 
See also 2b) 
5. Conducting interviews with standards 
team, advisory panel and workshop 
participants to explore their different 
perspectives on the joint standard scheme 
and how it can best be developed, and 
presenting these perspectives in a 
document; 
5. Undertook a study using Q methodology to explore 
diversity of opinions on fairness and how to achieve it in 
Fairtrade carbon projects. Involved conducting statement 
sorting exercise with 26 participants composed of staff 
from FTI, GS, and other Fairtrade and carbon stakeholders 
involved directly or indirectly in the FCS-setting process. 
Results shared with participants in a summary document. 
6. Documenting standards pilot projects 
in Sub-Saharan Africa through field level 
research and interviews with producers 
and project developers and providing 
feedback and recommendations to FLO 
and GSF; 
Not possible to undertake due to delays in FCS-piloting 
process- instead:  
6. Undertook 15 weeks of independent research in Kenya 
exploring two carbon projects in detail and interviewing a 
range of actors involved in carbon projects. Fed insights 
back to FTI and GS in the form of:  
Briefing note to FTI WG (Mar 2014) 
Research findings webinar (May 2015) 
Presentation at Fair Trade International Symposium (Jun 
2015) 
Research paper (Jun 2015) 
Research findings workshops/ webinars (Mar 2016) 
7. Measuring the response to GSF and 
FLO’s joint standard by reviewing 
feedback after the public launch and 
7. Beyond scope- happened too late in my research 
process to engage closely with it 
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presentations at public forums (such as 
Carbon Expo or COP 19) and conducting 
follow-up interviews with standards users 
and other carbon market actors; 
8. Providing FLO and GSF with an 
opinion document at the end of the 
research period, on the way forward- 
outlining risks, opportunities and 
recommendations. 
8. Findings shared during research findings workshops/ 
webinars with FTI and GS (Mar 2016) 
Thesis shared Jun 2016 
 
Additional research tasks accomplished 
9. Provided process and content feedback on the following occasions: 
Independent report and feedback after Group of Experts meeting (Sep 2013) 
Independent report and feedback after COP 19 events (Nov 2013) 
Mid-term feedback report on progress to date (Dec 2013) 
Research findings workshops/ webinars (Mar 2016) 
10. Provided content feedback on the following standard drafts: 
FCS pre consultation draft (in mid-term feedback report, see 9) 
FCS 1
st
 consultation draft (jointly prepared with participants of an A/R project)  
FCS 2
nd
 consultation draft 
GS CSA Advisory Panel draft 
GS CSA consultation draft (jointly prepared with participants of an A/R project) 
GS A/R smallholder guidelines 
11. Provided support with reflection on process, content, values and assumptions on the following 
occasions: 
‘House’ (building blocks) exercise with FTI, May 2014 
Q interviews (statement sorting exercise) with FTI, GS and other stakeholders, May-Sep 2014 
Research findings workshops/ webinars (Mar 2016) 
12. Wrote and published two open access journal articles, reviewed by FTI and GS on  
a) the opportunities and challenges for achieving fairness in carbon project through collaborative 
standard-setting;  
b) different perceptions of fairness in carbon projects visible amongst stakeholders in the FCS-setting 
process and how these relate to existing debates within Fairtrade and in the carbon sector 
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Appendix Figure 1: Pathways elements in the thesis  
          
 
